feat: Allow newtabs and data: images to function in iframe. (#1016)

jsantell · web-flow · commit cfe4a3284377 · 2025-04-10T11:29:29.000-07:00
diff --git a/iframe-sandbox/README.md b/iframe-sandbox/README.md
@@ -10,19 +10,12 @@ a sandboxed iframe to execute arbitrary code.
 ## Goals
 
 To run untrusted code within an iframe, with the ability to communicate with
-host to read, write, and subscribe to values in a key value store.
-
-Code within an iframe **MUST NOT** be able to communicate with any third party.
-
-For example, private data could be added to query parameters in a background
-image or JS module URL.
-
-In the future, there could be verified authors and domains per frame.
+host to read, write, and subscribe to values in a key value store, not allowing
+code to communicate with any external third party.
 
 > [!CAUTION]
-> During experimental development, there are currently hardcoded CDNs that are
-> accessible in the iframe context. Data could be exfiltrated this way to those
-> CDNs.
+> During experimental development, there are intentional gaps in the sandboxing
+> to enable product features where data within the sandbox may be exfiltrated.
 
 ## Usage
 
@@ -70,9 +63,11 @@ frame that propagates to the inner (untrusted) frame across browsers.
 
 ## Incomplete Security Considerations
 
-- Currently, the hardcoded CDNs (and their logging services) **MAY** receive
-  exfiltrated data. We should only allow 1P mediated communications in the
-  future.
+Some of these are shortcomings of implementation, and some are intentional
+product decisisons during experimentation.
+
+- Hardcoded CDNs (and their logging services) are an exfiltration vector.
+- Allowing anchor elements with `target="_blank"` is an exfiltration vector.
 - `document.baseURI` is accessible in an iframe, leaking the parent URL
 - Currently without CFC, data can be written in the iframe containing other
   sensitive data, or newly synthesized fingerprinting via capabilities
diff --git a/iframe-sandbox/src/common-iframe-sandbox.ts b/iframe-sandbox/src/common-iframe-sandbox.ts
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ export class CommonIframeSandboxElement extends LitElement {
       <iframe
         ${ref(this.iframeRef)}
         allow="clipboard-write"
-        sandbox="allow-scripts allow-pointer-lock"
+        sandbox="allow-scripts allow-pointer-lock allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox"
         .srcdoc=${OuterFrame}
         height="100%"
         width="100%"
diff --git a/iframe-sandbox/src/csp.ts b/iframe-sandbox/src/csp.ts
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ export const CSP = `` +
   `style-src ${HOST_ORIGIN} 'unsafe-inline' ${STYLE_CDNS.join(" ")};` +
   // Fonts: Allow 1P, inline.
   `font-src ${HOST_ORIGIN} 'unsafe-inline' ${FONT_CDNS.join(" ")};` +
-  // Images: Allow 1P, inline.
-  `img-src ${HOST_ORIGIN} 'unsafe-inline';` +
+  // Images: Allow 1P, data URIs.
+  `img-src ${HOST_ORIGIN} data:;` +
   // Disabling until we have a concrete case.
   `form-action 'none';` +
   // Disable <base> element
diff --git a/iframe-sandbox/src/outer-frame.ts b/iframe-sandbox/src/outer-frame.ts
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ export default `
 <!DOCTYPE html>
 <html>
 <head>
-	<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${CSP}" \/>
-  <style>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${CSP}" \/>
+<style>
 html, body {
   padding: 0;
   margin: 0;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ iframe {
 <body>
 <iframe
   allow="clipboard-write"
-  sandbox="allow-scripts allow-modals"><\/iframe>
+  sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-scripts allow-modals"><\/iframe>
 <script>
 const iframe = document.querySelector("iframe");
 const HOST_ORIGIN = "${HOST_ORIGIN}";
diff --git a/iframe-sandbox/test/iframe-csp.test.ts b/iframe-sandbox/test/iframe-csp.test.ts
@@ -59,13 +59,23 @@ const SCRIPT_URL = "https://common.tools/static/sketch.js";
 const STYLE_URL = "https://common.tools/static/main.css";
 const IMG_URL = "https://common.tools/static/text.png";
 const ORIGIN_URL = new URL(globalThis.location.href).origin;
+const BASE64_IMG_URL = "";
 
 function openWindow(target: any) {
   return `<script>
     let win = window.open("${HTML_URL}", "${target}");
     if (win) throw new Error("Window Opened");</script>`;
 }
 
+function clickAnchor(target: string) {
+  return `
+<a id="anchor-test" href="${HTML_URL}" target="${target}">
+<script>
+const anchor = document.querySelector("#anchor-test");
+anchor.click();
+</script>`;
+}
+
 const cases = [[
   "allows inline script",
   `<script>console.log("foo")</script><style>* { background-color: red; }</style><div>foo</div>`,
@@ -78,6 +88,10 @@ const cases = [[
   "allows 1P img",
   `<img src="${ORIGIN_URL}/foo.jpg" />`,
   null,
+], [
+  "allows data: img",
+  `<img src="${BASE64_IMG_URL}" />`,
+  null,
 ], [
   "allows 1P CSS",
   `<link rel="stylesheet" href="${ORIGIN_URL}/styles.css">`,
@@ -98,6 +112,18 @@ const cases = [[
   "disallows opening windows (_top)",
   openWindow("_top"),
   null,
+], [
+  "disallows anchor link target (_parent)",
+  clickAnchor("_parent"),
+  null,
+], [
+  "disallows anchor link target (_self)",
+  clickAnchor("_self"),
+  null,
+], [
+  "disallows anchor link target (_top)",
+  clickAnchor("_top"),
+  null,
 ], [
   "disallows fetch",
   `<script>fetch("${SCRIPT_URL}");</script>`,
@@ -161,6 +187,15 @@ const falseNegatives = [[
   "CSP:default-src",
 ]];
 
+// /!\ These tests do not report correctly.
+// /!\ Not sure why! But they appear to be allowed
+// /!\ but are not in practice.
+const falsePositives = [[
+  "Allows anchor link target (_blank)",
+  clickAnchor("_blank"),
+  null,
+]];
+
 const unknownStatuses = [
   [
     // `prerender` is a Chrome-only feature-flagged
@@ -178,6 +213,9 @@ for (const [name, html, expected] of cases) {
 for (const [name, html, expected] of falseNegatives) {
   definePending(name, html, expected);
 }
+for (const [name, html, expected] of falsePositives) {
+  definePending(name, html, expected);
+}
 for (const [name, html, expected] of unknownStatuses) {
   definePending(name, html, expected);
 }
