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Subarna Shakya
Klimis Ntalianis
Khaled A. Kamel Editors
Mobile
Computing and
Sustainable
Informatics
Proceedings of ICMCSI 2022
Lecture Notes on Data Engineering and
Communications Technologies
Volume 126
Series Editor
Fatos Xhafa, Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain
The aim of the book series is to present cutting edge engineering approaches to data
technologies and communications. It will publish latest advances on the engineering
task of building and deploying distributed, scalable and reliable data infrastructures
and communication systems.
The series will have a prominent applied focus on data technologies and
communications with aim to promote the bridging from fundamental research on
data science and networking to data engineering and communications that lead to
industry products, business knowledge and standardisation.
Indexed by SCOPUS, INSPEC, EI Compendex.
All books published in the series are submitted for consideration in Web of Science.
Mobile Computing
and Sustainable Informatics
Proceedings of ICMCSI 2022
Editors
Subarna Shakya Klimis Ntalianis
Institute of Engineering University of Applied Sciences
Tribhuvan University, Pulchowk Campus Athens, Greece
Lalitpur, Nepal
Khaled A. Kamel
Department of Computer Science
Texas Southern University
Houston, TX, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse
of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
We are privileged to dedicate the proceedings
of ICMCSI 2022 to all the participants and
editors of ICMCSI 2022.
Preface
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Contents
xi
xii Contents
Dr. Klimis Ntalianis is Full Professor at the University of West Attica, Athens,
Greece. He has worked as Senior Researcher in multi-million research and devel-
opment projects, funded by the General Secretariat of Research and Technology of
Greece (GSRT), the Research Promotion Foundation of Cyprus (RPF), the Informa-
tion Society S.A. of Greece and the European Union. He is also serving as Senior
Project Proposal Evaluator for GSRT, RPF, the European Union, the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the National Science Center of
Poland. In parallel, he is Member of several master theses and Ph.D. evaluation
committees in Greece, Cyprus, Germany and India. He is also serving as Promo-
tion Evaluator for Saudi Arabia’s academic staff. He has served as General Chair in
several conferences (IEEE, etc.). Dr. Ntalianis has published more than 160 scientific
papers in international journals, books and conferences. His main research interests
include social computing, multimedia analysis and information security.
Dr. Khaled A. Kamel is currently Chairman and Professor at Texas Southern Univer-
sity, College of Science and Technology, Department of Computer Science, Houston,
TX. He has published many research articles in refereed journals and IEEE confer-
ences. He has more than 30 years of teaching and research experience. He has been
General chair, Session Chair, TPC Chair and Panelist in several conferences and
xvii
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tenants or good slaves no doubt induced landlords to entrust farms
to men who could and would work them profitably, whether freemen
or slaves. And a slave had in agriculture, as in trades and finance, a
point in his favour: his person and his goods[1494] remained in his
master’s power. If by skilled and honest management he relieved his
master of trouble and worry, and contributed by regular payment of
rent to assure his income, it was reasonable to look for gratitude
expressed, on the usual Roman lines, in his master’s will.
Manumission, perhaps accompanied by bequest[1495] of the very
farm that he had worked so well, was a probable reward. May we
not guess that some of the best farming carried on in Italy under the
earlier Empire was achieved by trusted slaves, in whom servile
apathy was overcome by hope? Such a farmer-slave would surely
have under him[1496] slave labourers, the property of his master;
and he would have the strongest possible motives for tact and skill
in their management, while his own capacity had been developed by
practical experience. I can point to no arrangement in Roman
agriculture so calculated to make it efficient on a basis of slavery as
this.
The services (operae) of a slave, due to his owner or to some one
in place of his owner, were a property capable of valuation, and
therefore could be let and hired at a price. That is, the person to
whom they were due could commute[1497] them for a merces. This
might, as in the corresponding Greek case of ἀποφορά, be a paying
business, if a slave had been bought cheap and trained so as to earn
good wages. It was common enough in various trades: what
concerns us is that the plan was evidently in use in the rustic world
also. Now this is notable. We naturally ask, if the man’s services
were worth so much to the hirer, why should they not have been
worth as much (or even a little more) to his own master? Why
should it pay to let him rather than to use him yourself? Of course
the owner might have more slaves than he needed at the moment:
or the hirer might be led by temporary need of labour to offer a
fancy price for the accommodation: or two masters on neighbouring
farms might engage in a reciprocity of cross-hirings to suit their
mutual convenience at certain seasons. Further possibilities might be
suggested, but are such occasional explanations sufficient to account
for the prevalence of this hiring-system? I think not. Surely the
principal influence, steadily operating in this direction, was one that
implied an admission of the economic failure of slavery. If A’s slave
worked for B so well that it paid A to let him do so and to receive a
rent for his services, it follows that the slave had some inducement
to exert his powers more fully as B’s hireling than in the course of
ordinary duty under his own master. Either the nature and conditions
of the work under B were pleasanter, or he received something for
himself over and above the stipulated sum claimed by his master. In
other words, as a mere slave he did not do his best: as a hired man
he felt some of the stimulus that a free man gets from the prospect
of his wage. So Slavery, already philanthropically questioned, was in
this confession economically condemned.
These points considered, we are not surprised to find mention of
slaves letting out their own[1498] operae. This must imply the
consent of their masters, and it is perhaps not rash to see in such a
situation a sign of weakening in the effective authority of masters. A
master whose interest is bound up with the fullest development of
his slave’s powers (as rentable property exposed to competition) will
hardly act the martinet without forecasting the possible damage to
his own pocket. A slave who knows that his master draws an income
from his efficiency is in a strong position for gradually extorting
privileges till he attains no small degree of independence. We may
perhaps find traces of such an advance in the arrangement by which
a slave hires his own operae[1499] from his master. He will thus
make a profit out of hiring himself: in fact he is openly declaring that
he will not work at full power for his master, but only compound with
him for output on the scale of an ordinary slave. This arrangement
was common in arts and handicrafts, and not specially characteristic
of Rome. In rustic life, the slave put into a farm as tenant[1500] at a
fixed rent, and taking profit and loss, may furnish an instance.
Whether such cases were frequent we do not know. The general
impression left by the Digest passages on hiring and letting of slaves
is that, when we read of mercennarii, it is generally if not always
hireling[1501] slaves, not free wage-earners, that are meant. In a
passage[1502] where servus occurs as well as mercennarius, it is
reference to the owner as well as to the hirer that necessitates the
addition. If I have interpreted these points aright, the picture
suggested is a state of things in which the rustic slave was steadily
improving his position, supplying hired labour, at times entrusted
with the charge of a farm, and with a fair prospect of becoming by
manumission under his owner’s will a free colonus, or even his own
landlord. How far this picture is really characteristic of rustic Italy, or
of the Provinces (such as Gaul or Spain), is what one would like to
know, but I can find no evidence.
In the foregoing paragraphs I have refrained from inquiring
whether the colonus as he appears in the Digest was a farmer who
worked with his own hands, or merely an employer and director of
labour. The reason is that I have found in the texts no evidence
whatever on the point. It was not the jurist’s business. We are left to
guess at the truth as best we may, and we can only start from
consideration of the farmer’s own interest, and assume that the
average farmer knew his own interest and was guided thereby. Now,
being bound to pay rent in some form or other and to make good
any deficiencies in the instrumentum at the end of his tenancy, he
had every inducement to get all he could out of the land while he
held it. How best to do this, was his problem. And the answer no
doubt varied according to the size of the farm, the kind of crops that
could profitably be raised there, and the number and quality of the
staff. In some rough operations, his constant presence on one spot
and sharing the actual work might get the most out of his men.
Where nicety of skill was the main thing, he might better spend his
time in direction and minute watching of the hands. On a fairly large
farm he would have enough to do as director. We may reasonably
guess that he only toiled with his own hands if he thought it would
pay him to do so. This a priori guesswork is not satisfactory. But I
see nothing else to be said; for the African inscriptions do not help
us. The circumstances of those great domains were exceptional.
So far we have been viewing agriculture as proceeding in times
and under conditions assumed to be more or less normal, without
taking account of the various disturbing elements in rustic life, by
which both landlords and tenants were liable to suffer vexation and
loss. Yet these were not a few. Even a lawyer could not ignore wild
beasts. Wolves carried off some of A’s pigs. Dogs kept by B, colonus
of a neighbouring villa, for protection of his own flocks, rescued the
pigs. A legal question[1503] at once arises: are the rescued pigs
regarded as wild game, and therefore belonging to the owner of the
dogs? No, says the jurist. They were still within reach; A had not
given them up for lost; if B tries to retain them, the law provides
remedies to make him give them up. I presume that B would have a
claim to some reward for his services. But the lawyer is silent,
confining his opinion to the one question of property. References to
depredations of robbers or brigands (latrones, grassatores,) occur
often, and quite as a matter of course. The police of rural Italy, not
to mention the Provinces, was an old scandal. Stock-thieves, who
lifted a farmer’s cattle sheep or goats, and sometimes his crops,
were important enough to have a descriptive name (abigei)[1504]
and a title of the Digest to themselves. That bad neighbours made
themselves unpleasant in many ways, and that their presence gave a
bad name to properties near them, was an experience of all lands
and all ages: but the jurists treat it gravely[1505] as a lawyer’s
matter. Concealment of such a detrimental fact[1506] by the seller of
an estate made the sale voidable. The rich (old offenders in this
kind) were by a rescript of Hadrian[1507] awarded differential
punishment for removing landmarks: in their case the purpose of
encroachment was not a matter open to doubt.
In one connexion the use of force as an embarrassing feature of
rustic life was a subject of peculiar interest to the jurists, and had
long been so. This was in relation to questions of possession. In
Roman law possessio held a very important place. All that need be
said of it here is that the fact of possession, or lack of it, seriously
affected the position of litigants in disputes as to property. Great
ingenuity was exercised in definition and in laying down rules for
ascertaining the fact. Now among the means employed in gaining or
recovering possession none was more striking or more effective than
the use of force. Special legal remedies had been provided to deal
with such violence; interdicta issued by the praetor, to forbid it, or to
reinstate a claimant dislodged by his rival, or simply to state the
exact issue raised in a particular case. On conformity or
disobedience to the praetor’s order the case was formally tried in
court: the question of law mainly turned on questions of fact. What
concerns us is that force was solemnly classified under two heads,
vis and vis armata. Each of these had its own proper interdict at
least as early as the time of Cicero, and they occupy a whole
title[1508] in the Digest. Clearly the use of force was no negligible
matter. That it was a danger or at least a nuisance to owners or
claimants of property, is not less clear. But how did it touch the
colonus? He was, as such, neither owner nor claimant of the
property of his farm. He had in his own capacity[1509] no possession
either. But, as tenant of a particular owner, his presence
operated[1510] to secure the possession of his landlord. Hence to
oust him by force broke the landlord’s possession; whether rightly or
wrongly, the law had to decide. Now it is obvious that, in cases
where serious affrays resulted from intrusion, a tenant might suffer
grave damage to his goods and person. The intruders (often a gang
of slaves) would seldom be so punctiliously gentle as to do no harm
at all. Therefore, having regard to the amount of interest in this
subject shewn by the lawyers, we cannot omit the use of force in
matters of possession from the list of rustic embarrassments.
Another cause of annoyance was connected with servitudes, such
as rights of way and water, which were frequent subjects of dispute
in country districts. Whether regarded as rights or as burdens, the
principles governing them were a topic that engaged the minute and
laborious attention[1511] of the lawyers. Now it is evident that a right
of way or water through an estate, though a material advantage to a
neighbouring estate served by the convenience, might be a material
disadvantage to the one over which the right extended. Also that the
annoyance might be indefinitely increased or lessened by the
cantankerous or considerate user of the right by the person or
persons enjoying it. When we consider that servitudes were already
an important department of jurisprudence in Republican days, and
see how great a space they occupy in the Digest, we can hardly
resist the conclusion that country proprietors found in them a fertile
subject of quarrels. But surely the quarrels of landlords over a
matter of this kind could not be carried on without occasional and
perhaps frequent disturbances and injury to the tenants on the land.
Even if the law provided means of getting compensation for any
damage done to a tenant’s crops or other goods in the course of
attempts to enforce or defeat a claimed servitude, was the average
colonus a man readily to seek compensation in the law-courts? I
think not. But, if not, he would depend solely on the goodwill of his
own landlord, supposing the latter to have got the upper hand in the
main dispute. On the whole, I strongly suspect that in practice these
quarrels over rustic servitudes were a greater nuisance to farmers
than might be supposed. So far as I know, we have no statement of
the farmer’s point of view. Another intermittent but damaging
occurrence was the occasional passage of soldiery, whose discipline
was often lax. We might easily forget the depredations and general
misconduct of these unruly ruffians, and imagine that such
annoyances only became noticeable in a later period. But the jurists
do not allow us to forget[1512] the military requisitions for supply of
troops on the march, the payment for which is not clearly provided,
and would at best be a cause of trouble; or the pilferings of the
men, compensation for which was probably not to be had. It would
be farmers in northern Italy and the frontier-provinces that were the
chief sufferers.
Damage by natural disturbances or by fires may happen in any
age or country. That Italy in particular was exposed to the effect of
floods and earthquakes, we know. Accordingly the lawyers are
seriously concerned with the legal and equitable questions arising
out of such events. It was not merely the claim of tenants[1513] to
abatement of rent that called for a statement of principles. Beside
the sudden effects of earthquakes torrents or fires, there were the
slower processes of streams changing their courses[1514] and
gradual land-slides on the slopes of hills. These movements
generally affected the proprietary relations of neighbouring
landlords, taking away land from one, sometimes giving to another.
Here was a fine opening for ingenious jurists, of which they took full
advantage. The growth of estates by alluvion, and loss by erosion,
was a favourite topic, the operation of which, and the questions
thereby raised, are so earnestly treated as to shew their great
importance in country life. Of fire-damage, due to malice or neglect,
no more need be said; nor of many other minor matters.
But, when all the above drawbacks have been allowed for, it is still
probably true that scarcity of labour was a far greater difficulty for
farmers. We hear very little directly of this trouble, as it raised no
point of law. Very significant[1515] however are the attempts of the
Senate and certain emperors to put down an inveterate scandal
which is surely good indirect evidence of the scarcity. It consisted in
the harbouring[1516] of runaway slaves on the estates of other
landlords. A runaway from one estate was of course not protected
and fed on another estate from motives of philanthropy. The slave
would be well aware that severe punishment awaited him if
recovered by his owner, and therefore be willing to work for a new
master who might, if displeased, surrender him any day. The
landlords guilty of this treason to the interests of their class were
probably the same as those who harboured[1517] brigands, another
practice injurious to peaceful agriculture both in Italy and abroad.
Another inconvenience, affecting all trades and all parts of the
empire in various degrees, was the local difference in the money-
value[1518] of commodities in different markets. This was sometimes
great: and that it was troublesome to farmers may be inferred from
the particular mention of wine oil and corn as cases in point. No
doubt dealers had the advantage over producers, as they generally
have, through possessing a more than local knowledge of necessary
facts. These middlemen however could not be dispensed with, as
experience shewed, and one of the later jurists[1519] openly
recognized. Facilities for borrowing, and rates of interest, varied
greatly in various centres. But all these market questions do not
seem to have been so acute as to be a public danger until the
ruinous debasement of the currency in the time of Gallienus. A few
references may be found to peculiar usages of country life in
particular Provinces. Thus we read that in Arabia[1520] farms were
sometimes ‘boycotted,’ any person cultivating such a farm being
threatened with assassination. In Egypt[1521] special care had to be
taken to protect the dykes regulating the distribution of Nile water.
Both these offences were summarily dealt with by the provincial
governor, and the penalty was death. Here we have one more proof
of the anxiety of the imperial government to insure the greatest
possible production of food. The empire was always hungry,—and so
were the barbarians. And the northern frontier provinces could not
feed both themselves and the armies.
While speaking of landlords and tenants we must not forget that
all over the empire considerable areas of land were owned by
municipalities, and dealt with at the discretion of the local
authorities. Variety of systems was no doubt dictated by variety of
local circumstances: but one characteristic was so general as to
deserve special attention on the part of jurists. This was the system
of perpetual leaseholds[1522] at a fixed (and undoubtedly beneficial)
rent, heritable and transferable to assigns. So long as the tenant
regularly paid the vectigal, his occupation was not to be disturbed. It
was evidently the desire of the municipal authorities to have a
certain income to reckon with: for the sake of certainty they would
put up with something less than a rack-rent. There were also other
lands owned by these civitates that were let on the system[1523] in
use by private landlords; the normal term probably being five years.
Of these no more need be said here. Beneficial leases under a
municipality were liable to corrupt management. It had been found
necessary[1524] to disqualify members of the local Senate
(decuriones) from holding such leases, that they might not share out
the common lands among themselves on beneficial terms. But this
prohibition was not enough. The town worthies put in men of
straw[1525] as nominal tenants, through whom they enjoyed the
benefits of the leases. So this evasion also had to be met by
revoking the ill-gotten privilege. But disturbance of tenancies was
not to be lightly allowed, so it appears that a reference to the
emperor[1526] was necessary before such revocation could take
place. This system of perpetual leases is of interest, not as indicating
different methods of cultivation from those practised on private
estates, but as betraying a tendency to fixity[1527] already existing,
destined to spread and to take other forms, and to become the fatal
characteristic of the later Empire. Another striking piece of evidence
in the same direction occurs in connexion with the lessees
(publicani) of various state dues (vectigalia publica) farmed out in
the usual way. In the first half of the third century the jurist Paulus
attests[1528] the fact that, in case it was found that the right of
collecting such dues, hitherto very profitable to the lessees, could
only be let at a lower lump sum than hitherto, the old lessees were
held bound to continue their contract at the old price. But
Callistratus, contemporary or nearly so, tells us that this was not so,
and quotes[1529] a rescript of Hadrian (117-138 ad) condemning the
practice as tyrannical and likely to deter men from entering into so
treacherous a bargain. It appears that other[1530] emperors had
forbidden it, but there is no proof that they succeeded in stopping it.
At all events the resort to coercion in a matter of contract like this
reveals the presence of a belief in compulsory fixity, ominous of the
coming imperial paralysis, though of course not so understood at the
time. It did not directly affect agriculture as yet; but its application
to agriculture was destined to be a symptom and a cause of the
empire’s decline and fall.
Another group of tenancies, the number and importance of which
was quietly increasing, was that known as praedia Caesaris[1531],
fundi fiscales, and so forth. We need not discuss the departmental
differences and various names of these estates. The tenants,
whether small men or conductores on a large scale who sublet in
parcels[1532] to coloni, held either directly or indirectly from the
emperor. We have seen specimens in Africa, the Province in which
the crown-properties were exceptionally large. What chiefly concerns
us here is the imperial land-policy. It seems clear that its first aim
was to keep these estates permanently occupied by good solvent
tenants. The surest means to this end was to give these estates a
good name, to create a general impression that on imperial farms a
man had a better chance of thriving than on those of average
private landlords. Now the ‘state,’ that is the emperor or his
departmental chiefs, could favour crown-tenants in various ways
without making a material sacrifice of a financial kind. In particular,
the treatment of crown-estates as what we call ‘peculiars,’ in which
local disputes were settled, not by resort to the courts of ordinary
law, but administratively[1533] by the emperor’s procuratores, was
probably a great relief; above all to the humbler coloni, whom we
may surely assume to have been a class averse to litigation. No
doubt a procurator might be corrupted and unjust. But he was
probably far more effectually watched than ordinary magistrates;
and, if the worst came to the worst, there was as we have seen the
hope of a successful appeal to the emperor. Another favour
consisted in the exemption of Caesar’s tenants from various
burdensome official duties in municipalities, the so-called munera,
which often entailed great expense. This is mentioned by a
jurist[1534] near the end of the second century: they are only to
perform such duties so far as not to cause loss to the treasury.
Another[1535], somewhat later, says that their exemption is granted
in order that they may be more suitable tenants of treasury-farms.
This exemption is one more evidence of the well-known fact that in
this age municipal offices were beginning to be evaded[1536] as
ruinous, and no longer sought as an honour. We must note that, if
this immunitas relieved the crown-tenants, it left all the more
burdens to be borne by those who enjoyed no such relief. And this
cannot have been good for agriculture in general.
It is not to be supposed that the fiscus[1537] was a slack and easy
landlord. Goods of debtors were promptly seized to cover liabilities:
attempts to evade payment of tributa by a private agreement[1538]
between mortgagor and mortgagee were quashed: a rescript[1539]
of Marcus and Verus insisted on the treasury share (½) of treasure
trove: and so on. But there are signs of a reasonable and
considerate policy, in not pressing demands so as to inflict hardship.
Trajan[1540] had set a good example, and good emperors followed it.
We may fairly guess that this moderation in financial dealings was
not wholly laid aside in the management of imperial estates. Nor is it
to be imagined that the advantages of imperial tenants were exactly
the same in all parts of the empire. In Provinces through which
armies had to move it is probable that coloni Caesaris would suffer
less[1541] than ordinary farmers from military annoyances. But on
the routes to and from a seat of war it is obvious that the imperial
post-service would be subjected to exceptional strain. Now this
service was at the best of times[1542] a cause of vexations and
losses to the farmers along the line of traffic. The staff made good
all deficiencies in their requirements by taking beasts fodder vehicles
etc wherever they could find them: what they restored was much
the worse for wear, and compensation, if ever got, was tardy and
inadequate. The repair of roads was another pretext for exaction. It
is hardly to be doubted that in these respects imperial tenants
suffered less than others. Some emperors[1543] took steps to ease
the burden, which had been found too oppressive to the roadside
estates. But this seems to have been no more than relief from
official requisitions: irregular ‘commandeering’ was the worst evil,
and we have no reason to think that it was effectually suppressed. It
appears in the next period as a rampant abuse, vainly forbidden by
the laws of the Theodosian code.
L. THE LATER COLONATE, ITS PLACE IN
ROMAN HISTORY.
In the endeavour to extract from scattered and fragmentary
evidence some notion of agricultural conditions in the Roman empire
before and after Diocletian we are left with two imperfect pictures,
so strongly contrasted as to suggest a suspicion of their truth. We
can hardly believe that the system known as the later Colonate
appeared in full force as a sudden phenomenon. Nor indeed are we
compelled to fly so directly in the face of historical experience. That
we have no narrative of the steps that led to this momentous
change, is surely due to the inability of contemporaries to discern
the future effect of tendencies operating silently[1544] and
piecemeal. What seems at the moment insignificant, even if
observed, is seldom recorded, and very seldom intentionally. Hence
after generations, seeking to trace effects to causes, are puzzled by
defects of record. Their only resource is to supplement, so far as
possible, defective record by general consideration of the history of
the time in question and cautious inference therefrom: in fact to get
at the true meaning of fragmentary admissions in relation to their
historical setting. The chief topic to be dealt with here from this
point of view is the character of the Roman Empire in several
aspects. For among all the anxieties of the government during these
troubled centuries the one that never ceased was the fear of failure
in supplies of food.
The character of the Roman Empire had been largely determined
by the fact that it arose from the overthrow of a government that
had long been practically aristocratic. The popular movements that
contributed to this result only revealed the impossibility of
establishing anything like a democracy, and the unreality of any
power save the power of the sword. The great dissembler Augustus
concealed a virtual autocracy by conciliatory handling of the remains
of the nobility. But the Senate, to which he left or gave many
powers, was never capable of bearing a vital part in the
administration, and its influence continued to dwindle under his
successors. The master of the army was the master of the empire,
and influence was more and more vested in those who were able to
guide his policy. That these might be, and sometimes were, not born
Romans at all, but imperial freedmen generally of Greek or mixed-
Greek origin, was a very significant fact. In particular, it marked and
encouraged the growth of departmental bureaus, permanent and
efficient beyond the standard of previous Roman experience. But the
price of this efficiency was centralization, a condition that carried
with it inevitable dangers, owing to the vast extent of the empire. In
modern times the fashionable remedy suggested for over-
centralization is devolution of powers to local governments
controlling areas of considerable size. Or, in cases of aggregation,
the existing powers left to states merged in a confederation are
considerable. In any case, the subordinate units are free to act
within their several limited spheres, and the central government
respects their ‘autonomy,’ only interfering in emergencies to enforce
the fulfilment of definite common obligations.
But, if it had been desired to gain any such relief by a system of
devolution within the Roman empire, this would have meant the
recognition of ‘autonomy’ in the Provinces. And this was
inconceivable. The extension of Roman dominion had been achieved
by dividing Rome’s adversaries. Once conquered, it was the interest
or policy of the central power to keep them in hand by preventing
the growth of self-conscious cohesion in the several units. Each
Province was, as the word implied, a department of the Roman
system, ruled by a succession of Roman governors. It looked to
Rome for orders, for redress of grievances, for protection at need. If
the advance of Rome destroyed no true nations, her government at
least made the development of truly national characteristics
impossible, while she herself formed no Roman nation. Thus, for
better or worse, the empire was non-national. But, as we have
already seen, the decline of Italy made it more and more clear that
the strength of the empire lay in the Provinces. Now, having no
share in initiative and no responsibility, the Provinces steadily lost
vitality under Roman civilization, and became more and more
helplessly dependent on the central power. As the strain on the
empire became greater, the possibility of relief by devolution grew
less: but more centralization was no cure for what was already a
disease.
That local government of a kind existed in the empire is true
enough; also that it was one of the most striking and important
features of the system. But it was municipal, and tended rather to
subdivide than to unite. It was the outcome of a civilization
profoundly urban in its origins and ideas. The notion that a city was
a state was by no means confined to the independent cities of early
Greece. Whether it voluntarily merged itself in a League or lived on
as a subordinate unit in the system of a dominant power, the city
and its territory were politically one. Within their several boundaries
the townsmen and rustic citizens of each city were subject to the
authorities of that community. Beyond their own boundary they were
aliens under the authorities of another city. It is no wonder that
jealousies between neighbour cities were often extreme, and that
Roman intervention was often needed to keep the peace between
rivals. But the system suited Roman policy. In the East and wherever
cities existed they were taken over as administrative units and as
convenient centres of taxation: in the West it was found useful and
practicable to introduce urban centres into tribes and cantons, and
even in certain districts to attach[1545] local populations to existing
cities as dependent hamlets. And, so long as the imperial
government was able to guard the frontiers and avert the shock of
disturbances of the Roman peace, the empire held its own in
apparent prosperity. To some historians the period of the ‘Antonines’
(say about 100-170 ad) has seemed a sort of Golden Age. But signs
are not lacking that the municipal system had seen its best days.
The severe strain on imperial resources in the time of Marcus left
behind it general exhaustion. The decay of local patriotism marked
the pressure of poverty and loss of vitality in the cities. More and
more their importance became that of mere taxation-centres, in
which the evasion of duty was the chief preoccupation: they could
not reinvigorate the empire, nor the empire them.
Another characteristic of the empire, not less significant than
those mentioned above, was this: taken as a whole, it was non-
industrial. Manufactures existed here and there, and products of
various kinds were exchanged between various parts of the empire.
So far as the ordinary population was concerned, the Roman world
might well have supplied its own needs. But this was not enough.
The armies, though perilously small for the work they had to do,
were a heavy burden. The imperial civil service as it became more
elaborate did not become less costly. The waste of resources on
unremunerative buildings and shows in cities, above all in Rome, and
the ceaseless expense of feeding a worthless rabble, were a serious
drain: ordained by established custom, maintained by vanity, to
economize on these follies would seem a confession of weakness.
Nor should the extravagance of the rich, and of many emperors, be
forgotten: this created a demand for luxuries chiefly imported from
the East; precious stones, delicate fabrics, spices, perfumes, rare
woods, ivory, and so forth. Rome had no goods to export in payment
for such things, and the scarcity of return-cargoes must have added
heavily to the cost of carriage. There was on this account a steady
drain of specie to the East, and this had to be met by a
corresponding drain of specie to Rome. In one form or another this
meant money drawn from the Provinces, for which the Provinces
received hardly the bare pretence of an equivalent, or a better
security for peace.
Thus the empire, created by conquest and absorption,
administered by bureaucratic centralization, rested on force; a force
partly real and still present, partly traditional, derived from a
victorious past. The belief in Rome as the eternal city went for much,
and we hear of no misgivings as to the soundness of a civilization
which expressed itself in a constant excess of consumption over
production. Naturally enough, under such conditions, the imperial
system became more and more what it really was from the first, a
vast machine. It was not a league of cooperating units, each
containing a vital principle of growth, and furnishing the power of
recovery from disaster. Its apathetic parts looked passively to the
centre for guidance or relief, depending on the perfection of a
government whose imperfection was assured by attempting a task
beyond the reach of human faculty and virtue. The exposure of the
empire’s weakness came about through collision with the forces of
northern barbarism. What a machine could do, that it did, and its
final failure was due to maladies that made vain all efforts to renew
its internal strength.
The wars with the northern barbarians brought out with singular
clearness two important facts, already known but not sufficiently
taken into account. First, that the enemy were increasing in numbers
while the people of the empire were in most parts stationary or even
declining. Bloody victories, when gained, did practically nothing to
redress the balance. Secondly, that at the back of this embarrassing
situation lay a food-question of extreme seriousness and complexity.
More and more food was needed for the armies, and the rustics of
the empire, even when fitted for military service, could not be
spared from the farms without danger to the food-supply. The
demands of the commissariat were probably far greater than we
might on the face of it suppose; for an advance into the enemy’s
territory did not ease matters. Little or nothing was found to eat:
indeed it was the pressure of a growing population on the means of
subsistence that drove the hungry German tribes to face the Roman
sword in quest of abundant food and the wine and oil of the South
and West. The attempt of Marcus and others after him, to solve the
problems of the moment by enlisting barbarians in Roman armies,
was no permanent solution. The aliens too had to be fed, and their
pay in money could not be deferred. Meanwhile the taxation of the
empire inevitably grew, and the productive industries had to stagger
along under heavier burdens. The progressive increase of these is
sufficiently illustrated in the history of indictiones. At first an indictio
was no more than an occasional[1546] impost of so much corn levied
by imperial proclamation on landed properties in order to meet
exceptional scarcity in Rome. But it was in addition to the regular
tributum, and was of course most likely to occur in years when
scarcity prevailed. No wonder it was already felt onerous[1547] in the
time of Trajan. Pressure on imperial resources caused it not only to
become more frequent, and eventually normal: it was
extended[1548] to include other products, and became a regular
burden of almost universal application, and ended by furnishing a
new chronological unit, the Indiction-period of 15 years.
That agriculture, already none too prosperous, suffered heavily
under this capricious impost in the second century, seems to me a
fact beyond all doubt. And, not being then a general imperial tax, it
fell upon those provinces that were still flourishing producers of
corn. Debasement of currency already lowered the value of money-
taxes, and tempted emperors to extend the system of dues in kind.
Under Diocletian and Galerius things came to a head. Vast increase
of taxation was called for under the new system, and it was mainly
taxation in kind. Already the failure of agriculture was notorious, and
attempts had been made to enforce cultivation of derelict lands. The
new taxation only aggravated present evils, and in despair of milder
measures Constantine attached the coloni to the soil. Important as
the legal foundation of the later serf-colonate, this law is historically
still more important as a recognition of past failure which nothing
had availed to check. He saw no way of preventing a general
stampede from the farms save to forbid it as illegal, and to employ
the whole machinery of the empire in enforcing the new law. This
policy was only a part of the general tendency to fix everything in a
rigid framework, to make all occupations hereditary, that became
normal in the later Empire. The Codes are a standing record of the
principle that the remedy for failure of legislation was more
legislation of the same kind. Hard-pressed emperors needed all the
resources they could muster, particularly food. They had no
breathing-space to try whether more freedom might not promote
enterprise and increase production, even had such a policy come
within their view. Hence the cramping crystallizing process went on
with the certainty of fate. The government, unable to develope
existing industry, simply squeezed it to exhaustion.
How came it that the government was able to do this? How came
it that agricultural tenants could be converted into stationary serfs
without causing a general upheaval[1549] and immediate dissolution
of the empire? Mainly, I think, because the act of Constantine was
no more than a recognition de iure of a condition already created de
facto by a long course of servilizing influences. Also because it was
the apparent interest, not only of the imperial treasury but of the
great proprietors generally, to tie down to the soil[1550] the
cultivators of their estates. Labour was now more valuable than
land. In corn-growing Africa the importance attached to the task-
work of sub-tenants was a confession of this. And, law or no law,
things had to move in one or other direction. Either the landlord and
head-lessee had to win further control of the tenants, or the tenants
must become less dependent. Only the former alternative was
possible in the circumstances; and the full meaning of the change
that turned de facto dependence into legal constraint may be stated
as a recognition of the colonus as labourer rather than tenant.
Whether the settlement of barbarians as domiciled aliens in some
Provinces under strict conditions of farm-labour had anything to do
with the creation of this new semi-servile status, seems hardly to be
decided on defective evidence. At all events it cannot have hindered
it. And we must make full allowance for the effect of various
conditions in various Provinces. If we rightly suppose that the
position of coloni had been growing weaker for some time before the
act of Constantine, this does not imply that the process was due to
the same causes operating alike in all parts of the empire in the
same degree. The evidence of the Theodosian Code shews many
local differences of phenomena in the fourth and fifth centuries; and
it is not credible that there was a greater uniformity in the conditions
of the preceding age. Laws might aim at uniformity, but they could
not alter facts.
My conclusion therefore is that the general character of the
imperial system was the main cause of the later serf-colonate.
However much the degradation of free farm-tenants, or the
admission of slaves to tenancies, or the settlement of barbarians
under conditions of service, may have contributed to the result, it
was the mechanical nature of the system as a whole that gave effect
to them all. After Trajan the rulers of the empire became more and
more conscious that the problem before them was one of
conservation, and that extension was at an end. Hadrian saw this,
and strove to perfect the internal organization. By the time of
Aurelian it was found necessary to surrender territory as a further
measure of security. We can hardly doubt that under such conditions
the machine of internal administration operated more mechanically
than ever. Then, when the reforms of Diocletian made fresh taxation
necessary to defray their cost, an agricultural crisis was produced by
the turning of the imperial screw. The hierarchy of officials justified
their existence by squeezing an assured revenue out of a population
unable to resist but able to remove. There was no other source of
revenue to take the place of the land: moreover, it was agricultural
produce in kind that was required. Therefore the central
bureaucracy, unchecked by any public opinion, did after its wont. In
that selfish and servile world each one took care of his own skin.
Compulsion was the rule: the coloni must be made to produce food:
therefore they must be bound fast to the soil, or the empire would
starve—and the officials with it.