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Contents vii

Bar Charts and Column Charts 90

A Note on Pie Charts and 3-D Charts 93
Bubble Charts 93
Heat Maps 95
Additional Charts for Multiple Variables 97
PivotCharts in Excel 101
3.4 Advanced Data Visualization 102
Advanced Charts 103
Geographic Information Systems Charts 104
3.5 Data Dashboards 105
Principles of Effective Data Dashboards 106
Applications of Data Dashboards 106
Summary 108
Glossary 109
Problems 110
Case Problem: All-Time Movie Box Office Data 118
Appendix: Creating a Scatter Chart Matrix and a Parallel Coordinates
Plot with XLMiner 119

Chapter 4 Linear Regression 123

Analytics in Action: Alliance Data Systems 124
4.1 The Simple Linear Regression Model 125
Regression Model and Regression Equation 125
Estimated Regression Equation 126
4.2 Least Squares Method 127
Least Squares Estimates of the Regression Parameters 129
Using Excel’s Chart Tools to Compute the Estimated Regression
Equation 132
4.3 Assessing the Fit of the Simple Linear Regression Model 133
The Sums of Squares 134
The Coefficient of Determination 136
Using Excel’s Chart Tools to Compute the Coefficient of
Determination 137
4.4 The Multiple Regression Model 138
Regression Model and Regression Equation 138
Estimated Multiple Regression Equation 138
Least Squares Method and Multiple Regression 139
Butler Trucking Company and Multiple Regression 140
Using Excel’s Regression Tool to Develop the Estimated Multiple
Regression Equation 140
4.5 Inference and Regression 143
Conditions Necessary for Valid Inference in the Least Squares
Regression Model 144
viii Contents

Testing Individual Regression Parameters 150

Addressing Nonsignificant Independent Variables 153
Multicollinearity 154
Inference and Very Large Samples 156
4.6 Categorical Independent Variables 161
Butler Trucking Company and Rush Hour 161
Interpreting the Parameters 162
More Complex Categorical Variables 164
4.7 Modeling Nonlinear Relationships 165
Quadratic Regression Models 167
Piecewise Linear Regression Models 170
Interaction Between Independent Variables 173
4.8 Model Fitting 177
Variable Selection Procedures 177
Overfitting 179
Summary 180
Glossary 180
Problems 182
Case Problem: Alumni Giving 197
Appendix: Using XLMiner for Regression 198

Chapter 5 Time Series Analysis and Forecasting 202

Analytics in Action: Forecasting Demand for a Broad Line
of Office Products 203
5.1 Time Series Patterns 205
Horizontal Pattern 205
Trend Pattern 207
Seasonal Pattern 209
Trend and Seasonal Pattern 209
Cyclical Pattern 211
Identifying Time Series Patterns 212
5.2 Forecast Accuracy 212
5.3 Moving Averages and Exponential Smoothing 217
Moving Averages 217
Forecast Accuracy 221
Exponential Smoothing 221
Forecast Accuracy 224
5.4 Using Regression Analysis for Forecasting 226
Linear Trend Projection 226
Seasonality 228
Seasonality Without Trend 228
Seasonality with Trend 230
Using Regression Analysis as a Causal Forecasting Method 231
Contents ix

Combining Causal Variables with Trend and Seasonality

Effects 235
Considerations in Using Regression in Forecasting 235
5.5 Determining the Best Forecasting Model to Use 236
Summary 237
Glossary 237
Problems 238
Case Problem: Forecasting Food and Beverage Sales 246
Appendix: Using XLMiner for Forecasting 247

Chapter 6 Data Mining 251

Analytics in Action: Online Retailers Using Predictive Analytics
to Cater to Customers 252
6.1 Data Sampling 253
6.2 Data Preparation 254
Treatment of Missing Data 254
Identification of Outliers and Erroneous Data 254
Variable Representation 254
6.3 Unsupervised Learning 255
Cluster Analysis 256
Association Rules 265
6.4 Supervised Learning 269
Partitioning Data 269
Classification Accuracy 273
Prediction Accuracy 277
k-Nearest Neighbors 277
Classification and Regression Trees 283
Logistic Regression 299
Summary 308
Glossary 309
Problems 311
Case Problem: Grey Code Corporation 319

Chapter 7 Spreadsheet Models 320

Analytics in Action: Procter and Gamble Sets Inventory Targets Using
Spreadsheet Models 321
7.1 Building Good Spreadsheet Models 322
Influence Diagrams 322
Building a Mathematical Model 322
Spreadsheet Design and Implementing the Model
in a Spreadsheet 324
x Contents

7.2 What-If Analysis 327

Data Tables 327
Goal Seek 331
7.3 Some Useful Excel Functions for Modeling 332
SUM and SUMPRODUCT 332
IF and COUNTIF 333
VLOOKUP 337
7.4 Auditing Spreadsheet Models 339
Trace Precedents and Dependents 339
Show Formulas 340
Evaluate Formulas 340
Error Checking 341
Watch Window 342
Summary 343
Glossary 343
Problems 344
Case Problem: Retirement Plan 350

Chapter 8 Linear Optimization Models 352

Analytics in Action: Timber Harvesting Model at MeadWestvaco
Corporation 353
8.1 A Simple Maximization Problem 354
Problem Formulation 355
Mathematical Model for the Par, Inc. Problem 357
8.2 Solving the Par, Inc. Problem 358
The Geometry of the Par, Inc. Problem 358
Solving Linear Programs with Excel Solver 360
8.3 A Simple Minimization Problem 364
Problem Formulation 364
Solution for the M&D Chemicals Problem 365
8.4 Special Cases of Linear Program Outcomes 367
Alternative Optimal Solutions 367
Infeasibility 368
Unbounded 370
8.5 Sensitivity Analysis 372
Interpreting Excel Solver Sensitivity Report 372
8.6 General Linear Programming Notation and More Examples 374
Investment Portfolio Selection 375
Transportation Planning 378
Advertising Campaign Planning 381
8.7 Generating an Alternative Optimal Solution for a Linear Program 386
Summary 388
Glossary 389
Contents xi

Problems 390
Case Problem: Investment Strategy 398
Appendix: Solving Linear Optimization Models Using Analytic Solver
Platform 399

Chapter 9 Integer Linear Optimization Models 405

Analytics in Action: Optimizing the Transport of Oil Rig Crews 406
9.1 Types of Integer Linear Optimization Models 406
9.2 Eastborne Realty, An Example of Integer Optimization 407
The Geometry of Linear All-Integer Optimization 408
9.3 Solving Integer Optimization Problems with Excel Solver 410
A Cautionary Note About Sensitivity Analysis 414
9.4 Applications Involving Binary Variables 415
Capital Budgeting 415
Fixed Cost 416
Bank Location 420
Product Design and Market Share Optimization 424
9.5 Modeling Flexibility Provided by Binary Variables 426
Multiple-Choice and Mutually Exclusive Constraints 427
k out of n Alternatives Constraint 427
Conditional and Corequisite Constraints 427
9.6 Generating Alternatives in Binary Optimization 428
Summary 430
Glossary 430
Problems 431
Case Problem: Applecore Children’s Clothing 441
Appendix: Solving Integer Linear Optimization Problems Using Analytic
Solver Platform 442

Chapter 10 Nonlinear Optimization Models 448

Analytics in Action: Intercontinental Hotels Optimizes Retail Pricing 449
10.1 A Production Application: Par, Inc. Revisited 449
An Unconstrained Problem 450
A Constrained Problem 450
Solving Nonlinear Optimization Models Using Excel Solver 453
Sensitivity Analysis and Shadow Prices in Nonlinear Models 454
10.2 Local and Global Optima 455
Overcoming Local Optima with Excel Solver 457
10.3 A Location Problem 459
10.4 Markowitz Portfolio Model 461
10.5 Forecasting Adoption of a New Product 465
xii Contents

Summary 469
Glossary 470
Problems 470
Case Problem: Portfolio Optimization with Transaction Costs 477
Appendix: Solving Nonlinear Optimization Problems with Analytic
Solver Platform 480

Chapter 11 Monte Carlo Simulation 485

Analytics in Action: Reducing Patient Infections in the ICU 486
11.1 What-If Analysis 487
The Sanotronics Problem 487
Base-Case Scenario 487
Worst-Case Scenario 488
Best-Case Scenario 488
11.2 Simulation Modeling with Native Excel Functions 488
Use of Probability Distributions to Represent
Random Variables 489
Generating Values for Random Variables with Excel 491
Executing Simulation Trials with Excel 495
Measuring and Analyzing Simulation Output 495
11.3 Simulation Modeling with Analytic Solver Platform 498
The Land Shark Problem 499
Spreadsheet Model for Land Shark 499
Generating Values for Land Shark’s Random Variables 500
Tracking Output Measures for Land Shark 503
Executing Simulation Trials and Analyzing Output for Land Shark 504
The Zappos Problem 506
Spreadsheet Model for Zappos 507
Modeling Random Variables for Zappos 510
Tracking Output Measures for Zappos 515
Executing Simulation Trials and Analyzing Output for Zappos 517
11.4 Simulation Optimization 518
11.5 Simulation Considerations 524
Verification and Validation 524
Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Simulation 524
Summary 525
Glossary 526
Problems 527
Case Problem: Four Corners 536
Appendix 11.1: Incorporating Dependence Between
Random Variables 537
Appendix 11.2: Probability Distributions for Random Variables 545
Contents xiii

Chapter 12 Decision Analysis 550

Analytics in Action: Phytopharm’s New Product Research and
Development 551
12.1 Problem Formulation 552
Payoff Tables 553
Decision Trees 553
12.2 Decision Analysis Without Probabilities 554
Optimistic Approach 554
Conservative Approach 555
Minimax Regret Approach 555
12.3 Decision Analysis with Probabilities 557
Expected Value Approach 557
Risk Analysis 559
Sensitivity Analysis 560
12.4 Decision Analysis with Sample Information 561
Expected Value of Sample Information 566
Expected Value of Perfect Information 567
12.5 Computing Branch Probabilities with Bayes’ Theorem 568
12.6 Utility Theory 571
Utility and Decision Analysis 573
Utility Functions 577
Exponential Utility Function 580
Summary 581
Glossary 582
Problems 584
Case Problem: Property Purchase Strategy 595
Appendix: Using Analytic Solver Platform to Create Decision Trees 596

Appendix A Basics of Excel 609

Appendix B Data Management and Microsoft Access 621

Appendix C Answers to Even-Numbered Exercises (online)

References 659
Index 661
About the Authors

Jeffrey D. Camm Jeffrey D. Camm is Professor of Quantitative Analysis, Head of the

Department of Operations, Business Analytics, and Information Systems and College of
Business Research Fellow in the Carl H. Lindner College of Business at the University of
Cincinnati. Born in Cincinnati, Ohio, he holds a B.S. from Xavier University and a Ph.D.
from Clemson University. He has been at the University of Cincinnati since 1984, and has
been a visiting scholar at Stanford University and a visiting professor of business adminis-
tration at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.
Dr. Camm has published over 30 papers in the general area of optimization applied
to problems in operations management. He has published his research in Science, Man-
agement Science, Operations Research, Interfaces and other professional journals. At the
University of Cincinnati, he was named the Dornoff Fellow of Teaching Excellence and
he was the 2006 recipient of the INFORMS Prize for the Teaching of Operations Research
Practice. A firm believer in practicing what he preaches, he has served as an operations
research consultant to numerous companies and government agencies. From 2005 to
2010 he served as editor-in-chief of Interfaces, and is currently on the editorial board of
INFORMS Transactions on Education.
James J. Cochran James J. Cochran is the Bank of Ruston Barnes, Thompson, & Thurmon
Endowed Research Professor of Quantitative Analysis at Louisiana Tech University. Born
in Dayton, Ohio, he holds a B.S., an M.S., and an M.B.A. from Wright State University
and a Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati. He has been at Louisiana Tech University
since 2000, and has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University, Universidad de Talca,
and the University of South Africa.
Professor Cochran has published over two dozen papers in the development and ap-
plication of operations research and statistical methods. He has published his research in
Management Science, The American Statistician, Communications in Statistics—Theory
and Methods, European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization, and other professional journals. He was the 2008 recipient of the INFORMS
Prize for the Teaching of Operations Research Practice and the 2010 recipient of the Mu
Sigma Rho Statistical Education Award. Professor Cochran was elected to the International
Statistics Institute in 2005 and named a Fellow of the American Statistical Association
in 2011. A strong advocate for effective operations research and statistics education as a
means of improving the quality of applications to real problems, Professor Cochran has
organized and chaired teaching effectiveness workshops in Montevideo, Uruguay; Cape
Town, South Africa; Cartagena, Colombia; Jaipur, India; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and
Nairobi, Kenya. He has served as an operations research consultant to numerous compa-
nies and not-for-profit organizations. He currently serves as editor-in-chief of INFORMS
Transactions on Education and is on the editorial board of Interfaces, the Journal of the
Chilean Institute of Operations Research, and ORiON.
Michael J. Fry Michael J. Fry is Associate Professor of Operations, Business Analyt-
ics, and Information Systems in the Carl H. Lindner College of Business at the University
of Cincinnati. Born in Killeen, Texas, he earned a B.S. from Texas A&M University, and
M.S.E. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Michigan. He has been at the University of
Cincinnati since 2002, and he has been a visiting professor at The Johnson School at Cornell
University and the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia.
About the Authors xv

Professor Fry has published over a dozen research papers in journals such as Op-
erations Research, M&SOM, Transportation Science, Naval Research Logistics, and In-
terfaces. His research interests are in applying quantitative management methods to the
areas of supply chain analytics, sports analytics, and public-policy operations. He has
worked with many different organizations for his research, including Dell, Inc., Copeland
Corporation, Starbucks Coffee Company, the Cincinnati Fire Department, the State of Ohio
Election Commission, the Cincinnati Bengals, and the Cincinnati Zoo. In 2008, he was
named a finalist for the Daniel H. Wagner Prize for Excellence in Operations Research
Practice, and he has been recognized for both his research and teaching excellence at the
University of Cincinnati.

Jeffrey W. Ohlmann Jeffrey W. Ohlmann is Associate Professor of Management

Sciences in the Tippie College of Business at the University of Iowa. Born in Valentine,
Nebraska, he earned a B.S. from the University of Nebraska, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees
from the University of Michigan. He has been at the University of Iowa since 2003.
Professor Ohlmann’s research on the modeling and solution of decision-making prob-
lems has produced over a dozen research papers in journals such as Mathematics of Opera-
tions Research, INFORMS Journal on Computing, Transportation Science, and Interfaces.
He has collaborated with companies such as Transfreight, LeanCor, Cargill, the Hamilton
County Board of Elections, and the Cincinnati Bengals. Due to the relevance of his work to
industry, he was bestowed the George B. Dantzig Dissertation Award and was recognized
as a finalist for the Daniel H. Wagner Prize for Excellence in Operations Research Practice.

David R. Anderson David R. Anderson is Professor Emeritus of Quantitative Analysis

in the Carl H. Lindner College of Business at the University of Cincinnati. Born in Grand
Forks, North Dakota, he earned his B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees from Purdue University.
Professor Anderson has served as Head of the Department of Quantitative Analysis and
Operations Management and as Associate Dean of the College of Business Administration.
In addition, he was the coordinator of the College’s first Executive Program.
At the University of Cincinnati, Professor Anderson has taught introductory statistics
for business students as well as graduate-level courses in regression analysis, multivariate
analysis, and management science. He has also taught statistical courses at the Department
of Labor in Washington, D.C. He has been honored with nominations and awards for
excellence in teaching and excellence in service to student organizations.
Professor Anderson has coauthored 10 textbooks in the areas of statistics, management
science, linear programming, and production and operations management. He is an active
consultant in the field of sampling and statistical methods.

Dennis J. Sweeney Dennis J. Sweeney is Professor Emeritus of Quantitative Analysis

and Founder of the Center for Productivity Improvement at the University of Cincinnati.
Born in Des Moines, Iowa, he earned a B.S.B.A. degree from Drake University and his
M.B.A. and D.B.A. degrees from Indiana University, where he was an NDEA Fellow.
During 1978–1979, Professor Sweeney worked in the management science group at
Procter & Gamble; during 1981–1982, he was a visiting professor at Duke University.
Professor Sweeney served as Head of the Department of Quantitative Analysis and as
Associate Dean of the College of Business Administration at the University of Cincinnati.
Professor Sweeney has published more than 30 articles and monographs in the areas
of management science and statistics. The National Science Foundation, IBM, Procter &
Gamble, Federated Department Stores, Kroger, and Cincinnati Gas & Electric have funded
his research, which has been published in Management Science, Operations Research,
Mathematical Programming, Decision Sciences, and other journals.
Professor Sweeney has coauthored 10 textbooks in the areas of statistics, management
science, linear programming, and production and operations management.
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xvi About the Authors

Thomas A. Williams Thomas A. Williams is Professor Emeritus of Management Science

in the College of Business at Rochester Institute of Technology. Born in Elmira, New York,
he earned his B.S. degree at Clarkson University. He did his graduate work at Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, where he received his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees.
Before joining the College of Business at RIT, Professor Williams served for seven
years as a faculty member in the College of Business Administration at the University of
Cincinnati, where he developed the undergraduate program in Information Systems and
then served as its coordinator. At RIT he was the first chairman of the Decision Sciences
Department. He teaches courses in management science and statistics, as well as graduate
courses in regression and decision analysis.
Professor Williams is the coauthor of 11 textbooks in the areas of management sci-
ence, statistics, production and operations management, and mathematics. He has been a
consultant for numerous Fortune 500 companies and has worked on projects ranging from
the use of data analysis to the development of large-scale regression models.
Preface

Essentials of Business Analytics is designed to introduce the concept of business analytics

to undergraduate and graduate students. This textbook contains one of the first collections
of materials that are essential to the growing field of business analytics. In Chapter 1 we
present an overview of business analytics and our approach to the material in this text-
book. In simple terms, business analytics helps business professionals make better deci-
sions based on data. We discuss models for summarizing, visualizing, and understanding
useful information from historical data in Chapters 2 through 6. Chapter 7 covers the use of
spreadsheets for examining data and building decision models. In Chapters 8 through 10 we
discuss optimization models to help decision makers choose the best decision based on the
available data. Chapter 10 presents material that some may consider more advanced forms
of optimization (nonlinear optimization models), although these models are extremely use-
ful and widely applicable to many business situations. In any case, some instructors may
choose to omit covering Chapter 10. In Chapter 11 we introduce the concept of simulation
models for understanding the effect of uncertainty on decisions. Chapter 12 is an overview
of decision analysis approaches for incorporating a decision maker’s views about risk into
decision making. In Appendix A we present optional material for students who need to
learn the basics of using Microsoft Excel. The use of databases and manipulating data in
Microsoft Access is discussed in Appendix B.
This textbook can be used by students who have previously taken a course on basic
statistical methods as well as students who have not had a prior course in statistics. This
textbook introduces basic statistical concepts in enough detail to support their use in busi-
ness analytics tools. For the student who has not had a prior statistics course, these concepts
are sufficient to prepare the student for more advanced business analytics methods. For
students who have had a previous statistics class, the material will provide a good review.
All statistical concepts contained in this textbook are presented from a business analytics
perspective using practical business examples. For those instructors who wish to skip the
introductory statistics material, Chapters 2 and 4 can be considered optional.

Features and Pedagogy

The style and format of this textbook is based on the other classic textbooks written by the
Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams (ASW) team. Some of the specific features that we use
in this textbook are listed below.
● Integration of Microsoft Excel: Excel has been thoroughly integrated throughout
this textbook. For many methodologies, we provide instructions for how to perform
calculations both by hand and with Excel. In other cases where realistic models
are practical only with the use of a spreadsheet, we focus on the use of Excel to
describe the methods to be used.
● Use of Excel 2013: The material presented for Excel in this textbook is fully com-
patible with Excel 2013. In most cases, Excel 2013 can be considered a relatively
minor update from previous Excel versions as it relates to business analytics.
However, the data visualization abilities of Excel have been greatly enhanced in
Excel 2013. It is much easier to create, modify and analyze charts in Excel 2013.
xviii Preface

Recognizing that many students and instructors may not have access to Excel 2013
at this time, we also provide instructions for using previous versions of Excel when-
ever possible.
● Use of Analytics Solver Platform and XLMiner: This textbook incorporates the
use of two very powerful Microsoft Excel Add-ins: Analytics Solver Platform and
XLMiner, both created by Frontline Systems. Analytics Solver Platform provides
additional optimization and simulation features for Excel. XLMiner incorporates
sophisticated data mining algorithms into Excel and allows for additional data vi-
sualization and data exploration. In most chapters we place the use of Analytics
Solver Platform and XLMiner in the chapter appendix so that the instructor can
choose whether or not to cover this material. However, because these tools are es-
sential to performing simulation and data mining methods, we integrate XLMiner
throughout Chapter 6 on data mining and we utilize Analytics Solver Platform in
Sections 11.3 and 11.4 for simulation.
● Notes and Comments: At the end of many sections, we provide Notes and Com-
ments to give the student additional insights about the methods presented in that
section. These insights include comments on the limitations of the presented meth-
ods, recommendations for applications, and other matters. Additionally, margin
notes are used throughout the textbook to provide additional insights and tips re-
lated to the specific material being discussed.
● Analytics in Action: Each chapter contains an Analytics in Action article. These
articles present interesting examples of the use of business analytics in practice.
The examples are drawn from many different organizations in a variety of areas
including healthcare, finance, manufacturing, marketing, and others.
● WEBfiles: All data sets used as examples and in student exercises are also provided
online as files available for download by the student. The names of the WEBfiles
are called out in margin notes throughout the textbook.
● Problems and Cases: With the exception of Chapter 1, each chapter contains more
than 20 problems to help the student master the material presented in that chapter.
The problems vary in difficulty and most relate to specific examples of the use of
business analytics in practice. Answers to even-numbered problems are provided
in an online supplement for student access. With the exception of Chapter 1, each
chapter also includes an in-depth case study that connects many of the different
methods introduced in the chapter. The case studies are designed to be more open-
ended than the chapter problems, but enough detail is provided to give the student
some direction in solving the cases.

Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the work of our reviewers, who provided comments and
suggestions for improvement of this text. Thanks to:

Matthew D. Bailey Q B. Chung

Bucknell University Villanova University
Phillip Beaver Elizabeth A. Denny
Daniels College of Business University of Kentucky
University of Denver
Mike Taein Eom
M. Khurrum S. Bhutta University of Portland
Ohio University
Preface xix

Yvette Njan Essounga Marco Lam

Fayetteville State University York College of Pennsylvania
Lawrence V. Fulton Ram Pakath
Texas State University University of Kentucky
James F. Hoelscher Susan Palocsay
Lincoln Memorial University James Madison University
Eric Huggins Dothan Truong
Fort Lewis College Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Faizul Huq Kai Wang
Ohio University Wake Technical Community College

We are indebted to our product director Joe Sabatino and our product manager,
Aaron Arnsparger; our marketing director, Natalie King, our marketing manager, Heather
Mooney, and our associate marketing development manager, Roy Rosa; our content de-
veloper, Maggie Kubale; our senior content project manager, Cliff Kallemeyn; our media
developer, Chris Valentine; and others at Cengage Learning for their counsel and support
during the preparation of this text.
Jeffrey D. Camm
James J. Cochran
Michael J. Fry
Jeffrey W. Ohlmann
David R. Anderson
Dennis J. Sweeney
Thomas A. Williams
 CHAPTER 1
Introduction
CONTENTS 1.5 BUSINESS ANALYTICS
IN PRACTICE
1.1 DECISION MAKING Financial Analytics
1.2 BUSINESS ANALYTICS Human Resource (HR) Analytics
DEFINED Marketing Analytics
Health Care Analytics
1.3 A CATEGORIZATION OF
Supply Chain Analytics
ANALYTICAL METHODS
Analytics for Government and
AND MODELS
Nonprofits
Descriptive Analytics
Sports Analytics
Predictive Analytics
Web Analytics
Prescriptive Analytics
1.4 BIG DATA
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
secondary law which takes note of the fact that there was more of
the random element in the world when the signal dropped than
when the lever moved. But the feature of secondary law is that it
ignores strict causation; it concerns itself not with what must happen
but with what is likely to happen. Thus distinction of cause and
effect has no meaning in the closed system of primary laws of
physics; to get at it we have to break into the scheme, introducing
considerations of volition or of probability which are foreign to it.
This is rather analogous to the ten vanishing coefficients of
curvature which could only be recognised if the closed system of the
world were broken into by standards foreign to it.
For convenience I shall call the relation of effect to cause
causation, and the symmetrical relation which does not distinguish
between cause and effect causality. In primary physics causality has
completely replaced causation. Ideally the whole world past and
future is connected into a deterministic scheme by relations of
causality. Up till very recently it was universally held that such a
determinate scheme must exist (possibly subject to suspension by
supernatural agencies outside the scope of physics); we may
therefore call this the “orthodox” view. It was, of course, recognised
that we were only acquainted with part of the structure of this
causal scheme, but it was the settled aim of theoretical physics to
discover the whole.
This replacement in orthodox science of causation by causality is
important in one respect. We must not let causality borrow an
intuitive sanction which really belongs only to causation. We may
think we have an intuition that the same cause cannot have two
alternative effects; but we do not claim any intuition that the same
effect may not spring from two alternative causes. For this reason
the assumption of a rigid determinateness enforced by relations of
causality cannot be said to be insisted on by intuition.
What is the ground for so much ardent faith in the orthodox
hypothesis that physical phenomena rest ultimately on a scheme of
completely deterministic laws? I think there are two reasons—
 (1) The principal laws of Nature which have been discovered are
apparently of this deterministic type, and these have furnished the
great triumphs of physical prediction. It is natural to trust to a line of
progress which has served us well in the past. Indeed it is a healthy
attitude to assume that nothing is beyond the scope of scientific
prediction until the limits of prediction actually declare themselves.
(2) The current epistemology of science presupposes a
deterministic scheme of this type. To modify it involves a much
deeper change in our attitude to natural knowledge than the mere
abandonment of an untenable hypothesis.
In explanation of the second point we must recall that knowledge
of the physical world has to be inferred from the nerve-messages
which reach our brains, and the current epistemology assumes that
there exists a determinate scheme of inference (lying before us as
an ideal and gradually being unravelled). But, as has already been
pointed out, the chains of inference are simply the converse of the
chains of physical causality by which distant events are connected to
the nerve-messages. If the scheme of transmission of these
messages through the external world is not deterministic then the
scheme of inference as to their source cannot be deterministic, and
our epistemology has been based on an impossible ideal. In that
case our attitude to the whole scheme of natural knowledge must be
profoundly modified.
These reasons will be considered at length, but it is convenient to
state here our answers to them in equally summary form.
(1) In recent times some of the greatest triumphs of physical
prediction have been furnished by admittedly statistical laws which
do not rest on a basis of causality. Moreover the great laws hitherto
accepted as causal appear on minuter examination to be of
statistical character.
(2) Whether or not there is a causal scheme at the base of
atomic phenomena, modern atomic theory is not now attempting to
find it; and it is making rapid progress because it no longer sets this
up as a practical aim. We are in the position of holding an
epistemological theory of natural knowledge which does not
correspond to actual aim of current scientific investigation.

Predictability of Events. Let us examine a typical case of successful

scientific prediction. A total eclipse of the sun visible in Cornwall is
prophesied for 11 August 1999. It is generally supposed that this
eclipse is already predetermined by the present configuration of the
sun, earth and moon. I do not wish to arouse unnecessary misgiving
as to whether the eclipse will come off. I expect it will; but let us
examine the grounds of expectation. It is predicted as a
consequence of the law of gravitation—a law which we found in
chapter VII to be a mere truism. That does not diminish the value of
the prediction; but it does suggest that we may not be able to pose
as such marvellous prophets when we come up against laws which
are not mere truisms. I might venture to predict that will be
equal to 4 even in 1999; but if this should prove correct it will not
help to convince anyone that the universe (or, if you like, the human
mind) is governed by laws of deterministic type. I suppose that in
the most erratically governed world something can be predicted if
truisms are not excluded.
But we have to look deeper than this. The law of gravitation is
only a truism when regarded from a macroscopic point of view. It
presupposes space, and measurement with gross material or optical
arrangements. It cannot be refined to an accuracy beyond the limits
of these gross appliances; so that it is a truism with a probable error
—small, but not infinitely small. The classical laws hold good in the
limit when exceedingly large quantum numbers are involved. The
system comprising the sun, earth and moon has exceedingly high
state-number (p. 198); and the predictability of its configurations is
not characteristic of natural phenomena in general but of those
involving great numbers of atoms of action—such that we are
concerned not with individual but with average behaviour.
 Human life is proverbially uncertain; few things are more certain
than the solvency of a life-insurance company. The average law is so
trustworthy that it may be considered predestined that half the
children now born will survive the age of years. But that does not
tell us whether the span of life of young A. McB. is already written in
the book of fate, or whether there is still time to alter it by teaching
him not to run in front of motor-buses. The eclipse in 1999 is as safe
as the balance of a life-insurance company; the next quantum jump
of an atom is as uncertain as your life and mine.
We are thus in a position to answer the main argument for a
predetermination of the future, viz. that observation shows the laws
of Nature to be of a type which leads to definite predictions of the
future, and it is reasonable to expect that any laws which remain
undiscovered will conform to the same type. For when we ask what
is the characteristic of the phenomena that have been successfully
predicted, the answer is that they are effects depending on the
average configurations of vast numbers of individual entities. But
averages are predictable because they are averages, irrespective of
the type of government of the phenomena underlying them.
Considering an atom alone in the world in State 3, the classical
theory would have asked, and hoped to answer, the question, What
will it do next? The quantum theory substitutes the question, Which
will it do next? Because it admits only two lower states for the atom
to go to. Further, it makes no attempt to find a definite answer, but
contents itself with calculating the respective odds on the jumps to
State 1 and State 2. The quantum physicist does not fill the atom
with gadgets for directing its future behaviour, as the classical
physicist would have done; he fills it with gadgets determining the
odds on its future behaviour. He studies the art of the bookmaker
not of the trainer.
Thus in the structure of the world as formulated in the new
quantum theory it is predetermined that of 500 atoms now in State
3, approximately 400 will go on to State 1 and 100 to State 2—in so
far as anything subject to chance fluctuations can be said to be
predetermined. The odds of 4 to 1 find their appropriate
representation in the picture of the atom; that is to say, something
symbolic of a 4:1 ratio is present in each of the 500 atoms. But there
are no marks distinguishing the atoms belonging to the group of 100
from the 400. Probably most physicists would take the view that
although the marks are not yet shown in the picture, they are
nevertheless present in Nature; they belong to an elaboration of the
theory which will come in good time. The marks, of course, need not
be in the atom itself; they may be in the environment which will
interact with it. For example, we may load dice in such a way that
the odds are 4 to 1 on throwing a 6. Both those dice which turn up 6
and those which do not have these odds written in their constitution
—by a displaced position of the centre of gravity. The result of a
particular throw is not marked in the dice; nevertheless it is strictly
causal (apart perhaps from the human element involved in throwing
the dice) being determined by the external influences which are
concerned. Our own position at this stage is that future
developments of physics may reveal such causal marks (either in the
atom or in the influences outside it) or it may not. Hitherto
whenever we have thought we have detected causal marks in
natural phenomena they have always proved spurious, the apparent
determinism having come about in another way. Therefore we are
inclined to regard favourably the possibility that there may be no
causal marks anywhere.
But, it will be said, it is inconceivable that an atom can be so
evenly balanced between two alternative courses that nowhere in
the world as yet is there any trace of the ultimately deciding factor.
This is an appeal to intuition and it may fairly be countered with
another appeal to intuition. I have an intuition much more
immediate than any relating to the objects of the physical world; this
tells me that nowhere in the world as yet is there any trace of a
deciding factor as to whether I am going to lift my right hand or my
left. It depends on an unfettered act of volition not yet made or
foreshadowed.[48] My intuition is that the future is able to bring forth
deciding factors which are not secretly hidden in the past.
 The position is that the laws governing the microscopic elements
of the physical world—individual atoms, electrons, quanta—do not
make definite predictions as to what the individual will do next. I am
here speaking of the laws that have been actually discovered and
formulated on the old quantum theory and the new. These laws
indicate several possibilities in the future and state the odds on
each. In general the odds are moderately balanced and are not
tempting to an aspiring prophet. But short odds on the behaviour of
individuals combine into very long odds on suitably selected statistics
of a number of individuals; and the wary prophet can find
predictions of this kind on which to stake his credit—without serious
risk. All the successful predictions hitherto attributed to causality are
traceable to this. It is quite true that the quantum laws for
individuals are not incompatible with causality; they merely ignore it.
But if we take advantage of this indifference to reintroduce
determinism at the basis of world structure it is because our
philosophy predisposes us that way, not because we know of any
experimental evidence in its favour.
We might for illustration make a comparison with the doctrine of
predestination. That theological doctrine, whatever may be said
against it, has hitherto seemed to blend harmoniously with the
predetermination of the material universe. But if we were to appeal
to the new conception of physical law to settle this question by
analogy the answer would be:—The individual is not predestined to
arrive at either of the two states, which perhaps may here be
sufficiently discriminated as State 1 and State 2; the most that can
be considered already settled is the respective odds on his reaching
these states.

The New Epistemological Outlook. Scientific investigation does not

lead to knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things. “Whenever we
state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are
imparting knowledge of the response of various metrical indicators
to its presence and nothing more” (p. 257). But if a body is not
acting according to strict causality, if there is an element of
uncertainty as to the response of the indicators, we seem to have
cut away the ground for this kind of knowledge. It is not
predetermined what will be the reading of the weighing-machine if
the body is placed on it, therefore the body has no definite mass;
nor where it will be found an instant hence, therefore it has no
definite velocity; nor where the rays now being reflected from it will
converge in the microscope, therefore it has no definite position; and
so on. It is no use answering that the body really has a definite
mass, velocity, position, etc., which we are unaware of; that
statement, if it means anything, refers to an intrinsic nature of
things outside the scope of scientific knowledge. We cannot infer
these properties with precision from anything that we can be aware
of, because the breach of causality has broken the chain of
inference. Thus our knowledge of the response of indicators to the
presence of the body is non-existent; therefore we cannot assert
knowledge of it at all. So what is the use of talking about it? The
body which was to be the abstraction of all these (as yet unsettled)
pointer readings has become superfluous in the physical world. That
is the dilemma into which the old epistemology leads us as soon as
we begin to doubt strict causality.
In phenomena on a gross scale this difficulty can be got round. A
body may have no definite position but yet have within close limits
an extremely probable position. When the probabilities are large the
substitution of probability for certainty makes little difference; it adds
only a negligible haziness to the world. But though the practical
change is unimportant there are fundamental theoretical
consequences. All probabilities rest on a basis of a priori probability,
and we cannot say whether probabilities are large or small without
having assumed such a basis. In agreeing to accept those of our
calculated probabilities which are very high as virtually equivalent to
certainties on the old scheme, we are as it were making our adopted
basis of a priori probability a constituent of the world-structure—
adding to the world a kind of symbolic texture that cannot be
expressed on the old scheme.
 On the atomic scale of phenomena the probabilities are in
general well-balanced, and there are no “naps” for the scientific
punter to put his shirt on. If a body is still defined as a bundle of
pointer readings (or highly probable pointer readings) there are no
“bodies” on the atomic scale. All that we can extract is a bundle of
probabilities. That is in fact just how Schrödinger tries to picture the
atom—as a wave centre of his probability entity .
We commonly have had to deal with probabilities which arise
through ignorance. With fuller knowledge we should sweep away the
references to probability and substitute the exact facts. But it
appears to be a fundamental point in Schrödinger’s theory that his
probabilities are not to be replaced in that way. When his is
sufficiently concentrated it indicates the point where the electron is;
when it is diffused it gives only a vague indication of the position.
But this vague indication is not something which ideally ought to be
replaced by exact knowledge; it is itself which acts as the source
of the light emitted from the atom, the period of the light being that
of the beats of . I think this means that the spread of is not a
symbol for uncertainty arising through lack of information; it is a
symbol for causal failure—an indeterminacy of behaviour which is
part of the character of the atom.
We have two chief ways of learning about the interior of the
atom. We can observe electrons entering or leaving, and we can
observe light entering or leaving. Bohr has assumed a structure
connected by strictly causal law with the first phenomenon,
Heisenberg and his followers with the second. If the two structures
were identifiable then the atom would involve a complete causal
connection of the two types of phenomena. But apparently no such
causal linkage exists. Therefore we have to be content with a
correlation in which the entities of the one model represent
probabilities in the second model. There are perhaps details in the
two theories which do not quite square with this; but it seems to
express the ideal to be aimed at in describing the laws of an
incompletely causal world, viz. that the causal source of one
phenomenon shall represent the probability of causal source of
another phenomenon. Schrödinger’s theory has given at least a
strong hint that the actual world is controlled on this plan.

The Principle of Indeterminacy. Thus far we have shown that

modern physics is drifting away from the postulate that the future is
predetermined, ignoring it rather than deliberately rejecting it. With
the discovery of the Principle of Indeterminacy (p. 220) its attitude
has become more definitely hostile.
Let us take the simplest case in which we think we can predict
the future. Suppose that we have a particle with known position and
velocity at the present instant. Assuming that nothing interferes with
it we can predict the position at a subsequent instant. (Strictly the
non-interference would be a subject for another prediction, but to
simplify matters we shall concede it.) It is just this simple prediction
which the principle of indeterminacy expressly forbids. It states that
we cannot know accurately both the velocity and position of a
particle at the present instant.
At first sight there seems to be an inconsistency. There is no limit
to the accuracy with which we may know the position, provided that
we do not want to know the velocity also. Very well; let us make a
highly accurate determination of position now, and after waiting a
moment make another highly accurate determination of position.
Comparing the two accurate positions we compute the accurate
velocity—and snap our fingers at the principle of indeterminacy. This
velocity, however, is of no use for prediction, because in making the
second accurate determination of position we have rough-handled
the particle so much that it no longer has the velocity we calculated.
It is a purely retrospective velocity. The velocity does not exist in the
present tense but in the future perfect; it never exists, it never will
exist, but a time may come when it will have existed. There is no
room for it in Fig. 4 which contains an Absolute Future and an
Absolute Past but not an Absolute Future Perfect.
 The velocity which we attribute to a particle now can be regarded
as an anticipation of its future positions. To say that it is unknowable
(except with a certain degree of inaccuracy) is to say that the future
cannot be anticipated. Immediately the future is accomplished, so
that it is no longer an anticipation, the velocity becomes knowable.
The classical view that a particle necessarily has a definite (but
not necessarily knowable) velocity now, amounts to disguising a
piece of the unknown future as an unknowable element of the
present. Classical physics foists a deterministic scheme on us by a
trick; it smuggles the unknown future into the present, trusting that
we shall not press an inquiry as to whether it has become any more
knowable that way.
The same principle extends to every kind of phenomenon that we
attempt to predict, so long as the need for accuracy is not buried
under a mass of averages. To every co-ordinate there corresponds a
momentum, and by the principle of indeterminacy the more
accurately the co-ordinate is known the less accurately the
momentum is known. Nature thus provides that knowledge of one-
half of the world will ensure ignorance of the other half—ignorance
which, we have seen, may be remedied later when the same part of
the world is contemplated retrospectively. We can scarcely rest
content with a picture of the world which includes so much that
cannot be known. We have been trying to get rid of unknowable
things, i.e. all conceptions which have no causal connection with our
experience. We have eliminated velocity through aether, “right”
frames of space, etc., for this reason. This vast new unknowable
element must likewise be swept out of the Present. Its proper place
is in the Future because then it will no longer be unknowable. It has
been put in prematurely as an anticipation of that which cannot be
anticipated.
In assessing whether the symbols which the physicist has
scattered through the external world are adequate to predetermine
the future, we must be on our guard against retrospective symbols.
It is easy to prophesy after the event.
Natural and Supernatural. A rather serious consequence of dropping
causality in the external world is that it leaves us with no clear
distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural. In an earlier
chapter I compared the invisible agent invented to account for the
tug of gravitation to a “demon”. Is a view of the world which admits
such an agent any more scientific than that of a savage who
attributes all that he finds mysterious in Nature to the work of
invisible demons? The Newtonian physicist had a valid defence. He
could point out that his demon Gravitation was supposed to act
according to fixed causal laws and was therefore not to be compared
with the irresponsible demons of the savage. Once a deviation from
strict causality is admitted the distinction melts away. I suppose that
the savage would admit that his demon was to some extent a
creature of habit and that it would be possible to make a fair guess
as to what he would do in the future; but that sometimes he would
show a will of his own. It is that imperfect consistency which
formerly disqualified him from admission as an entity of physics
along with his brother Gravitation.
That is largely why there has been so much bother about “me”;
because I have, or am persuaded that I have, “a will of my own”.
Either the physicist must leave his causal scheme at the mercy of
supernatural interference from me, or he must explain away my
supernatural qualities. In self-defence the materialist favoured the
latter course; he decided that I was not supernatural—only
complicated. We on the other hand have concluded that there is no
strict causal behaviour anywhere. We can scarcely deny the charge
that in abolishing the criterion of causality we are opening the door
to the savage’s demons. It is a serious step, but I do not think it
means the end of all true science. After all if they try to enter we
can pitch them out again, as Einstein pitched out the respectable
causal demon who called himself Gravitation. It is a privation to be
no longer able to stigmatise certain views as unscientific
superstition; but we are still allowed, if the circumstances justify it,
to reject them as bad science.
Volition. From the philosophic point of view it is of deep interest to
consider how this affects the freedom of the human mind and spirit.
A complete determinism of the material universe cannot be divorced
from determinism of the mind. Take, for example, the prediction of
the weather this time next year. The prediction is not likely ever to
become practicable, but “orthodox” physicists are not yet convinced
that it is theoretically impossible; they hold that next year’s weather
is already predetermined. We should require extremely detailed
knowledge of present conditions, since a small local deviation can
exert an ever-expanding influence. We must examine the state of
the sun so as to predict the fluctuations in the heat and corpuscular
radiation which it sends us. We must dive into the bowels of the
earth to be forewarned of volcanic eruptions which may spread a
dust screen over the atmosphere as Mt. Katmai did some years ago.
But further we must penetrate into the recesses of the human mind.
A coal strike, a great war, may directly change the conditions of the
atmosphere; a lighted match idly thrown away may cause
deforestation which will change the rainfall and climate. There can
be no fully deterministic control of inorganic phenomena unless the
determinism governs mind itself. Conversely if we wish to
emancipate mind we must to some extent emancipate the material
world also. There appears to be no longer any obstacle to this
emancipation.
Let us look more closely into the problem of how the mind gets a
grip on material atoms so that movements of the body and limbs
can be controlled by its volition. I think we may now feel quite
satisfied that the volition is genuine. The materialist view was that
the motions which appear to be caused by our volition are really
reflex actions controlled by the material processes in the brain, the
act of will being an inessential side phenomenon occurring
simultaneously with the physical phenomena. But this assumes that
the result of applying physical laws to the brain is fully determinate.
It is meaningless to say that the behaviour of a conscious brain is
precisely the same as that of a mechanical brain if the behaviour of
a mechanical brain is left undetermined. If the laws of physics are
not strictly causal the most that can be said is that the behaviour of
the conscious brain is one of the possible behaviours of a mechanical
brain. Precisely so; and the decision between the possible
behaviours is what we call volition.
Perhaps you will say, When the decision of an atom is made
between its possible quantum jumps, is that also “volition”?
Scarcely; the analogy is altogether too remote. The position is that
both for the brain and the atom there, is nothing in the physical
world, i.e. the world of pointer readings, to predetermine the
decision; the decision is a fact of the physical world with
consequences in the future but not causally connected to the past.
In the case of the brain we have an insight into a mental world
behind the world of pointer readings and in that world we get a new
picture of the fact of decision which must be taken as revealing its
real nature—if the words real nature have any meaning. For the
atom we have no such insight into what is behind the pointer
readings. We believe that behind all pointer readings there is a
background continuous with the background of the brain; but there
is no more ground for calling the background of the spontaneous
behaviour of the atom “volition” than for calling the background of
its causal behaviour “reason”. It should be understood that we are
not attempting to reintroduce in the background the strict causality
banished from the pointer readings. In the one case in which we
have any insight—the background of the brain—we have no
intention of giving up the freedom of the mind and will. Similarly we
do not suggest that the marks of predestination of the atom, not
found in the pointer readings, exist undetectable in the unknown
background. To the question whether I would admit that the cause
of the decision of the atom has something in common with the
cause of the decision of the brain, I would simply answer that there
is no cause. In the case of the brain I have a deeper insight into the
decision; this insight exhibits it as volition, i.e. something outside
causality.
A mental decision to turn right or turn left starts one of two
alternative sets of impulses along the nerves to the feet. At some
brain centre the course of behaviour of certain atoms or elements of
the physical world is directly determined for them by the mental
decision—or, one may say, the scientific description of that behaviour
is the metrical aspect of the decision. It would be a possible though
difficult hypothesis to assume that very few atoms (or possibly only
one atom) have this direct contact with the conscious decision, and
that these few atoms serve as a switch to deflect the material world
from one course to the other. But it is physically improbable that
each atom has its duty in the brain so precisely allotted that the
control of its behaviour would prevail over all possible irregularities
of the other atoms. If I have at all rightly understood the processes
of my own mind, there is no finicking with individual atoms.
I do not think that our decisions are precisely balanced on the
conduct of certain key-atoms. Could we pick out one atom in
Einstein’s brain and say that if it had made the wrong quantum jump
there would have been a corresponding flaw in the theory of
relativity? Having regard to the physical influences of temperature
and promiscuous collision it is impossible to maintain this. It seems
that we must attribute to the mind power not only to decide the
behaviour of atoms individually but to affect systematically large
groups—in fact to tamper with the odds on atomic behaviour. This
has always been one of the most dubious points in the theory of the
interaction of mind and matter.

Interference with Statistical Laws. Has the mind power to set aside
statistical laws which hold in inorganic matter? Unless this is granted
its opportunity of interference seems to be too circumscribed to
bring about the results which are observed to follow from mental
decisions. But the admission involves a genuine physical difference
between inorganic and organic (or, at any rate, conscious) matter. I
would prefer to avoid this hypothesis, but it is necessary to face the
issue squarely. The indeterminacy recognised in modern quantum
theory is only a partial step towards freeing our actions from
deterministic control. To use an analogy—we have admitted an
uncertainty which may take or spare human lives; but we have yet
to find an uncertainty which may upset the expectations of a life-
insurance company. Theoretically the one uncertainty might lead to
the other, as when the fate of millions turned on the murders at
Sarajevo. But the hypothesis that the mind operates through two or
three key-atoms in the brain is too desperate a way of escape for us,
and I reject it for the reasons already stated.
It is one thing to allow the mind to direct an atom between two
courses neither of which would be improbable for an inorganic atom;
it is another thing to allow it to direct a crowd of atoms into a
configuration which the secondary laws of physics would set aside as
“too improbable”. Here the improbability is that a large number of
entities each acting independently should conspire to produce the
result; it is like the improbability of the atoms finding themselves by
chance all in one half of a vessel. We must suppose that in the
physical part of the brain immediately affected by a mental decision
there is some kind of interdependence of behaviour of the atoms
which is not present in inorganic matter.
I do not wish to minimise the seriousness of admitting this
difference between living and dead matter. But I think that the
difficulty has been eased a little, if it has not been removed. To leave
the atom constituted as it was but to interfere with the probability of
its undetermined behaviour, does not seem quite so drastic an
interference with natural law as other modes of mental interference
that have been suggested. (Perhaps that is only because we do not
understand enough about these probabilities to realise the
heinousness of our suggestion.) Unless it belies its name, probability
can be modified in ways which ordinary physical entities would not
admit of. There can be no unique probability attached to any event
or behaviour; we can only speak of “probability in the light of certain
given information”, and the probability alters according to the extent
of the information. It is, I think, one of the most unsatisfactory
features of the new quantum theory in its present stage that it
scarcely seems to recognise this fact, and leaves us to guess at the
basis of information to which its probability theorems are supposed
to refer.
Looking at it from another aspect—if the unity of a man’s
consciousness is not an illusion, there must be some corresponding
unity in the relations of the mind-stuff which is behind the pointer
readings. Applying our measures of relation structure, as in chapter
XI, we shall build matter and fields of force obeying identically the
principal field-laws; the atoms will individually be in no way different
from those which are without this unity in the background. But it
seems plausible that when we consider their collective behaviour we
shall have to take account of the broader unifying trends in the
mind-stuff, and not expect the statistical results to agree with those
appropriate to structures of haphazard origin.
I think that even a materialist must reach a conclusion not unlike
ours if he fairly faces the problem. He will need in the physical world
something to stand for a symbolic unity of the atoms associated with
an individual consciousness, which does not exist for atoms not so
associated—a unity which naturally upsets physical predictions based
on the hypothesis of random disconnection. For he has not only to
translate into material configurations the multifarious thoughts and
images of the mind, but must surely not neglect to find some kind of
physical substitute for the Ego.
[47] A few days after the course of lectures was completed,
Einstein wrote in his message on the Newton Centenary, “It is
only in the quantum theory that Newton’s differential method
becomes inadequate, and indeed strict causality fails us. But the
last word has not yet been said. May the spirit of Newton’s
method give us the power to restore unison between physical
reality and the profoundest characteristic of Newton’s teaching—
strict causality.” (Nature, 1927, March 26, p. 467.)
[48] It is fair to assume the trustworthiness of this intuition in
answering an argument which appeals to intuition; the
assumption would beg the question if we were urging the
argument independently.
 Chapter XV
SCIENCE AND MYSTICISM
One day I happened to be occupied with the subject of “Generation
of Waves by Wind”. I took down the standard treatise on
hydrodynamics, and under that heading I read—
The equations (12) and (13) of the preceding Art.
enable us to examine a related question of some interest,
viz. the generation and maintenance of waves against
viscosity, by suitable forces applied to the surface.
If the external forces , be given multiples of
, where and are prescribed, the equations in
question determine and , and thence, by (9) the
value of . Thus we find

where has been written for as before....

And so on for two pages. At the end it is made clear that a wind
of less than half a mile an hour will leave the surface unruffled. At a
mile an hour the surface is covered with minute corrugations due to
capillary waves which decay immediately the disturbing cause
ceases. At two miles an hour the gravity waves appear. As the
author modestly concludes, “Our theoretical investigations give
considerable insight into the incipient stages of wave-formation”.
 On another occasion the same subject of “Generation of Waves
by Wind” was in my mind; but this time another book was more
appropriate, and I read—

There are waters blown by changing winds to laughter

And lit by the rich skies, all day. And after,
Frost, with a gesture, stays the waves that dance
And wandering loveliness. He leaves a white
Unbroken glory, a gathered radiance,
A width, a shining peace, under the night.

The magic words bring back the scene. Again we feel Nature
drawing close to us, uniting with us, till we are filled with the
gladness of the waves dancing in the sunshine, with the awe of the
moonlight on the frozen lake. These were not moments when we fell
below ourselves. We do not look back on them and say, “It was
disgraceful for a man with six sober senses and a scientific
understanding to let himself be deluded in that way. I will take
Lamb’s Hydrodynamics with me next time”. It is good that there
should be such moments for us. Life would be stunted and narrow if
we could feel no significance in the world around us beyond that
which can be weighed and measured with the tools of the physicist
or described by the metrical symbols of the mathematician.
Of course it was an illusion. We can easily expose the rather
clumsy trick that was played on us. Aethereal vibrations of various
wave-lengths, reflected at different angles from the disturbed
interface between air and water, reached our eyes, and by
photoelectric action caused appropriate stimuli to travel along the
optic nerves to a brain-centre. Here the mind set to work to weave
an impression out of the stimuli. The incoming material was
somewhat meagre; but the mind is a great storehouse of
associations that could be used to clothe the skeleton. Having woven
an impression the mind surveyed all that it had made and decided
that it was very good. The critical faculty was lulled. We ceased to
analyse and were conscious only of the impression as a whole. The
warmth of the air, the scent of the grass, the gentle stir of the
breeze, combined with the visual scene in one transcendent
impression, around us and within us. Associations emerging from
their storehouse grew bolder. Perhaps we recalled the phrase
“rippling laughter”. Waves—ripples—laughter—gladness—the ideas
jostled one another. Quite illogically we were glad; though what
there can possibly be to be glad about in a set of aethereal
vibrations no sensible person can explain. A mood of quiet joy
suffused the whole impression. The gladness in ourselves was in
Nature, in the waves, everywhere. That’s how it was.
It was an illusion. Then why toy with it longer? These airy fancies
which the mind, when we do not keep it severely in order, projects
into the external world should be of no concern to the earnest
seeker after truth. Get back to the solid substance of things, to the
material of the water moving under the pressure of the wind and the
force of gravitation in obedience to the laws of hydrodynamics. But
the solid substance of things is another illusion. It too is a fancy
projected by the mind into the external world. We have chased the
solid substance from the continuous liquid to the atom, from the
atom to the electron, and there we have lost it. But at least, it will
be said, we have reached something real at the end of the chase—
the protons and electrons. Or if the new quantum theory condemns
these images as too concrete and leaves us with no coherent images
at all, at least we have symbolic co-ordinates and momenta and
Hamiltonian functions devoting themselves with single-minded
purpose to ensuring that shall be equal to .

In a previous chapter I have tried to show that by following this

course we reach a cyclic scheme which from its very nature can only
be a partial expression of our environment. It is not reality but the
skeleton of reality. “Actuality” has been lost in the exigencies of the
chase. Having first rejected the mind as a worker of illusion we have
in the end to return to the mind and say, “Here are worlds well and
truly built on a basis more secure than your fanciful illusions. But
there is nothing to make any one of them an actual world. Please
choose one and weave your fanciful images into it. That alone can
make it actual”. We have torn away the mental fancies to get at the
reality beneath, only to find that the reality of that which is beneath
is bound up with its potentiality of awakening these fancies. It is
because the mind, the weaver of illusion, is also the only guarantor
of reality that reality is always to be sought at the base of illusion.
Illusion is to reality as the smoke to the fire. I will not urge that
hoary untruth “There is no smoke without fire”. But it is reasonable
to inquire whether in the mystical illusions of man there is not a
reflection of an underlying reality.
To put a plain question—Why should it be good for us to
experience a state of self-deception such as I have described? I
think everyone admits that it is good to have a spirit sensitive to the
influences of Nature, good to exercise an appreciative imagination
and not always to be remorselessly dissecting our environment after
the manner of the mathematical physicists. And it is good not merely
in a utilitarian sense, but in some purposive sense necessary to the
fulfilment of the life that is given us. It is not a dope which it is
expedient to take from time to time so that we may return with
greater vigour to the more legitimate employment of the mind in
scientific investigation. Just possibly it might be defended on the
ground that it affords to the non-mathematical mind in some feeble
measure that delight in the external world which would be more fully
provided by an intimacy with its differential equations. (Lest it should
be thought that I have intended to pillory hydrodynamics, I hasten
to say in this connection that I would not rank the intellectual
(scientific) appreciation on a lower plane than the mystical
appreciation; and I know of passages written in mathematical
symbols which in their sublimity might vie with Rupert-Brooke’s
sonnet.) But I think you will agree with me that it is impossible to
allow that the one kind of appreciation can adequately fill the place
of the other. Then how can it be deemed good if there is nothing in
it but self-deception? That would be an upheaval of all our ideas of
ethics. It seems to me that the only alternatives are either to count
all such surrender to the mystical contact of Nature as mischievous
and ethically wrong, or to admit that in these moods we catch
something of the true relation of the world to ourselves—a relation
not hinted at in a purely scientific analysis of its content. I think the
most ardent materialist does not advocate, or at any rate does not
practice, the first alternative; therefore I assume the second
alternative, that there is some kind of truth at the base of the
illusion.
But we must pause to consider the extent of the illusion. Is it a
question of a small nugget of reality buried under a mountain of
illusion? If that were so it would be our duty to rid our minds of
some of the illusion at least, and try to know the truth in purer form.
But I cannot think there is much amiss with our appreciation of the
natural scene that so impresses us. I do not think a being more
highly endowed than ourselves would prune away much of what we
feel. It is not so much that the feeling itself is at fault as that our
introspective examination of it wraps it in fanciful imagery. If I were
to try to put into words the essential truth revealed in the mystic
experience, it would be that our minds are not apart from the world;
and the feelings that we have of gladness and melancholy and our
yet deeper feelings are not of ourselves alone, but are glimpses of a
reality transcending the narrow limits of our particular consciousness
—that the harmony and beauty of the face of Nature is at root one
with the gladness that transfigures the face of man. We try to
express much the same truth when we say that the physical entities
are only an extract of pointer readings and beneath them is a nature
continuous with our own. But I do not willingly put it into words or
subject it to introspection. We have seen how in the physical world
the meaning is greatly changed when we contemplate it as surveyed
from without instead of, as it essentially must be, from within. By
introspection we drag out the truth for external survey; but in the
mystical feeling the truth is apprehended from within and is, as it
should be, a part of ourselves.
Symbolic Knowledge and Intimate Knowledge. May I elaborate this
objection to introspection? We have two kinds of knowledge which I
call symbolic knowledge and intimate knowledge. I do not know
whether it would be correct to say that reasoning is only applicable
to symbolic knowledge, but the more customary forms of reasoning
have been developed for symbolic knowledge only. The intimate
knowledge will not submit to codification and analysis; or, rather,
when we attempt to analyse it the intimacy is lost and it is replaced
by symbolism.
For an illustration let us consider Humour. I suppose that humour
can be analysed to some extent and the essential ingredients of the
different kinds of wit classified. Suppose that we are offered an
alleged joke. We subject it to scientific analysis as we would a
chemical salt of doubtful nature, and perhaps after careful
consideration of all its aspects we are able to confirm that it really
and truly is a joke. Logically, I suppose, our next procedure would be
to laugh. But it may certainly be predicted that as the result of this
scrutiny we shall have lost all inclination we may ever have had to
laugh at it. It simply does not do to expose the inner workings of a
joke. The classification concerns a symbolic knowledge of humour
which preserves all the characteristics of a joke except its
laughableness. The real appreciation must come spontaneously, not
introspectively. I think this is a not unfair analogy for our mystical
feeling for Nature, and I would venture even to apply it to our
mystical experience of God. There are some to whom the sense of a
divine presence irradiating the soul is one of the most obvious things
of experience. In their view a man without this sense is to be
regarded as we regard a man without a sense of humour. The
absence is a kind of mental deficiency. We may try to analyse the
experience as we analyse humour, and construct a theology, or it
may be an atheistic philosophy, which shall put into scientific form
what is to be inferred about it. But let us not forget that the
theology is symbolic knowledge whereas the experience is intimate
knowledge. And as laughter cannot be compelled by the scientific
exposition of the structure of a joke, so a philosophic discussion of
the attributes of God (or an impersonal substitute) is likely to miss
the intimate response of the spirit which is the central point of the
religious experience.

Defence of Mysticism. A defence of the mystic might run something

like this. We have acknowledged that the entities of physics can from
their very nature form only a partial aspect of the reality. How are
we to deal with the other part? It cannot be said that that other part
concerns us less than the physical entities. Feelings, purpose, values,
make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We
follow up the sense-impressions and find that they lead into an
external world discussed by science; we follow up the other
elements of our being and find that they lead—not into a world of
space and time, but surely somewhere. If you take the view that the
whole of consciousness is reflected in the dance of electrons in the
brain, so that each emotion is a separate figure of the dance, then
all features of consciousness alike lead into the external world of
physics. But I assume that you have followed me in rejecting this
view, and that you agree that consciousness as a whole is greater
than those quasi-metrical aspects of it which are abstracted to
compose the physical brain. We have then to deal with those parts
of our being unamenable to metrical specification, that do not make
contact—jut out, as it were—into space and time. By dealing with
them I do not mean make scientific inquiry into them. The first step
is to give acknowledged status to the crude conceptions in which the
mind invests them, similar to the status of those crude conceptions
which constitute the familiar material world.
Our conception of the familiar table was an illusion. But if some
prophetic voice had warned us that it was an illusion and therefore
we had not troubled to investigate further we should never have
found the scientific table. To reach the reality of the table we need
to be endowed with sense-organs to weave images and illusions
about it. And so it seems to me that the first step in a broader
revelation to man must be the awakening of image-building in
connection with the higher faculties of his nature, so that these are
no longer blind alleys but open out into a spiritual world—a world
partly of illusion, no doubt, but in which he lives no less than in the
world, also of illusion, revealed by the senses.
The mystic, if haled before a tribunal of scientists, might perhaps
end his defence on this note. He would say, The familiar material
world of everyday conception, though lacking somewhat in scientific
truth, is good enough to live in; in fact the scientific world of pointer
readings would be an impossible sort of place to inhabit. It is a
symbolic world and the only thing that could live comfortably in it
would be a symbol. But I am not a symbol; I am compounded of
that mental activity which is from your point of view a nest of
illusion, so that to accord with my own nature I have to transform
even the world explored by my senses. But I am not merely made
up of senses; the rest of my nature has to live and grow. I have to
render account of that environment into which it has its outlet. My
conception of my spiritual environment is not to be compared with
your scientific world of pointer readings; it is an everyday world to
be compared with the material world of familiar experience. I claim
it as no more real and no less real than that. Primarily it is not a
world to be analysed, but a world to be lived in.
Granted that this takes us outside the sphere of exact
knowledge, and that it is difficult to imagine that anything
corresponding to exact science will ever be applicable to this part of
our environment, the mystic is unrepentant. Because we are unable
to render exact account of our environment it does not follow that it
would be better to pretend that we live in a vacuum.
If the defence may be considered to have held good against the
first onslaught, perhaps the next stage of the attack will be an easy
tolerance. “Very well. Have it your own way. It is a harmless sort of
belief—not like a more dogmatic theology. You want a sort of
spiritual playground for those queer tendencies in man’s nature,
which sometimes take possession of him. Run away and play then;
but do not bother the serious people who are making the world go
round.” The challenge now comes not from the scientific materialism
which professes to seek a natural explanation of spiritual power, but
from the deadlier moral materialism which despises it. Few
deliberately hold the philosophy that the forces of progress are
related only to the material side of our environment, but few can
claim that they are not more or less under its sway. We must not
interrupt the “practical men”, these busy moulders of history carrying
us at ever-increasing pace towards our destiny as an ant-heap of
humanity infesting the earth. But is it true in history that material
forces have been the most potent factors? Call it of God, of the
Devil, fanaticism, unreason; but do not underrate the power of the
mystic. Mysticism may be fought as error or believed as inspired, but
it is no matter for easy tolerance—

We are the music-makers

And we are the dreamers of dreams
Wandering by lone sea-breakers
And sitting by desolate streams;

World-losers and world-forsakers,

On whom the pale moon gleams:
Yet we are the movers and shakers
Of the world for ever, it seems.

Reality and Mysticism. But a defence before the scientists may not
be a defence to our own self-questionings. We are haunted by the
word reality. I have already tried to deal with the questions which
arise as to the meaning of reality; but it presses on us so
persistently that, at the risk of repetition, I must consider it once
more from the standpoint of religion. A compromise of illusion and
reality may be all very well in our attitude towards physical
surroundings; but to admit such a compromise into religion would
seem to be a trifling with sacred things. Reality seems to concern
religious beliefs much more than any others. No one bothers as to
whether there is a reality behind humour. The artist who tries to
bring out the soul in his picture does not really care whether and in
what sense the soul can be said to exist. Even the physicist is
unconcerned as to whether atoms or electrons really exist; he
usually asserts that they do, but, as we have seen, existence is there
used in a domestic sense and no inquiry is made as to whether it is
more than a conventional term. In most subjects (perhaps not
excluding philosophy) it seems sufficient to agree on the things that
we shall call real, and afterwards try to discover what we mean by
the word. And so it comes about that religion seems to be the one
field of inquiry in which the question of reality and existence is
treated as of serious and vital importance.
But it is difficult to see how such an inquiry can be profitable.
When Dr. Johnson felt himself getting tied up in argument over
“Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of
matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal”, he
answered, “striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone,
till he rebounded from it,—‘I refute it thus’” Just what that action
assured him of is not very obvious; but apparently he found it
comforting. And to-day the matter-of-fact scientist feels the same
impulse to recoil from these flights of thought back to something
kickable, although he ought to be aware by this time that what
Rutherford has left us of the large stone is scarcely worth kicking.
There is still the tendency to use “reality” as a word of magic
comfort like the blessed word “Mesopotamia”. If I were to assert the
reality of the soul or of God, I should certainly not intend a
comparison with Johnson’s large stone—a patent illusion—or even
with the ′s and ′s of the quantum theory—an abstract symbolism.
Therefore I have no right to use the word in religion for the purpose
of borrowing on its behalf that comfortable feeling which (probably
wrongly) has become associated with stones and quantum co-
ordinates.
Scientific instincts warn me that any attempt to answer the
question “What is real?” in a broader sense than that adopted for
domestic purposes in science, is likely to lead to a floundering
among vain words and high-sounding epithets. We all know that
there are regions of the human spirit untrammelled by the world of
physics. In the mystic sense of the creation around us, in the
expression of art, in a yearning towards God, the soul grows upward
and finds the fulfilment of something implanted in its nature. The
sanction for this development is within us, a striving born with our
consciousness or an Inner Light proceeding from a greater power
than ours. Science can scarcely question this sanction, for the
pursuit of science springs from a striving which the mind is impelled
to follow, a questioning that will not be suppressed. Whether in the
intellectual pursuits of science or in the mystical pursuits of the
spirit, the light beckons ahead and the purpose surging in our nature
responds. Can we not leave it at that? Is it really necessary to drag
in the comfortable word “reality” to be administered like a pat on the
back?
The problem of the scientific world is part of a broader problem—
the problem of all experience. Experience may be regarded as a
combination of self and environment, it being part of the problem to
disentangle these two interacting components. Life, religion,
knowledge, truth are all involved in this problem, some relating to
the finding of ourselves, some to the finding of our environment
from the experience confronting us. All of us in our lives have to
make something of this problem; and it is an important condition
that we who have to solve the problem are ourselves part of the
problem. Looking at the very beginning, the initial fact is the feeling
of purpose in ourselves which urges us to embark on the problem.
We are meant to fulfil something by our lives. There are faculties
with which we are endowed, or which we ought to attain, which
must find a status and an outlet in the solution. It may seem
arrogant that we should in this way insist on moulding truth to our
own nature; but it is rather that the problem of truth can only spring
from a desire for truth which is in our nature.
A rainbow described in the symbolism of physics is a band of
aethereal vibrations arranged in systematic order of wave-length
from about .000040 cm. to .000072 cm. From one point of view we
are paltering with the truth whenever we admire the gorgeous bow
of colour, and should strive to reduce our minds to such a state that
we receive the same impression from the rainbow as from a table of
wave-lengths. But although that is how the rainbow impresses itself
on an impersonal spectroscope, we are not giving the whole truth
and significance of experience—the starting-point of the problem—if
we suppress the factors wherein we ourselves differ from a
spectroscope. We cannot say that the rainbow, as part of the world,
was meant to convey the vivid effects of colour; but we can perhaps
say that the human mind as part of the world was meant to perceive
it that way.

Significance and Values. When we think of the sparkling waves as

moved with laughter we are evidently attributing a significance to
the scene which was not there. The physical elements of the water—
the scurrying electric charges—were guiltless of any intention to
convey the impression that they were happy. But so also were they
guiltless of any intention to convey the impression of substance, of
colour, or of geometrical form of the waves. If they can be held to
have had any intention at all it was to satisfy certain differential
equations—and that was because they are the creatures of the
mathematician who has a partiality for differential equations. The
physical no less than the mystical significance of the scene is not
there; it is here—in the mind.
What we make of the world must be largely dependent on the
sense-organs that we happen to possess. How the world must have
changed since man came to rely on his eyes rather than his nose!
You are alone on the mountains wrapt in a great silence; but equip
yourself with an extra artificial sense-organ and, lo! the aether is
hideous with the blare of the Savoy bands. Or—

The isle is full of noises,

Sounds, and sweet airs, that give delight, and hurt not.
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments
Will hum about mine ears; and sometimes voices.
 So far as broader characteristics are concerned we see in Nature
what we look for or are equipped to look for. Of course, I do not
mean that we can arrange the details of the scene; but by the light
and shade of our values we can bring out things that shall have the
broad characteristics we esteem. In this sense the value placed on
permanence creates the world of apparent substance; in this sense,
perhaps, the God within creates the God in Nature. But no complete
view can be obtained so long as we separate our consciousness from
the world of which it is a part. We can only speak speculatively of
that which I have called the “background of the pointer readings”;
but it would at least seem plausible that if the values which give the
light and shade of the world are absolute they must belong to the
background, unrecognised in physics because they are not in the
pointer readings but recognised by consciousness which has its roots
in the background. I have no wish to put that forward as a theory; it
is only to emphasise that, limited as we are to a knowledge of the
physical world and its points of contact with the background in
isolated consciousness, we do not quite attain that thought of the
unity of the whole which is essential to a complete theory.
Presumably human nature has been specialised to a considerable
extent by the operation of natural selection; and it might well be
debated whether its valuation of permanence and other traits now
apparently fundamental are essential properties of consciousness or
have been evolved through interplay with the external world. In that
case the values given by mind to the external world have originally
come to it from the external world-stuff. Such a tossing to and fro of
values is, I think, not foreign to our view that the world-stuff behind
the pointer readings is of nature continuous with the mind.
In viewing the world in a practical way values for normal human
consciousness may be taken as standard. But the evident possibility
of arbitrariness in this valuation sets us hankering after a standard
that could be considered final and absolute. We have two
alternatives. Either there are no absolute values, so that the
sanctions of the inward monitor in our consciousness are the final
court of appeal beyond which it is idle to inquire. Or there are
absolute values; then we can only trust optimistically that our values
are some pale reflection of those of the Absolute Valuer, or that we
have insight into the mind of the Absolute from whence come those
strivings and sanctions whose authority we usually forbear to
question.
I have naturally tried to make the outlook reached in these
lectures as coherent as possible, but I should not be greatly
concerned if under the shafts of criticism it becomes very ragged.
Coherency goes with finality; and the anxious question is whether
our arguments have begun right rather than whether they have had
the good fortune to end right. The leading points which have
seemed to me to deserve philosophic consideration may be
summarised as follows:
(1) The symbolic nature of the entities of physics is generally
recognised; and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a
way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of
something wider.
(2) Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas
of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction and it is not
possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all
the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently.
This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject
to deterministic law or alternatively that it can suspend deterministic
law in the material world.
(3) Recognising that the physical world is entirely abstract and
without “actuality” apart from its linkage to consciousness, we
restore consciousness to the fundamental position instead of
representing it as an inessential complication occasionally found in
the midst of inorganic nature at a late stage of evolutionary history.
(4) The sanction for correlating a “real” physical world to certain
feelings of which we are conscious does not seem to differ in any
essential respect from the sanction for correlating a spiritual domain
to another side of our personality.