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Ricardo A. Halperin
An Inquiry
into the Root Causes
of the Great Recession
of 2007-2008
The Influence of Uncertainty in a Changing
Financial Environment
Ricardo A. Halperin
The Influence of
Uncertainty in a
Changing Financial
Environment
An Inquiry into the Root Causes of the Great
Recession of 2007–2008
Ricardo A. Halperin
Retired from the World Bank
Maryland, USA
At the end of 2001, I retired from the World Bank, where I had worked
for 25 years, and soon after I recognized the splendid opportunity ahead:
I had free time and no longer had to worry about earning a salary for
a living! Even before graduate school, I had developed a love for eco-
nomics inspired by an excellent teacher at the University of Buenos Aires:
Julio H.G. Olivera, and after retirement I decided to rekindle the rela-
tion. While consulting assignments came my way from time to time, I was
finally able to catch up on my readings, which I had neglected due to the
demands of my work; it helped that I had unlimited access to the Joint
Library of the IMF and the World Bank.
Then came the Great Recession of 2007–2008, and a few years ago
I concluded that, while many excellent works discussing it were already
available, some important aspects had not received the attention that they
deserved, so I decided to write this book.
During this time, I received suggestions from many former colleagues,
as well as encouragement and support from close friends and family. I
particularly want to thank Miguel E. Martinez, who read through several
early versions of this book, providing me with very helpful comments.
After Palgrave Macmillan accepted to publish the book, they followed
their standard practice of sending it out to a peer reviewer, who provided
very constructive comments and suggestions, which I was happy to take
into account as best I could. He, or she, deserves my thanks!
As authors usually declare, I alone bear responsibility for the ideas pre-
sented here. To all those that helped this book come to print, my heartfelt
thanks!
vii
Contents
1 A Failure of Imagination 1
Part I Crisis! 15
ix
x Contents
12 Prudential Regulation 221
15 Summing Up 267
Bibliography 275
Index 281
About the Author
xi
CHAPTER 1
A Failure of Imagination
…In summary, your majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, extent and sever-
ity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a
failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country
and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole….
the Federal Reserve (Fed), the “Maestro” Alan Greenspan, would write
an article titled “Why I Didn’t See the Crisis Coming”.1
This book tries to shed some light on this question. It starts with a dis-
cussion of how the Great Recession unfolded and of the actions taken to
overcome it, and in the second part, it proceeds to examine the role played
by developments in the financial sector.
The third part of the book explores how economic theory has changed
over time, and why macroeconomic models were not designed to provide
warnings about the impending crisis. It argues that the explanatory power
of these models had been eroded by developments in the financial sector
and notes that this sector is especially vulnerable to public perceptions of
risk, driven by uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment and its
prospects.
The last section of the book explores some policy options to reduce the
likelihood of another major downturn originating in the financial sector
and also to address some of the major challenges that the economy pres-
ently faces.
Background
The Industrial Revolution that started in UK toward the end of the eigh-
teenth century and eventually spread around the globe changed people’s
worldviews and expectations. For centuries household incomes had hardly
witnessed any growth, but the technological changes that gave its name to
the revolution enabled a quantum rise in production, as well as important
changes in its composition.
Despite initial high human and social costs, the Industrial Revolution
eventually increased the well-being of the vast majority of the population
in those countries that, starting in the twentieth century, would be called
the “developed world”. This revolution provides the backdrop for the
economic theories that prevail today.
Presently we are living through a new wave of innovations in technol-
ogy which, though not as momentous as those of the past, continue to
improve the quality of our lives. Furthermore, today there is a widespread
expectation that technological progress will go on, providing an impor-
tant enabling condition for economic growth, despite the recent concerns
of some economists that this progress may not be powerful enough to
help us to achieve the rates of growth that we had in the past.
A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION 3
A Changing Environment
The economic growth that the USA experienced, particularly since the end
of the Civil War, has enabled households to save some of their incomes,
and over time this has resulted in a significant increase in national wealth,
which includes housing, durable goods (such as automobiles), buildings
and equipment used for the production of goods and services, and invest-
ments in education and technical training (human wealth). Excluding the
latter, wealth estimates for the USA amount to more than $80 trillion, and
this figure may be compared to annual gross domestic product (GDP),
which is about $18 trillion.
Most households do not manage directly the physical assets used for
production; this is mostly done by corporations. Households provide them
with the resources to do this and, in return, corporations issue legal instru-
ments that entitle those households to a “share” of the net assets of the
corporations, and consequently of their profits. Households also provide
corporations with loans, sometimes directly—by purchasing debt instru-
ments that the corporations issue—and more often indirectly, through the
financial intermediaries in which they place their savings. Governments
also have tapped into household wealth by selling them debt instruments.
Thus, other than for education, housing and consumer durables, the
wealth of households is largely held in the form of financial instruments;
it is financial wealth.
Housing ownership in the USA is widespread, and it is estimated
that over 60% of households own the home where they live. Ownership
of financial assets, on the other hand, tends to be more concentrated
among those in the middle and upper income brackets. Data compiled by
Campbell shows that housing accounts for over 40% of nonhuman wealth
in the USA; vehicles, valuables and other physical assets for over 22%;
4 R.A. HALPERIN
and financial wealth for 30%. Other developed countries exhibit a similar
pattern, the proportion of financial wealth depending on institutional
arrangements and rising with the countries’ average income per capita.2
In the two or three decades immediately preceding the Great Recession
of 2007–2008, the world economy experienced a number of significant
changes of which the most important was thought to be the spread of
globalization. On the other hand, until the Great Recession happened,
the rapid growth that financial intermediation had been experiencing,
accompanied by the proliferation of new financial instruments, did not
receive much scrutiny and—by and large—was not discussed critically by
the media. It would appear that at the time awareness of its broader impli-
cations was limited.
This omission has become an important shortcoming. When we exam-
ine macroeconomic developments, we should pay special attention to the
financial markets, and the macroeconomic models upon which we ulti-
mately rely should consider the linkages between the real and the financial
sectors, and identify the variables that impact the latter. The challenge, of
course, will be to do so without engaging in excessive complexity.
the orthodox economists have been much preoccupied with elegant elaborations
of minor problems, which distract the attention of their pupils from the uncon-
genial realities of the modern world….7
A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION 7
the economic theory that is taught… – the intellectual basis of economic policy
in capitalist democracies – is seriously flawed… The model does not deal with
time, money, uncertainty, financing of ownership of capital assets, and invest-
ment… The Wall Streets of this world are important; they generate destabiliz-
ing forces, and from time to time the financial processes of our economy lead to
serious threats of financial and economic instability…
A Changing Context
Today, financial transfers across borders are easy to carry out and respond
in real time to developments everywhere. Hence, economists and politi-
cians not only need to abandon the facile assumption that it is possible to
develop economic policies for a country largely in isolation from what is
taking place outside its borders; they must also work harder to coordinate
policies between countries.
At present, the accumulated amounts of liquid savings that can move
across borders have grown to such a level that, in many cases, currency
runs cannot be readily offset by monetary authorities, adding volatility to
exchange rates, potentially weakening their relationship to “real” variables
in the short run.
Economists need to shed their aversion to policies designed to constrain
short-term financial flows, and new instruments need to be enhanced or
developed to implement such policies, while preserving as much as pos-
sible the benefits of a substantially open economy.
In addition to the issues that are discussed in the pages of the daily
media, there are others of a long-term nature that are building up pres-
sures that will require the development of suitable policy responses.
Demographic trends and progress in medicine are expected to con-
tinue, resulting in an aging population structure in the developed and
most of the developing world, and this will require savings to continue to
steadily grow to enable a growing elderly population to support itself after
retirement. Consequently, an important policy challenge will be to protect
savings and their earning capacity from wide swings in value, as this would
have an important impact on the elderly.
At the same time, two related concerns arise: (a) as the labor force
becomes a smaller proportion of the total population (because the spike
caused by the incorporation of women to the labor market is largely
behind us, and also because younger people spend more time studying
before entering the market at the same time as life expectancies con-
tinue to increase), will productivity continue to increase fast enough to
offset these impacts and enable per capita incomes to continue to rise
as they did in the past?, and (b) will investment opportunities become
available at the same pace as savings increase, or will excessive savings
become a recessionary force that will need to be offset by government
spending?
Climate change looms as a major concern that will only increase in
importance as time passes; it will inevitably require governments to invest
in infrastructure to ameliorate its impact much more than they are doing
at present, and additional policy actions will need to be taken to conserve
energy and reduce carbon emissions; in both cases, fiscal policy will need
to play an important role.
We would be naïve to think that with this short list we have exhausted
the issues that economic theory will need to address and there are oth-
ers, such as the vulnerability of the financial sector to cyberattacks, which
lie outside the traditional domain of economic analysis, but which pose
a concern about their potentially devastating impact. Furthermore, with
time, new challenges that we cannot identify today will develop and
economic theory will need to periodically revisit its assumptions and mod-
els to ensure that they remain relevant.
This book does not explore these other important issues and is focused
on how we can develop a better understanding of our economic environ-
ment to help us to avoid repeats of financial crises, such as the one expe-
rienced in 2007–2008.
A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION 11
Notes
1. Greenspan, Alan “Why I Didn’t See the Crisis Coming”, Foreign
Affairs, November/December 2013, pp. 88–96.
2. Cf.: Campbell, J. “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of
Consumer Financial Regulation”, The American Economic Review,
May 2016, p. 5.
3. In this regard, Jean Tirole’s “textbook” on corporate finance
deserves a special mention, as the approach he pursues is largely
indistinguishable from that of conventional microeconomics, and
the many references that he provides come more from books and
articles by economists than from the more conventional literature
on finance. Cf.: Tirole, Jean, The Theory of Corporate Finance.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
4. Markowitz wrote on portfolio selection and the article through
which he introduced his approach was originally published in the
Journal of Finance.
5. American Economic Review, February 2011. The panel was inte-
grated by Kenneth Arrow, Douglas Bernheim, Martin Feldstein,
Daniel McFadden, James Poterba and Robert Solow.
6. An article written in 1981 by R. Schiller, “Do Stock Prices Move Too
Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?”
7. Robinson, Joan An Essay on Marxian Economics. London:
Macmillan and Co., 1964, p. 2.
8. Minsky, Hyman Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New York: Mc.
Graw Hill, 2008, p. 4.
9. This legislation was approved in 1930. It is named after the two
Republican legislators who promoted it. By levying taxes on US
imports, it resulted in retaliatory actions from most trading part-
ners, resulting in a reduction not just in imports but alsoin exports.
When it was being considered by Congress, over 1000 US econo-
mists, including Irving Fisher, asked President Hoover to veto the
bill. However, this did not happen and Bernanke, who studied the
Depression in depth, has argued that it increased its severity. Looking
back, it appears that the tariff increases under the law were not that
significant and that the most negative consequence was its impact on
international economic relations, shifting the position of the USA
on trade issues from promoting free trade toward protectionism.
PART I
Crisis!
CHAPTER 2
Introduction
By 2007 most people believed that the Great Depression belonged in the
history books, and in prior years some economists had argued that we had
the knowledge and the tools to ensure that a repeat incident could not
happen.1 Yet, to some degree, in 2007 some of those weaknesses that John
Galbraith found present in 19292 were still there, and the fear of a major
Depression soon awoke.
Until 1998 real estate prices had been increasing a little more than
inflation, but not by much, but by 1998 the rises started to accelerate,
averaging about 7% nationwide; the next year they went up again to over
8%, then almost 10% in the year 2000, continuing at roughly that pace
until 2004 when they further accelerated to almost 15%, repeating that
gain the following year. Of course, these national averages hide the fact
that some regions experienced much larger increases.
Then, in late 2006, housing markets started a free fall that lasted for
several years, causing many financial intermediaries with a significant stake
in those markets to run into serious trouble. These developments cascaded
throughout the financial sector and eventually the economy, causing a drop
in output and an important increase in unemployment. They triggered a
massive policy response from the government and the Fed, which eventu-
ally stemmed the downturn and caused the economy to slowly improve.
The seeds of the recession had been planted well before 2007, when
economic prospects looked bright. Interest rates then were relatively low,
providing an incentive to borrow. At a time when the growth of incomes
tended to concentrate in the most affluent sectors,3 the incentive to bor-
row appears to have been strong among those with lower incomes, who
may have regarded it as a low-risk strategy to enable them to eventually
increase their wealth.
Abundant liquidity caused financial intermediaries seeking returns
higher than those from more conventional investments to invest in
mortgage-backed instruments that were heavily weighted with sub-prime
mortgages. This appetite was fed by mortgage originators who proceeded
to securitize mortgage loans and sell those securities at a pace not wit-
nessed before. While securitization was not a new phenomenon, Tirole
notes that between 1995 and 2006 the rate of securitization of housing
loans increased from 30% to 81%.4
All these factors were known and could be regarded as ingredients for
the perfect storm. Despite this, how did the crisis of 2007–2008 creep
upon us, seemingly without warning? Or is it that policy makers failed to
understand them—or chose to ignore them?
Akerlof and Shiller answered these questions by arguing that:
But economists (and their models) also bear responsibility for the crisis. Flawed
monetary and regulatory policies were guided by economists’ models, and the
dominant models failed to predict the crisis … One of the reasons for the failures
of those models was their inadequate modeling of the credit markets (banks and
shadow banks) …
… the years leading up to the financial crisis and recession were characterized
by an increase in net investment by the US household sector that was funded by
borrowing rather than saving. The household sector’s shift from its role from the
1960s through the 1990s as a net funding source for other sectors’ investment to
a net borrowing position is something that appears to have been unprecedented
in the US postwar period
In his memoirs, Bernanke tells us that the Fed was well aware of develop-
ments in the housing markets, which it monitored. However, the potential
THE GREAT RECESSION OF 2007–2008 21
for a major financial meltdown was underestimated until it was too late,
and this may be in part because the shadow banking system did not get
from the Fed the attention it deserved.
Geithner also confirms that by the summer of 2007, the Fed had
become concerned about the course of the economy and points to the
failure of Countrywide (a large mortgage originator) that took place in
August 2007 as the starting event of the financial debacle.10 In a more
recent speech, Stanley Fischer points to even earlier indications of trouble
in the financial sector, going to late 2006 and culminating in the failure
of Ownit Mortgage Solutions, a large sub-prime mortgage originator, in
December of that year.11
Reading Bernanke and Geithner’s memoirs, one gets the sense that the
Fed did have timely information on many important developments in the
real as well as in the financial sector but failed to adequately interpret it
until it was too late. It may be that they were too close to the trees to be
able to see the forest, and it does appear that still in 2007 concerns about
inflation (which had been a perennial problem ever since the 1950s) were
in the minds of some decision makers. “Group-thinking”, perhaps just as
much as models, may account for this.
On the other hand, the data then available on operations in the shadow
banking system12 was sketchy, and even the Fed was dealing with frag-
mentary information, a shortcoming that appears to have not been fully
resolved to this day.
While, in hindsight, what took place in 2008 was qualitatively similar to
the financial bubbles that the world saw in the past,13 there were also some
differences arising from the increased importance achieved in recent times
by the financial sector, reflected in the larger share of financial holdings in
households’ wealth, and from the role played by the shadow banking sys-
tem. At the time, the increased importance of the shadow banking system,
highly leveraged and dependent on short-term funding was not recog-
nized by macroeconomic practitioners, who failed to capture its activities
in their models.
Waldenses, 403-415
Weeks, how and when made, 16, 30, 31
Wilderness of sin, record of, how connecting Gen. 2:1-3, and
Ex. 20:8-11, 46, 47
ERRATA.
Page 141, chapter xix., in the notes, should be chapter xxvii.
” 255, “and,” in the Latin notes, should be “&.”
” 295, “exaltation.” in line 16, should be “exultation.”
” 505, for “$70,000,” read $82,000,—Auditor’s later report.
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