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 CONTENTS IN DETAIL

TITLE PAGE

COPYRIGHT

DEDICATION

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FOREWORD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Who Is This Book For?
What Does “Simple” Mean?
What’s in This Book?
What’s NOT in This Book
How to Read This Book
About the Vocabulary
Theory Recaps
Objective or Opinionated?
The Examples
What About a Project?
Prerequisites
PART I: THE PYTHON ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER 1: THE PYTHON PHILOSOPHY
What Is Python, Exactly?
Myths: What Python Isn’t
Myth #1: Python Is Merely a Scripting Language
Myth #2: Python Is Slow
Myth #3: Python Cannot Be Compiled
Myth #4: Python Gets Compiled Behind the Scenes
Myth #5: Python Is Unsuitable for Large Projects
Python 2 vs. Python 3
Defining “Pythonic” Code
The Zen of Python
Documentation, PEPs, and You
Who Calls the Shots?
The Python Community
The Pursuit of the One Obvious Way
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 2: YOUR WORKBENCH

Installing Python
Installing on Windows
Installing on macOS
Installing on Linux
Installing from Source
Meet the Interpreter
Interactive Session
Running Python Files
Packages and Virtual Environments
Creating a Virtual Environment
Activating a Virtual Environment
Leaving a Virtual Environment
Introducing pip
System-Wide Packages
Installing Packages
requirements.txt
Upgrading Packages
Removing Packages
Finding Packages
One Warning About pip . . .
Virtual Environments and Git
The Whole Shebang
File Encoding
A Few Extra Virtual Environment Tricks
Using a Virtual Environment Without Activating
The Alternatives
The Line Limit Debate
Tabs or Spaces?
Quality Control: Static Analyzers
Pylint
Flake8
Mypy
Style Janitors: Autoformatting Tools
autopep8
Black
Testing Frameworks
An Exhibition of Code Editors
IDLE
Emacs and Vim
PyCharm
Visual Studio Code
Sublime Text
Spyder
Eclipse + PyDev/LiClipse
The Eric Python IDE
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 3: SYNTAX CRASH COURSE

Hello, World!
Statements and Expression
The Importance of Whitespace
Doing Nothing
Comments and Docstrings
Docstrings
Declaring Variables
What About Constants?
Mathematics
Meet the Number Types
Operators
The math Module
Logic
Conditionals
Comparison Operators
Boolean, None, and Identity Operators
Truthiness
Logical Operators
The Walrus Operator
Ellipsis
Strings
String Literals
Raw Strings
Formatted Strings
Template Strings
String Conversion
A Note on String Concatenation
Functions
Classes and Objects
Error Handling
Tuples and Lists
Loops
while Loop
Loop Control
for Loop
Structural Pattern Matching
Literal Patterns and Wildcards
Or Patterns
Capture Patterns
Guard Statements
More About Structural Pattern Matching
Wrapping Up
CHAPTER 4: PROJECT STRUCTURE AND IMPORTS
Setting Up the Repository
Modules and Packages
PEP 8 and Naming
Project Directory Structure
How import Works
Import Dos and Don’ts
Importing Functions from Modules
The Problem of Shadowing
The Trouble with Nested Packages
Beware of Importing All
Importing Within Your Project
Absolute Imports
Relative Imports
Importing from the Same Package
Entry Points
Module Entry Points
Package Entry Points
Controlling Package Imports
Program Entry Points
The Python Module Search Path
What Really Happens
Wrapping Up

PART II: ESSENTIAL STRUCTURES

CHAPTER 5: VARIABLES AND TYPES
Variables According to Python: Names and Values
Assignment
Data Types
The type() Function
Duck Typing
Scope and Garbage Collection
Local Scope and the Reference-Counting Garbage Collector
Interpreter Shutdown
Global Scope
The Dangers of Global Scope
The nonlocal Keyword
Scope Resolution
The Curious Case of the Class
Generational Garbage Collector
The Immutable Truth
Passing by Assignment
Collections and References
Shallow Copy
Deep Copy
Coercion and Conversion
A Note About Systems Hungarian Notation
Terminology Review
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 6: FUNCTIONS AND LAMBDAS

Python Function Essentials
Recursion
Default Argument Values
Keyword Arguments
On Overloaded Functions
Variadic Arguments
Keyword Variadic Arguments
Keyword-Only Parameters
Positional-Only Parameters
Argument Types: All Together Now!
Nested Functions
Closures
Recursion with Closures
Stateful Closures
Lambdas
Why Lambdas Are Useful
Lambdas as Sorting Keys
Decorators
Type Hints and Function Annotations
Duck Typing and Type Hints
Should You Use Type Hinting?
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 7: OBJECTS AND CLASSES

Declaring a Class
The Initializer
The Constructor
The Finalizer
Attributes
Instance Attributes
Class Attributes
Scope-Naming Conventions
Nonpublic
Public
Name Mangling
Public, Nonpublic, or Name Mangled?
Methods
Instance Methods
Class Methods
Static Methods
Properties
Setting Up the Scenario
Defining a Property
Property with Decorators
When Not to Use Properties
Special Methods
Scenario Setup
Conversion Methods
Comparison Methods
Binary Operator Support
Unary Operator Support
Making Callable
More Special Methods: Looking Ahead
Class Decorators
Structural Pattern Matching with Objects
Functional Meets Object Oriented
When to Use Classes
Classes Aren’t Modules
Single Responsibility
Sharing State
Are Objects Right for You?
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 8: ERRORS AND EXCEPTIONS

Exceptions in Python
Reading Tracebacks
Catching Exceptions: LBYL vs. EAFP
Multiple Exceptions
Beware the Diaper Anti-pattern
Raising Exceptions
Using Exceptions
Exceptions and Logging
Bubbling Up
Exception Chaining
Else and Finally
Else: “If All Goes Well”
Finally: “After Everything”
Creating Exceptions
A Gallery of Exceptions
Wrapping Up

PART III: DATA AND FLOW

CHAPTER 9: COLLECTIONS AND ITERATION
Loops
while Loops
for Loops
Collections
Tuples
Named Tuples
Lists
Deques
Sets
frozenset
Dictionaries
Check or Except?
Dictionary Variants
Unpacking Collections
Starred Expressions
Unpacking Dictionaries
Structural Pattern Matching on Collections
Accessing by Index or Key
Slice Notation
Start and Stop
Negative Indices
Steps
Copy with Slice
Slice Objects
Slicing on Custom Objects
Using islice
The in Operator
Checking Collection Length
Iteration
Iterables and Iterators
Manually Using Iterators
Iterating with for Loops
Sorting Collections in Loops
Enumerating Loops
Mutation in Loops
Loop Nesting and Alternatives
Iteration Tools
Basic Built-in Tools
Filter
Map
Zip
Itertools
Custom Iterable Classes
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 10: GENERATORS AND COMPREHENSIONS

Lazy Evaluation and Eager Iterables
Infinite Iterators
Generators
Generators vs. Iterator Classes
Closing Generators
Behavior on Close
Throwing Exceptions
yield from
Generator Expressions
Generator Objects Are Lazy
Generator Expressions with Multiple Loops
Conditionals in Generator Expressions
Nested Generator Expressions
List Comprehensions
Set Comprehensions
Dictionary Comprehensions
Hazards of Generator Expressions
They Quickly Become Unreadable
They Don’t Replace Loops
They Can Be Hard to Debug
When to Use Generator Expressions
Simple Coroutines
Returning Values from a Coroutine
Sequence of Behavior
What About Async?
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 11: TEXT IO AND CONTEXT MANAGERS

Standard Input and Output
Revisiting print()
Revisiting input()
Streams
Context Manager Basics
File Modes
Reading Files
The read() Method
The readline() Method
The readlines() Method
Reading with Iteration
Stream Position
Writing Files
The write() Method
The writelines() Method
Writing Files with print()
Line Separators
Context Manager Details
How Context Managers Work
Using Multiple Context Managers
Implementing the Context Management Protocol
The __enter__() Method
The __exit__() Method
Using the Custom Class
Paths
Path Objects
Parts of a Path
Creating a Path
Relative Paths
Paths Relative to Package
Path Operations
Out-of-Place File Writes
The os Module
File Formats
JSON
Other Formats
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 12: BINARY AND SERIALIZATION

Binary Notation and Bitwise
Number Systems Refresher
Python Integers and Binary
Bitwise Operations
Bytes Literals
Bytes-Like Objects
Creating a bytes Object
Using int.to_bytes()
Sequence Operations
Converting bytes to int
struct
struct Format String and Packing
Unpacking with struct
struct objects
Bitwise on Bytes-Like Objects
Bitwise Operations via Integers
Bitwise Operations via Iteration
memoryview
Reading and Writing Binary Files
Organizing the Data
Writing to a File
Reading from a Binary File
Seek with Binary Stream
BufferedRWPair
Serialization Techniques
Forbidden Tools: pickle, marshal, and shelve
Serialization Formats
Wrapping Up

PART IV: ADVANCED CONCEPTS

CHAPTER 13: INHERITANCE AND MIXINS
When to Use Inheritance
Crimes of Inheritance
Basic Inheritance in Python
Multiple Inheritance
Method Resolution Order
Ensuring Consistent Method Resolution Order
Explicit Resolution Order
Resolving Base Class in Multiple Inheritance
Mixins
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 14: METACLASSES AND ABCS

Metaclasses
Creating Classes with type
Custom Metaclasses
Type Expectations with Duck Typing
EAFP: Catching Exceptions
LBYL: Checking for Attributes
Abstract Classes
Built-in ABCs
Deriving from ABCs
Implementing Custom ABCs
Virtual Subclasses
Setting Up the Example
Using Virtual Subclassing
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 15: INTROSPECTION AND GENERICS

Special Attributes
Inside Object Attribute Access: The __dict__ Special Attribute
Listing Attributes
Getting an Attribute
Checking for an Attribute
Setting an Attribute
Deleting an Attribute
Function Attributes
The Wrong Way to Use Function Attributes
Mutability and Function Attributes
Descriptors
The Descriptor Protocol
Writing a Descriptor Class (the Slightly Wrong Way)
Using a Descriptor
Writing a Descriptor Class the Right Way
Using Multiple Descriptors in the Same Class
Slots
Binding Attribute Names to Values
Using Arbitrary Attributes with Slots
Slots and Inheritance
Immutable Classes
Single-Dispatch Generic Functions
Registering Single-Dispatch Functions with Type Hints
Registering Single-Dispatch Functions with Explicit Type
Registering Single-Dispatch Functions with the register() Method
Using the Element Class
Arbitrary Execution
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 16: ASYNCHRONY AND CONCURRENCY

Asynchrony in Python
The Example Scenario: Collatz Game, Synchronous Version
Asynchrony
Native Coroutines
Tasks
The Event Loop
Making It (Actually) Asynchronous
Scheduling and Asynchronous Execution Flow
Simplifying the Code
Asynchronous Iteration
Asynchronous Context Managers
Asynchronous Generators
Other Asynchrony Concepts
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 17: THREADING AND PARALLELISM

Threading
Concurrency vs. Parallelism
Basic Threading
Timeouts
Daemonic Threads
Futures and Executors
Timeouts with Futures
Race Conditions
A Race Condition Example
Creating Multiple Threads with ThreadPoolExecutor
Locks
Deadlock, Livelock, and Starvation
Passing Messages with Queue
Futures with Multiple Workers
Achieving Parallelism with Multiprocessing
Pickling Data
Speed Considerations and ProcessPoolExecutor
The Producer/Consumer Problem
Importing the Modules
Monitoring the Queue
Subprocess Cleanup
Consumers
Checking for an Empty Queue
Producers
Starting the Processes
Performance Results
Logging with Multiprocessing
Wrapping Up

PART V: BEYOND THE CODE

CHAPTER 18: PACKAGING AND DISTRIBUTION
Planning Your Packaging
The Dangers of Cargo Cult Programming
A Note on Packaging Opinions
Determining Your Packaging Goals
Project Structure: src or src-less
Packaging a Distribution Package with setuptools
Project Files and Structure
Where Metadata Belongs
The README.md and LICENSE Files
The setup.cfg File
The setup.py File
The MANIFEST.in File
The requirements.txt File
The pyproject.toml File
Testing the Setup Configuration
Building Your Package
Publishing on pip (Twine)
Uploading to Test PyPI
Installing Your Uploaded Package
Uploading to PyPI
Alternative Packaging Tools
Poetry
Flit
Distributing to End Users
PEX
Freezers
Images and Containers
A Note on Native Linux Packaging
Documentation
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 19: DEBUGGING AND LOGGING

Warnings
Types of Warnings
Filtering Warnings
Converting Warnings into Exceptions
Logging
Logger Objects
Handler Objects
Logging with Levels
Controlling the Log Level
Running the Example
Filter, Formatter, and Configuration
Assert Statements
Proper Use of assert
Wrong Use of assert
Seeing assert in Action
The inspect Module
Using pdb
A Debugging Example
Starting the Debugger
Debugger Shell Commands
Stepping Through the Code
Setting a Breakpoint and Stepping into a Function
Moving Through the Execution Stack
Inspecting the Source
Checking a Solution
Postmortem Debugging
Using faulthandler
Evaluating Your Program’s Security with Bandit
Reporting Bugs to Python
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 20: TESTING AND PROFILING

What About TDD?
Test Frameworks
The Example Project
Testing and Project Structure
Testing Basics
Starting the Example
Unit Testing
Executing the Tests with pytest
Testing for Exceptions
Test Fixtures
Continuing the Example: Using the API
Sharing Data Between Test Modules
Flaky Tests and Conditionally Skipping Tests
Advanced Fixtures: Mocking and Parametrizing
Continuing the Example: Representing a Typo
Parametrizing
Indirect Parametrization of Fixtures
Mocking Inputs with Monkeypatch
Marking
Capturing from Standard Streams
GUI Testing
Continuing the Example: Connecting the API to Typo
Autouse Fixtures
Mixed Parametrization
Fuzzing
Wrapping Up the Example
Code Coverage
Automating Testing with tox
Benchmarking and Profiling
Benchmarking with timeit
Profiling with cProfile or profile
tracemalloc
Wrapping Up

CHAPTER 21: THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

About the Future
Where Do You Go from Here?
Application Development in Python
Game Development in Python
Web Development in Python
Client-Side Python
Data Science in Python
Machine Learning in Python
Security
Embedded Development in Python
Scripting
Python Flavors
Developing for Python
Developing Python Packages and Tools
Developing Python Extensions
Contributing to Python
Getting Involved with Python
Asking Questions
Answering Questions
User Groups
PyLadies
Conferences
Joining the Python Software Foundation
And the Road Goes Ever On . . .

APPENDIX A: SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES AND METHODS

Special Methods
Special Attributes

APPENDIX B: PYTHON DEBUGGER (PDB) COMMANDS

APPENDIX : GLOSSARY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z

INDEX
 DEAD SIMPLE PYTHON

Idiomatic Python for the Impatient

Programmer

Jason C. McDonald
DEAD SIMPLE PYTHON. Copyright © 2023 by Jason C. McDonald.
All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior
written permission of the copyright owner and the publisher.
First printing
26 25 24 23 22 1 2 3 4 5
ISBN 13: 978-1-7185-0092-1 (print)
ISBN 13: 978-1-7185-0093-8 (ebook)
Publisher: William Pollock
Production Manager: Rachel Monaghan
Developmental Editor: Frances Saux
Production Editor: Rachel Monaghan
Cover and Interior Design: Octopod Studios
Cover Illustrator: Gina Redman
Technical Reviewers: Steven Bingler with Daniel Foerster, Ryan Palo, Denis
Pobedrya, and Simon de Vlieger
Copyeditors: Doug McNair with Anne McDonald
Compositor: Ashley McKevitt, Happenstance Type-O-Rama
Proofreader: James M. Fraleigh
Indexer: JoAnne Burek
For information on distribution, bulk sales, corporate sales, or translations, please
contact No Starch Press, Inc. directly at info@nostarch.com or:
No Starch Press, Inc.
245 8th Street, San Francisco, CA 94103
phone: 1.415.863.9900
www.nostarch.com
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: McDonald, Jason C., 1992- author.

Title: Dead simple Python : idiomatic Python for the impatient programmer /
Jason C. McDonald.
Description: San Francisco, CA : No Starch Press, Inc., [2023] | Includes
index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022018822 (print) | LCCN 2022018823 (ebook) | ISBN
9781718500921 (print) | ISBN
9781718500938 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Python (Computer program language) | Computer programming.
Classification: LCC QA76.73.P98 M397 2023 (print) | LCC QA76.73.P98
(ebook) | DDC 005.13/3--dc23/eng/20220616
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022018822
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022018823
No Starch Press and the No Starch Press logo are registered trademarks of No
Starch Press, Inc. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be
the trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than use a trademark symbol
with every occurrence of a trademarked name, we are using the names only in an
editorial fashion and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of
infringement of the trademark.
The information in this book is distributed on an “As Is” basis, without warranty.
While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this work, neither the
author nor No Starch Press, Inc. shall have any liability to any person or entity
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indirectly by the information contained in it.
 In loving
memory of Chris
“Fox” Frasier.
It’ll always be
“lern u a snek” to
you.
 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
 When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large numbers
concerning the foreign policy of the government, as in 1857 and
again in 1878 after the concealment of the Schuvalof agreement,
complaint was frequently made in Parliament and in the press to the
effect that Parliament on the one hand was not given a chance to
acquire a complete knowledge of foreign policy, and on the other it
was not sufficiently alert and active in using its opportunities for
control. In 1886 the following resolution was moved:

“That in the opinion of this House it is not just or

expedient to embark in war, contract engagements involving
grave responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the
Empire, without the knowledge and consent of Parliament.”

Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass. Mr. Gladstone opposed
it on the ground that the House of Commons under existing
arrangements actually possessed all necessary power of control and
that the passage of this resolution would mean simply that the
House of Lords would share this power with it.
In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to public criticism of
negotiations which were still in progress between Russia and Great
Britain regarding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the following
interesting and important statement with respect to the relations of
foreign policies to public opinion, which in temper resembles that of
Lord Clarendon cited above:

“The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine

which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty
of an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the conduct of
the Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of
discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world.
That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which
it is impossible to assent to.... If we are of opinion that the
course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government
 has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and
dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to
whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our absolute
Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is they, and
they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief which is
going on. You have a form of Government which in many
points is purely democratic, and you must take it with the
incidents which naturally adhere to it, and one of these
incidents is publicity of deliberation. The Cabinet is the
people, and their deliberations are conducted in the open
field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal fully
and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their
determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes,
but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if
Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged
communications between you and those by whose verdict you
must stand. You cannot suppress the argument because
somebody else outside hears it and you may be adversely
affected by it....”

The concealment of important obligations and the growing

secrecy of diplomatic affairs during the first decade of the Twentieth
Century brought on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the House
of Commons. After the secret agreement concerning Morocco
became known, Mr. John Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a
speech in the House of Commons in September, 1911:

“I do not believe any representative assembly in the

history of the world has ever been called upon to discuss a
matter so vital and so far-reaching as that which the House of
Commons has before it to-day to consider, and with so
absolute a lack of information.... The House was summoned
for this discussion to-day without any papers whatsoever....
We ought at all events to have had an account of diplomatic
correspondence between the four great Powers intimately
 interested in the question of Morocco, as is customary to be
given to the House of Commons on such an occasion. This
would have enabled members of the House before the debate
commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment upon
the whole matter. We have heard a good deal to-night of the
secrecy of the Foreign policy of this country. It is no use
attempting to deny it. Those of us who have been a long time
in this House, and can remember the methods of the Foreign
Office twenty-five years ago, know as a matter of fact, which
cannot be successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy
has become during the last ten years progressively more
secret every year. Until this present year this has gone on,
when the intense pressure of Foreign Affairs and the danger
of war has forced the hands of the Minister to give some time
for the discussion of Foreign Office affairs. For ten years the
Foreign policy of this country has been conducted behind an
elaborate screen of secrecy. Some of us pointed out years
ago that the secrecy of Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and
logical result of that new departure which was heralded about
ten years ago, and which we heard praised once more on the
floor of this House to-night. I refer to what is known as the
policy of the continuity of the Foreign policy of this country;
of the withdrawal of the Foreign policy of this country from
the sphere of party politics.”

At the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill expressed himself very

strongly on the subject of withholding information from Parliament,
in the following terms:

“From generation to generation, you have allowed treaties

involving the highest international obligations—involving
questions of peace and war—to be taken absolutely out of the
hands of the House. It is no exaggeration to say, so far as
international policy is concerned, you have rendered the
House as little effectively powerful as any man walking over
 Westminster Bridge. Over and over again treaties involving
matters of life and death, involving questions of first-class
importance, have been ratified behind the back of
Parliament.... The people themselves must be allowed to
know all about this diplomacy and what it is. And there
should be no secrecy in regard to high diplomatic statecraft
about it. The House of Commons is sample judge of what is
discreet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete absurdity
for others to treat us as children or for us to allow ourselves
to be so treated in matters of such high international
importance as those involving questions of peace and war.”

Sir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy up to a certain point
was necessary and that particularly the ratification of treaties could
not be previously discussed. He then made the very significant
remark that not until the House of Commons “was really free to
devote itself to discussions of imperial affairs would it get control.” In
other words as long as the House of Commons remains a body
occupied primarily with domestic and local legislation it cannot spare
the attention necessary for an effective control of foreign policy.
Early in 1914, evidence was taken by a select committee on
House of Commons procedure. Mr. Balfour during these discussions
rather emphasized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign
affairs. He thinks that such matters should not be aired too
frequently in the House of Commons, because indiscreet speeches,
which can be perfectly appraised in the House, may make bad blood
when reported. Diplomatic conversations must be kept confidential if
you are to work the European system at all. But though the House of
Commons does not and cannot know the current details of
international negotiations, it is not uninformed. This plainly is the
language of a statesman to whom the idiosyncrasies of the
European system are so familiar that they seem to be the only
natural state of affairs. The statement is made from the point of
view of the expert who rather resents any sort of interference on the
part of the less well informed.
 In March, 1918, it was moved in the House of Commons:

“That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Committee

of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, representative of all
parties and groups in the House, in order that a regular
channel of communication may be established between the
Foreign Secretary and the House of Commons, which will
afford him frequent opportunities of giving information on
questions of Foreign policy and which, by allowing Members
to acquaint themselves more fully with current international
problems, will enable this House to exercise closer supervision
over the general conduct of Foreign Affairs....”

Mr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on this motion and

further elaborated the ideas which he had put forward in 1914. In a
speech delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably the most
complete and persuasive exposition of the value of traditional
methods in diplomacy:

“... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are great

instruments for preventing, as far as can be prevented, and
diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, friction between
States which are, or which ought to be, friendly. How is the
task of peace-maker—because that is largely the task which
falls to diplomatists and to the Foreign Office, which controls
diplomatists—to be pursued if you are to shout your
grievances from the housetop whenever they occur? The only
result is that you embitter public feeling, that the differences
between the two States suddenly attain a magnitude they
ought never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers
of the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parliaments
of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great
crises arise, which may end, have ended sometimes, in
international catastrophes.... Office officials, or officials of any
Department,—to expend some of their energy in getting
ready for cross-examination, you will really be destroying the
public service. There is nothing on which I feel more strongly
than that. They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not
to be accustomed to it.... I do not hold the view that antique
methods are pursued by diplomatists which no man of
common sense adopts in the ordinary work of every-day life.
On the contrary, the work of diplomacy is exactly the work
which is done every day between two great firms, for
instance, which have business relations, or between two great
corporate entities which have interests diverging or interests
in common. If you are a man of sense you do not create
difficulties to begin with. You try to get over all these things
without the embitterment which advertisement always brings
with it. It is when you begin to press your case in public that
antagonism arises. In private—in conversation which need not
go beyond the walls of the room in which you are,—you can
put your case as strongly as you like, and the gentleman with
whom you are carrying on the discussion may put his case as
strongly as he likes, and if good manners are observed and
nothing but fair discussion takes place no soreness remains
and no one is driven to ignore the strong points of his
opponent’s case. Directly a controversy becomes public all
that fair give-and-take becomes either difficult or
impossible.... But if all you mean ... is that it is wrong for the
nations of the world to find themselves hampered in their
mutual relations by treaties of which those countries know
nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say that there have
not been secret treaties which were inevitable; but I do say
that, if they are necessary, they are a necessary evil. Please
remember that two nations make a treaty together for their
mutual advantage. Both are desirous of passing it. One nation
says, ‘It is against our interest that this treaty should be made
public at present.’ The other says, ‘We do not like being
committed to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make
public at once.’ Which is going to prevail?... It does not rest
with any single Foreign Office, British or other. It is always an
 arrangement between two—possibly three or four, Foreign
Offices. You cannot lay down—and I do not think you would
be wise to lay down, an absolute rule that under no
circumstances, and for no object, could you so far concede
the point as to say that a treaty is to be made which is not to
become public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that
that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable one.
To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible limits
should, I think, be the object of every responsible statesman
who has the control of foreign affairs. Beyond that I do not
feel inclined to go. I do not see any signs of a grasp of the
true realities of life in the Motion before us. You should have
your control over those who manage your affairs, but it is not
the kind of control which the honorable Member wishes to set
up with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a different
control. You must know, broadly speaking, what the general
lines of policy are, and I maintain that that is thoroughly
known with regard to foreign affairs at this moment by every
man in this House who takes the trouble to think. The general
lines on which we are proceeding are thoroughly known.”

This argument brings out all the strong points of the system of
secret diplomacy under the existing conditions of international
politics, but it contains no hint that these conditions need
improvement. They cannot, as a matter of fact, be improved until
some strong nations, even at the risk of disadvantage to themselves,
take the lead in placing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis.
 XII
THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY
In consequence of the startling developments in diplomacy
which preceded and accompanied the great war, the relation of
democracy to diplomacy has been earnestly discussed of late,
particularly in Great Britain.
When considering this important matter, the distinction between
the methods of diplomacy and diplomatic policies should be borne in
mind for the sake of clearness of thought. The development of
public opinion, the disappearance of purely dynastic aims of state
action, and the constantly broadening outlook of political life, have
led to the elimination of most of the cruder methods of deception
and intrigue. But two questions still remain: Should diplomatic
negotiations be carried on in the public view, that is with constant
and full information given to the public or parliament, on all
important details? and, Should the diplomatic policy of a democratic
government at all times be kept fully before the representative
bodies, and the public?
Most discussions which favor the use of secret diplomacy, refer
to the presumed necessity of confidential methods of negotiation.
But there are some publicists and statesmen who believe that the
policy of foreign affairs itself can best be handled by responsible
statesmen keeping their own counsel and giving to the public only a
general adumbration of the trend of policy. These two questions are
constantly mixed up in current discussion; and their absolute
separation is indeed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic policy
will naturally accentuate the secrecy of the methods employed.
Abstractly considered, it would be quite possible to have the foreign
policy of a country determined by public action, and still to surround
diplomatic negotiations with secrecy. But if the substance of the
policy were definitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods would
lose much of its effectiveness.
The use of such methods is defended from two points of view;
from that of the trader who looks for a better bargain through not
having given away his entire hand at the beginning; and from that of
the builder who desires to work quietly without interruptions from an
excitable public, who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away
contrasts which publicity would tend to exaggerate.
There is an ex post facto publicity of diplomatic policy. If this is
afforded as soon as a new situation has arisen or a new agreement
has been created, some of the harm of secrecy is avoided. In such a
case the statesmen, cabinet, or conference, practically give
assurance that, if allowed to work quietly on a certain problem, they
will produce a solution which will commend itself in general to the
sense of equity of the nation or nations concerned; although the
sum total of the arrangement may contain details which, considered
by themselves, would be unacceptable and which might have
interfered with the making of an accord, if unduly emphasized or
given publicity during the negotiations.
Mr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918, which has already
been referred to, indeed speaks quite convincingly of the advantage
of confidential relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but he goes
so far as strongly to deprecate a demand for information on the part
of Parliament. In that he certainly shows a measure of anti-
democratic bias, as when he says, “Do not suppose that we can do
the work better by having to explain it to a lot of people who are not
responsible. That is not the way to get business properly done.” He
therefore rejects the idea of a parliamentary committee of control in
the matter of foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the
existence of secret treaties is an evil, although he thinks that it may
be at certain times necessary, because the associated treaty power
may desire it. He is mildly deprecatory, at best.
Count Czernin, speaking to the Austrian delegations on June 24,
1918, concerning President Wilson’s fourteen points, stated that he
has no objection to the introduction of the principle of “open
covenants,” although he confesses that he does not know by what
means effective adherence thereto can be assured. Concerning
diplomatic negotiations, which he treats simply as a matter of
business, he points out the advantages of secrecy from the point of
view of trading. Moreover, if there were full publicity, the general
public might passionately oppose every action involving any
concession as a defeat. This would not be conducive to peaceable
relations.
There are those who believe that the chief evils of secret
diplomacy would be avoided if ample opportunity were given for
discussion in representative assemblies, if there were a
parliamentary committee keeping constantly in touch with the
conduct of foreign relations, and if treaties and declarations of war
could not be made without the consent of the national legislature.
Some advocates of democratic control go so far as to reason that a
decision to make war and thereby to order the shedding of human
blood, should not be made without a national referendum vote.
On the other hand, those opposed to all publicity of diplomatic
affairs argue that international policies cannot be determined in the
market place. They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that as
democracy cannot be expected to regulate the details of an
important undertaking, it is particularly unqualified to deal with
international matters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are
required. Followers of this opinion believe that the conduct of foreign
affairs is best placed quite unreservedly in the hands of responsible
statesmen, who have greater information, larger experience and
more self-control than the average of humanity. They generally have
in view the preservation of national interests, under conditions of
peace if possible; they will not be inflamed by exciting incidents, but
will keep these in proper subordination to the general plan. Such
details, if made public, would easily lead to occurrences that would
upset the results of wise planning. As Lord Cromer has said, it is
such untoward chance incidents which cannot be controlled that are
to be feared, rather than any deliberate plotting on the part of
diplomats. Such responsible statesmen always remain accountable
for the general results of their policy; they are conscious of the
importance of their trust, and therefore are a safer repository of
discretionary powers than a general committee.
Back of these arguments, however, there usually lies the
conviction that the public is superficial, easily swayed, excitable and
altogether delighting more in the hurrah of war than in the
humdrum of peace. It might be remarked that if such had actually
been the case, the most recent experience of the people with war
has probably given them a different idea of the attractiveness of that
kind of excitement; unless indeed the mass of humanity are
irremediably and forever fools, when taken in the aggregate.
The sensational character of the daily press must be considered
in this connection. The news value of normal, peaceable
developments is very small. It is therefore a godsend to the
newspapers when something extraordinary happens, particularly in
international affairs. For this reason, the daily news frequently
presents an untrue or warped picture of the actual situation. Gilbert
Murray asks what people are referred to by those who demand
popular control of diplomacy; are they the people of educational
societies, or of the music halls? The public is not homogeneous, or
so organized as to give expression to convictions on current affairs
which have been maturely considered. It lacks the leisure and
training for penetrating superficialities and going to the bottom of
difficult questions. Lord Cromer believes in general that democracies
are not peaceful, and he refers particularly to the American
democracy for proof; Lord Lytton said, “Governments are generally
for diplomacy, the people for war.”
 Men of all shades of opinion are agreed that the people are not
greatly interested in foreign affairs, and the opponents of proposals
of democratic control argue that it would be useless to create
machinery for action where there exists no interest, nor purpose to
act.
It is quite true that the public during the nineteenth century
seemed less interested in foreign affairs than during the eighteenth.
At the earlier time, diplomacy was a fascinating, personal game,
about which the wiseacres in the coffee houses were eager to make
their criticisms and prognostications. When the middle class came to
power in the nineteenth century, it was primarily interested in
economic and other domestic questions, and was satisfied to leave
the conduct of foreign affairs to statesmen and diplomats. The
constantly growing political consciousness of the public at large was
concentrated chiefly on questions of internal politics and reform.
Foreign affairs, as they reached the public, were thought of still from
the point of view of the onlooker, rather than of him who actually
had to bear the brunt of the burden. Those who had to bleed and
die when hostilities had been brought about, never had any chance,
nor determination, to influence the course of diplomacy leading up
to wars.
With such a general apathy of the public, it was not surprising
that diplomacy should cling to its caste privileges, should try to
preserve its discretionary powers, and should often attempt
deliberately to keep people in the dark. “In the public interest” is the
curtain beyond which no one may peer. Even in the American
Government, particularly during and since the war, foreign affairs
have been handled with what would ordinarily seem insufficient
information to the public; in fact, with occasional putting forth of
misleading and entirely partial information, or the refusal to furnish
information even when requested by those having official
responsibilities. This is a notable change, as up to 1914 it was
substantially true that the United States had no diplomatic secrets.
 While from the point of view of traditional diplomacy, and of
international relations as they were up to the Great War, it seems
quite natural that democratic control should be thought by many to
be unpractical; and while indeed no one can flatter himself that
through a change of method the conduct of international affairs
could suddenly be rendered more wise and entirely effective towards
the public welfare, yet I cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a
wrong orientation in the emphasis of the need of secrecy and of the
unfitness of the people to deal with problems of foreign affairs. The
belief in the unfitness of the people in this matter appears to be the
result of a preconceived notion as to the overpowering difficulty,
complexity and almost sanctity of foreign affairs. Modern
governments are based on the principle that all legislation must
meet the test of public criticism and rest on public consent; certainly
it cannot be argued that matters of the incidence of taxation, the
proper organization of credit, and the determination of commercial
policies, are less complex and intricate than are foreign affairs. It is
indeed true that it is difficult for one nation thoroughly to appreciate
in detail the conditions of life in another. This truth should have its
greatest value in dissuading a nation from meddling with the internal
affairs of another, even from good motives. Those international
questions which are apt to produce war may indeed relate to
intricate matters, but the essential point is always the contention for
power, influence or commercial advantage, and it is not apparent
why the public in general should be unfit to judge as to whether
national treasure and life are eventually to be spent in huge
quantities to bring about, or to prevent, any such shifting of power
or influence.
It is, however, because the motives involved are so largely
connected with class interests, or survivals of pride of race, that
those concerned in them are eager to deny the fitness of the general
public, which if called on to decide would put into the foreground the
question, “How does the control of this or that group of capitalists in
Morocco, for instance, or the greater or smaller influence of Austria
or Russia in Servia, affect the daily life and welfare of our people?” It
is certainly true that questions of peace and war have never
definitely been reasoned out on that basis. There has always been
the assumption that certain things were essential to national
prestige and could not be questioned; it is only when the actually
existing broader base of national political life is organized also for
active control of foreign affairs, that these considerations will have
their full weight. Only the most exceptional statesmen could lift
themselves out of the narrow groove of tradition and precedent; and
more exceptional still, in fact all but impossible, is the capacity of
one man to represent in himself in just proportion, all the interests
and feelings of a nation.
Infallibility cannot be expected in the handling of foreign affairs,
whether under a broad discretion of statesmen or under strict
democratic control. There will always be an alternative of wisdom
and rashness, constructive planning and headlong action,
carefulness and negligence. But past experience has certainly
established beyond peradventure of doubt that secret diplomacy is
not infallible, and particularly that diplomacy acting under absolutist
traditions, as in Germany before the war, may make the most fatal
mistakes of judgment and of policy. Balfour said: “I do not think the
Government in June, 1914, had the slightest idea that there was any
danger ahead.” A remarkable statement, when we consider the
actions and reactions of secret diplomacy during the decade
preceding the war. It has been quite truly said that diplomacy is far
more eminent in autopsy than in diagnosis. M. Cheradame
somewhat severely observes, “The typical diplomat lives in a world
of his own. His information is rarely obtained by direct observation of
people and facts.” And while ordinarily men of exceptional talents
are selected for the difficulty position of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
yet all considered, it is hard to believe that were decisions on the
essential matters of international life made on a broader basis, and
influenced more by a direct action of public opinion, the result would
be less wise.
Active participation of the people in the making of momentous
decisions regarding foreign affairs, is denied either under the
assumption that the people might not be ready to face the fateful
test, or, by the majority, with the thought that the people are too
excitable and rash to be trusted with such far-reaching decisions.
While it is indeed easy to generate warlike excitement among the
masses, it must be remembered, when such a charge of rashness is
made, that the people have never been currently informed of the
development of international dangers, but usually at a critical time
shreds of information have been flashed on them, designed or at
least apt to stir up all their atavistic love of fight and fear of attack.
Even thus, the greatest noise is made usually by those who do not in
the event of hostilities actually have to risk their blood and bones.
It stands to reason that if honestly kept informed about
international relationships, the people would be far less prone to
sudden excitement. Very few people indeed appear to doubt that
had the decision of war or no war been laid before the peoples of
Europe in 1914, with a full knowledge of the facts, the terrible
catastrophe would never have come about. As Mr. Lowes Dickinson
has said, if the people had been allowed to share the apprehension
and precautions of the diplomats before 1914, there would have
been quite a simple and clear question before the English people, for
one. It could have decided whether it would pursue a policy that
might lead at any moment to a general European war, or to take the
alternative which Sir Edward Grey later spoke of, namely, “to
promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
would be pursued against her by France, Russia and ourselves,
jointly or separately.” Without the support of the people, kept in line
by fear of hidden dangers, not even the militarists of Germany could
have forced military action.
One of the first acts of the Russian Soviet Government was to
announce its hostility to secret diplomacy. When it first published the
secret treaties and documents of the Czarist Government, its motive
was, as shown by Trotsky’s declaration made at the time, thoroughly
to discredit the management of affairs under the old régime. In the
same connection, it announced its own purpose of conducting
foreign affairs in the open. Such seems indeed to have been its
general practice with respect to the announcement of policies,
though its agents continued to use underground methods. One
thing, however, the Soviet Government is evidently trying to bring
about, namely, a broad public interest in the conduct of foreign
affairs. It desires the Russian people, and more particularly the
members of the ruling Communist Party, to be currently informed
about the progress of international affairs and about arrangements
concluded. Observers report that at the meeting of the provincial
soviets the first business ordinarily taken up is the reading and
discussion of a report on international relations sent by the central
government. We have no means to check up the truth of these
reports; but this effort to interest the broad mass of the population
in the outward relations of the state is certainly worth notice. The
expectation is encouraged that the reason for acts relating to foreign
affairs will be explained, particularly when sacrifices are demanded.
 XIII
A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM
Those who view the modern state as a purely predatory
organization,—for exploitation within and without,—point to the
methods, practices and results of diplomacy as one of the plainest
indications of the sinister nature of the political state. Such criticism
cannot be safely brushed aside as utterly unreasonable; it should
rather call forth a searching inquiry as to whether, as a matter of
fact, the conduct of foreign affairs could not and should not be
brought into greater consonance with genuinely democratic
principles, and be placed on the sound basis of well-informed public
support.
No matter what opinion one may hold with respect to the
necessity of secret diplomacy, it must be recognized that this
practice involves a very narrow conception of the active scope of
democracy. It is in fact a historical survival from the period of the
absolutist state; or in other words, that aspect of the modern state
which deals with foreign affairs has retained the character of
absolutism. It is a superstition, in the picturesque sense of that word
used by Lowell, when he defines it as “something left standing over
from one of the world’s witenagemotes to the other.” In this case,
indeed the most recent witenagemote approached the question and
proposed a step in advance towards its solution. But the difficulty
still persists.
In its relations with other states, the state is considered to be
absolute, not bound by any laws, responsible only for its own
security, welfare and progressing influence. The struggle for political
power still exists among states, in essentially the same keenness and
rigidity with which it appeared to the eyes of Machiavelli. The
importance of world-wide human relationships, and of international
coöperation in scientific and economic life, has indeed been brought
forth and given its place in the public mind; but because of the
manner in which the conduct of international affairs is actually
handled, the feeling thus generated does not have much chance to
influence action at critical times, when the people are startled and
excited by the sudden revelation of dangers, which awaken in them
all the bitter feelings engendered by the past struggles of mankind.
This survival is given strength by class interests, pride of race,
and by the manipulations of plutocratic control. Where affairs are
handled by a narrow circle of men, no matter how high-minded and
how thoroughly conscious of their public responsibility, yet with the
necessary limitations of the human mind, they cannot but be
influenced at every turn by the opinions of others with whom they
are actually in contact; so that in decisions on these momentous
matters, the thing which is concretely present is very often an
interest comparatively narrow in itself, and related to the public
welfare only by a series of remote inferences which are accepted at
their face value. The most successful statesman of the nineteenth
century said that the whole Balkan question was not worth the
bones of one Pomeranian grenadier; yet his successors in power
risked the very existence of the nations of Europe for one phase of
that question.
Powerful interests will always have means, formal or informal, to
lay their needs and desires before the men in power. They may
indeed be very important and may deserve special attention, but
unfortunately, many cases have happened in which their point of
view has been adopted without making sure that there existed a
general public interest sufficiently important to warrant taking the
risks involved.
A diplomatic caste recruited from a certain class of society,
trained in the traditions of authority, in contact all the time with men
of similar views and principles, cannot in the nature of things free
itself from the limitations of such environment and such training.
From the personal point of view diplomacy has adhered to the
belief in the superior intelligence, ability and foresight in the
handling of foreign affairs, on the part of those who by inherited
traditions and special experience may be said to belong to a caste
distinguished from the mass of humanity. Some one has said, there
is a great danger in that there exists a caste of people who have
taken the making of history as their profession; who still cling to the
erroneous idea that the manipulation of large masses of people, the
redistribution of territories, and the modification of the natural
processes of grouping and settlement, is history. But such people
who believe they are making history are really obstructing it. Even
so unusual a man as Bismarck, working as he did on a great national
problem, did not gain lasting success in action whereby he
endeavored to anticipate the developments of history. The artful
contrivance and harsh, ruthless execution of many of his plans left a
heritage of evil to the world; but the greatest evil lay in the example
given by so successful a man in making it seem that history could
actually thus be made. The attitude which is taken in behalf of such
men, in claiming for them a completely free and full discretion in
controlling foreign affairs, recalls a statement made by H. G. Wells
concerning a British leader: “He believes that he belongs to a
particularly gifted and privileged class of beings to whom the lives
and affairs of common men are given over—the raw material for
brilliant careers. It seems to him an act of insolence that the
common man should form judgments on matters of statecraft.” The
diplomats of the old school indeed do require the people, but only as
material with which to work out their grandiose projects. Their view
not too distantly resembles that of the German militarists to whom
ordinary humanity existed only for one purpose, “to do their damn’d
duty.”
We should naturally expect to find the greatest secrecy and the
most callous use of secretive methods, where absolutism remains
most completely established. In the last remaining absolutism, that
of Japan, these expectations are fulfilled, both as regards carefully-
guarded secrecy of all diplomatic action, and the habitual use of well
phrased declarations of a theoretical policy, announced for public
consumption, but bearing only a Platonic relation to the details of
actual doings. But more liberally governed states have not by any
means all freed themselves from this practice, even to the extent of
faithfully keeping the representative bodies, and the public, informed
of the true character and aims of important national policies.
During the discussions of the last few years, a great many
remedies for this state of affairs have been suggested. The
Constitutional practice of the United States has been taken as a
model in England in the suggestion that there should be a
representative committee on foreign affairs in the House of
Commons, which should keep in constant touch with the diplomatic
officials and supervise the conduct of foreign relations; that there
should be at least two days given to the discussion of the Foreign
Office Vote; that there should be full reports made on the progress
of all important negotiations; and that treaties and alliances should
not be concluded, nor war made, without a previous authorization
on the part of Parliament. The last formal proposal of this kind was
the motion made in March, 1918, in the House of Commons, the
opposition to which by Mr. Balfour has already been alluded to. That
he should object particularly to the prying into foreign affairs on the
part of persons “not responsible,” and by “politicians,” that the
proposed committee of the House of Commons should be thus
characterized, throws light on the prejudices involved; but it also
reveals the absurdity of the present arrangement from the point of
view of free government. In France there has existed, since 1902, a
standing committee on foreign and colonial affairs in the Chamber of
Deputies.
When he was premier, in 1920, Signor Giolliti introduced a bill
carrying the following provision: “Treaties and International
understandings, whatever be their subject and character, are valid
only after they have been approved by Parliament. The Government
of the King can declare war only with the approval of the two
Chambers.” The ministry of Giolliti fell before this sound measure
could be passed.
It may be questioned whether many of the arrangements
suggested could be more than palliatives, as long as an intelligent
and constant public interest in foreign affairs has not been aroused,
and as long as the absolutist aspect of foreign policy continues. The
suggestion that war should not be made without a previous national
referendum, has indeed logic on its side from the point of view of
the democratic theory of state, but it has thus far not entered into
the state of practical consideration.
The most important remedy as yet attempted is the provision in
the Covenant of the League of Nations, that all treaties shall be
made public. No greater encouragement, indeed, could be given to
the growth of confidence and the destruction of baneful suspicions
and fears, throughout international life, than if it were possible to
assure the nations of the world that all engagements imposing
international obligations of any kind whatsoever would be made
known immediately upon their conclusion. This provision of the
Covenant has already gone into force, and numerous new treaties
have been submitted, even by governments who are not as yet
members of the League. But certain governments have delayed
compliance in cases where treaties are known to have been made
secretly. As there is no specific sanction for this provision in the
Covenant, and as actually binding agreements can be made without
taking the form of a treaty or convention, this remedy is not in itself
powerful enough to remove the evil. If two or three states are willing
to keep an engagement secret at the risk of later incurring a certain
amount of opprobrium when the fact is discovered, there is no
means as yet available for obliging them to abandon such course.
Nevertheless, this provision of the Covenant constitutes a great
advance in the work of placing the public business of the world on
the only sound basis, and cultivating that confidence upon which
depends the future immunity of mankind from constant danger of
suffering and destruction. It will, however, not be a real remedy until
the nations agree actually to outlaw all secret agreements as a
conspiracy against the general welfare and safety.
The other important advance made in the Covenant is found in
the provisions for the investigation of any cause of conflict before
hostilities shall be resorted to. If after the first shock of excitement,
which accompanies the revelation of a serious international crisis,
public opinion can be given a certain space of time to inform itself,
then it may indeed be hoped that a different temper will control the
giving of the fateful doom of war. As Count Czernin has stated, on
the night of August 4, 1914, between the hours of nine and midnight
the decision as to whether England would come into the war, lay
with the German Government. A system under which such
tremendous issues have to be decided in such a manner, is absurd to
E
the verge of insanity.

E
A German writer puts the blame for the
outbreak of the war on the telegraph. He says
that if there had been no telegraphic
communication between the capitals, the fatal
crisis would not have arisen; there would have
been time for reflection and a decision to make
war would never have been taken in blood.

While the above arrangements, if they could be effectively

carried out, would undoubtedly serve to moderate the evils which
now result from the conduct of international affairs on so narrow a
basis, yet it is difficult to expect from them more than relatively
superficial results. It is only if a new spirit can be developed among
the nations, and if the absolutist conception of the state as far as it
still remains, can be transformed into something more consonant
with the complexity and delicacy of human relationships, that we
may hope to hail the dawn of a new era. It would be as great a
transformation as that which separates the Pagan from the Christian
ideal. Mankind is still somewhat blinded by the glitter and pageantry
of the absolutist state; the pride of power manifests itself now
particularly in foreign intercourse. When Portugal became a republic,
it desired at first to abolish the entire diplomatic establishment, and
to allow all international business to be done by the consuls. That
proposal may have resulted from an instinctive feeling that there
was something incompatible between a really free community, and
the sense of absolute power embodied in diplomacy.
A change can be brought about only when the underlying unity
of mankind is more intensely felt and when the common interests in
science, commerce, industry and the universal language of art are
valued at their true importance to the welfare of the people of all
nations. Joint effort in the constructive work of developing
resources, particularly in the tropics, will make it possible for vastly
increased populations to live in comfort on their present sites,
without the need of crowding each other. A higher valuation of
humanity, a more just proportion in the influence permitted different
interests, a keener scrutiny of traditions and watch-words—all this is
necessary. Men and women to-day feel an intense apprehension,
when they think of the fate of their children in a world in which the
unreasoning prejudices and unenlightened practices that have
recently again come to the fore in international life should prevail,
leaving mankind in a dazed confusion, and pushing the people from
time to time into wholesale slaughter with ever more horrible
instruments of destruction. They feel also that if secret policies,
engendering fears and suspicion, are to continue to be the dominant
factor, then all improvement in human welfare, education and
science, will have to be in a large measure postponed to the
preparation of constantly more formidable engines of death. One
cannot but remember the worst imprecations of the Greek tragic
poets and philosophers, on the miserable destiny of man. In fact, if
we should have to believe that no better way could be found to
manage the vital interests of mankind, a great natural catastrophe,
which would extinguish once and for all the miserable breed on this
planet, would almost appear in the light of a redemption.
 But we cannot believe that the peoples of the world will be so
foolish as to allow themselves to remain in this condition and not to
find their way to a reorganization of public affairs which will make
such a haphazard and perilous situation impossible. It seems plain
that the idea of the state and of state action will have to be
transformed in accordance with the greater self-consciousness of
humanity which has developed in the last century, or the desire to
scrap the political state and to find some more adequate and natural
form of organization will rapidly gain in strength. Meanwhile, there is
a need of the formation of a great freemasonry of all publicists,
political men and teachers of the people, united in the resolve to
know and make known the essential elements in current
international affairs, to arouse the public to a sense of the
importance of these matters to their every-day life, and to support
the men more directly responsible for the conduct of foreign policy,
with an intelligent, searching, reasonable and broad public opinion.
 XIV
RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Up until a recent date Americans could contemplate the play of
secret diplomacy in Europe and Asia with a feeling of entire
aloofness, as belonging to a political society which had neither need
nor inclination to utilize such methods. Our unmenaced continental
position, the natural protection and separation implied in distance
and ocean boundaries, and the conscious intention of keeping clear
of international entanglements, all contributed to make the foreign
policy of the United States entirely public and straightforward. The
fathers of the Constitution had established the sound principle that
treaties are the law of the land. This not only involves mature
consideration of a treaty before it is made, but publicity as well. The
American people have known at all times what obligations had been
incurred, and the world had the same information. There has been
no room for guesswork and suspicion.
The instructions which were issued to John Jay when he was
sent as special envoy to England in 1794 lay down the following rule
of conduct: “It is the President’s wish that the characteristics of an
American minister should be marked on the one hand by a firmness
against improper compliances, and on the other by sincerity, candor,
truth and prudence, and by a horror of finesse and chicane.” These
straightforward words began a tradition which has ever since
animated the American diplomatic service. When after the Spanish
war, under Secretary Hay, American diplomacy entered more fully
into world-wide problems than in any previous era, the expression
“the new diplomacy” was currently used in a laudatory sense to
designate what Hay had implied when in a public address he had
declared the Golden Rule to be the cardinal principle of American
diplomacy—an ideal which makes secrecy and intrigue unnecessary.
In order to give the public an opportunity of informing itself
concerning the conduct and development of foreign affairs, the
United States Government has from an early date published an
annual collection of diplomatic correspondence. Since 1861, this
publication is known as Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States. It was formerly published within two or three
years of the year to which it related, but during the war this interval
was considerably extended. The precedents and principles
elaborated in the diplomatic correspondence of the United States
have been collected, codified and published in a very important and
useful compendium by Francis Wharton, under the title of Digest of
International Law. This work was expanded, amplified and brought
down to date by Prof. John Bassett Moore, under the same title, in
1906. It is of the highest importance, not only as a repository of
diplomatic and legal precedent, but as a definite and public record of
the position taken by the American Government on all international
questions that had arisen up to the date of its publication. The
preparation of such digest on the part of other governments is highly
to be desired for the purpose of clarifying international law and
policy, and for giving them a sound basis of reason and experience
upon which the people and governments may rely. The fact that a
precedent reported in this digest, might be cited against the
American Government as an admission, does not imply a
disadvantage which would at all offset the benefits resulting in
general from public knowledge.
With respect to the details of negotiation, there are confidential
relationships which have always been observed by the American
Government. Ordinary considerations of courtesy require that those
who may speak to us frankly in confidence shall not be made to
suffer by being quoted and thus perhaps be exposed to
misunderstanding and criticism. On our part, in preparing a sound
basis of action, favorable as well as unfavorable matters have to be
considered; yet there is ordinarily no need of publicly advertising the
shortcomings of individuals and governments as set forth in reports
on such unfavorable matters. Such considerate action is not based
on a desire to mislead or to take advantage, but to save
unnecessary irritation. For the purpose of permitting complete
freedom of discussion and of criticism without the risk of giving
offense, the United States Senate, as a matter of its ordinary
procedure, goes into secret session when discussing a treaty
submitted to it. There have, however, been several exceptions. Thus,
for instance, the debates on the Bayard-Chamberlain Fisheries Treaty
of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties of 1912, and on the
Nicaragua Treaty of 1916, were carried on, and concluded, in open
session. Many senators are in favor of making this the common
practice.
Before the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore, whose knowledge
of the records is unequaled, said to me, the State Department had
no secrets whatsoever, with the exception of personnel reports. We,
too, however, can depart from a well-established tradition, as is
shown by our diplomatic history during the war. I do not believe it
will ever be charged that in any matter big or little the American
Government sought narrow, selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such
motives, there was none. There was no American policy or
enterprise that needed concealment, apart from military policies and
strategy during a war. When I glanced over at the end of my mission
in Peking the extra-confidential cable correspondence, I was
inwardly amazed by the entire lack of anything that really needed
concealing, in that closely guarded dossier.
Yet American diplomacy did during the war fall somewhat under
the spell of the traditional methods still in vogue in Europe. We were
not a party to any secret engagements for the division of spoils after
the war, although from the time of the peace conference on, the
influence of the American Government was exercised mostly in
secret, and the agreements subsidiary to the general settlement
were secretly signed. These did not contain any apportionment of
advantage to the United States, but on the contrary were supposed
to contain the nearest approach to the equitable ideas of American