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TH IR D
EDITION
•••••
zn w n17
Dk-1( i,j)
Dk (i,j) = min D..., (i,k) + D... , (k,j) BY
AMRINDER
ARORA
THIRD EDITION
BY AMRINDER ARORA
The George Washington University
nella® ACADEMIC
PUBLISHING
Bassim Hamadeh, CEO and Publisher
Michael Simpson, Vice President of Acquisitions
Jamie Giganti, Managing Editor
Jess Estrella, Senior Graphic Designer
Carrie Montoya, Manager, Revisions and Author Support
Natalie Lakosil, Licensing Manager
Kaela Martin and Berenice Quirino, Associate Editors
Claire Yee, Interior Designer
Copyright© 2017 by Cognella, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publica-
tion may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form or by
any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information
retrieval system without the written permission of Cognella, Inc.
3.1 Record 15
3.2 Linked List 16
3.3 Stack 16
3.4 Queue 17
3.5 Set 17
3.6 Map 18
3.7 Graph and Tree Data Structures 19
3.8 Heaps 22
3.9 Exercises 22
7.7 Exercises
CHAPTER 8: BRANCH AND BOUND 89
8.1 Example Problems 90
8.2 Branch and Bound Template 90
8.3 Applying B&B to 0/1 Knapsack Problem 91
8.4 Applying B&B to Job Assignment Problem 92
8.5 Exercises 93
Miscellaneous Notes 93
Exercises 138
INDEX 149
X111
ost people agree that algorithms is one of the most important
subjects in computer science, and almost all computer science
students learn algorithms. Also, many software companies ask algorith-
mic questions in their interviews.
I think one of the difficulties in learning algorithms is sorting out
the details. One example is an index starting from 0, requiring the
last number to be n-1 instead of n. Many students are buried in these
details, losing track of the big picture.
Another difficulty is choosing the right algorithm technique ...
especially given a real-life problem. Often, multiple algorithm
techniques need to be applied, and without seeing the big picture,
it's very hard to find a starting point. In fact, there are only a handful
algorithm techniques, as you will read in this book, that can solve
most real -life problems and interview questions.
Furthermore, algorithms are not exercised on a daily basis, even
in the technology industry, since we usually work on top of libraries
that hide algorithm details, and thus it is very easy to forget them.
When needed, going through a thick and \\thorough'' textbook for
algorithms is very painful and time consuming.
Amrinder's book balances algorithm details and the overall picture
very well. The book takes me right to the point, and the explanations
xv
XV I J ANALYS IS AND DESIGN OF ALGOR ITHMS
XV II
XV III J ANALYS IS AND DESIGN OF A LGORITHMS
to grab this edition of the book before the author also falls to such temptation
in the coming editions.
This book is divided into 4 broad sections.
One of the key observations that I have made from teaching the graduate
course in algorithms class over multiple years is the rigor required by this class.
Many students come into this class with some aspect of their mathematical
background missing. Other students who have been working for a few years
find that some of the mathematical material seems ''vaguely familiar'' and
nothing else. Those essential mathematical topics are frequently mentioned in
the book-the students need to return to those topics often. Those topics will
ensure that while you can read this book in a few hours from end to end, you
will need to spend many more hours making the best of the material in your
capacity of a computer scientist.
The students are encouraged to use this book as an accompaniment to their
study sessions. Algorithms, in some respects even more than other topics, re-
quires a clarity of thought that can perhaps more easily be achieved by speak-
ing and explaining, than by listening and reading. Every time you are asked to
explain the topic of dynamic programming to someone, your knowledge and
understanding of the topic increases. [More of this is covered in Appendix A.]
The best way to read this book (and many other books) is to remember to
finesse the concepts presented in this book, and apply them in your everyday
work. Read the chapters in different frames of mind, at leisure and consider dif-
ferent variations of problems presented herein. Observe how minor variations
affect the complexity of those problems.
Another observation that I have made is that there is an almost direct cor-
relation between grades and number of classes attended. There is also a strong
correlation between grades and time spent on course, which manifests in form
PR EFACE J XIX
of emails, and other activities done by the student. There is an even stronger
correlation between grades, homework assignments and projects-not many
students finished with a top grade after losing easy points on assignments or
projects. Perhaps Woody Allen was referring to algorithms when he said that
80% of success is showing up.
-"
••
1. 1 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM?
n algorithm is generally defined in one of two following ways:
3
4 J ANALYS IS AND DESIGN OF A LGORIT HMS
From this pseudo-code, we can attempt to estimate the best case running
time, the worst case running time and the average case running time. We observe
that the for loop runs n-1 times, but the while loop can run a variable number of
times based on the actual values in the array. In the worst case scenario, it may run
i times, and in the best case, it may run Otimes.
For our third example, let us turn to the searching problem. We are given
a sorted list of numbers, and we are asked to find if a certain number exists in
the list or not. The commonly known Binary Search algorithm compares the
middle element of the array with the given number, and depending upon the
result, focuses on either the left half or the right half of the array.
IN TROD UCTION AND BARE ESSENTIA L S I 5
• Given a list of train stations and a map of tracks, create a schedule that
minimizes the sum of travel time across all users.
(i) How long will the algorithm take to run, in best case, worst case and
average case?
(ii) How much memory will it require, in best case, worst case and aver-
age case?
We may also want to know if there are some inputs on which the answer
varies considerably, and what the average case values would be if the input is
limited to certain range.
Depending upon the type of algorithm, analyzing an algorithm may have
many other meanings as well.
chines is the Random-Access Machine (the RAM model). In this model, math
operations (addition, subtraction, division and multiplication) take one unit of
time, simple logic operations (comparison of two numbers) and also read and
write operations take one unit of time. Further, we can access any memory
location (including registers, etc.) in a unit time as well. We will be using this
computation model in the rest of the book.
Here are some simple observations that we can make in analyzing the time
complexity of given programs.
1.6 PRE-REQUISITES
This book significantly depends on the reader having the appropriate Math
background. The following topics are assumed to be well understood. In case
a deeper explanation is required for these topics, excellent textbooks are
available for these topics, although going through these materials will take a
semester or so. So, if you find yourself lacking in these topics, you may want to
take a different class first, and then return to algorithms in a future semester.
1. Consider A and Bare two sets, such that /A/= 50, and /A - Bf= 20, and
/Bf= 85. Find the value of /B -A/.
2. Given that log 17 = 0.3010 and log 103 = 0.4771, find the value of log 610.
3. Given that T[n) =T[n-1) + n2 can you find a closed-form expression
for T[n)?
4. What is the sum of the following series:
r ;_li 2i
5. What is the sum of the following series:
r ;_li22i
6. Which of the following two terms is larger:
~ ni 2 ~ n"2 i
£..J 1 or £..J 1
CHAPTER 2
pler format.
For example, consider an
algorithm that takes an array 1000
9
10 I ANALYS IS AN D DE SIGN OF A LGOR ITHMS
as n[n-1 )/2 + 3n + 7. This is the closed form expression that we may have arrived
at after a visual inspection of the algorithm.
In the second phase, we simplify this polynomial expression. As n becomes
larger, as we plot the performance of this algorithm, we observe that the final
two terms (3n and 7) do not affect the curve. In fact, drawing that curve against
the curve of much simpler expression n2/2, we can observe that the two curves
are nearly the same. This represents the first step in simplifying the closed form
expression-simply drop the ''lower level'' terms. The second step is a similar
simplification-simply drop the constant multiple of the highest-level term, for
example, using n2 instead of n2/2. This idea allows us to ignore some constant
time jumps in performance-for example, something that makes an algorithm
twice as fast.
Asymptotic notation is an important tool at our disposal to articulate and
communicate the running time and space usage of algorithms. An algorithm
may be complicated and its running time may depend upon the input. Even
on a given input, it may be difficult to specify exactly how long an algorithm
wil l take. The asymptotic notation allows us to specify those attributes in very
simple terms such as being able to say, ''Algorithm A has O(n) running time'',
something that we could easily tell someone over the phone· 1
The implicit purpose of the asymptotic notation is that it allows us to com-
pare algorithms in terms of their running time or space usage. Even though the
algorithms may have many idiosyncrasies, using asymptotic analysis, and after
we arrive at asymptotic notation, we can compare which algorithm performs
better as the input size grows.
The concise idea: Asymptotic analysis is the technique. Asymptotic nota-
tion is the output, which allows us to easily communicate the performance of
algorithms.
1 We sometimes use the telephone conversation ana logy. In its simplistic form, the telephone
conversation includes questions and answers that we can ask each other over an old fash ioned
telephone line, without the benefit of any video, screen sharing, etc . It is an attempt to articulate
our concepts in simple terms, and ignore all details that can indeed be ignored.
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The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the
President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would
be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed
powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others.
When the objects are widely stretched out, or greatly diversified,
meandering through such an extent of territory as that the United
States possess, a minister cannot see with his own eyes every
transaction, or feel with his hands the minutiæ that pass through his
department. He must therefore have assistants. But in order that he
may be responsible to his country, he must have a choice in
selecting his assistants, a control over them, with power to remove
them when he finds the qualifications which induced their
appointment cease to exist. There are officers under the constitution
who hold their office by a different tenure—your judges are
appointed during good behavior; and from the delicacy and peculiar
nature of their trust, it is right it should be so, in order that they may
be independent and impartial in administering justice between the
Government and its citizens. But the removability of the one class, or
immovability of the other, is founded on the same principle, the
security of the people against the abuse of power. Does any
gentleman imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an
estate? Or does the Legislature establish them for the convenience
of an individual? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into
effect the purposes for which the constitution was intended.
The executive powers are delegated to the President, with a view to
have a responsible officer to superintend, control, inspect, and check
the officers necessarily employed in administering the laws. The only
bond between him and those he employs, is the confidence he has
in their integrity and talents; when that confidence ceases, the
principal ought to have power to remove those whom he can no
longer trust with safety. If an officer shall be guilty of neglect or
infidelity, there can be no doubt but he ought to be removed; yet
there may be numerous causes for removal which do not amount to
a crime. He may propose to do a mischief; but I believe the mere
intention would not be cause of impeachment. He may lose the
confidence of the people upon suspicion, in which case it would be
improper to retain him in service; he ought to be removed at any
time, when, instead of doing the greatest possible good, he is likely
to do an injury to the public interest by being continued in the
administration.
I presume gentlemen will generally admit that officers ought to be
removed when they become obnoxious; but the question is, how
shall this power be exercised? It will not, I apprehend, be
contended, that all officers hold their offices during good behavior. If
this be the case, it is a most singular Government. I believe there is
not another in the universe that bears the least semblance to it in
this particular; such a principle, I take it, is contrary to the nature of
things. But the manner how to remove is the question. If the officer
misbehaves, he can be removed by impeachment; but in this case is
impeachment the only mode of removal? It would be found very
inconvenient to have a man continued in office after being
impeached, and when all confidence in him was suspended or lost.
Would not the end of impeachment be defeated by this means? If
Mr. Hastings, who was mentioned by the gentleman from Delaware
(Mr. Vining) preserved his command in India, could he not defeat the
impeachment now pending in Great Britain? If that doctrine obtains
in America, we shall find impeachments come too late; while we are
preparing the process, the mischief will be perpetrated, and the
offender will escape. I apprehend it will be as frequently necessary
to prevent crimes as to punish them; and it may often happen that
the only prevention is by removal. The superintending power
possessed by the President, will perhaps enable him to discover a
base intention before it is ripe for execution. It may happen that the
Treasurer may be disposed to betray the public chest to the enemy,
and so injure the Government beyond the possibility of reparation;
should the President be restrained from removing so dangerous an
officer, until the slow formality of an impeachment was complied
with, when the nature of the case rendered the application of a
sudden and decisive remedy indispensable?
But it will, I say, be admitted, that an officer may be removed. The
question then is, by whom? Some gentlemen say by the President
alone; and others, by the President, by and with the advice of the
Senate. By the advocates of the latter mode, it is alleged, that the
constitution is in the way of the power of removal being by the
President alone. If this is absolutely the case, there is an end to all
further inquiry. But before we suffer this to be considered as an
insuperable impediment, we ought to be clear that the constitution
prohibits him the exercise of what, on a first view, appears to be a
power incident to the executive branch of the Government. The
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) has made so many
observations to evince the constitutionality of the clause, that it is
unnecessary to go over the ground again. I shall therefore confine
myself to answer only some remarks made by the gentleman from
South Carolina, (Mr. Smith.) The powers of the President are defined
in the constitution; but it is said, that he is not expressly authorized
to remove from office. If the constitution is silent also with respect
to the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves
that the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly
proves that it cannot be exercised by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident
to Government; but not being distributed by the constitution, it will
come before the Legislature, and, like every other omitted case,
must be supplied by law.
Mr. Livermore.—I am for striking out this clause, Mr. Chairman, upon
the principles of the constitution, from which we are not at liberty to
deviate. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr.
Sedgwick,) calls the Minister of Foreign Affairs the creature of the law,
and that very properly; because the law establishes the office, and
has the power of creating him in what shape the Legislature pleases.
This being the case, we have a right to create the office under such
limitations and restrictions as we think proper, provided we can
obtain the consent of the Senate; but it is very improper to draw as
a conclusion, from having the power of giving birth to a creature,
that we should therefore bring forth a monster, merely to show we
had such power. I call that creature a monster that has not the
proper limbs and features of its species. I think the creature we are
forming is unnatural in its proportions. It has been often said, that
the constitution declares the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint this officer. This, to be sure, is
very true, and so is the conclusion which an honorable gentleman
(Mr. White) from Virginia drew from it, that an officer must be
discharged in the way he was appointed.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, this question depends upon a just
construction of a short clause in the constitution. "The President
shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges
of Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States." Here
is no difference with respect to the power of the President to make
treaties and appoint officers, only it requires in the one case a larger
majority to concur than in the other. I will not by any means suppose
that gentlemen mean, when they argue in favor of removal by the
President alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to the
repeal of treaties; because, if they do, there will be little occasion for
us to sit here. But let me ask these gentlemen, as there is no real or
imaginary distinction between the appointment of ambassadors and
ministers, or Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, whether they mean that
the President should have the power of recalling or discarding
ambassadors and military officers, for the words in the constitution
are "all other officers," as well as he can remove your Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. To be sure, they cannot extend it to the judges;
because they are secured under a subsequent article, which declares
they shall hold their offices during good behavior; they have an
inheritance which they cannot be divested of, but on conviction of
some crime. But I presume gentlemen mean to apply it to all those
who have not an inheritance in their offices. In this case, it takes the
whole power of the President and Senate to create an officer, but
half the power can uncreate him. Surely a law passed by the whole
Legislature cannot be repealed by one branch of it; so I conceive, in
the case of appointments, it requires the same force to supersede an
officer as to put him in office.
I acknowledge, that the clause relative to impeachment is for the
benefit of the people; it is intended to enable their representatives to
bring a bad officer to justice who is screened by the President; but I
do not conceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Carolina,
(Mr. Smith,) that it by any means excludes the usual ways of
superseding officers. It is said in the constitution, that the House
shall have the power of choosing their own officers. We have chosen
a clerk, and, I am satisfied, a very capable one; but will any
gentleman contend we may not discharge him and choose another
and another as often as we see cause? And so it is in every other
instance; where they have the power to make, they have likewise
the power to unmake. It will be said by gentlemen, that the power
to make does not imply the power of unmaking; but I believe they
will find very few exceptions in the United States.
Mr. Sherman.—I wish, Mr. Chairman, that the words may be left out of
the bill, without giving up the question either way as to the propriety
of the measure. Many of the honorable gentlemen who advocate this
clause have labored to show that the President has, constitutionally,
the power of removal. If this be a well-founded opinion, they ought
not to let the words remain in the bill, because they are of such a
nature as to imply that he had not the power before it was granted
him by the law.
If gentlemen would consent to make a general law, declaring the
proper mode of removal, I think we should acquire a greater degree
of unanimity, which, on this occasion, must be better than carrying
the question against a large minority.
The call for the question being now very general, it was put, shall
the words "to be removable by the President," be struck out?
It was determined in the negative; being yeas 20, nays 34.
Department of War.
The House then went into a committee on the bill for establishing
the Department of War. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.
Mr. Benson proposed, with respect to the Secretary's being removable
by the President, a similar amendment to that which had been
obtained in the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary to load this bill with any words on
that subject; he conceived the gentleman ought to be satisfied with
having had the principle established in the other bill.
Mr. Page was of the same opinion, but further thought it argued a
doubt, even in the mind of the majority, of the truth of their
principles, and they wanted, by repetition, to force that upon the
mind which was not impressed by right reason. The question on the
amendment was taken without further debate, and carried in the
affirmative, twenty-four to twenty-two.
Some other small alterations being made, the committee rose, and
reported the bill as amended; which being partly considered, the
House adjourned.
Thursday, June 25.
Department of War.
The House resumed the consideration of the amendments reported
by the Committee of the Whole to the bill for establishing the War
Department; which being agreed to, the bill was ordered to be
engrossed.
Treasury Department.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
bill for establishing the Treasury Department, Mr. Trumbull in the
chair. The second clause being under consideration,
Mr. Page objected to the words making it the duty of the Secretary to
"digest and report plans for the improvement and management of
the revenue, and the support of the public credit;" observing that it
might be well enough to enjoin upon him the duty of making out
and preparing estimates; but to go any further would be a
dangerous innovation upon the constitutional privilege of this House;
it would create an undue influence within these walls, because
members might be led, by the deference commonly paid to men of
abilities, who give an opinion in a case they have thoroughly studied,
to support the minister's plan, even against their own judgment. Nor
would the mischief stop here; it would establish a precedent which
might be extended, until we admitted all the ministers of the
Government on the floor, to explain and support the plans they have
digested and reported: thus laying a foundation for an aristocracy or
a detestable monarchy.
Mr. Tucker.—The objection made by the gentleman near me is,
undoubtedly, well founded. I think it proper to strike out all the
words alluded to, because the following are sufficient to answer
every valuable purpose, namely, "to prepare and report estimates of
the public revenue and public expenditures." If we authorize him to
prepare and report plans, it will create an interference of the
executive with the legislative powers; it will abridge the particular
privilege of this House; for the constitution expressly declares, that
all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives. How can the business originate in this House, if we
have it reported to us by the Minister of Finance? All the information
that can be required, may be called for, without adopting a clause
that may undermine the authority of this House, and the security of
the people. The constitution has pointed out the proper method of
communication between the executive and legislative departments;
it is made the duty of the President to give, from time to time,
information to Congress of the state of the Union, and to
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient. If revenue plans are to be prepared and
reported to Congress, here is the proper person to do it; he is
responsible to the people for what he recommends, and will be more
cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of
responsibility is attached. Under this clause, you give the Secretary
of the Treasury a right to obtrude upon you plans, not only
undigested, but even improper to be taken up.
I hope the House is not already weary of executing and sustaining
the powers vested in them by the constitution; and yet it would
argue that we thought ourselves less adequate to determine than
any individual what burthens our constituents are equal to bear. This
is not answering the high expectations that were formed of our
exertions for the general good, or of our vigilance in guarding our
own and the people's rights. In short, Mr. Chairman, I can never
agree to have money bills originated and forced upon this House by
a man destitute of legislative authority, while the constitution gives
such power solely to the House of Representatives; for this reason, I
cheerfully second the motion for striking out the words.
Mr. Benson.—If the proposed amendment prevail, the bill will be
nearly nugatory. The most important service that can be rendered by
a gentleman who is at the head of the Department of Finance, is
that of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the
revenue, and supporting public credit; and, for my part, I shall
despair of ever seeing your revenue improved, or the national credit
supported, unless the business is submitted into the hands of an
able individual. I thought this subject was well understood, from the
debate on the original motion. It was then insisted upon by an
honorable gentleman, Mr. Gerry, who opposed the appointment of a
Secretary of the Treasury, that his important duties ought to be "to
consider of the means of improving the revenue, and introducing
economy into the expenditures, and to recommend general systems
of revenue." Now, what more than this is required by the clause?
For my part, I am at a loss to see how the privilege of the House is
infringed. Can any of the Secretary's plans be called bills? Will they
be reported in such a form even? But admitting they were, they do
not become bills, unless they are sanctioned by the House; much
less is the danger that they will pass into laws without full
examination by both Houses and the President. From this view of
the subject, so far is the clause from appearing dangerous, that I
believe it discovers itself to be not only perfectly safe, but essentially
necessary; and without it is retained, the great object of the bill will
be defeated.
Mr. Goodhue.—We certainly carry our dignity to the extreme, when
we refuse to receive information from any but ourselves. It must be
admitted, that the Secretary of the Treasury will, from the nature of
his office, be better acquainted with the subject of improving the
revenue or curtailing expense, than any other person; if he is thus
capable of affording useful information, shall we reckon it hazardous
to receive it? For my part, when I want to attain a particular object, I
never shut my ears against information likely to enable me to secure
it.
Mr. Page.—I can never consent to establish, by law, this interference
of an executive officer in business of legislation; it may be well
enough in an absolute monarchy, for a minister to come to a
Parliament with his plans in his hands, and order them to be
enregistered or enacted; but this practice does not obtain even in a
limited monarchy like Britain. The minister there, who introduces his
plans, must be a member of the House of Commons. The man
would be treated with indignation, who should attempt in that
country to bring his schemes before Parliament in any other way.
Now, why we, in the free republic of the United States, should
introduce such a novelty in legislation, I am at a loss to conceive.
The constitution expressly delegates to us the business of the
revenue; our constituents have confidence in us, because they
suppose us acquainted with their circumstances; they expect, in
consequence of this knowledge, we will not attempt to load them
with injudicious or oppressive taxes; but they have no such security,
if we are blindly to follow perhaps an unskilful minister. It does not
answer me, Mr. Chairman, to say the House has a right of
deliberating and deciding upon these plans, because we may be
told, if you prune away this part or that part of the system, you
destroy its efficiency. Therefore we must act with caution; we must
either take or reject the whole; but if we reject the whole, sir, we are
to depend upon ourselves for a substitute. How are we to form one?
For my part, I should not despair, that the united wisdom of this
House could procure one; but if we are to do this in the second
instance, why cannot we attempt it in the first? I have no objection
to our calling upon this or any other officer for information; but it is
certainly improper to have him authorized by law to intrude upon us
whatever he may think proper. I presume, sir, it is not supposed by
the worthy gentleman from New York (Mr. Benson) that we shall be
at a loss to conceive what information would be useful or proper for
us to require, that we must have this officer to present us with what
he chooses. When the President requires an opinion of him, the
constitution demands him to give it; so under the law, let him send
his opinion in here when it is asked for. If any further power is given
him, it will come to this at last: we, like the Parliament of Paris, shall
meet to register what he dictates. Either these reports of the
Secretary are to have weight, or they are not; if they are to have
weight, the House acts under a foreign influence, which is altogether
improper and impolitic; if they are to have no weight, we impose a
useless duty upon the officer, and such as is no mark of our wisdom.
Mr. Ames hoped the subject might be treated with candor and
liberality; he supposed the objections were made on those
principles, and therefore required a serious answer. The worthy
gentleman who first expressed his aversion to the clause seemed to
be apprehensive that the power of reporting plans by the Secretary
would be improper, because it appeared to him to interfere with the
legislative duty of the House, which the House ought not to
relinquish.
Whenever it is a question, Mr. Speaker, said he, whether this House
ought, or ought not, to establish offices to exercise a part of the
power of either branch of the Government, there are two points
which I take into consideration, in order to lead my mind to a just
decision; first, whether the proposed disposition is useful; and,
second, whether it can be safely guarded from abuse. Now I take it,
sir, that the House by their order for bringing in a bill to establish the
Treasury Department in this way, have determined the point of
utility; or, have they erred in adopting that opinion, I will slightly
make an inquiry, How does it tend to general utility? The Secretary is
presumed to acquire the best knowledge of the subject of finance of
any member of the community. Now, if this House is to act on the
best knowledge of circumstances, it seems to follow logically that
the House must obtain evidence from that officer; the best way of
doing this will be publicly from the officer himself, by making it his
duty to furnish us with it. It will not be denied, sir, that this officer
will be better acquainted with his business than other people can be.
It lies within his department to have a comprehensive view of the
state of the public revenues and expenditures. He will, by his
superintending power over the collection, be able to discover
abuses, if any, in that department, and to form the most eligible plan
to remedy or prevent the evil. From his information respecting
money transactions, he may be able to point out the best mode for
supporting the public credit; indeed, these seem to me to be the
great objects of his appointment.
Mr. Livermore.—I shall vote for striking out the clause, because I
conceive it essentially necessary so to do. The power of originating
money bills within these walls, I look upon as a sacred deposit which
we may neither violate nor divest ourselves of, although at first view
it may appear of little importance who shall form a plan for the
improvement of the revenue. Although every information tending to
effect this great object may be gratefully received by this House, yet
it behoves us to consider to what this clause may lead, and where it
may terminate. Might it not, by construction, be said that the
Secretary of the Treasury has the sole right of digesting and
reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue? This
construction may appear a little extraordinary, but it is not more so
than some constructions heretofore put upon other words; but
however extraordinary it may be, it may take place, and I think the
best way to avoid it, will be to leave out the words altogether. It is
certainly improper that any person, not expressly intrusted by our
constituents with the privilege of taking their money, should direct
the quantum and the manner in which to take it.
Mr. Sedgwick.—If the principle prevails for curtailing this part of the
Secretary's duty, we shall lose the advantages which the proposed
system was intended to acquire. The improvement and management
of the revenue is a subject that must be investigated by a man of
abilities and indefatigable industry, if we mean to have our business
advantageously done. If honorable gentlemen will for a moment
consider the peculiar circumstances of this country, the means of
information attainable by the individual members of this House, and
compare them with the object they have to pursue, they will plainly
perceive the necessity of calling to their aid the advantages resulting
from an establishment like the one contemplated in the bill; if they
weigh these circumstances carefully, their objections, I trust, will
vanish.
Mr. Boudinot.—A proper jealousy for the liberty of the people is
commendable in those who are appointed and sworn to be its
faithful guardians; but when this spirit is carried so far as to lose
sight of its object, and instead of leading to avoid, urges on to the
precipice of ruin, we ought to be careful how we receive its
impressions. So far is the present measure from being injurious to
liberty, that it is consistent with the true interest and prosperity of
the community. Are gentlemen apprehensive we shall be led by this
officer to adopt plans we should otherwise reject? For my part, I
have a better opinion of the penetration of the representation of the
people than to dread any such visionary phantom.
Let us consider whether this power is essentially necessary to the
Government. I take it to be conceded by the gentlemen, that it is
absolutely so. They say they are willing to receive the information
because it may be serviceable, but do not choose to have it
communicated in this way. If the Secretary of the Treasury is the
proper person to give the information, I can see no other mode of
obtaining it that would be so useful. Do gentlemen mean that he
shall give it piecemeal, by way of question and answer? This will
tend more to mislead than to inform us. If we would judge upon any
subject, it would be better to have it in one clear and complete view,
than to inspect it by detachments; we should lose the great whole in
the minutiæ, and, instead of a system, should present our
constituents with a structure composed of discordant parts,
counteracting and defeating the operation of each other's properties.
Mr. Hartley rose to express his sentiments, as he did on every
occasion, with diffidence in his own abilities; but he looked upon the
clause as both unsafe and inconsistent with the constitution. He
thought the gentleman last up proved too much by his arguments;
he proved that the House of Representatives was, in fact,
unnecessary and useless; that one person could be a better judge of
the means to improve and manage the revenue, and support the
national credit, than the whole body of Congress. This kind of
doctrine, Mr. Chairman, is indelicate in a republic, and strikes at the
root of all legislation founded upon the great democratic principle of
representation. It is true, mistakes, and very injurious ones, have
been made on the subject of finance by some State Legislatures; but
I would rather submit to this evil, than, by my voice, establish tenets
subversive of the liberties of my country.
Notwithstanding what I have said, I am clearly of opinion it is
necessary and useful to take measures for obtaining other
information than what members can acquire in their characters as
citizens; therefore, I am in favor of the present bill; but I think these
words too strong. If it was modified so as to oblige him to have his
plans ready for this House when they are asked for, I should be
satisfied; but to establish a legal right in an officer to obtrude his
sentiments perpetually on this body is disagreeable, and it is
dangerous, inasmuch as the right is conveyed in words of doubtful
import, and conveying powers exclusively vested by the constitution
in this House.
Mr. Gerry expressed himself in favor of the object of the clause; that
was, to get all the information possible for the purpose of improving
the revenue, because he thought this information would be much
required, if he judged from the load of public debt, and the present
inability of the people to contribute largely towards its reduction.
He could not help observing, however, the great degree of
importance they were giving this, and the other executive officers. If
the doctrine of having prime and great ministers of state was once
well established, he did not doubt but we should soon see them
distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other insignia of court
favor and patronage. He wished gentlemen were aware of what
consequences these things lead to, that they might exert a greater
degree of caution.
The practice of Parliament in Britain is first to determine the sum
they will grant, and then refer the subject to a Committee of Ways
and Means: this might be a proper mode to be pursued in this
House.
Do gentlemen, said he, consider the importance of the power they
give the officer by the clause? Is it not part of our legislative
authority? And does not the constitution expressly declare that the
House solely shall exercise the power of originating revenue bills?
Now, what is meant by reporting plans? It surely includes the idea of
originating money bills, that is, a bill for improving the revenue, or,
in other words, for bringing revenue into the treasury. For if he is to
report plans, they ought to be reported in a proper form, and
complete. This is giving an indirect voice in legislative business to an
executive officer. If this be not the meaning of the clause, let
gentlemen say what is, and to what extent it shall go; but if my
construction is true, we are giving up the most essential privilege
vested in us by the constitution. But what does this signify? The
officer is responsible, and we are secure. This responsibility is made
an argument in favor of every extension of power. I should be glad
to understand the term. Gentlemen say the Secretary of the
Treasury is responsible for the information he gives the House—in
what manner does this responsibility act? Suppose he reports a plan
for improving the revenue, by a tax which he thinks judicious, and
one that will be agreeable to the people of the United States; but he
happens to be deceived in his opinion, that his tax is obnoxious, and
excites a popular clamor against the minister—what is the advantage
of his responsibility? Nothing. Few men deserve punishment for the
error of opinion; all that could be done would be to repeal the law,
and be more cautious in future in depending implicitly on the
judgment of a man who had led us into an impolitic measure.
Suppose the revenue should fall short of his estimate, is he
responsible for the balance? This will be carrying the idea further
than any Government hitherto has done. What then is the officer to
be responsible for, which should induce the House to vest in him
such extraordinary powers?
Mr. Lawrence.—I do not see consequences so dangerous as some
gentlemen seem to apprehend; nor did they appear to them, I
believe, when the subject was last under consideration. I recollect,
Mr. Chairman, that some difficulty was made about establishing this
office, because it was feared we could not find men of sufficient
abilities to fill it. The duties were then properly deemed of a high
and important nature, and enumerated as those proposed in the bill.
It was supposed by an honorable gentleman, that the powers here
expressed might be lodged in a board, because an individual was
incompetent to undertake the whole. But now we have the
wonderful sagacity of discovering, that if an individual is appointed,
he will have capacity to form plans for improving the revenue in such
an advantageous manner, as to supersede the necessity of having
the representatives of the people consulted on the business: he will
not only perform the usual duties of a Treasury Board, but be
adequate to all purposes of legislation. I appeal to the gentleman for
his usual candor on this occasion, which will assure us that he has
wire-drawn his arguments.
Mr. Madison.—After hearing and weighing the various observations of
gentlemen, I am at a loss to see where the danger lies. These are
precisely the words used by the former Congress, on two occasions,
one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which established
the Revenue Board. The same power was also annexed to the office
of Superintendent of Finance, but I never yet heard that any
inconvenience or danger was experienced from the regulation;
perhaps, if the power had been more fully and frequently exercised,
it might have contributed more to the public good.
There is a small probability, though it is but small, that an officer
may derive a weight from this circumstance, and have some degree
of influence upon the deliberations of the Legislature; but compare
the danger likely to result from this clause, with the danger and
inconvenience of not having well-formed and digested plans, and we
shall find infinitely more to apprehend. Inconsistent, unproductive,
and expensive schemes, will be more injurious to our constituents
than the undue influence which the well-digested plans of a well-
informed officer can have. From a bad administration of the
Government, more detriment will arise than from any other source.
The want of information has occasioned much inconvenience and
unnecessary burthens under some of the State Governments. Let it
be our care to avoid those rocks and shoals in our political voyage,
which have injured, and nearly proved fatal to, many of our
cotemporary navigators.
A gentleman has asked, what is meant by responsibility? I will
answer him. There will be responsibility in point of reputation, at
least a responsibility to the public opinion with respect to his
abilities; and supposing there is no personal responsibility, yet we
know that men of talents and ability take as much care for the
preservation of their reputation as any other species of property of
which they are possessed. If a superior degree of wisdom is
expected to be displayed by them, they take pains to give proofs
that they possess it in the most unequivocal manner; this of itself
will ensure us no small degree of exertion.
With respect to originating money bills, the House has the sole right
to do it; but if the power of reporting plans can be construed to
imply the power of originating revenue bills, the constitution is
inconsistent with itself, in giving the President authority to
recommend such measures as he may think expedient or necessary;
but the construction is too unnatural to require further investigation.
I have admitted there is a small probability of a small inconvenience,
but I do not think it any more an argument against the clause, than
it would be an argument against having windows in a house, that it
is possible the wind and the rain may get in through the crevices.
Mr. Stone was not afraid of giving the officer the power of reporting
plans, because he was sure Congress would, in every case, decide
upon their own judgment. A future Congress would not pay such a
deference, even to their predecessors, as to follow in their footsteps,
unless they were convinced of the good policy of their measures. He
thought if the House wanted to make use of the information
acquired by the Secretary, they ought to give him notice of their
intention; consequently, something of this kind was proper in the
bill.
Mr. Sherman thought the principle held up by the clause, was
absolutely necessary to be received. It was of such a nature as to
force itself upon them; therefore it was in vain to attempt to elude it
by subterfuge. It was owing to the great abilities of a financier, that
France had been able to make the exertions we were witnesses of a
few years ago, without embarrassing the nation. This able man,
after considerably improving the national revenue, was displaced;
but such was the importance of the officer, that he has been
restored again.
Mr. Baldwin.—I do not see what we are guarding against by striking
out the words, unless gentlemen mean to go so far as to introduce a
prohibitory clause, and declare that the Secretary of the Treasury
shall be restrained from digesting or preparing plans for the
improvement of the revenue. If there is any evil in having him attend
to this branch of the business, I cannot see how to avoid it. Suppose
the officer is a bad man, and there are others like him in this House,
(for this must be what the gentlemen are afraid of;) and suppose he
has prepared a scheme for peculation, which he hopes to get
adopted by making dupes of the honest part; how are you to hinder
it from being brought forward? Cannot his friends introduce it as
their own, by making and seconding a motion for that purpose? Will
you restrain him from having access to the members out of doors?
And cannot he infuse his dangerous and specious arguments and
information into them as well in the closet, as by a public and official
communication? But, Mr. Chairman, can this House, or if it can, will it
prevent any of their constituents from bringing before them plans for
the relief of grievances or oppressions? Every individual of the
community can bring business before us by petition, memorial, or
remonstrance, provided it be done in a decent manner. How then do
you propose to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury?
I think the clause is very well as it stands, and shall therefore be
against the amendment.
Mr. Page's motion for striking out the clause being put and negatived:
The question on Mr. Fitzsimon's motion to amend the bill, by striking
out the word report, and inserting prepare, was taken and carried by
a great majority.
After which the House adjourned.
Revenue Bill.
Mr. Boudinot, from the managers on the part of this House in the
conference with the Senate on the subject of the amendments to the
Impost Bill, reported that the conference had agreed to pass the bill
as amended by the Senate, with some additional amendments, viz:
the duty on distilled spirits of Jamaica proof, to be reduced from
fifteen cents to ten cents per gallon. The duty on all other spirits, to
be reduced from twelve to eight cents per gallon. The duty on beer,
ale, porter, or cider, imported in casks, from eight to five cents per
gallon. The duty on beer imported in bottles, from twenty-five to
twenty cents per gallon. The duty on coal, from three to two cents
per bushel.
Western Lands.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
state of the Union. Mr. Boudinot in the chair.
Mr. Scott requested that the report of the committee on the Western
Territory might be read, which was read accordingly, as follows:
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that an act of
Congress should pass for establishing a Land Office, and to regulate
the terms of granting vacant and unappropriated lands in the
Western Territory.
Mr. Scott.—In endeavoring, sir, to open the interesting subject now
before you, I shall avoid the repetition of those ideas which I threw
out on a former occasion, as far as my memory will serve me, and
the nature of the subject will permit.
This subject, sir, will appear of great magnitude in point of interest,
if we consider the extent of the territory; I think I shall not be far
beyond the mark, if I say it is one thousand miles long by five
hundred broad; nor if I say it is sufficient to contain two millions of
farms; nevertheless, for greater caution, say it will contain one
million, (which is notoriously and greatly within the real contents,)
and that each of these farms may be peopled by six souls, they will
amount to six millions of inhabitants, double the number of the
present inhabitants of the United States. From this view, it is an
object of great concern. It will appear also an object of concern, if
we contemplate the climate, the soil, and the waters of that country;
consider that it lies in the heart of the temperate zone; its soil
infinitely more rich and more fertile than any in the Atlantic States;
its waters pure and good—in a word, it is such a territory as must
command inhabitants, and will be peopled. Its situation in the
middle of our continent, gives the climate a salubrity that
accommodates it to the emigrants from both Northern and Southern
States. It is meeting them on a middle ground, softening the harsh
restrictions of the rugged North, and breathing bland the zephyr
grateful to the sun-scorched South. In short, it is such as gives to all
who have seen it the utmost satisfaction—it is both healthy and
agreeable.
It may perhaps be objected, that the measure now proposed will
lead or tend to a depopulation of the Atlantic States, and therefore
ought not to be adopted. This is a circumstance I by no means wish.
I am as far from desiring a depopulation of the Atlantic shores, as I
am from fearing it on this ground. I am confident it will not operate
in any considerable degree to bring about that event; but if it should
be thought it would, that could be no solid objection against the
measure. Whilst the desire of emigration continues, and lands are to
be procured, settlers will find their way into that territory; nor is it in
the power of Congress to withhold lands altogether, because they
are to be got of others on better terms. There is superior
encouragement held out to the people settling on the other side of
the river Mississippi, where the soil is fertile, and the climate equally
agreeable. In proof of this assertion, I will read to the committee the
translation of a kind of proclamation issued by the Governor of the
Spanish posts at the Illinois. [This paper contains an invitation to all
persons inclined to settle in the Western country, offering as
inducements, lands without charge, exemptions from taxes,
protection in civil and religious liberties, besides provision and the
implements of husbandry.] After this, Mr. S. proceeded: Now, sir, if
Congress fear to sell their lands lest it tend to depopulate the
Atlantic States, what must they apprehend from propositions like
these? They will certainly have all the effect which encouragement
from this quarter can have. It may be said, that Americans will not
venture to live under the Spanish Government, or settle a Spanish
colony. To this it may be replied, that when people, from their
necessities or inclinations, are determined to emigrate, in order to
mitigate their distresses, they think little of the form of government;
all they care for is relief from their present or approaching wants and
troubles.
Nobody will emigrate from the Atlantic States but a certain
description of men, and they will go whether you hold out this
encouragement to them or not; they will pay little regard to
Congressional restrictions. And here let me make one remark, drawn
from my own observation. The forming settlements in a wilderness
upon the frontiers, between the savages and the least populated of
the civilized parts of the United States, requires men of enterprising,
violent, nay, discontented and turbulent spirits. Such always are our
first settlers in the ruthless and savage wild; they serve as pioneers
to clear the way for the more laborious and careful farmer. These
characters are already in that country by thousands, and their
number is daily increasing, and will continue to increase; for
congenial spirits will assimilate maugre all our endeavors to the
contrary. But how will you prevent them? I should be glad to see a
plan for hemming in the emigration to that territory; I think the
thing wholly impracticable, therefore it becomes the immediate
interest of Congress, to direct the emigration to a proper point;
direct it to their own territory, rather than be inactive spectators of
its silent, though rapid course to the Spanish and British
dependencies; rather sell your lands and get something for them,
than let your citizens leave your dominions. By improving a part, you
add to the value of the remainder; their population will produce a
hardy race of husbandmen and warriors, always at the command of
the United States, to support and defend your liberty and property.
These being facts, I leave it to the wisdom of the House to draw the
inference.
I will make one further remark, with respect to the encouragement
or discouragement of emigration. Suppose it was in the power of
Congress to stop the course of the impetuous current, which has
already won its way through insuperable obstructions, and spread
itself over the fertile lands of the Ohio. I ask, with perfect security, if
it is not such an act of contumacy, and inconsistency with the
fundamental principles of the Government, that Congress could not
adopt it? Consider that many of your citizens are destitute of the
comforts, nay, the common necessaries of life, without a prospect of
providing for the subsistence of themselves and families: I ask,
would Congress prevent the emigration of such persons if they
could? I think not; they would not act as kind protecting fathers to
their people if they did. I presume this would be too serious an
objection for any man to face, with a restraining proposition. I
question if any man would be hardy enough to point out a class of
citizens by name, that ought to be the servants of the community;
yet, unless that is done, to what class of the people could you direct
such a law? But if you passed such an act, it would be tantamount
to saying that there is some class which must remain here, and by
law must be obliged to serve the others, for such wages as they
please to give.
This being the case, let us make the best of liberty, our people, and
our land. Your citizens, I tell you, are already there by thousands;
they are going by thousands more, and are every hour growing up
into consequence. They never expect to return into the Atlantic
States; plant them in your soil, add this wealth of population to your
own, and form an empire illustrious as it is extended. Remember, ye
sages of my country, an historic truth recorded for your instruction,
that empire has been slowly, but invariably, moving from East to
West; emigration has uniformly receded in that direction, from the
time that our common parents quitted the garden of Eden, till the
present hour; nor doubt but it will continue to pursue that course, as
long as there are lands to be inhabited.
Much will depend upon the energy and force of the Government
established in that country; it ought to be such as will furnish
sufficient power for its own internal purposes, and also to secure it
to the Union. But that is not the only tie by which its union is held.
That country is attached to the Atlantic States by its natural
situation. To be convinced of this truth, nothing more is necessary
than to look upon the chart: all the commerce of that country must
come through the States upon the sea-coast. We know, at Pittsburg,
that we are a thousand miles nearer to the market than settlers at
the mouth of the Ohio river. When we export our produce by that
and the Mississippi, we know we can get easier home with our
returns by the way of Philadelphia, than the others can by turning
up and stemming the current of the Mississippi. Therefore, the
imports for all that territory must come through the United States.
From these considerations, I conclude it would be madness in the
extreme for them to think of a separation, unless they were driven
to it by a fatal necessity; they will be too sensible of its ill effects
ever to attempt it.
But suppose, for a moment, that they break off from the Union, and
even become our enemies, it would be good policy in us to get as
much as we can from them first, especially as they are disposed to
give it us; let us make them extinguish part of our national debt
before they leave us. The soil and climate of that country, as I said
before, will be great inducements for emigrants to settle there. If
they were to break off, they would know how to get money enough
from the sale of the territory to support their Government, without
any other resource whatever. If I, as a resident in that country, had
the remotest view of a separation from the Atlantic States, I should
be sorry to see Congress sell an acre of that land; for selling it, in
that case, would be neither more nor less than preventing us from
putting the money into our pockets when we became independent.
If they meditate independency, the most likely way to make them
so, will be to let their lands alone, in order to supply them with funds
sufficient to support them in the measure. If they are sold, it will not
be in their power.
I apprehend it will be found that a Land Office will effect these
objects better than any other plan that can be devised. If this should
be effectual, and no doubt can be entertained but it will, the
inhabitants of the United States cannot, with a good grace, be called
upon for heavy taxes in order to pay the interest on a debt which
can be so easily and properly extinguished. Every individual who
contemplates the subject, will see how much it is his interest to buy
a few dollars in certificates, and purchase a piece of land with them,
which will annihilate the debt, and prevent the demand for taxes to
pay the interest; besides, it will remain as a security to reimburse
the principal to the proprietor, as the population of the country
extends; but, at all events, it would be but advancing four or five
years' interest, and the whole debt would be absorbed.
If we mean to sell our lands for ready money, or mean to trust, we
have a superior advantage. It is more probable that the necessitous
person who wants the land for the subsistence of himself and family,
will labor harder to procure a property of this kind, and secure it for
himself, than the speculator who never means to pay a farthing until
he has received it from the sale of the land; besides, the necessitous
person is better able to buy of Government than of the speculator,
because he can get it cheaper. The purchasers of large tracts retail
out their land to this class of men, and certainly charge them
something for their trouble. But if we sell on credit, as under the
Proprietary Government was the practice in Pennsylvania, those who
take out small quantities get their land surveyed, and set themselves
down; they cultivate the ground, and erect buildings for their own
accommodation. Land, in this improved state, furnishes a better
security to Government for any arrearage of purchase money, than a
large tract sold on speculation, and which lies in the same state of
nature as it did when it was disposed of, perhaps adding thereto the
expense of making the survey. If the land must revert to Congress at
last for default of payment, we get nothing in the latter case;
whereas, when sold in lots, if a man has settled himself down, and
paid for his warrant and survey, which costs the Union nothing, but
for the first price and interest thereon, it must strike every
gentleman's mind that it would be disagreeable, after a man had
made a settlement for three or four years, to have to turn out.
Rather than do this, he would make every exertion to discharge the
price: if his situation was so wretched as not to furnish the means,
some of his neighbors, on such security, might befriend him; but at
any rate Government would be secure. By this argument, I do not
mean to insist that Congress should sell their lands on trust; they
may do so, or sell for ready pay, as their wisdom may think eligible. I
shall be satisfied either way.
I think the convenience of the people is a subject not unworthy of
being taken into view. My plan proposes that they should be able to
perfect their titles on the spot. I fear not the objection which has
been raised. It may be said, the titles ought not to be completed
until it was done immediately under the eye of Congress. Let this be
as it may, I will make one remark: can we not have every tie, every
check, and security upon these officers that we have upon the
collectors of the revenue? I think there is as much room for
confidence in the one case as in the other. We can take care that the
Secretary of the Land Office shall send in his accounts of patents
and warrants. I think we may depend here upon a true return.
The Receiver of the office shall take nothing but public securities,
which are not quite so great a temptation to embezzlement or illicit
practices as money. The Surveyor will be a check upon both. I think
the gentlemen employed in this business cannot be of very trifling
character. In short, this department may be as well checked and
balanced as any other; the expense of it will be nothing, because the
officer may be supported out of the fees. This being the case, I shall
conclude with moving that the committee adopt the resolution
reported by the committee, and recommend it to the House to
appoint a select committee to bring in a bill accordingly.
Mr. Fitzsimons asked if it would not be better to settle all the
principles of the bill first, that the select committee might not lose
their labor, as had been once or twice experienced, for want of this
precaution.
He was in favor of some measure of this kind, though he had some
doubts of the necessity there was supposed to be of establishing a
Land Office.
The question was now taken on the resolution, and agreed to.
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