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Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-1

Chapter 8
Arrays
A Guide to this Instructor’s Manual:

We have designed this Instructor’s Manual to supplement and enhance your teaching
experience through classroom activities and a cohesive chapter summary.

This document is organized chronologically, using the same headings that you see in the
textbook. Under the headings you will find: lecture notes that summarize the section, Teaching
Tips, Class Discussion Topics, and Additional Projects and Resources. Pay special attention to
teaching tips and activities geared towards quizzing your students and enhancing their critical
thinking skills.

In addition to this Instructor’s Manual, our Instructor’s Resources also contain PowerPoint
Presentations, Test Banks, and other supplements to aid in your teaching experience.

At a Glance

Instructor’s Manual Table of Contents

• Overview

• Objectives

• Teaching Tips

• Quick Quizzes

• Class Discussion Topics

• Additional Projects

• Additional Resources

• Key Terms
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-2

Lecture Notes

Overview
Chapter 8 introduces the concept of arrays. An array is a list of elements of the same
data type. Students will learn to create arrays of primitive data types and objects. They
will work with arrays by searching, sorting, and passing them to methods.

Objectives
• Declare arrays
• Initialize an array
• Use variable subscripts with an array
• Declare and use arrays of objects
• Search an array and use parallel arrays
• Pass arrays to and return arrays from methods

Teaching Tips
Declaring Arrays
1. Introduce the concept of an array, which is a named list of data items with the same
data type. Discuss the programming situations in which an array is useful. Have the
students consider the code and the question posed on page 394.

If time permits, ask students to write a program with several related elements of
Teaching the same type, such as test scores. Once they have created a program with several
Tip scalar variables, ask how they might expand this program to several hundred
elements. This exercise will make the need for arrays very clear.

2. Describe the syntax for declaring an array. Arrays are indicated using square brackets:
double [] salesFigures;. Discuss naming strategies for arrays.

3. Explain that declaring an array does not reserve memory space for the array elements.
The process of reserving memory space is called creating the array. The new operator is
used to create an array: salesFigures = new double[20];.

Teaching An array can be declared and created in the same statement: double[]
Tip salesFigures = new double[20];.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-3

4. Introduce the terms subscript and element. Define the boundaries of the array, and
explain what happens when a subscript is out of bounds. Be sure to emphasize that
arrays are zero-based. Discuss the impact this has on the first and last indexes
(subscripts) in an array.

5. Review Figure 8-1, which shows an array of 20 elements.

6. Discuss the variety of methods to declare an array size shown on pages 396-397.

7. Point out that arrays can be used as properties of classes.

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 397.

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on pages 397–399 to create a Java
application that declares and initializes an array.

Initializing an Array
1. Explain how to initialize an array by assigning values to individual array elements or to
the entire array using curly brackets.

2. Initializing an array is often referred to as populating an array.

3. The {} contains the initialization list of values. Note that when the entire array is
initialized using {}, there is no need to specify the size of the array.

4. Create an array of test scores during your lecture.

Teaching
When populating the array, remember that arrays start at index 0.
Tip

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 401.

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on page 401 to initialize the array of
doubles created earlier in the chapter.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-4

Using Variable Subscripts with an Array

1. Note that the power of arrays lies in using a variable as a subscript. This allows the
array elements to be processed in a loop that increments the variable used as a subscript.
Many Java programmers use a constant to define the size of the array.

Teaching
Remind students of the benefit of using constants over literals.
Tip

2. Explain that arrays have a length field that holds the number of elements in the array.

3. Using the code on page 402 and page 403, point out the effectiveness of combining
for loops with arrays.

4. Define the enhanced for loop, also known as the foreach loop. Compare the
traditional loop with the foreach loop using the code on page 404.

5. Write an array application during your lecture. Use both the normal for loop and the
new enhanced for loop.

Note that the enhanced for loop cannot be used in every programming situation.
Teaching
Several situations in which it is not usable are listed at the bottom of the
Tip
following page: http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/guide/language/foreach.html.

Using Part of an Array

1. Discuss situations where you may not need all parts of an array. The code in Figure 8-4
codes a scenario where any number of quiz scores, up to 10, can be entered and
averaged.

2. Create an array in class that does not use every part of an array. An excellent example is
monthDays, which holds the number of days in each month of the year. Start with
subscript 1 instead of 0.

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 406.

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on page 406 to create a Java application
that uses a loop to access array elements.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-5

Declaring and Using Arrays of Objects

1. Note that programmers can create arrays of objects as well as primitive types. Use the
class created in Figure 8-6 while reviewing the code examples on page 407.

2. Emphasize the need to explicitly call the constructor for each element in the array.

3. Demonstrate calling class methods from the array element.

4. Reuse one of the classes from your earlier lectures as an array of objects. Be sure to
instantiate the values and use several of the methods.

Teaching It can be difficult to declare and initialize an array of objects in a single

Tip statement.

Using the Enhanced for Loop with Objects

1. Explain that you can use the enhanced for loop to cycle through an array of objects. It
eliminates the need to use a limiting value, and eliminates the need for a subscript
following each element.

Teaching Using the enhanced for loop to access array elements is often easier for new
Tip programmers to understand than the traditional for loop and subscripts.

Manipulating Arrays of Strings

1. Note that programmers can create arrays of Strings.

2. During your lecture, create an array named monthNames that holds the names of the
months.

3. During your lecture, print out the abbreviations of the months using a for loop and the
substring() method of the String class.

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 409.

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on pages 409–414 to create a Java class
containing an array of Strings. This class is then used to create an array of
BowlingTeam objects.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-6

Quick Quiz 1
1. True or False: You declare an array variable in the same way you declare any simple
variable, but you insert a pair of curly brackets after the type.
Answer: False

2. A(n) ____ is an integer contained within square brackets that indicates one of an array’s
variables, or elements.
Answer: subscript

3. How would you set the value of the first element in the someNums array to 42?
Answer: someNums[0] = 42;

4. The ____ loop allows you to cycle through an array without specifying the starting and
ending points for the loop control variable.
Answer: enhanced for

5. The last subscript in an array of size 100 is ____.

Answer: 99

Searching an Array and Using Parallel Arrays

1. Explain that the process of searching an array involves examining each array element
to determine whether it matches a particular value. This technique can be used to
determine whether a particular value is valid by entering each valid choice in an array
and then searching the array for the value.

The search algorithm described in the text is the linear search method. Point out
Teaching
that this is the slowest search to implement, but the easiest to code. Other
Tip
methods exist and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Using Parallel Arrays

1. Define the term parallel array as two or more arrays that store logically related
elements at corresponding indexes. Figure 8-9 shows a program that uses parallel
arrays. Figure 8-11 shows a loop with an early exit. A while loop, covered later in the
chapter, can be used in place of this if structure.

2. Point out that the monthName and monthDays arrays created during your lecture are
parallel arrays.

Teaching An alternative to using parallel arrays is to create an object that encapsulates the
Tip logically related data, and create an array holding elements of that type.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-7

Searching an Array for a Range Match

1. Define a range match. Explain how to search an array for a range match. This
technique is illustrated in Figure 8-13.

2. During your lecture, calculate the letter grade corresponding to a percentage using a
range match.

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 420.

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on pages 421–422 to create a Java
application that searches an array of BowlingTeam objects.

Passing Arrays to and Returning Arrays from Methods

1. Review the program listing in Figure 8-16. In this program, a primitive type is passed to
a method. Note that primitive types are passed by value, which means that a copy of
the primitive data type is passed into the method.

Teaching Stress the importance of understanding that primitive types are passed by value
Tip and any changes made within a method will not be seen in the calling method.

2. Review the program listing in Figure 8-18. In this program, an array is passed to a
method. Since an array is a reference type and not a primitive type, it is passed by
reference, not by value. This means that the method has the ability to alter original
values in array elements.

3. During your lecture, create a method that accepts an array for a parameter.

Returning an Array from a Method

1. Review the program listing in Figure 8-20, which illustrates the syntax for returning an
array from a method.

2. Create a method during your lecture that returns an array of values.

Two Truths and a Lie

1. Discuss the two truths and a lie on page 426.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-8

You Do It
1. Students should follow the steps in the book on pages 427–428 to create a Java
application that passes an array to a method.

Don’t Do It
1. Review this section, discussing each point with your class.

Quick Quiz 2
1. A(n) ____ array is one with the same number of elements as another and for which the
values in corresponding elements are related.
Answer: parallel

2. True or False: Searching an array for an exact match is not always practical.
Answer: True

3. Arrays, like all nonprimitive objects, are ____ types; this means that the object actually
holds a memory address where the values are stored, and the receiving method gets a
copy of the array’s actual memory address.
Answer: reference

Class Discussion Topics

1. In what situation, if any, would you use a constant value as an array subscript?

2. Is it possible to store elements with different data types in the same array? Explain why
or why not.

3. Outside of the programming element, discuss where arrays are used.

4. Discuss how arrays can be used in video games.

Additional Projects
1. An alternative to parallel arrays is to create an object that encapsulates the logically
related data and create an array holding elements of that type. Take the program
example in Figure 8-9 and modify it to get rid of the parallel arrays and use an array of
objects instead.

2. Create a program that prompts the user for an integer number and searches for it within
an array of 10 elements. What is the average number of comparisons required to find an
element in the array?
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-9

Hints:
• Your program should print the number of comparisons required to find the
number or determine that the number does not exist.
• Try finding the first and last number stored in the array.
• Run your program several times before computing the average.

Additional Resources
1. Details about working with arrays from developer.com:
www.developer.com/java/other/article.php/1143571

2. Java arrays - Java tutorial:

www.tutorialhero.com/tutorial-76-java_arrays.php

3. Does Java pass by reference or pass by value?:

www.javaworld.com/javaworld/javaqa/2000-05/03-qa-0526-pass.html

4. Top Ten Errors Java Programmers Make:

www.javacoffeebreak.com/articles/toptenerrors.html

Key Terms
 Array: a named list of data items that all have the same type.
 Element: one variable or object in an array.
 Enhanced for loop: allows you to cycle through an array without specifying the
starting and ending points for the loop control variable.
 foreach loop: an enhanced for loop.
 Index: another name for a subscript.
 Initialization list: comma-separated values enclosed within curly braces that initialize
the elements in an array.
 length field: contains the number of elements in an array.
 Out of bounds: the error returned whenever an array is accessed using a subscript
either below 0 or above the largest subscript value.
 Parallel array: one with the same number of elements as another and for which the
values in corresponding elements are related.
 Passed by reference: when a value is passed to a method, the address is passed to the
method.
 Passed by value: when a variable is passed to a method, a copy is made in the receiving
method.
 Populating an array: providing values for all of the elements in an array.
 Property: an object’s instance variable or field.
 Range match: the process of comparing a value to the endpoints of numerical ranges to
find a category in which the value belongs.
 Reference types: the object actually holds a memory address where the values are
stored.
Java Programming, Eighth Edition 8-10

 Scalar: simple, primitive variables, such as int, double, or char.

 Searching an array: the process of comparing a value to a list of values in an array and
looking for a match.
 Subscript: an integer contained within square brackets that indicates one of an array’s
variables, or elements.
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 In the XVIII. cent. Comte distinguishes three schools of Ethics: the
utilitarian school, especially represented in his view by Helvetius; the
Kantian School, which he knows through Cousin; and finally the
philosophy of the moral sentiment; that is to say, the Scottish
school; by none of the three is he fully satisfied. The Utilitarianism of
Helvetius rests upon an inadequate psychology, which distorts
human nature by denying against all evidence the existence of
altruistic inclinations. He involuntarily tends to “reduce all the social
relations to low coalitions of private interests.” The ethics of duty, as
presented by Cousin, at any rate, organises “a kind of mystification,
in which the so-called permanent disposition of each one to direct
his conduct according to the abstract idea of duty would end in a
small number of clever schemers taking advantage of the human
race.” These remarks, in Comte’s mind address themselves less to
the doctrine than to the person of Cousin. Finally the Scottish school
was nearer to the truth than the others, since it admitted the
existence of the altruistic tendencies beside the selfish ones. But it
lacked precision and strength.
These various schools of ethics had a common failing by which
they stood condemned as erroneous: they were constituted before
the science of human nature had become positive. Thus utilitarian
morality is quite deducible from a psychology such as that of
Condillac: but this “metaphysical” psychology treated man chiefly as
a reasoning and calculating being, and misunderstood the
preponderance of the affective faculties. In the same way, the
“german,” that is to say Cousin’s philosophy, represents the ego as
being free, of an absolute freedom, and as being subjected to no
law whatever: hence a strange and metaphysical system of ethics of
duty.
Theological doctrines of ethics hitherto have been very superior to
those which have been produced by philosophical speculation. The
reason for this is simple. Without any scientific apparatus, religion
implies a far more exact psychology than that of philosophers up to
the present time. It deals with man “concrete” and real. It was
bound not to misunderstand the relative importance of his faculties,
and the respective power of his inclinations and his passions. The
priest very often has a better knowledge of men than the
metaphysician.
Comte especially admires Christian morality or, more precisely, the
teaching of this morality as it was given by the Catholic church in the
Middle Ages. “All the different branches of this morality have
received most important improvements from Catholicism.” In saying
“Love thy neighbour as thyself,” in making charity the supreme
virtue, in fighting against selfishness as the source of all vices,
Christian morality has taught what above all other things must be
engraved upon men’s hearts. Positive philosophy will use the same
language. “For anyone who has gone deeply into the study of
humanity, universal love as Catholicism conceived it is still more
important than the intellect itself in the economy of our individual or
social existence, because to the gain of each one and of all, love
makes use even of the least of our mental faculties, while selfishness
disfigures or paralyses even the best dispositions.”323
But the greatest merit of Catholicism has been that it considered
ethics as “the first of social necessities.” Everything is subordinated
to it: it is subordinated to nothing. It dominates the entire life of
man so as ceaselessly to direct and control all his actions. In ancient
society, morals depended upon politics. In Christian society even
politics borrows its principles from morals. That was the finest
triumph of “Catholic wisdom,” which instituted a spiritual power
independent of the temporal power.
Unfortunately this pure and lofty morality has linked its destinies
with those of Catholicism. Now, Catholicism has been unable to keep
pace with the progress of the intellect and of the positive method. At
first it gave proof of “admirable liberality.” Later it became
indifferent, and then hostile, to scientific progress. Finally it showed
itself to be “retrograde,” when it had to struggle for its own
existence. Catholic dogmas underwent a decomposition the
necessary stages of which have been already described324 as it was
bound to happen, and as a matter of fact did happen, the morality
itself came to be affected by the attacks which were loosening the
foundations of dogma. The work of criticism, after having
successively ruined all the foundations of the old intellectual system,
was subsequently to attack those of ethics. So we see the family,
marriage, heredity, “assailed by senseless sects.”325 To be sure,
private morality depends upon other conditions than those of
unanimous opinions immovably established. Natural feeling speaks in
it. Nevertheless it is not beyond the reach of “corrosive discussion,”
when opinions of this kind are lacking, but public morality is all the
more threatened. Here, without naming them, but clearly pointing
them out, Comte attacks the schools of Saint-Simon and Fourier.
“While dreaming about reorganisation of society they only developed
the most dangerous anarchy.” Saint-Simonism endeavoured to ruin
the family which the revolutionary storm, “with a few exceptions,”
had respected. Fourierism denies the most general and the
commonest principle of individual morality: the subordination of the
passion to reason.
Must we then go back, as the retrograde school would have us do,
and in order to save morality base it once again upon revealed
religion? But the remedy, if it be not worse than the disease, is at
least powerless to cure it. How could the religious dogmas be used
as a support for morality when they cannot sustain themselves?
What, in the future, can we expect from beliefs which have not
withstood the progress of reason? Far from being able to furnish a
solid basis for morality to-day, religious beliefs tend more and more
to become doubly detrimental to it. On the one hand they are
opposed to the human mind placing it on a more solid foundation;
and, on the other hand, they are not active enough, even among
those who believe in them, to exert a marked influence upon
conduct. The clearest result of these dogmas is to inspire the greater
number of men who are still imbued with them, with an instinctive
and insurmountable hatred of those who have shaken them off.
 II.

Being founded upon positive science, Comte’s ethics will reproduce

its essential characteristics. In the first place it will be “real,” that is
to say it will rest upon observation and not upon imagination. It will
consider man as he is and not as he fancies himself to be. It will
then rest, not upon the abstract analysis which he may make of his
own heart, but upon the proofs given by humanity of its inclinations
and of the usual motives for its actions, during the centuries made
known to us by history. In a word, through the use of an objective
and truly scientific method, it will avoid serious causes for mistakes.
Being positive, this morality will be relative. For the immediate and
necessary consequence of the relativity of knowledge is the relativity
of morality. Kant, whom Comte himself called “the last of his great
precursors,” attempted to preserve an absolute character for ethics:
it is because, at bottom, he also preserved metaphysics. The moral
law, says Kant, is universally valid for every free and reasonable
being. But the only species of beings of this kind which we know,
the human species, is developed in time according to the laws of a
necessary progress. At every stage in this development it was not
possessed of an equal aptitude for understanding a moral law. The
most we can say is that, with time, the aptitude becomes greater
and greater. Then, the existence of our species depends upon a
great number of natural conditions—astronomical, physical,
biological, sociological. If these conditions were different, which is
not an absurd hypothesis, our morality would be different also. It is
then relative at once to our situation and to our organisation.”
The idea of a relative morality is still a source of anxiety to many
minds, who take it to be a preliminary step towards the negation of
all morality. They think that, either good is absolute or the distinction
between good and evil vanishes; there is no middle course.
However, history shows that there is a way out of such deadlocks.
Was not a similar dilemma put on the subject of knowledge? Was it
not even said: either truth is absolute, or there is not truth at all?
The dilemma was a false one. The human mind has become
accustomed to relative truths; and an analogous solution will end by
being also accepted for ethics. The acknowledgment of its relativity
will not be any more fatal for it than it has been for science.
As the distinction between the true and the false subsists,
although good is no longer conceived as absolute and immutable, so
the distinction between good and evil subsists, although good is no
longer conceived as a supreme theological or metaphysical reality,
but as a “progress” towards an end indefinitely approached but
never reached. The evolution of morality corresponds to that of
knowledge. Both go through successive phases, of which each one
implies the preceding ones, and preserves while modifying them.
There are then “goods” as there are “truths,” provisional and
temporary. Positive philosophy can thus give a reason for moral
ideas, sometimes so poor and even so horrible, upon which
humanity formerly lived. It does not judge the ethics of the past as
compared with the ideals of to-day. It gives full justice to the
theological and philosophical ethics which it replaces, and of which it
proclaims itself the legitimate heir.
Finally it claims neither to be moral nor original in morality.
Already positive science is “a prolongation of public reason.” In its
nature it does not differ from simple commonsense, to which it owes
its essential ideas: only in science these ideas assume a more
systematic definition, and an abstract character which allows us to
make the most thorough use of them. In the same way systematic
morality is a prolongation of spontaneous morality.326 It simply
disengages the principles which, as a matter of fact, have directed
the moral development of humanity. Does it follow from this that it
only has, so to speak, an interest for curiosity, and that moral
progress takes place of itself as rapidly and as completely as
possible, even if philosophical reflection is not applied to it? But
Comte has already replied to this form of inept sophism. What is
true of the evolution of humanity in general is true of the moral
evolution included in it. This evolution allows of crises, of diseases,
of stoppages in development, etc. It is then not at all a matter of
indifference that systematic morality should bring out strongly the
end towards which man’s efforts must tend, according to his nature
and to the whole of the conditions in which he is placed. By throwing
light upon its advance it helps progress as effectually as it is in man’s
power to help it.

III.

In its positive form the enunciation of the moral problem is as

much as possible to make the sympathetic instincts predominate
over the selfish impulses, “sociability over personality.”327
That human nature admits of sympathetic instincts, or, according
to the name given them by Comte, altruistic instincts, is not a
postulate but a fact. Positive psychology proves it. It is one of the
solid portions of Gall’s doctrine. To be convinced of this it is enough
to observe men, children, and even animals. Without these instincts,
moreover, society would not subsist. Metaphysicians who considered
man as a being acting chiefly through reasoning, may have imagined
a society founded upon the expressed or tacit consent of the
contracting parties. In reality, before all things men obey their
inclinations. If they live in society, it is assuredly because their
affective faculties lead them to it. Without inborn altruistic
tendencies there can be no society and no morality.
But biology has proved that, since organic life preponderates over
animal life, the selfish instincts are naturally stronger than the
sympathetic ones. How could the latter succeed first in counter-
balancing and then in dominating the former? This problem would
have no solution if the progressive ascendency of the altruistic
instincts, very weak originally, were not favoured by two orders of
conditions, the one subjective, the other objective, whose action is
unceasingly felt.
 The following development of domestic and social affection is, in
the first place, the result of the fact that man lives in society, and,
consequently, in continual relation with his neighbours and his
fellows. For, as we know, habitual exercise favours the development
of organs and of functions. Further, the natural inferiority of the
altruistic inclinations is compensated for by their aptitude for
“indefinite extension.” They can grow in all the members of a group
at the same time. Far from their being obstacles in each other’s way,
the stronger altruism in one awakens and encourages nascent
altruism in others. On the contrary, forms of selfishness tend to
exclude each other. Save in the case of a more or less durable
coalition, their rival claims clash with each other, to the peril of social
peace. They are bound to make mutual concessions. They are never
altogether repressed; however, social life obliges them to dissimulate
and to restrain their most violent outbursts.
Add to this that the benevolent affections find in themselves their
own satisfaction, and that this satisfaction is inexhaustible. We tire
of acting, said Comte, we even tire of thinking; we never tire of
loving. The affections which it is sweetest to experience have also a
tendency to occupy a larger and larger place in the heart of man.
Moreover the question for them is not to take the place of egoism
but to hold it more and more in check. If human nature evolves it is,
as we know, without any essential transformation. The
preponderance of selfishness in us is connected with organic reasons
which are beyond our power and which will never change. To wish
to uproot egoism is folly; qui veut faire l’ange fait la bête. Whatever
efforts we make, we cannot permanently change the relations
between our altruistic and egoistic instincts. The latter will always be
the strongest. But we can regard this change as an ideal which we
shall approach always without ever actually reaching it.328
Finally, it is rare that our selfish instincts do not awaken some
altruistic feeling as a counter-result. For example, the sexual instinct
determines the development of maternal love. The desire to impose
one’s will generates devotion to the common weal. Once the
benevolent affection has arisen it persists and grows, and, after the
selfish instinct has ceased to operate, it is sometimes sought after
for its own sake. This fact, says Comte, greatly facilitates the
“solution of the great human problem.”329
This solution would however remain exceedingly uncertain and
very precarious if its only guarantee were the whole of the
subjective conditions which have just been analysed. For, in order
that it may become established and last, this group of conditions
itself requires what Comte calls an “objective basis.” The moral order
within us must be united to the order of the world outside ourselves.
It is true that, including the altruistic ones, our inclinations tend to
become spontaneously developed. But it is also true that the
external world tends constantly to modify them, through the medium
of the impressions which it makes upon us. For the development of
these inclinations is necessarily affected by the direction of our
conceptions and by the success of our undertakings. Now both are
ever becoming more subordinated to external order, since the end of
science is to know this order, and that of the useful arts is to modify
it. In this way, independently of ourselves, order tends in a twofold
manner to regulate our instincts, “either by the excitement resulting
from the notions which it procures, or by exercise corresponding to
the efforts which it demands.”330 In a word, the laws of the “milieu”
in which we live act like a regulation upon our inclinations. Although
an indirect one, the influence of these laws upon them becomes in
the long run irresistible.
And further, in order to be felt, this action does not require that
we should have a more or less clear knowledge of it. Even at the
time when man knew almost nothing of the laws of nature, his
activity was more or less controlled by them. The ends sought after
by man have always depended upon his moral and physical nature:
the reason of the failure or the success of his efforts have always
been found in the natural laws. Gradually positive knowledge was
developed. Man became conscious of the order by which he is
himself surrounded, of which he feels himself to be a portion, and in
which his intellect collaborates in a measure difficult to determine
but yet certain. The external regulator which, whatever our will may
be, imposes itself upon our activity is thus revealed to our mind. The
last degree to be reached is that it should finally be accepted by our
feeling. This is precisely the result obtained by positive philosophy.
For it makes us know our individual and social nature. It has shown
us that humanity must not be explained by man, but man by
humanity. It has explained the growing development of social life
and that of altruism, which is at once its condition and its
consequence. We now understand that our benevolent affections
find themselves “spontaneously in conformity with the natural laws
which govern the development of society.”331
Thus it is the continual pressure of external order which makes
our egotistic instincts capable of being trained. They would
undoubtedly get the mastery, if our sympathetic inclinations did not
find without, in the laws of nature, a constant support which reason
ends by understanding.
Moral perfection would be harmony realised among all men, by
their mutual goodwill, according to the principle: Live for others,
and, at the same time, harmony realised in each individual soul, by
the subjection of egoism to the altruistic sentiments. But this
harmony is not what is produced in the first place. On the contrary,
war rages between the social groups, discord between the members
of the same groups, the passions in each individual soul. Sometimes
one, sometimes another of our tendencies influences us, according
to circumstances whose details vary to infinity. No stable order of
subordination is established among our tendencies: human nature,
considered by itself, does not contain any principle which could
maintain such an order. Left to itself, the human soul would remain
in the state called by Spinoza “fluctuation.” The moral problem would
have no durable solution. Hence the necessity of a “universal brake,”
to make sure of the development of the altruistic tendencies. This
brake is no other than the inevitable and continual pressure of the
order of the world upon our conduct, and in the long run, upon our
motives.
When the human mind wishes to direct its own phenomena, it
instinctively seeks, in the general system of intelligible facts which
constitutes the world, a group of well combined data, in order to
refer its own less stable phenomena to it. We have already seen an
example of this kind in the formation of language. Man
“consolidates” his thought by coordinating it with a combination of
signs which themselves are movements, and, as such, are subject to
the general laws of the universe. In ethics we find something
analogous. The main artifice in moral perfection, writes Comte, lies
in diminishing the inconsistency, indecision and divergency in our
purposes, by connecting our moral and practical intellectual habits
with external motives. The mutual links between our various
tendencies are incapable of securing their stability, until they have
found an immovable fulcrum outside themselves. To endure, the
harmony of the soul must be realised by itself as founded on reason,
that is to say, upon the order of the world.

IV.

What place must we assign to this positive ethics, in the usual

classification of ethical doctrines? It is often considered as a theory
of the moral sentiment. And, as a matter of fact, Comte himself
characterises his ethics by “the direct preponderance of the social
feeling.” In its origin also it belongs to this group. Comte makes use
of Adam Smith and of Hume, when he affirms the existence of
inborn altruistic tendencies within the soul. He indicates these
tendencies, in his Cerebral Table, under the general name of
“sympathy,” which comes from the Scottish school. Establish these
altruistic feelings, he says, and morality is given, take them away,
and morality disappears.
But these philosophers did not push analysis any further. They
neglected to inquire how morality is developed in fact, although the
altruistic tendencies are less powerful than the others. Comte
reproaches the ethics of the Scottish school with its superficial
character and its lack of systematic strictness. He praises their
psychology which is less incomplete than that of their
contemporaries; he is not satisfied with their theory of human
activity. If the existence of sympathetic inclinations is a fact, their
evolution must none the less be explained. The latter only becomes
intelligible through the continued action of the objective order upon
the soul of man, an action which becomes all the more decisive as
man becomes more conscious of it, by the discovery of the laws of
nature.
Thus, in order to give an account of human morality, Comte adds
a rational element to the feeling-elements. Undoubtedly it is not an a
priori element. But it is that which for Comte is the substitute of the
a priori in metaphysical doctrines: that is the invariableness of the
laws of phenomena, which makes the world intelligible. From the
speculative point of view this intelligibility, under the name of “the
principle of laws,” is the basis of our science. From the practical point
of view, the order of the world alone can guarantee the lasting
harmony of our inclinations. In this way it becomes the foundation of
morality.
In spite of the more than evident differences of all kinds which
separate Comte from Malebranche and from Leibnitz, it then appears
that in his philosophy as in theirs, the idea of order is made use of to
pass from the domain of knowledge to that of action. Undoubtedly,
with Comte, from theological or metaphysical this idea has become
positive. He does not intend to go beyond experience, and affirms
nothing which cannot be verified as a fact. But, like the philosophers
his predecessors, he is none the less anxious to find the unity of the
soul beneath the diversity of its modes of activity, and to show that
theoretical reason and practical reason are one and the same.
Malebranche solved the problem by appealing to the idea of divine
perfection, expressed everywhere by order. Comte explains that the
pressure exercised by external order generates order in our mind
(which moreover collaborates in it), then, as a consequence, in our
feelings and finally in our actions. The stoics had already said
something similar on this subject. Briefly, Comte’s ethics may be
presented as the positive form of the ethics of universal order.
Shall we then say that, being sentimental and rational at once,
this morality is not definite in character? Is it merely an eclectic
attempt at conciliation?—Eclecticism in a certain sense would not
frighten Comte. Positive philosophy flatters itself on being just in
regard to its predecessors. It takes pleasure in praising each of them
for the portion of truth which it contains. But, in the present case
there is no occasion for it to be eclectic. It suffices for it to be
relative, and, since it is a question of moral and social things, to
appeal to history. Thus we see that the sentimental and the rational
principles in no way exclude each other. From the historical point of
view, that is to say, if we consider the genesis of morality, the latter
finds birth in the sympathetic feelings which man, like many other
animals, experiences, and which are spontaneously developed in
domestic affection and in social life. How is it that subsequently this
morality evolves, that friendly relations grow indefinitely in relative
importance, in spite of the inborn strength of selfishness, that
humanity, in a word, should gradually rise above animality? Without
any doubt, that is due to the development of intelligence, itself
bound up with the efforts which man is obliged to make to adapt
himself to the “milieu” in which he lives.
Instinctive in its animal origin, morality becomes rational in its
human evolution. We can say as much of language, of art, of
science, and even of religion. All this was in embryo in the primitive
nature of man, since nothing absolutely new ever appears in it. All
this only manifested itself under pressure from external order, which,
consciously or unconsciously, is always being exercised. Only when
we know this order, we can make use of our science to turn the
natural forces to our own ends, which in themselves are rational. It
is in this way that systematic morality is substituted to spontaneous
morality.
 If we were more intelligent, says Comte, it would be equivalent to
our being more moral. Understanding better the intimate connection
which in a thousand ways, at every moment, binds each one of us to
the whole of our fellows, we should more surely observe the
precept: “Live for others.” And, if we were more moral, it would be
equivalent to our being more intelligent. We would then act precisely
as a more open and a deeper intelligence than our own would lead
us to act. Now, we cannot become more moral by an immediate
modification of our inclinations. Positive psychology has established
that we exercise no direct action upon the affective part of our
nature. But we can endeavour to become more intelligent: every
successful effort that we make to understand the order of nature
affords us the means of making fresh attempts.332 In this indirect
manner morality can grow. Finally, it grows still more surely, when
the intellect has understood that it does not contain its end within
itself, that it must be subordinated to the heart, and that the only
happiness compatible with the nature of man is found in devotion
and in love.
 CHAPTER II
SOCIAL ETHICS
“Live for others”: such is the supreme formula of positive ethics.
Feeling bears witness to its justice; science discloses its far-reaching
importance and its deep consequences. But this formula is not only
applied in a general way to the natural society formed by men
among themselves, a society in which Comte even includes animals
capable of affection and of devotion, whose services deserve our
gratitude. The moral law finds a precise application in the definite
relations established among men by civic society, that is to say in the
rights and in the mutual duties of individuals. If it be true that ethics
and politics are distinct from each other, politics is none the less
closely subordinated to ethics. The spiritual power does not govern;
however it directs those who govern as well as those who are
governed. It is this power which gives to all the sum of common
beliefs and feelings which enable Society to live. Thus to ethics
belongs the task of determining the principles according to which
positive politics will regulate the relations between men.
Now, as a matter of fact, these relations are in a very unsettled
condition to-day. Public order is unstable, revolutions are frequent,
suffering is excessive. Are we to lay the blame upon public
institutions? They are rather an effect than a cause. In order to
understand the present condition it is necessary to grasp the law of
the general evolution of humanity, and in particular that of European
Society. It then becomes apparent that the actual disturbances
proceed from the great conflict inaugurated by the French
revolution. This conflict is still going on. The old régime has not yet
quite disappeared, and the régime which is to take its place is not
yet organised. The struggle is prolonged between the theologico-
metaphysical spirit and the positive spirit, between revealed belief
which is becoming weaker and demonstrated belief which is being
formed, and finally between the old economic landmarks and an
industrial activity whose laws have not yet been discovered.
The relations between masters and workmen are at the present
time “anarchical.” The advance of industry, as it grows, oppresses
the majority of those whose co-operation in it is indispensable. And
the ever more strongly marked division between “brains and hands”
is far more due to the political incapacity, the social thoughtlessness,
and especially to the blind selfishness of the masters than to the
inordinate demands of the workmen.333 The capitalists have not
dreamt of organising a liberal education for the people to defend it
against the seductions of the revolutionary propaganda. They seem
to fear that the people should receive instruction. As far as they can,
they take the place of the ancient chiefs whose social rank they
covet. But they do not inherit their generosity. They do not
understand that “noblesse oblige.” In this way the great masters of
industry too often tend to utilise their political influence to the
detriment of the public, to appropriate important monopolies and to
take the advantage of the power of capital to make the claims of the
masters predominate over those of the workers, without any regard
for equity, since the right of coalition which is allowed to the former
is refused to the latter.
Comte saw the bourgeoisie at work during Louis-Philippe’s reign,
and he passes severe judgment upon it. Its political conceptions, he
says, refer not to the aim and exercise of power, but especially to its
possession. It regards the revolution as terminated by the
establishment of the parliamentary régime, whereas this is only an
“equivocal halting place.” A complete social reorganisation is not less
feared by this middle class than by the old upper classes. Although
filled with the critical spirit of the XVIII. century, even under a
Republican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy,
by means of which the respectful submission of the masses is
insured, while no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders.334 This is
hard upon the proletariat, whose condition is far from improving. It
“establishes dungeons for those who ask for bread.”335 It believes
that these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely
“encamped” in modern society without being properly settled in it
with definite and respected rights.336 The capital which it holds in its
hands, after having been an instrument of emancipation, has
become one of oppression. It is thus that, by a paradox difficult to
uphold, the invention of machinery, which a priori, one would be led
to believe, would soften the condition of the proletariat, has, on the
contrary, been a new cause of suffering to them, and has made their
lot a doubly hard one.337
Here, in brief, we have a formidable indictment against the middle
classes, and in particular against the political economy which has
nourished them. Comte has in view sometimes the classical
economists of the end of the XVIII. century, sometimes their
orthodox successors in the XIX. Those of the XVIII. he regards as
having collaborated in the great revolutionary work. They took part
in the diffusion of critical doctrines and of negative philosophy. In
this capacity they have, no doubt, rendered certain services. They
contributed to the decomposition of the old régime. Political
economy had succeeded in convincing the governments themselves
of their unfitness to direct the commercial and industrial
movement.338
The affinities between the philosophers and the economists of the
XVIII. century are evident enough: is it necessary to recall the spirit
of “individualism” of the economists, and their characteristic
tendency to restrict the functions of government as much as
possible? Despite the efforts of a great number among them,
conservatives by temperament or by political tendencies, the logical
consequences of their principles were bound to come to light. Thus
“the superfluity of all regular moral teaching, the suppression of all
official encouragement of science and the fine arts; even the recent
attacks against the fundamental institution of property find their
origin in economical metaphysics.” It was with this doctrine as with
the other parts of negative philosophy; after having accomplished its
work of destruction, it sought to transform its critical principles into
organic ones, without realising that this amounted to repudiating
beforehand any positive organisation.
The famous formula, “Laissez faire, laissez passer,” is no more a
real principle in political economy than liberty itself is one in politics
properly so-called. Comte vigorously opposes the dogma of non-
intervention. Because in some particular and secondary cases
political economy has ascertained “the natural tendencies of
societies in the direction of a certain necessary order, it concluded
from this that any special institution is useless.” But this order is
extremely imperfect. The knowledge of sociological laws will give us
the power of improving it, as we already do in the case of medicine
and surgery. Merely to admit the degree of order which is
spontaneously established in practice is equivalent to “a solemn
dismissal in the case of every difficulty which arises.” Look at the
social crisis brought about by the development of machinery. In
reply to the just and urgent claims of the workmen suddenly
deprived of their means of livelihood, and unable in a day to find
another, our economists can only repeat, “with merciless pedantry,”
their barren aphorism about absolute industrial liberty. To all
complaints they dare to answer that it is a question of time! And this
to men who require food to-day! “Such a theory proclaims its own
social impotence.”339
And so neither is political economy a science yet, nor, so far, are
economists men of science. Originally being nearly all barristers or
men of letters, they were strangers to the idea of scientific
observation, to the precise notion of a natural law, and finally to the
sense of what constitutes a demonstration. If we make an exception
of Adam Smith and of a few others, how could they apply the
positive method which they did not know to the most difficult cases
of analysis? Destutt de Tracy placed political economy between logic
and ethics. And this was not without reason: for it is nearer to
metaphysics than to positive science. In it, work preserves its
personal character, schools contend with each other, the discussions
as to the elementary notions of value, of utility, etc., savour of
scholasticism. The very idea of studying economical phenomena
separately is not scientific, since the various “social series” are
interdependent, and since in sociology more particular laws depend
upon more general laws.340 There is no scientific study of
economical facts unless we first look at them from the sociological
point of view. We can no more isolate the laws which regulate the
material existence of societies than we can describe man as an
essentially calculating being, only actuated by the motive of personal
interest.
The same objections naturally hold good against the adversaries
of the economists, since, in general, socialists and communists have
confined themselves to an analogous conception of their science.
However, while criticising them, Comte recognises the fact that they
have established some truths. Everything they say is not false. Thus,
they justly claim the right for the government to intervene in
economical relations. And, if it be absurd to wish to abolish private
property, as certain sects demanded, it is very true that property is
of a social nature, and that it is necessary to regulate it.341 To
endow it with an absolute character is, says Comte, an “anti-social”
theory. No property can be created, nor even transmitted, by its
mere possessor without the concurrence of society. Thus always and
everywhere the community has intervened in the exercise of the
right of property. The tax makes the public a partner in every private
fortune.
In discussing the essential problems of property, the communists
(whom Comte confuses with the socialists), to-day render an
important service. The very dangers called forth by the solution they
propose concur in fixing the general attention upon this great
subject, “without which the metaphysical empiricism and the
aristocratic selfishness of the leading classes would cause it to be set
aside or disdained.” Merely to state the problem without the solution
with which the communists associate it, would not suffice. Our weak
intellect does not fasten upon a question for long, unless a reply to
it, be it true or false, which we must accept or reject is forthcoming
at the same time. Moreover, are the communist “aberrations” more
useless, and at bottom, more dangerous than the current illusion
according to which the Revolution is ended by the establishment of
the parliamentary régime?342
But, this being admitted the innovating schools have all fallen into
grave mistakes. In general, being devoid of the historic sense, and
on the other hand, ignoring the principles of social statics, they do
not see that man’s action upon social phenomena is only usefully
exercised within certain limits. The idea that a revolution can, in a
moment, transform the régime of property and all the social
conditions which depend upon it is destined to disappear, when the
“positive mode of thought” shall have extended to the social
phenomena in the same way as it has to all others. Then the
“extravagant proposals” of the socialists will find no adherents, and
the demand for what is recognised as impossible will no longer be
made by anyone.343
Finally, Comte reproaches communism with its tendency to
restrain individuality. This objection, coming from him, is remarkable,
for it has very often been made in his own case. As an organiser of
despotism, John Stuart Mill has compared him to Ignatius of Loyola.
But Comte reminds us that, according to him, the collective
organism, or society, differs from the individual organisms, or living
beings, by the fact that in it the elements live an independent life.
The problem consists in conciliating, as much as possible, this free
division with the convergence of the activities. Neither of the two
must be sacrificed to the other. To restrain individualities would tend
to destroy the dignity of man by doing away with his responsibility,
while the want of independence, and the subjection to a community
indifferent to him would make life intolerable. “Such is the immense
danger of all utopias which sacrifice real liberty to an anarchical
equality, or even to an exaggerated fraternity.”344 On this point,
positive philosophy on its own account takes up again the “decisive
criticism” of communism made by our economists.
 II.

Positive philosophy does not confine itself to refuting the orthodox

economists and the socialists by the help of their own arguments. In
its turn it takes up all the questions raised by them, and, for their
solution, takes its stand upon the results obtained by sociology.
In the first place it states the problem of “social reorganisation” in
its most general form. Socialists, in the same way as their
adversaries, are only concerned with riches as if they were the only
ill-divided and ill-administered social forces. But there are others.
The reform of economical conditions depends, in conclusion, upon
that of morals. Before all things then we must “reorganise” morals.
We must determine the rights and mutual duties of citizens, and
inspire everyone with the feeling of his duty and with respect for the
rights of others.
The two ideas of right and of duty are not dealt with by Comte in
the same manner. He accepts the idea of duty without subjecting it
to a special criticism. Duty is the rule of action prescribed to each
one both by feeling and by reason. It is our duty to do what we
recognise as most suitable to our individual and social nature. On
the contrary, the idea of right “disappears” in the positive state. The
word “right” must be removed from political language, in the same
way as the word “cause” is from philosophical language. They are
two metaphysical notions. Everyone has duties, and towards all. No
one has any right properly so-called. “The idea of right is as false as
it is immoral, because it presupposes an absolute individuality.”345
These formulæ called forth strong protests, particularly from M.
Renouvier and his disciples. Indeed, in the constitution of civil
society, they appear to neglect justice entirely, to establish the
relations between men merely upon charity and feeling. However, if
we look into it closely, Comte’s thought as is often the case, has
been forced and warped, by its expression. But the comparison
between the ideas of right and of cause suggested by him,
satisfactorily throws a light upon his meaning.
Positive science has given up the search after causes, in order to
confine itself to establishing the invariable relations between
phenomena. But these relations correspond to what was formerly
called causal action. They represent what was real in this supposed
action. The only difference—but it is important—consists in the fact
that the human mind has forsaken the absolute point of view for the
relative one, and is henceforth content to establish the connection
between phenomena, without imagining “connecting entities”
according to Malebranche’s strong expression.
The idea of right has gone through an analogous transformation.
In the same way as the idea of cause, it was theological for a long
time, and then metaphysical. In antiquity it was closely allied to
religion. In modern times the rights of peoples, and even the rights
of individuals, are conceived according to the ancient standard of the
rights of princes and masters. But, having become established by
triumphing over the rights of princes, the rights of peoples and
individuals ultimately rest, as they did, upon a supernatural and
mystical basis. The rights which every citizen claims are the change
in small coin of the absolute right formerly possessed by the
sovereign who represented the whole nation. Having become
metaphysical in the XVIII. century, the idea of absolute, intangible,
indefeasible right, which attaches to the human person, has been
most useful for the decomposition of the old régime. But, once this
work has been accomplished, it cannot be made use of in the work
of reorganisation any more than the other metaphysical principles.
Positive philosophy admits nothing absolute. Everything in society is
at once subject to conditions, and places conditions upon all things.
Nothing is unconditional; and sociology teaches that we must go not
from the individual to society, but from society to the individual.
In consequence, here again we must give up endeavouring to
transform a critical principle into an organic one. Undoubtedly rights
will remain, as the constant connections between phenomena
subsist. But we shall cease to base these rights upon a metaphysical
conception of human nature, in the same way as we have ceased to
refer the connections between phenomena to metaphysical entities
called causes. Instead of making individual duties consist in the
respect of universal rights, we shall conceive inversely the rights of
each one as the result of the duties of others towards him. In a
word, duty is established before right. This principle is of the highest
importance in Comte’s eyes. In it he sees an expression and a proof
of the predominance of the positive over the metaphysical spirit, and
of the subordination of politics to ethics. He likes to say that “the
consideration of duty is bound up with the spirit of the whole.” On
the contrary, the consideration of right, if it be conceived as
absolute, leads to a denial of all government and of all social
organisation.
The new philosophy will tend more and more to replace “the
vague and stormy discussion of rights, by the calm and strict
determination of respective duties.” Henceforth, the problem raised
by the communists assumes a new aspect. That there should be
powerful industrial masters is only an evil if they use their power to
oppress the men who depend upon them. It is a good thing, on the
contrary, if these masters know and fulfil their duties. It is of little
consequence to popular interests in whose hands capital is
accumulated, so long as the use made of it is beneficial to the social
masses.346 Now this essential condition “depends far more upon
moral than upon political measures.” The latter can undoubtedly
prevent the accumulation of riches in a small number of hands, at
the risk of paralysing industrial activity. But these “tyrannical”
proceedings would be far less efficacious than the universal reproof
inflicted by positive ethics upon a selfish use of the riches possessed.
The reproof would be all the more irresistible, because of the fact
that the very people who would have to submit to it could not
challenge its principle, inculcated in all by the common moral
education.” It is thus that in the Middle Ages, excommunication was
not less feared by the princes who incurred it than it was by the
peoples who witnessed it.
 Once common education was established, under the direction of
the spiritual power, the tyranny of the capitalist class would be no
more to be feared. Rich men would consider themselves as the
moral guardians of public capital. It is not here a question of charity.
Those who possess will have the “duty” of securing, first, education
and then work for all.
These ideas seem perhaps paradoxical and chimerical. But, says
Comte, this is because modern society has not yet got its system of
morality. Industrial relations which have become immensely
developed in it are abandoned to a dangerous empiricism, instead of
being systematised according to moral laws. War, more or less
openly declared, alone regulates the relations between capital and
labour. In a normal state of humanity these relations, on the
contrary, are “organised.” Strength does not generate oppression.
Every citizen is a “public functionary,” whose well-defined functions
determine at once his obligations and his claims (that is to say his
rights). Property is a function like any other, and not a privilege. It
serves for the formation and administration of capital by means of
which each generation prepares the work of the next. Those who
hold it must not turn it from its public use to their own individual
advantage.347
In the same way as the capitalists, the workers are public
functionaries, and they perform a no less important service.
Independently of their salary, they are deserving social gratitude.
Our customs already admit of this feeling in the case of the liberal
professions in which the salary does not dispense with gratitude.
This feeling will have to be extended to all work which contributes to
the common weal. The service of humanity, says Comte, is a
gratuitous one. The salary, whatever it may be, only pays for the
material part in every office. It serves to repair the consumption
demanded by the organ and the function. As to the essence of
service itself it allows of no other reward than the very satisfaction
of performing it, and the gratitude which it arouses.348
 Consequently in a “truly organised” society (note this expression
which M. de Bonald often uses), the vulgar distinction between
public and private functionaries is destined to disappear. As, in an
army, even the private soldier has his own dignity which comes from
the close solidarity of the military organisation, and from this fact,
that all share the same honour in it; so, when positive education has
made evident to all the part played by each one in the social work,
professions which are humblest to-day will become ennobled.349 The
industrial régime of to-day, which shows us little else than the
conflict of rival egoisms, is an anarchical régime, or, to put it better,
an “absence of régime.”
Modern society has not yet got its morals. It will form them
gradually, in the same way as military society did. Military life, more
than any other, is ruled by the predominating selfish inclinations.
Nevertheless, as it could only be developed by the spirit of union,
this condition alone sufficed for it to determine admirable
devotion.350 Why should it not be the same in industrial life which
rests upon the peaceful and constructing instinct? Otherwise, if the
present “anarchy” of morals were to last, modern society would
remain below the level of the Middle Ages, which really was
organised by its spiritual power. It would even be below the level of
military societies. What would be the use of substituting monopoly
to conquest, and a despotism based upon the right of the richest to
the despotism resting upon the right of the strongest?351
Everything then depends upon the common moral education,
which itself depends upon the establishment of a spiritual power.
The superiority of the positive doctrine lies in the fact that it has
restored this power. The innovating schools all wish to secure normal
education and regular work for the proletariat. But they want both at
once, or work before education. Positivism wishes to organise
education first.352
Naturally, in positive education duties will be presented in their
social aspect. Thus the elementary virtues of temperance, of
chastity, etc., are recommended by positive morality;—but not from
the point of view of their usefulness to the individual. Even if “an
exceptionally constituted nature should shield the individual from the
consequences of intemperance or debauchery,” soberness and
continence would be no less strictly required of him as being
indispensable for the fulfilment of his social duties.353 In the same
way, the object of domestic morality is not to form “a selfishness
shared by several,” but to develop the sympathetic affections which,
from the family will gradually extend to the social group, and then to
humanity. The principle is to get man into the habit of subjecting
himself to humanity, even in his smallest actions, and in all his
thoughts. Once this point is reached, modern society will
spontaneously become organised and the positive régime will of
itself be established.
 CHAPTER III
THE IDEA OF HUMANITY
In this world there is nothing absolute, everything is relative;
Comte wrote this to his friend Valat as early as 1818.354 But as a
matter of fact, there exists a supreme reality to which all others are
subordinated, the idea of which is the principle of a rational
conception of the world. Comte calls this reality humanity. Instead of
being the ultimate end of all thought and all action “in itself,” it is the
ultimate end “for us.” But this difference simply signifies that the
new philosophy leaves the metaphysical for the positive point of
view. With these limitations the idea of humanity “corresponds” to
the old idea of the absolute. It takes its place and fulfils its religious
part. It is truly, if one dares to say so, a “relative absolute.”
In Comte’s doctrine, the idea of humanity is presented under
several successive aspects, or, to put it better, the development of
his system has brought to light, in turns, the various attributes of
this “Great Being.” In his first career, Comte prefers to consider
humanity as an object of science. In his second career, it rather
appears to him as an object of adoration and of love. Here we can
follow the progress of the mystical and religious feeling which,
especially from 1846, filled his thoughts and modified his language,
his philosophical doctrine, nevertheless, remaining essentially the
same.

I.

We must not, says Comte, define Humanity by man, but on the

contrary man by Humanity. In general this formula is understood in a
moral and social sense. It is understood as a condemnation of
“individualism,” and one of the directing principles of the positivist
régime. This interpretation is not a false one, and consequences of
this kind can indeed be drawn from Comte’s formula. But they are
only consequences. The immediate object of the formula is not to
subordinate the individual to the multitude. In the first place it
expresses a fact. If we consider a man by himself, positive science
only allows us to define him as an animal, in whom as in all others,
the end of animal life is to insure organic life. Do we wish to define
him by what is essentially human in him, that is to say, by intellect
and sociability? One must then pass from the consideration of the
individual to that of the species. From the strictly biological point of
view M. Bonald’s saying must be reversed; we must say that man is
an organism served by an intellect. It is only if we leave the
biological for the social point of view, if we look upon the human
species as a single “immense and eternal” individual (a conception
which is justified by the continued development of intelligence and
sociability),355 that we can consider the voluntary and systematic
subordination of vegative to animal life as the ideal type towards
which civilised humanity is tending. We can then make use of this
subordination to refine it. In a word, we are really men only by our
participation of humanity.
The essential attributes of this “immense and eternal social unity”
are solidarity and continuity.356 These attributes are at once social
and moral and it could have no others. The attributes of the
theological and metaphysical absolute had reference to the
categories of substance, of cause, of time, of space, etc. It was one,
simple, infinite, etc., all often incomprehensible and contradictory
expressions of this idea that the supreme principle is “absolute.” On
the contrary, positive philosophy admits that in the scale of beings,
dependence grows with dignity. Humanity, which is the most
“complex” and the “noblest” of all beings known to us, is therefore
also the most dependent. Its existence will necessarily end with that
of the planet which it inhabits. Its unity is one of “collection.” It is
imperfect and subject to crises of all kinds. Such as it is, however,
science and morality show us in it the highest term which our mind
can reach, the loftiest ideal which our heart can love, and finally the
object most worthy of our devotion.
 Human solidarity has been studied by statical sociology. We have
seen with what admiration the social consensus inspired Comte, a
consensus, according to him, even closer and more intimate than
the vital consensus. Positive education will develop the feeling of
solidarity and make it the principle of moral instruction. Every
individual in all his ways of thinking and acting, will be imbued with
two convictions which imply one another. In the first place he will
know that he is only really a man by his participation in humanity,
since his intelligence and his morality are essentially social things. He
will also know that the life of humanity is in part made up of what he
brings to it, and that each of his actions, independently of his will
has a social interest and a social counterpart. Once we are
thoroughly persuaded that we live in humanity and by humanity, we
shall also become convinced that we must live for humanity.
Malebranche said that God is the locus of intellects: Comte would
readily say that humanity is the locus of good wills.
As, in sociology, dynamics is more important than statics, so
among the attributes of humanity, continuity is placed above
solidarity. Not only are the individuals and the peoples of the same
epoch bound by a common solidarity, but the successive generations
co-operate in the same work. Each one has its “determined
participation” in it: and their combination in time produces “a still
nobler and more perfect conception of human unity.” This is the
conception which Comte admired so much in Condorcet, which he
borrowed from him, and which he developed in the positive idea of
progress.
Humanity so understood will inspire us with the strongest feelings
of gratitude. Do we not owe to her all that is good, precious and
human in us? Man will see “co-operators” in the men of all time.357
Each of us has to reflect only upon his physical, intellectual and
moral being to realise what he owes to the whole of his
predecessors. The man who would think himself independent of
others could not even formulate this error (which in Comte’s eyes
becomes blasphemy) without contradicting himself; for is not
language itself a collective and social work?358
History will become the “sacred science” of humanity. To put it
more simply, it will be the ever clearer consciousness which
humanity will have of itself, through the study of its intellectual and
moral activity in the past. Gradually, with the progress of the
historical spirit, the idea of an evolution subject to laws, the idea of
“order conceived as capable of development,” will become
substituted to the prejudice which attributes to man boundless
power of action upon social facts. It will become apparent that the
part played by each generation in the common work of humanity is
necessarily a very small one, as compared with what is transmitted
to it by previous generations. To refuse this inheritance would be to
refuse to be what we are: it would be an absurd and immoral
pretention, and, moreover, entirely fruitless. It is impossible for man
to disown humanity without ceasing to exist. He necessarily
represents, while he lives, a long past of intellectual and moral
efforts. And this is the most essential attribute of human life,
although we meet with more or less developed solidarity also among
other animal species. But continuity belongs to humanity alone. In a
word, according to Comte’s fine formula: “Humanity is made up
more of the dead than of the living.”
However, neither the “yoke” which presses upon the living with all
the weight of history and of prehistoric times, nor the consensus
which makes of humanity a great “collective organism” take from
man his liberty of action. The consequence of human solidarity and
continuity is not a kind of fatalism. Individuals remain responsible.
We must regard them neither as the wheels in a machine, nor as the
cells in an organism, nor as the members of an animal colony.
Humanity is not a polyp. This comparison, says Comte, “shows a
very imperfect philosophical appreciation of our social solidarity, and
a great biological ignorance of the kind of existence peculiar to
polypi.”359 It likens a voluntary and deliberate association to an
involuntary and indissoluble participation. Humanity, as a collective
organism, stands out, on the contrary, as distinct by its own
characteristics from animal colonies. In these colonies, the
individuals are physically bound together and physiologically
independent. In humanity, the individuals are independent physically,
and are only bound together in space and in time by their highest
functions.
Thus this “immense organism” is especially distinguished from
other beings in that it is made up of separable elements, of which
each one can feel its own co-operation, can will it, or even withhold
it, so long as it remains a direct one.360 The individual undoubtedly
cannot “unhumanise” himself: that is too evident. But he retains a
partial independence. As he can collaborate in the collective work by
free consent, he is also free to impede it in the measure of his
strength. Briefly, although the evolution of the Great Being is subject
to laws, every individuality, far from being annulled,361 plays its part
and can have its merit in it. The very knowledge of sociological laws
is a rule for human activity and not a tyranny.

II.

In the latter part of his life, Comte drew out precisely the features
of what he henceforth called the new Great Being. Although we
were not here to undertake to write an account of positive religion,
we must nevertheless, in a few words, indicate the form which this
supreme idea ended by assuming in Comte’s mind.
Firstly, humanity is not conceived simply as the sum of all the
individuals or human groups present, past and future. For all men
are necessarily born children of humanity; but all do not become her
servants. Many remain in the condition of parasites. All those who
are not or were not “sufficiently assimilable,”362 all those who were
only a burden to our species, do not form a part of the Great Being.
A selection takes place among men. Some finally enter into
humanity never to leave it; others leave it never to return. The
selection takes place according to the life they have preferred. Those
who have lived in the purely biological sense of the word, that is to
say, those in whom the higher faculties have been made to serve the
organic function, those whom with brutal energy Comte calls
“producteurs de fumier,”363 will only have been part of humanity in a
transitory manner. Death for them, as for their anatomical system,
will be an end without further appeal. Those in whom the “sublime
inversion” has been accomplished, or at least those who have made
an effort to subordinate the organic to the higher functions, those
finally who have worked for a pre-eminently human end: to make
the intellect predominate over the inclinations, and altruism over
egoism; those having lived for humanity will always live in her.
human end: to make the intellect predominate over the inclinations,
and altruism over egoism; those having lived for humanity will
always live in her.
As the conduct of each one can only be finally judged after his
death, humanity is essentially made up of the dead and “the
admission of the living within her will hardly ever be more than
provisional.”364 Each generation, while it lives, furnishes the
indispensable physiological substratum for the exercise of the
superior human functions. But this privilege which momentarily
distinguishes it from the others, soon slips away from it, as it slipped
away from the preceding ones, and from the men of which they
were composed; they alone who are worthy of it are incorporated
into humanity. Moreover, they are only incorporated in it by their
noblest elements. Death causes them to pass through a
“purification.”
This theory allows Comte to attain at the same time two results,
which he considers equally desirable. In the first place, the religious
idea of humanity remains in perfect accordance with the idea given
of it by biology and sociology. Humanity conceived as the Great
Being, is a kind of hypostasis of the functions by which man tends to
become distinguished from the animal. It is the progressive
realisation through time, of the intellectual and moral potentialities
contained in human nature: it is also its ideal impersonation. In this
last sense, it becomes an object of love and adoration. Thus, the
positivist religion naturally leads to a “commemoration” of great
men, the benefactors of humanity. Here we have one of the ideas
which were defined very early in Comte’s mind.
On the other hand, the desire for immortality is very strong in the
heart of man. On principle Comte recognised at any rate a
provisional value in all that arises spontaneously from human nature.
In science he saw a prolongation of “public reason,” in systematic
morality a development of spontaneous morality. He was thus led to
take into account the almost irresistible tendency which impels man
to desire to triumph over death.365 This tendency, up to the present
time, has satisfied itself by means of illusions. But beliefs of this kind
have become incompatible with the progress of our mental
evolution. Moreover, the social efficacy of hopes and fears
concerning the future life has been much exaggerated. As a matter
of fact, says Comte (and the science of religions bears him out on
this point), the tendency to desire, and consequently to accept the
idea of an ultimate survival, existed for a long time before it was
made use of to support religious beliefs or to preserve public order.
Here, again, positive philosophy does not deny, does not destroy: it
transforms. To the chimerical and vulgar notion of objective
immortality, it substitutes the notion, which is alone acceptable, of
subjective immortality. The same doctrine which takes from us the
consolations so dear to past generations, gives us an adequate
compensation, by allowing each one to hope that he may be united
to the Great Being.

“To continue to live in others,” is a very real mode of existence.366

It is the only one which we can hope for after death; but it is also
the only one which we ought to desire, if it be true that what most
constitutes ourselves in us does not consist in the individual in the
biological sense of the word, but truly in intelligence and good will,
that is to say, in the social and human element. He who has only
lived for himself, who has selfishly sought for life, has lost it: for