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Essential MATLAB for Engineers and Scientists 3rd
Edition Brian Hahn Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Brian Hahn
ISBN(s): 9780764597756, 0764597752
Edition: 3
File Details: PDF, 7.26 MB
Year: 2007
Language: english
Essential MATLAB® for Engineers and Scientists
 Reviewers’ Quotes
This book provides an excellent initiation into programming in MATLAB while serving as a
teaser for more advanced topics. It provides a structured entry into MATLAB programming
through well designed exercises.
Carl H. Sondergeld
Professor and Curtis Mewbourne Chair
Mewbourne School of Petroleum and Geological Engineering
University of Oklahoma

This updated version continues to provide beginners with the essentials of Matlab, with many
examples from science and engineering, written in an informal and accessible style. The new
chapter on algorithm development and program design provides an excellent introduction to a
structured approach to problem solving and the use of MATLAB as a programming language.
Professor Gary Ford
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of California, Davis

For a while I have been searching for a good MATLAB text for a graduate course on methods
in environmental sciences. I finally settled on Hahn and Valentine because it provides the
balance I need regarding ease of use and relevance of material and examples.
Professor Wayne M. Getz
Department Environmental Science Policy & Management
University of California at Berkeley

This book is an outstanding introductory text for teaching mathematics, engineering, and
science students how MATLAB can be used to solve mathematical problems. Its intuitive
and well-chosen examples nicely bridge the gap between prototypical mathematical models
and how MATLAB can be used to evaluate these models. The author does a superior job of
examining and explaining the MATLAB code used to solve the problems presented.
Professor Mark E. Cawood
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Clemson University
Essential MATLAB®
for
Engineers and Scientists
Third edition

Brian D. Hahn
and
Daniel T. Valentine

AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD

PARIS • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford, OX2 8DP
30 Corporate Drive, Burlington, MA 01803

First published 2002

Reprinted 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006
Second edition 2006
Third edition 2007

Copyright © 2002, 2006, 2007 Brian D. Hahn and Daniel T. Valentine. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

The right of Brian D. Hahn and Daniel T. Valentine to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the
publisher

Permission may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department
in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email: permissions@elsevier.com.
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Notice
No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of
products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or
ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular,
independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 13: 9-78-0-75-068417-0

ISBN 10: 0-75-068417-8

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Typeset by Charon Tec Ltd (A Macmillan Company), Chennai, India,

www.charontec.com
Printed and bound in Italy

07 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

Preface to the third edition xvii

PART I ESSENTIALS 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Using MATLAB 4
1.2 The MATLAB desktop 15
1.3 Sample program 16
1.3.1 Cut and paste 16
1.3.2 Saving a program: script files 19
1.3.3 How a program works 21

2 MATLAB fundamentals 24
2.1 Variables and the workspace 24
2.1.1 Variables 24
2.1.2 Case sensitivity 25
2.1.3 The workspace 25
2.1.4 Adding commonly used constants to the workspace 27
2.2 Arrays: vectors and matrices 27
2.2.1 Initializing vectors: explicit lists 28
2.2.2 Initializing vectors: the colon operator 29
2.2.3 linspace 30
2.2.4 Transposing vectors 30
2.2.5 Subscripts 31
2.2.6 Matrices 31
2.2.7 Capturing output 32
2.3 Vertical motion under gravity 33
2.4 Operators, expressions and statements 35
2.4.1 Numbers 35
2.4.2 Data types 36
2.4.3 Arithmetic operators 37
2.4.4 Precedence of operators 37
2.4.5 The colon operator 38
2.4.6 The transpose operator 39
Contents

2.4.7 Arithmetic operations on arrays 39

2.4.8 Expressions 41
2.4.9 Statements 41
2.4.10 Statements, commands and functions 43
2.4.11 Vectorization of formulae 43
2.5 Output 47
2.5.1 disp 47
2.5.2 format 49
2.5.3 Scale factors 50
2.6 Repeating with for 51
2.6.1 Square roots with Newton’s method 51
2.6.2 Factorials! 53
2.6.3 Limit of a sequence 53
2.6.4 The basic for construct 54
2.6.5 for in a single line 56
2.6.6 More general for 56
2.6.7 Avoid for loops by vectorizing! 56
2.6.8 A common mistake: for less loops! 59
2.7 Decisions 60
2.7.1 The one-line if statement 60
2.7.2 The if-else construct 62
2.7.3 The one-line if-else statement 63
2.7.4 elseif 64
2.7.5 Logical operators 65
2.7.6 Multiple ifs versus elseif 65
2.7.7 Nested ifs 67
2.7.8 Vectorizing ifs? 68
2.7.9 switch 68
2.8 Complex numbers 69
2.9 More on input and output 71
2.9.1 fprintf 71
2.9.2 Output to a disk file with fprintf 73
2.9.3 General file I/O 73
2.9.4 Saving and loading data 73
2.10 Odds ’n ends 73
2.10.1 Variables, functions and scripts with the same name 73
2.10.2 The input statement 74
2.10.3 Shelling out to the operating system 75
2.10.4 More Help functions 76
2.11 Programming style 76

3 Program design and algorithm development 86

3.1 Computer program design process 87
3.1.1 Projectile problem example 89

vi
 Contents

3.2 Other examples of structure plans 98

3.2.1 Quadratic equation 99
3.3 Structured programming with functions 100

4 MATLAB functions & *data import-export utilities 104

4.1 Some common functions 105
4.2 *Importing and exporting data 110
4.2.1 The load and save commands 110
4.2.2 Exporting text (ASCII) data 110
4.2.3 Importing text (ASCII) data 111
4.2.4 Exporting binary data 111
4.2.5 The Import Wizard 112
4.2.6 Low-level file I/O functions 113
4.2.7 Other import/export functions 118

5 Logical vectors 121

5.1 Examples 122
5.1.1 Discontinuous graphs 122
5.1.2 Avoiding division by zero 123
5.1.3 Avoiding infinity 125
5.1.4 Counting random numbers 126
5.1.5 Rolling dice 127
5.2 Logical operators 127
5.2.1 Operator precedence 129
5.2.2 Danger 130
5.2.3 Logical operators and vectors 130
5.3 Subscripting with logical vectors 131
5.4 Logical functions 133
5.4.1 Using any and all 134
5.5 Logical vectors instead of elseif ladders 135

6 Matrices of numbers & arrays of strings 141

6.1 Matrices 142
6.1.1 A concrete example 142
6.1.2 Creating matrices 143
6.1.3 Subscripts 144
6.1.4 Transpose 144
6.1.5 The colon operator 144
6.1.6 Duplicating rows and columns: tiling 148
6.1.7 Deleting rows and columns 148
6.1.8 Elementary matrices 149
6.1.9 *Specialized matrices 150
6.1.10 Using MATLAB functions with matrices 151
6.1.11 Manipulating matrices 152

vii
Contents

6.1.12 Array (element-by-element) operations on matrices 153

6.1.13 Matrices and for 153
6.1.14 Visualization of matrices 154
6.1.15 Vectorizing nested fors: loan repayment tables 154
6.1.16 Multidimensional arrays 156
6.2 Matrix operations 157
6.2.1 Matrix multiplication 157
6.2.2 Matrix exponentiation 159
6.3 Other matrix functions 160
6.4 *Strings 160
6.4.1 Assignment 160
6.4.2 Input 160
6.4.3 Strings are arrays 161
6.4.4 Concatenation of strings 161
6.4.5 ASCII codes, double and char 162
6.4.6 fprintf of strings 163
6.4.7 Comparing strings 163
6.4.8 Other string functions 164
6.5 *Two-dimensional strings 164
6.6 *eval and text macros 165
6.6.1 Error trapping with eval and lasterr 166
6.6.2 eval with try...catch 167

7 Introduction to graphics 171

7.1 Basic 2-D graphs 171
7.1.1 Labels 173
7.1.2 Multiple plots on the same axes 173
7.1.3 Line styles, markers and color 174
7.1.4 Axis limits 175
7.1.5 Multiple plots in a figure: subplot 176
7.1.6 figure, clf and cla 178
7.1.7 Graphical input 178
7.1.8 Logarithmic plots 178
7.1.9 Polar plots 179
7.1.10 Plotting rapidly changing mathematical functions: fplot 180
7.1.11 The property editor 181
7.2 3-D plots 181
7.2.1 plot3 182
7.2.2 Animated 3-D plots with comet3 183
7.2.3 Mesh surfaces 183
7.2.4 Contour plots 186
7.2.5 Cropping a surface with NaNs 187
7.2.6 Visualizing vector fields 188
7.2.7 Visualization of matrices 189

viii
 Contents

7.2.8 Rotation of 3-D graphs 190

7.2.9 Other cool graphics functions 192

8 Loops 205
8.1 Determinate repetition with for 205
8.1.1 Binomial coefficient 205
8.1.2 Update processes 206
8.1.3 Nested fors 208
8.2 Indeterminate repetition with while 208
8.2.1 A guessing game 208
8.2.2 The while statement 209
8.2.3 Doubling time of an investment 210
8.2.4 Prime numbers 211
8.2.5 Projectile trajectory 212
8.2.6 break and continue 215
8.2.7 Menus 215

9 Errors and pitfalls 222

9.1 Syntax errors 222
9.1.1 lasterr 225
9.2 Pitfalls and surprises 225
9.2.1 Incompatible vector sizes 225
9.2.2 Name hiding 225
9.2.3 Other pitfalls for the unwary 226
9.3 Errors in logic 226
9.4 Rounding error 226
9.5 Trapping and generating errors 228

10 Function M-files 230

10.1 Some examples 230
10.1.1 Inline objects: harmonic oscillators 230
10.1.2 Function M-files: Newton’s method again 232
10.2 Basic rules 233
10.2.1 Subfunctions 239
10.2.2 Private functions 239
10.2.3 P-code files 239
10.2.4 Improving M-file performance with the profiler 240
10.3 Function handles 240
10.4 Command/function duality 242
10.5 Function name resolution 243
10.6 Debugging M-files 243
10.6.1 Debugging a script 244
10.6.2 Debugging a function 246
10.7 Recursion 246

ix
Contents

11 Vectors as arrays & *advanced data structures 251

11.1 Update processes 251
11.1.1 Unit time steps 252
11.1.2 Non-unit time steps 255
11.1.3 Using a function 256
11.1.4 Exact solution 258
11.2 Frequencies, bar charts and histograms 259
11.2.1 A random walk 259
11.2.2 Histograms 260
11.3 *Sorting 261
11.3.1 Bubble Sort 261
11.3.2 MATLAB’s sort 263
11.4 *Structures 264
11.5 *Cell arrays 267
11.5.1 Assigning data to cell arrays 267
11.5.2 Accessing data in cell arrays 268
11.5.3 Using cell arrays 269
11.5.4 Displaying and visualizing cell arrays 270
11.6 *Classes and objects 270

12 *More graphics 272

12.1 Handle Graphics 272
12.1.1 Getting handles 273
12.1.2 Graphics object properties and how to change them 274
12.1.3 A vector of handles 276
12.1.4 Graphics object creation functions 277
12.1.5 Parenting 277
12.1.6 Positioning figures 278
12.2 Editing plots 279
12.2.1 Plot edit mode 279
12.2.2 Property Editor 280
12.3 Animation 281
12.3.1 Animation with Handle Graphics 282
12.4 Color etc. 285
12.4.1 Colormaps 285
12.4.2 Color of surface plots 287
12.4.3 Truecolor 288
12.5 Lighting and camera 288
12.6 Saving, printing and exporting graphs 289
12.6.1 Saving and opening figure files 289
12.6.2 Printing a graph 290
12.6.3 Exporting a graph 290

x
 Contents

13 *Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) 292

13.1 Basic structure of a GUI 292
13.2 A first example: getting the time 293
13.2.1 Exercise 297
13.3 Newton again 297
13.4 Axes on a GUI 301
13.5 Adding color to a button 302

PART II APPLICATIONS 305

14 Dynamical systems 307
14.1 Cantilever beam 309
14.2 Electric current 311
14.3 Free fall 314
14.4 Projectile with friction 323

15 Simulation 328
15.1 Random number generation 328
15.1.1 Seeding rand 329
15.2 Spinning coins 329
15.3 Rolling dice 330
15.4 Bacteria division 331
15.5 A random walk 331
15.6 Traffic flow 333
15.7 Normal (Gaussian) random numbers 336

16 *More matrices 341

16.1 Leslie matrices: population growth 341
16.2 Markov processes 345
16.2.1 A random walk 345
16.3 Linear equations 348
16.3.1 MATLAB’s solution 349
16.3.2 The residual 350
16.3.3 Overdetermined systems 350
16.3.4 Underdetermined systems 351
16.3.5 Ill conditioning 351
16.3.6 Matrix division 352
16.4 Sparse matrices 354

17 *Introduction to numerical methods 359

17.1 Equations 359
17.1.1 Newton’s method 359
17.1.2 The Bisection method 362

xi
Contents

17.1.3 fzero 364

17.1.4 roots 364
17.2 Integration 364
17.2.1 The Trapezoidal rule 365
17.2.2 Simpson’s rule 366
17.2.3 quad 367
17.3 Numerical differentiation 367
17.3.1 diff 368
17.4 First-order differential equations 369
17.4.1 Euler’s method 369
17.4.2 Example: bacteria growth 370
17.4.3 Alternative subscript notation 371
17.4.4 A predictor-corrector method 373
17.5 Linear ordinary differential equations (LODEs) 374
17.6 Runge-Kutta methods 375
17.6.1 A single differential equation 375
17.6.2 Systems of differential equations: chaos 376
17.6.3 Passing additional parameters to an ODE solver 379
17.7 A partial differential equation 381
17.7.1 Heat conduction 381
17.8 Other numerical methods 385

Appendix A: Syntax quick reference 390

A.1 Expressions 390
A.2 Function M-files 390
A.3 Graphics 390
A.4 if and switch 391
A.5 for and while 392
A.6 Input/output 393
A.7 load/save 393
A.8 Vectors and matrices 393

Appendix B: Operators 395

Appendix C: Command and functionquick reference 396

C.1 General purpose commands 397
C.1.1 Managing commands 397
C.1.2 Managing variables and the workspace 397
C.1.3 Files and the operating system 397
C.1.4 Controlling the Command Window 398
C.1.5 Starting and quitting MATLAB 398
C.2 Logical functions 398

xii
 Contents

C.3 Language constructs and debugging 398

C.3.1 MATLAB as a programming language 398
C.3.2 Interactive input 399
C.4 Matrices and matrix manipulation 399
C.4.1 Elementary matrices 399
C.4.2 Special variables and constants 399
C.4.3 Time and date 400
C.4.4 Matrix manipulation 400
C.4.5 Specialized matrices 400
C.5 Mathematical functions 400
C.6 Matrix functions 401
C.7 Data analysis 402
C.8 Polynomial functions 402
C.9 Function functions 402
C.10 Sparse matrix functions 402
C.11 Character string functions 403
C.12 File I/O functions 403
C.13 Graphics 403
C.13.1 2-D 403
C.13.2 3-D 404
C.13.3 General 404

Appendix D: ASCII character codes 405

Appendix E: Solutions to selected exercises 406

Index 421

xiii
This page intentionally left blank
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who had given the
orders for the preparation of the plan?
PAULUS: I assume that they originated from the same source,
namely, the OKW via the High Command of the Army. The Chief of
the General Staff of the Army had given to Major General Marx the
same documents that he had given me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): At the conferences on the Plan
Barbarossa how many members of the General Staff and High
Command of the German Armed Forces were usually present?
PAULUS: The departments concerned, the Operational
Department, the Department for Foreign Armies, the General
Quartermaster for Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those
were generally the chief departments which were involved.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): How many members of the General
Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were familiar
with the orders and directives as they were being signed?
PAULUS: In the course of time, that is, up to December, while the
actual marching orders were being prepared, more or less, all
General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many had
been informed previously, in the individual periods, is something
which I can no longer say exactly.
THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I.T. Nikitchenko, Member for the
U.S.S.R.): What exactly did the General Staff of the German Army
represent? Did it deal exclusively with the elaboration of technical
questions, was it the apparatus elaborating technical problems
according to instructions of the Supreme Command, or, again, was
the General Staff an organization which prepared, elaborated, and
submitted its findings to the Supreme Command independently?
PAULUS: It was a technical executive body which had the task of
carrying out existing instructions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Therefore the General Staff
was merely a technical apparatus?
PAULUS: That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as
such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of
the Army, and not an executive body.
 THE TRIBUNAL: (Gen. Nikitchenko): To what extent did the
General Staff conscientiously carry out the instructions received from
the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: They carried out these instructions absolutely.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did any conflict exist
between the General Staff and the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: It is a known fact that certain differences of opinion did
exist, although I am unable to explain that in detail. At any rate, I
know through my immediate superior that he had frequently had
differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the German
Armed Forces.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Could such officers remain?
Did they, in fact, remain in the service of the General Staff if they
disagreed with the policy of the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: Political questions did not arise in that connection.
Generally speaking, political questions were not discussed in the
circle of the Army Supreme Command.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not speaking of political
questions in the narrow sense of the word. I am speaking of the
policy of planning for war, of the policy of preparations and
aggression. That is what I had in mind. Was it intended, in case you
know about it, to transform that part of the Soviet Union, occupied
by the German Forces?
PAULUS: I never did know what the itemized plans were. My
knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were
contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the
country.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by
exploitation?
PAULUS: The economic exploitation of the country, so that by
utilizing its resources one could bring the war in the West to a close
and also to guarantee future supremacy in Europe.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did the nature of the
exploitation differ from the economic exploitation applied inside
Germany?
 PAULUS: In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I
only led that army in Russia for three-quarters of a year; and I was
captured early, in January 1943.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did you know of the
directives issued by Government organizations in Germany and by
the Supreme Command, concerning the treatment of the Soviet
population by the Army?
PAULUS: I remember that instructions did appear, but I cannot
recollect the date at the moment. In those instructions definite rules
were given for the manner of conducting the war in the East. I
believe that this principal decree was included in that so-called
Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders
to the effect that no particular consideration should be shown the
population.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by “not to
show particular consideration”—or perhaps the translation is not
quite correct?
PAULUS: That meant that only military necessities should be
considered a basis for all measures that were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Were there any divisions under your command
consisting entirely of SS troops?
PAULUS: During the time I led the Army I had no SS troops at all
under my command, as I remember. Even in the cauldron at
Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry, armored, and motorized
divisions, and two Romanian divisions, there were no SS units.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the SA did not form units, did
they? The SA?
PAULUS: I have never heard of SA units, but the existence of SS
units is a known fact.
THE PRESIDENT: And did you have any branches of the Gestapo
attached to your army?
PAULUS: No, I did not have those either.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you
had any questions to ask, and you said no, I take it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
 [The witness left the stand, and Gen. Zorya approached the
lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on, General.
GEN. ZORYA: Yesterday, I stopped at the questions connected
with the relations between the fascist conspirators and the
Romanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most
opportune moment to read into the Record the testimony of Ion
Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal.
The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in
conformance with the laws of the Soviet Union and I present to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-153 (Document Number USSR-
153) the record of his deposition, which is of exceptional importance
in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between
Germany and her satellites. I consider it necessary to read the
greater part of these depositions, beginning with the second
paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and
64 of the document book. I quote:
“Throughout the entire period during which I held office in
Romania”—testifies Ion Antonescu—“I followed the policy of
strengthening the alliance with Germany and resorted to her help for
retraining and rearming the Romanian army. For this purpose I had
several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with Hitler took place
in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Romanian
State. This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler’s
official residence, in the presence of the German Foreign Minister,
Ribbentrop, and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt. The
conversation with Hitler lasted over 4 hours.
“I assured Hitler that Romania remained true to the previously
concluded agreement regarding Romania’s adherence to the
Tripartite Pact.
“In reply to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler
declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the frontiers of
Romania.
“At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration should
not be considered as final and thus gave me to understand that
Romania could count on a revision of the decision previously taken
in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania.
“Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Romania
should continue its work of reconstructing the Romanian Army on
German lines.
“In the same way I also concluded an economic agreement, in
accordance with which the Germans would at a later date supply
Romania with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, antiaircraft and
antitank guns, automatic rifles, and other armaments, while they, in
return, would receive from Romania wheat and oil for the needs of
the German armies.
“To the question put to me as to whether this, my first conversation
with Hitler, could be regarded as the beginning of my agreement
with the Germans concerning the preparations for war against the
Soviet Union—I replied in the affirmative. There is no doubt that
Hitler had this fact in mind, when he elaborated his plans for the
attack on the Soviet Union.
“In January 1941, through the offices of the German Minister in
Romania, Fabricius, I was invited to Germany and had my second
meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The following persons were
present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German
Minister to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these, Field Marshal Keitel
and General Jodl were also present as representing the German
Armed Forces.
“At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced Killinger to
me, emphasizing that the latter was one of his closest friends. After
this, Hitler described the military situation in the Balkans and
declared that Mussolini had appealed to him for help in connection
with the Italian failures in the war against Greece, and that he,
Hitler, intended to give this help to Italy.
“While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the German troops
concentrated on Hungarian territory to pass through Romania, so
that they could render speedy assistance to the Italians.
“Knowing that the passage of German troops through Romania to
the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly act towards the Soviet
Union, I asked Hitler what, in his opinion, would be the subsequent
reaction of the Soviet Government.
“Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in November 1940, he
had already given appropriate guarantees to Romania and had taken
upon himself the obligation of protecting Romania by force of arms.
“I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through
Romania might serve as a pretext for military operations on the part
of the Soviet Union, and that Romania would then be in a difficult
position since the Romanian Army had not been mobilized.
“Hitler announced that he would give orders for some of the German
troops intended for participation in the operations against Greece to
be left in Romania. Hitler also stressed that, according to the
information at his disposal, the Soviet Union did not intend to fight
either Germany or Romania.
“Satisfied with Hitler’s declaration, I agreed to the passage of
German troops through Romanian territory.
“General Jodl, who was present at this conference, described to me
the strategic situation of the German Army and stressed the
necessity for an attack against Greece launched from Bulgaria.
“My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.
“At this meeting at which, in addition to ourselves, there were
present Ribbentrop and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt, we
reached a final agreement with regard to a joint attack on the Soviet
Union.
“Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed attack on the
Soviet Union. ‘Once we have prepared this attack,’ said Hitler, ‘we
must carry it out without warning, along the entire extent of the
Soviet frontier, from the Black to the Baltic Seas.’
“The unexpectedness of the military attack—Hitler went on to say—
would in a short time give Germany and Romania a chance to
liquidate one of our most dangerous adversaries.
“As a result of his military plans, Hitler suggested the use of
Romanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and, at the
same time, he requested me to participate directly in the attack on
the Soviet Union.
“Hitler stressed the point that Romania must not remain outside this
war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia and North Bukovina
returned to her, she had no other alternative but to fight on
Germany’s side. At the same time he pointed out that, in return for
our assistance in the war, Romania would be allowed to occupy and
administer other Soviet territories, right up to the River Dnieper.
“Since Hitler’s offer to initiate a joint campaign against the U.S.S.R.
corresponded to my own aggressive intentions, I announced my
agreement to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and
pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Romanian
troops and, at the same time, to increase deliveries of the oil and
food required by the German armies.
“Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler
whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her
participation in the war.
“Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to
participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. in alliance with Germany.
When, exactly, the Germans had agreed on this joint attack with the
Hungarians, Hitler did not specify.
“On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active preparations
for the coming campaign.”
Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following manner—I
refer to Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of the
testimony.
“After the Romanian troops under my supreme command had
invaded the Soviet territory Hitler sent me a letter in which he
expressed his gratitude to me and to the Romanian army for the
assistance given.
“Signed, Marshal Antonescu.”
The date of the beginning of Romanian preparations for war
against the U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions
furnished by the former Vice Minister, Mihai Antonescu, who was
also interrogated by the Soviet authorities upon the request of the
Soviet Prosecution: I now submit his testimony as Exhibit Number
USSR-152 (Document Number USSR-152). I shall not quote these
depositions in detail since their greater part is a repetition of some
of the facts described already in the testimony of Ion Antonescu. I
shall only refer to a few paragraphs. I would refer you to Page 1 of
the testimony which is translated into Russian, Paragraphs 1, 2, and
5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the document book:
“In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by the then
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Studza, left for Germany, where
he had a meeting with Hitler.
“During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed the
agreement for Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and
received Hitler’s promise for the later revision, in favor of Romania,
of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Treaty.
“The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial step of a
policy which subsequently led to a joint German and Romanian
attack on the Soviet Union.”
Your Honors, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well as the
testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, which have just
been submitted to the Tribunal, justify the Soviet Prosecution in
making the following statement:
1. The decision to send to Romania a military mission of the
German General Staff for the reorganization of the Romanian Army,
in order to prepare for and subsequently to attack the U.S.S.R., was
taken no later than September 1940, that is, no less than 9 months
prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R. 2. In November of the same year,
Romanian war preparations had been fully developed.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I
had intended presenting to the Tribunal a statement of General
Buschenhagen, general of the former German Army. I do not,
however, intend to do so now, since the Soviet Prosecution has the
possibility of examining this witness in court during the session. I, on
my part, request your permission to have this witness brought to the
court for examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, that would be convenient, in view of several
technical reasons, and would facilitate the task of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
[The witness, Buschenhagen, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ERICH BUSCHENHAGEN (Witness): Erich Buschenhagen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by
God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth
—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when and where
you were born?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was born on 8 December 1895 in Strasbourg,
in Alsace.
 GEN. ZORYA: Will you name your last military rank, please.
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was general in the infantry in the German
Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52d
Army Corps.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you tell us please, did you on 26 December
1945 appeal to us with a statement in connection with the Helsinki
trials?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you confirm this statement now?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I do.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you please tell us what you know about the
preparations made by fascist Germany for attacking the Soviet
Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: At the end of December 1940, in my position
as Chief of the General Staff of the German forces in Norway, I was
called to the OKH, where the then Chief of the General Staff,
Generaloberst Halder, had a conference with the chiefs of general
staffs of the army groups and of the independent armies, one of
which was mine. At this conference we were informed of the OKW’s
Directive Number 21, the Plan Barbarossa, which was issued on 18
December 1940. We were given in lectures the basic reasons for the
intended operations against Soviet Russia.
From this directive I learned that troops of my army also would
take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in
one speech made by the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army,
Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who was then also with the OKH. He
spoke at that time about the military actions in the winter war
between Finland and the Soviet Union. He drew a picture of the
methods of warfare and the fighting value of the Soviet Army and
also of the Finnish troops.
General Heinrichs also had conferences with Generaloberst
Halder at that time, in which I did not take part myself, but I assume
that they were concerned with possible co-operation between the
Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany
and the Soviet Union. There existed since the fall of 1940 a military
co-operation between Germany and Finland, and the German Air
Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for
through traffic from northern Norway to the Finnish harbors in the
transport of men and material. As the result of conferences, which
the German military attaché had held in Helsinki by order of the
OKW, this through traffic was extended in the winter of 1940 to a
general through traffic of the German Wehrmacht from northern
Norway to the Finnish Baltic seaports. In order to carry out this
traffic, a German Army administration center was set up in the main
city of Lapland, Rovanjemi, and a German army transport unit was
transferred to the Arctic Strait of Rovanjemi and Petsamo-Rovanjemi.
Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this Arctic Sea
route and along the railroad which led from Rovanjemi to ports on
the Finnish south coast.
In December to January 1940-41, I had, with the OKW,
discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway
together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.
GEN. ZORYA: Didn’t you also have conferences with the Finnish
General Staff about joint operations against the Soviet Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I did.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell us, who instructed you to negotiate with the
Finnish Government and what course did these negotiations follow?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I had orders and authorizations from the OKW,
which was the immediate superior of myself and my army. In
February 1941 I received—after the basic facts had been cleared in
regard to the participation of the troops from Norway based in
Finland—I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch
there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss with
them these operations from middle and northern Finland.
On 18 February 1941 I reached Helsinki and on the 2 following
days, I had conferences with the Finnish Chief of General Staff,
General Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of the
Operations Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola.
In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations
from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area around
Kuusamo and Rovanjemi; also from the area of Petsamo. These
conferences led to an agreement of the different opinions.
 After these conferences I travelled, together with the Chief of the
Operation Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola,
to middle and northern Finland in order to study the area of
Urinsalmo-Kuusamo, the area east of Rovanjemi-Petsamo, the
terrain, the possibilities for deployment and billeting, and for
operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local
Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on 28 February in
Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border. In a final conference it was
determined that an operation from the area of Kuusamo and Helsinki
and an operation from the area east of Rovanjemi in the direction of
Basikamo would prove successful; that, on the other hand, the
operations from Petsamo towards Rovanjemi would have
considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first
series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.
As a result of these discussions there was worked out by the
German High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an
operation from the Finnish areas. The operational study was
presented to the OKW and found its approval. It then received
through the High Command of Norway the name of “Blaufuchs.”
In May, that is, on 24 May, I met the Finnish Chief of Staff
Heinrichs, who had been invited to the Führer’s headquarters at
Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and
his chief of the Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff,
Colonel Tapola, a discussion in preparation for another conference at
Salzburg.
On the 25th there was at Salzburg a conference between the
OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl on the one side, and
on the other, Lieutenant General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, at
which the basic plans for co-operation between German and Finnish
troops were laid down.
After this conference I travelled, together with General Heinrichs,
to Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economic
Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the
Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of
the Air Force concerning joint questions of the air war and the
reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force with matériel. General
Heinrichs, after these discussions, also had a meeting with
Generaloberst Halder, in which I did not participate.
For the third time I met the Finnish General Staff on 2 June. In
my statement of 26 December I said that this conference took place
at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a
matter of fact, it took place on 2 June.
At these conferences, which again took place between General
Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this
collaboration were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule,
measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization; there it was
decided that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of
reinforcement of the border patrols, and then the form of further
enlistments for the military training of reservists and reserve officers;
a decision was also reached about the deployment and formation of
German-Finnish forces in such a way that the main Finnish forces,
under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south,
should operate together with the German Army Group North, coming
from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and also towards the
east of Lake Ladoga.
The other Finnish forces were to be under the command of
Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst north of the Rivers Ulo and Ulojoki.
For this army of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst there were three
directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo
through Kerskienski against the Murmansk railroad; the middle
group east of Rovanjemi through Salla Kandalaksha and finally, a
northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk.
There was complete agreement on all these questions and also there
were details discussed about exchange of information, about the use
of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air
Force about joint questions of air warfare and about the use of
Finnish airports by the German Air Force.
After these discussions I returned to Germany in order to work
out their results and put them into action on behalf of Germany.
Then again, on 12 or 13 July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of
conferring with Lieutenant General Erfurt, who was the German
liaison officer with the Finnish Armed Forces. We met General
Heinrichs at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum on the points
which we had agreed upon in previous conferences. He agreed to
these points, except for a minor detail. Then I turned over my duties
as liaison officer with the Finnish General Staff to Lieutenant General
Erfurt, to take up my activities as Chief of General Staff of the
German Army in Lapland.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like to ask you a last question. If it is not
too difficult for you, will you please indicate what was the exact
character of these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General
Staff? More especially, at the planning of these operations was the
necessity of defense taken into consideration?
BUSCHENHAGEN: All agreements between the OKW and the
Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very
beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German
troops on Finnish territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet
Union. There was no doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff,
to the outside world, always pointed out that all these measures had
only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage.
There was—from the very beginning—no doubt among the Finnish
General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the
attack against the Soviet Union, for all the preparations that we
made pointed in that same direction, namely, the plans for
mobilization; above all, the objectives for the attack. Nobody ever
reckoned with the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland.
Since, for cogent military reasons, the operations for attack from
Finnish territory could start only 8 to 10 days after the beginning of
the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken
during and after the attack, but the whole formation and lining-up of
the troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe
you can see sufficiently from that the aggressive character of all
these preparations.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor wish to ask any
questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No questions.
 THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask
any questions?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do defendants’ counsel wish to cross-examine?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in this Trial a group of people are
under indictment with the purpose of declaring them criminals.
Included in this group, to state it shortly, are all the commanders-in-
chief of the several parts of the Armed Forces.
Have you ever had any knowledge before the beginning of the
attack against the Soviet Union that an order came out, according to
which the captured commissars had to be executed?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you at any time speak to your commanding
general, Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: What opinion did Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst
and yourself hold concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: That this was a criminal order.
DR. LATERNSER: Since you had that opinion, I would like to ask
you whether, within your army, this order was carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Actually it was not carried out.
DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons was it not carried out?
Perhaps because the commander and his chief and you, Witness,
were of the opinion that this order should not be carried out or
because it would not have been practicable, for, as it is known, the
Soviet commissars fought until the last and fell and, in cases where
they were captured, their papers, which showed them to be
commissars, had already been destroyed?
For what reason was this order not actually carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Firstly, in view of the line taken by
Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and myself, comments were added to
it before it was passed on, in other words, we let the troops know
that inwardly we were not in agreement with it—and we found our
commanding generals to show a full understanding. Secondly,
because of the reason given by you, because, as a matter of fact,
not a single commissar fell into our hands, as far as I can remember.
 DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know any other commanders
who had the same attitude as you had with regard to this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you answer “no” because you did not speak
to others?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I did not speak to others because in Norway I
was so isolated from other armies that I had no opportunity of
speaking to others.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, aren’t you of the opinion that the
great majority of the commanding generals had the same attitude
concerning this order as you and your commanding general?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I cannot answer that because I cannot speak
the minds of the others.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask
questions? General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-
examination?
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
GEN. ZORYA: This morning I had to stop before reading the
testimony of Pantazi, Romania’s former Minister of War, which I
intend to present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-154
(Document Number USSR-154). Pantazi describes in detail the
preparations of Romania for war. I would ask you to accept this
testimony as evidence. You will find it on Page 71 of the document
book. I shall now read such extracts of this document as are of
interest to us:
“Romania’s preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in
November 1940 when, in accordance with the agreement signed by
Marshal Antonescu in Bucharest, regarding Romania’s adherence to
the Tripartite Pact, there arrived in Bucharest German military
missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors; those
for the army were headed by General Hansen, those for the Air
Force by Major General Speidel.
“With the arrival of the German military missions in Romania, the
Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General Joanitiu,
acting on the orders of Antonescu, issued an order to the army,
regarding the admission of German officer-instructors into units and
groups, for the purpose of reorganizing and re-educating the
Romanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the
German Army.
“At the same time, and still acting on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, all
reserve officers of the Romanian Army were called up for a course of
2 months of retraining and underwent instruction under German
direction.
“During the period of the retraining of officers, the General Staff of
the Romanian Army drafted a plan for calling up into the Army 12
age groups due for mobilization in case of war, the training of all
these groups to be carried out in accordance with the demands of
the code of regulations of the German Army, to be completed by 1
July 1941.
“The higher Romanian officers underwent similar retraining in their
respective branches of the service.
“In this way, under German leadership and prior to the beginning of
the war by Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union, the
whole of the Romanian Army and Air Force were reorganized and
retrained along German lines.”
I shall omit two paragraphs which are of no importance and I pass
to the second paragraph, which you will find on Page 72 in the
document book. These are also depositions of Pantazi.
 THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you
have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to
think you could omit these details of the preparations made in
Romania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of
German divisions who deployed on the Romanian frontier.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, this question is of importance. I hesitate at
present to point out the exact passage which deals with it—it must
be on Page 74 in the document book:
“In this connection the following units which were already mobilized
and ready for action against the Soviet Union were, in February
1941, on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, directed to the frontiers of
North Bukovina and Bessarabia: The 4th Alpine Rifle Division, the
7th, 8th, and 21st Infantry Divisions, the Infantry Division of the
Guards, a cavalry corps and another infantry division whose name I
do not recall at present. In addition, 3 German divisions, selected
from the 21 German divisions moving to Greece across Romania,
were sent to the U.S.S.R. frontier.”
I omit several paragraphs. On Page 73 of your book of
documents we find the following extract from Pantazi’s testimony,
marked in pencil:
“In accordance with instructions from Marshal Antonescu in May
1941, the following divisions were likewise sent to the frontier: The
Frontier Division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine Rifle Divisions, the 13th
Infantry Division, and a Panzer division. Concurrently with these
divisions the Germans transferred to the U.S.S.R. frontier seven
German divisions.
“Consequently, prior to the beginning of the Romanian and German
attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the frontier
between Romania and the U.S.S.R. 12 Romanian and 10 German
divisions, totalling up to 600,000 men.”
Thus the documents which have just been submitted to the
Tribunal justify the assertion that Romania’s preparations for
aggression against the Soviet Union on the directions received from
the staff of the fascist conspirators had begun long before they
found expression on paper in Plan Barbarossa. Having attacked the
Soviet Union, Hitler’s lackeys expected gratitude from their masters
for services rendered. On 27 July 1941 Hitler sent a letter addressed
to Antonescu expressing gratitude to him and to his army.
I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler, addressed to
Antonescu as Exhibit Number USSR-237 (Document Number USSR-
237). Hitler writes in this letter—Page 1 of the Russian translation of
the letter, Paragraph 3, Page 74 in the document book presented to
the Tribunal:
“To congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success is for me
personally as great a happiness as it is a satisfaction easy to
understand. The winning back of Bessarabia will be the most natural
reward for your effort and those of your gallant troops.”
The promises of the fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia
alone.
I beg for permission to return to the conversation of 12 February
1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop. This
conversation is set forth in a document which I presented as Exhibit
Number USSR-233 (Document USSR-233). I am now referring to
Paragraph 3 of the Russian translation of this document—3rd
paragraph from the top of this page—which you will find on Page 61
of the document book. It consists of the following entry made by
Antonescu:
“I reminded Herr Von Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him,
he raised his glass to the happiness of a great Romania, to which I
replied that we have entered into an alliance with the Axis in order
to create a ‘Great Romania.’ ”
What, then, was this “Great Romania” to represent, to which the
Defendant Ribbentrop had raised his glass?
This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-242 (Document USSR-242). This
document is one of Antonescu’s letters—a copy of a letter—to Hitler,
dated 17 August 1941. I request you to read this document into the
record, and I consider it necessary to read Paragraphs 2 and 4 from
it, which correspond to Page 2 of the Russian translation in the
document book in your possession. The corresponding text is on
Page 78. I quote Paragraph 2. Antonescu writes:
“In compliance with the wish of Your Excellency, I take upon myself
the responsibility for guarding the territory between the Rivers
Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there, and for its
security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delineate a
boundary to this territory on the north.”
Paragraph 4 of this letter:
“In order to maintain order and to control the economic exploitation
of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of the war,
I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be
established.
“I therefore beg Your Excellency to give precise instructions defining
my rights and responsibilities for the administration and economic
exploitation of the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, as
well as for the guarding, the maintenance of order and the security
of the whole territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper.
“I beg you, Your Excellency, to accept the best assurances from your
devoted Marshal Antonescu.”
Two days after this letter was written Antonescu appointed a
governor of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he
gave the name of the “Transnistrian” regions.
I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-295 (Document
Number USSR-295), the testimony of this “governor,” George
Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army, and beg you to
accept it as evidence.
Alexianu, giving details of his nomination, testifies as follows—
Page 2, Paragraph 2, of the Russian text, Page 79 in the document
book which is in your possession. I quote:
“Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of
the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he
offered to annex to Romania the Soviet territories extending from
the Dniester to the Dnieper which had been captured by the German
troops and to establish there their own occupational authorities.”
On Page 80 of the document book at the top of Page 3 of the
Russian text of the testimony, Alexianu states that in the summer of
1942 he was present at the Council of Romanian Ministers at which
Marshal Antonescu, referring to the successes of the German and
the Romanian armies on the Eastern Front, stated:
“It is now evident for us all that I acted rightly when, as early as
November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint
attack against the Soviet Union.”
However, the generosity of the fascist Führer, who gave Soviet
territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably
in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.
I have here before me one of Hitler’s letters to Ion Antonescu,
dated 25 October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence
as Exhibit Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240).
Something like 2 years and 3 months had passed since the moment
when Hitler complimented his Romanian satrap on the seizure of
Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been worrying over
the question of organizing a “unified” administration in Transnistria.
Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now writes—I
quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you will
find on Pages 82-83 of your document book:
“My further request concerns the essential exploitation of
Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army Groups A
and South it should not be hampered by any formal juridical or
economic considerations and difficulties. I must further request you
to put at the disposal of the German authorities the entire network
of the Transnistrian railways. . . .”
As a poor consolation Hitler adds—Page 82 of the document book:
“All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the preservation
of Transnistria for Romania.”
 Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently
assured Hitler of his submissiveness, reached the end of his
endurance. On 15 November 1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler.
In this letter Antonescu wrote unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the will
of his master at the expense of his people.
I present Antonescu’s letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239
(Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15
November 1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter,
towards the end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of
the document book:
“As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency that
it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit of a banker
the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, et
cetera.
“I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety.
“I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian participation
in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told
you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000 million lei; that during
this period we gave Germany more than 8 million tons of oil, thus
threatening our own national stocks, as well as the deposits
themselves; that we are bearing heavy expenses incurred in
supporting the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle.”
Here I omit four paragraphs which have no bearing in the gist of
the matter and continue to read on Page 89 of the document book.
“Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transnistrian territory is, as
you say, a shield on the gates of Romania. Our only desire is that all
be in good order and utilized in the most advantageous manner
possible. . . .
“As regards the transfer of the Transnistrian railways into German
hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg Your
Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this transfer is
not necessary.
“Transnistrian railways, from 1941 to the present day, functioned
well under Romanian administration. They always satisfied German
demands and their management was always highly appreciated.”
I request you to turn one page of the document book. I now
read an extract from Page 90 of the book:
“If the traffic capacity of the Transnistrian railways cannot still be
further increased in pursuance to the generally established joint
plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for that fact. Here too we
kept our obligations.”
And two paragraphs further on, the same page, the following
statement is made:
“I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the
measures necessary in order to increase the traffic capacity and to
improve the organization.
“As I personally was in charge of the organization of the
administration and economics of this region, it would be a great
mortification to me if the administration of the railways were to pass
to German hands, since one would justly say that our incapacity in
this respect was the reason for such measure.”
There came a moment in the relations between the two
aggressors when the former harmony, based on the seizure of
foreign lands and wealth, gave place to arguments on the question
as to who should bear the great financial responsibility for the losses
suffered as a result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by
both partners.
This is revealed by the following document, captured from the
personal archives of Antonescu and which I intend to present to the
honorable Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-245 (Document Number
USSR-245). I should like to read a quotation from this document,
which is lengthy but which is very important in enabling us to realize
the relationship between fascist Germany and her satellites. This
document is entitled, “General Hansen’s Meeting with Marshal
Antonescu on 7 July 1943.”
 As Your Honors will no doubt remember, General Hansen was the
head of the German Military Mission of the German General Staff in
Romania. I shall read into the record excerpts from this document,
underlined in red pencil, on Pages 92 and 93 of the document
book. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible for you to summarize
these documents with reference to Romania? Because you have
already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence
with reference to Romania’s participation, General Antonescu’s
statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be
able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation—in
Document Number USSR-294. What you are reading us now really
shows the extent, no doubt, of the Romanian participation, but it is
all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could
possibly go on to USSR-294.
GEN. ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not
detract from the case at all.
GEN. ZORYA: I shall summarize this document in a few
sentences, and I shall then pass on to the next document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. ZORYA: The sense of this conversation is interesting insofar
as it reveals the shameless bargaining which went on between
Hansen and Antonescu. The objects of this bargaining were money,
war supplies, and human lives. Antonescu, who was beginning to
feel the disadvantage of the absence of any kind of proper
agreement with Germany, insisted that all subsequent dealings,
whether of a material or any other nature, be subjected to
appropriate official agreements. He demanded from Germany the
delivery of various war supplies either of a technical or, in last
analysis, of a monetary nature. And when General Hansen said that
Germany had no lei, Antonescu replied, “If you have no lei, give us
at least arms and equipment.” That is how the document describes
the policy pursued by fascist Germany for extracting the most varied
resources from her vassals.
 Now, I should like to touch briefly upon certain methods of
foreign policy which the Hitlerites used in dealing with their vassals.
I should like to dwell on the policy pursued by the Hitlerite
conspirators in regard to the question of Transylvania. Holding out
the question of Transylvania as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators forced
their Hungarian and Romanian vassals to work out their own
promotion.
I submit, as Document Number USSR-294, the depositions of
Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, a former Generaloberst of the Hungarian Army.
Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in
the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September
1942 he commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy
War Minister of Hungary.
Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger,
concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should
like to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4
of the Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the
document book:
“The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a
decision which was of little profit to Hungary. The district of Megyes-
Kissármés, where natural oil could be obtained, was reserved for
Romania. In Hungarian political and military circles this was
interpreted in such a way that in the Second Vienna Arbitration
Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance with Romania in the war
against Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Romania a
more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds
that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would
undoubtedly need Romania’s southern wing which extends to the
Black Sea.
“In an official conversation which took place towards November
1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General
Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following:
“ ‘The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy of
Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages from
Hitler.’ ”
I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented
to the Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his
negotiations with Hitler:
“In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not been
spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me to
understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of the
decision previously adopted on the question of Transylvania.”
However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant
Ribbentrop expressed an entirely opposite point of view.
I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate
the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Göring under these
circumstances. I submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235
(Document Number USSR-235), containing the minutes of one of the
subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler, which took
place on 3 April 1942. This document will be found on Pages 113-
116 of the document book. I shall read some excerpts from this
document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which corresponds
to Page 113 in the document book. I quote:
“I”—Antonescu—“reminded him”—Hitler—“that the Hungarian
statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the
press after Ribbentrop’s visit to Budapest that should they
intervene”—that is, should they send their troops—“Transylvania is
to remain Hungarian; such rumors circulate, and they greatly
demoralize the Romanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor that
such promises had not been made and could not have been made,
and that this does not correspond to actual facts.”
In this way Hitler juggled with promises to encourage his
satellites.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?
 [A recess was taken.]

GEN. ZORYA: The next document, which I am submitting to the

Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-183 (Document Number USSR-
183), concerns the Transylvanian question and the Defendant
Ribbentrop. It is the record of a conference between Antonescu and
Von Dörnberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, which took place at the frontier on 10 February 1942. I am
asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. This
document, taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu,
was captured by the advancing Red Army. I do not consider it
necessary to read the entire document into the record, and I shall
merely confine myself to a few excerpts. Will you please open your
document book on Page 116, where there is a record of the
conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg of 10 February
1942. I quote:
“He openly introduced the subject of the Order of Charles the First
which Herr Von Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various
German official channels in our country, as well as through the
Romanian officials accredited to the German Government.”
I pass to the next page, Page 117 of the document book. I
quote:
“I told Herr Von Dörnberg that I would not be able to grant this
award until Herr Von Ribbentrop, at the very first opportunity, made
a public declaration also to Romania, a declaration which would
bolster up the faith of the Romanian people in their struggle for the
cause of justice and for their legitimate claims in the Europe of the
future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that it
be made public only after he had made this declaration.
“Herr Von Dörnberg asked for time to reflect on the matter.
“Next day, before entering the railway coach, he asked me to hand
him the decoration, telling me that Von Ribbentrop wanted it and
requesting me not to divulge our conversation to Ribbentrop, since
he now promised to make the award public only upon the fulfillment
of my conditions. On this condition I gave him the decoration,
without the appropriate certificate.”
Thus Ribbentrop was prepared to disclaim his Budapest
statement on receipt of the Romanian order.
I have also at my disposal a record of a conference between
Antonescu and Göring. Will you kindly turn to Page 118 of the
document book. Unfortunately, this document, discovered together
with other documents in Antonescu’s personal files, previously
mentioned by me, is undated. We submit this document as found. I
present it as Exhibit Number USSR-238 (Document USSR-238), and I
am reading one excerpt only. I quote:
“During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Göring was very
reticent on the problem of Transylvania. On the way, in the car, he
said to the Marshal”—that is to Antonescu:
“ ‘After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania,
which is actually more German than Romanian or Hungarian.’ ”
We may, presumably, agree that on this occasion Göring had
expressed the viewpoint of the fascist conspirators on the problem of
Transylvania with a sufficient degree of truthfulness.
With a view to concluding the clarification of Germany’s mutual
relations with her vassal, Romania, I should like to emphasize the
subject of crude oil. In this field, Romania was one of Germany’s
principal suppliers.
Both before and during the war the Hitlerites extracted oil from
Romania by all possible means. Antonescu, by the way, refers to this
in one of his letters which has already been read into the record. I
shall now submit two documents which sufficiently prove how
important this question was to Germany, and how significant it was
considered by the Hitlerites themselves. As Exhibit Number USSR-
244 (Document Number USSR-244), I present an urgent telegram
from the Defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonescu and
received by the latter on 31 October 1942. I shall not explain in
detail how this document was taken from the personal archives of
Antonescu, in the same way as the previous one. I now read this
telegram into the record and would ask you to accept it as evidence
—to be found on Page 119 of the document book:
“Telegram to the German Mission for direct transmission to Marshal
Antonescu.
“Herr Marshal! In the name of the Führer I approach Your Excellency
with a request for your personal intervention in the matter of
accelerating, as far as possible, the delivery of the maximum
possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is absolutely
essential to the latter for the continuance of military operations in
the Mediterranean.
“The absence and lack of all means of transport for further
operations have resulted in a critical situation in North Africa, and
the transport of supplies depends entirely on the delivery of
adequate quantities of fuel.
“I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree those
deliveries of fuel to Italy, which are exclusively reserved for
supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions in the
Mediterranean for the purpose of the joint warfare.
“I have chosen this method of direct appeal to you because I am
sure that your personal intervention will result in the assistance
required.
“Yours in comradely esteem, signed Keitel, Field Marshal.”
Allow me now to submit the telegram which Antonescu sent in
reply to Keitel. Please turn to Page 120 of the document book,
Exhibit Number USSR-244(a), (Document Number USSR-244(a)).
THE PRESIDENT: Could you summarize the contents of this
document.
GEN. ZORYA: I can summarize the contents of that telegram in
two sentences. In reply to the Defendant Keitel’s tearful appeal to
increase to the maximum degree the fuel supplies, Antonescu
replied, in a wire addressed to Keitel, that he would meet his
engagements in full, but that the supplies previously requested by
the German officials had already been delivered and that it was
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