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Random Processes
for Engineers
A PRIMER
Random Processes
for Engineers
A PRIMER

Arthur David Snider

Taylor & Francis Group
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© 2017 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

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Contents
Preface........................................................................................................................ix
Author........................................................................................................................xi

Chapter 1 Probability Basics: A Retrospective......................................................1

1.1 What Is “Probability”?...............................................................1
Online Sources......................................................................................2
1.2 The Additive Law.......................................................................3
1.3 Conditional Probability and Independence................................5
Summary: Important Laws of Probability.............................................8
1.4 Permutations and Combinations.................................................9
1.5 Continuous Random Variables.................................................10
Summary: Important Facts about Continuous Random Variables......15
1.6 Countability and Measure Theory............................................16
1.7 Moments...................................................................................18
Summary: Important Facts about Expected Value and Moments........21
1.8 Derived Distributions................................................................21
Summary: Important Facts about Change of Variable.........................24
1.9 The Normal or Gaussian Distribution......................................24
Summary: Important Equations Involving the Normal
(Gaussian) Distribution����������������������������������������������������������28
1.10 Multivariate Statistics...............................................................28
1.11 The Bivariate Probability Density Functions...........................30
Online Sources....................................................................................34
Summary: Important Equations for Bivariate Random Variables.......35
1.12 The Bivariate Gaussian Distribution........................................35
Online Sources....................................................................................38
Summary of Important Equations for the Bivariate Gaussian.............39
1.13 Sums of Random Variables.......................................................39
Online Sources....................................................................................43
Summary of Important Equations for Sums of Random Variables.....44
1.14 The Multivariate Gaussian........................................................44
1.15 The Importance of the Normal Distribution.............................46
Exercises..............................................................................................47

Chapter 2 Random Processes...............................................................................55

2.1 Examples of Random Processes...............................................55
2.2 The Mathematical Characterization of Random Processes......61
Summary: The First and Second Moments of Random Processes......64

v
vi Contents

2.3 Prediction: The Statistician’s Task............................................67

Exercises..............................................................................................69

Chapter 3 Analysis of Raw Data..........................................................................75

3.1 Stationarity and Ergodicity.......................................................75
3.2 The Limit Concept in Random Processes................................77
3.3 Spectral Methods for Obtaining Autocorrelations....................79
3.4 Interpretation of the Discrete Time Fourier Transform............82
3.5 The Power Spectral Density.....................................................83
3.6 Interpretation of the Power Spectral Density...........................89
3.7 Engineering the Power Spectral Density..................................91
3.8 Back to Estimating the Autocorrelation...................................95
Online Sources....................................................................................99
3.9 Optional Reading the Secret of Bartlett’s Method...................99
3.10 Spectral Analysis for Continuous Random Processes............104
Summary: Spectral Properties of Discrete and Continuous
Random Processes..................................................................105
Exercises............................................................................................105

Chapter 4 Models for Random Processes..........................................................111

4.1 Differential Equations Background........................................111
4.2 Difference Equations..............................................................112
4.3 ARMA Models.......................................................................115
4.4 The Yule–Walker Equations...................................................116
Online Sources..................................................................................118
4.5 Construction of ARMA Models.............................................118
4.6 Higher-Order ARMA Processes.............................................119
4.7 The Random Sine Wave.........................................................122
Online Sources..................................................................................124
4.8 The Bernoulli and Binomial Processes...................................125
Summary: Bernoulli Process.............................................................125
Online Sources..................................................................................126
Summary: Binomial Process.............................................................128
4.9 Shot Noise and the Poisson Process.......................................128
Online Sources and Demonstrations.................................................136
4.10 Random Walks and the Wiener Process.................................136
Online Sources..................................................................................138
4.11 Markov Processes...................................................................139
Online Sources..................................................................................144
Summary: Common Random Process Models..................................144
Exercises............................................................................................146
Contents vii

Chapter 5 Least Mean-Square Error Predictors.................................................151

5.1 The Optimal Constant Predictor.............................................151
5.2 The Optimal Constant-Multiple Predictor..............................152
5.3 Digression: Orthogonality......................................................152
5.4 Multivariate LMSE Prediction: The Normal Equations.........154
5.5 The Bias..................................................................................156
Online Sources..................................................................................157
5.6 The Best Straight-Line Predictor............................................157
5.7 Prediction for a Random Process...........................................159
5.8 Interpolation, Smoothing, Extrapolation,
and Back-Prediction...............................................................160
5.9 The Wiener Filter....................................................................161
Online Sources..................................................................................166
Exercises............................................................................................166

Chapter 6 The Kalman Filter.............................................................................169

6.1 The Basic Kalman Filter.........................................................169
6.2 Kalman Filter with Transition: Model and Examples............171
Digression: Examples of the Kalman Model..........................172
Online Sources..................................................................................173
6.3 Scalar Kalman Filter with Noiseless Transition.....................176
6.4 Scalar Kalman Filter with Noisy Transition...........................177
6.5 Iteration of the Scalar Kalman Filter......................................179
6.6 Matrix Formulation for the Kalman Filter..............................182
Online Sources..................................................................................188
Exercises............................................................................................189

Index.......................................................................................................................193
Preface
There are a lot of authoritative, comprehensive, and axiomatically correct books on
random processes, but they all suffer from lack of accessibility for engineering stu-
dents starting out in the area. This book fills the gap between the undergraduate engi-
neering statistics course and the rigorous approaches. A refresher on the prerequisite
topics from basic statistics is given in the first chapter.
Some of the features that distinguish the book from other resources are the
following:

1. “Probability spaces” based on measure theory and sigma-algebras are

appropriate for addressing some sticky philosophical questions (“How can
every possible outcome have probability zero while one of them certainly
occurs?”), but this esoteric machinery is not necessary for solving practical
problems. This book only discusses them sufficiently to introduce the issues
and whet the readers’ appetite for rigorous approaches (Section 1.6).
2. The Kalman filter is regarded as formidable by most engineers because it is
traditionally expostulated in full-blown matrix form. This book introduces
it in a very simple scalar context, where the basic strategy is transparent, as
is its extension to the general case (Chapter 6).
3. The book is exceptional in that it distinguishes between the science of
extracting statistical information from raw data (Chapter 3)—for example,
a time series about which nothing is known a priori—and that of analyzing
specific statistical models (Chapter 4). The former motivates the concepts
of statistical spectral analysis (such as the Wiener–Khintchine theory), and
the latter applies and interprets them in specific physical contexts.
4. The book’s premise, throughout, is that new techniques are best introduced
by specific, low-dimensional examples, rather than attempting to strive for
generality at the outset; the mathematics is easier to comprehend and more
enjoyable. Specific instances are the derivations of the Yule–Walker equa-
tions (Section 4.4), the normal equations (Section 5.4), and the Wiener filter
(Section 5.9).

In short, this book is not comprehensive and not rigorous, but it is unique in its
simplified approach to the subject. It “greases the skids” for students embarking on
advanced reading, while it provides an adequate one-semester survey of random pro-
cesses for the nonspecialist.
Supplementary material—selected answers, examples, exercises, insights, and
errata—will be made available as they are generated, at the author’s web site: http://
ee.eng.usf.edu/people/snider2.html.

ix
x Preface

MATLAB® is a registered trademark of The MathWorks, Inc. For product informa-

tion, please contact:

The MathWorks, Inc.

3 Apple Hill Drive
Natick, MA 01760-2098 USA
Tel: 508-647-7000
Fax: 508-647-7001
E-mail: info@mathworks.com
Web: www.mathworks.com
Author
Dr. Arthur David Snider has more than 50 years of experience in modeling physi-
cal systems in the areas of heat transfer, electromagnetics, microwave circuits, and
orbital mechanics, as well as the mathematical areas of numerical analysis, signal
processing, differential equations, and optimization.
Dr. Snider holds degrees in mathematics (BS from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and PhD from New York University) and physics (MA from Boston
University), and he is a registered professional engineer. He served for 45 years on
the faculties of mathematics, physics, and electrical engineering at the University
of South Florida. He worked five years as a systems analyst at MIT’s Draper
Instrumentation Lab and has consulted in many industries in Florida. He has
­published seven textbooks in applied mathematics.

xi
 1 A Retrospective
Probability Basics

This textbook is intended for readers who have already studied basic statistics and
probability. The purpose of Chapter 1 is to jog your memory by reviewing the mate-
rial from a different and, hopefully, refreshing perspective.

1.1 WHAT IS “PROBABILITY”?
Since this isn’t your first course in probability, you know how profound this question
is. Let’s consider a few ways in which we use the word.
There are some situations in which there is no question about the numerical val-
ues of the probabilities. If a bowl contains seven red balls and three green balls and
one is picked at random, the probability that it is green is 0.3. It’s hard to argue
with that—although I might be backed into a corner if you asked me to define “at
­random.” I might parry by saying each ball is “equally likely” or “equally probable.”
And then you’ve got me over a barrel, because my definition is circular.
But what if I select a ball “at random,” note that it is red, and wrap my fist around
it without showing it to you? To you, the probability of green is 0.3. But I know the
color of the ball, and to me the probability of green is 0. Probability can be subjec-
tive; it is a measure of our state of knowledge. In fact the probability of green, from
your point of view, will jump from 0.3 to 0 if I open my hand.
Some would argue that the probability is either 0 or 1 after the ball was drawn,
whether or not I looked, because there is no randomness after the selection, only
insufficient knowledge. In fact, there are some situations in quantum mechanics*
where the possible physical outcomes of experiments are predicted to be different,
according to whether or not the experimenter looks at the dials.
So let’s try to bypass this subjective “insider information” aspect of probability,
and consider the long-term-average interpretation. One is inclined to say that if the
pick-a-ball experiment is performed many times (replacing the ball after recording
the result), 30% of the times the ball will be green.
Is that true? Of course not! No matter how many repetitions are run, it is always
possible that 29%, 32%, or 99% of the balls selected will be green. Indeed, the sci-
ence of probability enables us to quantify how unlikely such results are.
But what, after all, does “unlikely” mean? We’re still going around in circles.
Equally devastating for this interpretation are such everyday statements such
as “there was a 30% chance of rain yesterday.” How do we assess such a claim?

* Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen, N. 1935. Can quantum-mechanical description of physical real-
ity be considered complete? Phys. Rev. 41: 777. See also Bohm, D. 1957. Quantum Theory. New York:
Dover; and Herbert, N. 1987. Quantum Reality. New York: Anchor.

1
2 Random Processes for Engineers: A Primer

We can’t run a series of experiments where we replicate “yesterday” 500 times and
calculate the number of times it rains. Either it rained or it didn’t.
So probability is an elusive concept, although it has been explicated by philos-
ophers and axiomatized by mathematicians. Nonetheless we feel comfortable dis-
cussing it, calculating it, and assessing strategies using it. Personally, I feel more
comfortable when I can visualize a long-term-average interpretation for an answer
that I have computed, even though I acknowledge the fallacies involved.
Let me give you an example. This problem has always been popular with textbook
authors, but it achieved notoriety in the movie “21” in 2007.
A game show host tells you that a prize lies behind one of three doors, and you will
win it if you select the correct door. The probability that you win is, of course, 1/3.
But then an intriguing strategy is added. After you have made a choice but before
the chosen door is opened, the host (who knows where the prize is) opens one of the
unchosen doors not containing the prize. Has this additional information—that the
revealed door does not contain the prize—changed the probability that you have won?
Has it increased to 1/2 (because now there is one choice out of 2)?
Should you change your choice of doors?
Bayes’ theorem in Section 1.3 handles these questions, but let’s try to find a long-
time-average interpretation. So suppose every day for the next 20 years you play this
game. You expect to pick the correct door 1/3 of those times. Regardless of whether
you chose correctly or not, there is always an “empty” door for the host to open, so
his action is not going to change whether or not you were correct; your probability of
choosing the right door remains 1/3.
So 2/3 of the time you have picked a wrong door. What happens when you pick a
wrong door? In such a case the host’s hands are tied. He can’t “choose” which door
to open—he has to open the one that does not contain the prize. In other words, he’s
giving away the secret when he opens the second door!
Therefore, in 2/3 of the trials the prize is (for certain) behind the door that the host
does not open, and in the other 1/3 of the trials, it is behind the door that you origi-
nally chose. If you decide to change your choice to the unopened door, you will win
every time your initial choice was wrong; your probability of winning increases—not
to 1/2, but to 2/3. Dang!
So even though the long-time-average interpretation of probability is logically
untenable, we feel comfortable with it, and in this book I will not pursue the ­definition
of probability further. In most applications, one postulates probabilities for a cer-
tain collection of outcomes (perhaps “equally likely”), and our mathematical theory
describes how to compute other probabilities from them.

ONLINE SOURCES
The game show problem was posed in Marilyn vos Savant’s column in Parade maga-
zine in 1990. I guarantee you will be entertained if you read her account at
vos Savant, Marilyn. Game show problem. Parade Magazine. Accessed June 24, 2016.
http://marilynvossavant.com/game-show-problem/.
The relative-frequency interpretation of probability is explored through simulations at
Boucher, Chris. The frequentist intuition behind assigning probabilities. Wolfram
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 duties, provided they speak to him clearly and simply,
above all inexorably.… See how happy a child is feeling
he has done his small duties. He already feels his
kinship with you thereby. Cherish this feeling, and it
will be salvation and blessing to him.”—M., p. 174.
As the feeling of the adult is called out by the helplessness of a
child, so, too:
“the child’s sympathy is roused by the young
creatures’ necessities more than by anything else, and
among these chiefly by their nakedness and softness:
‘… Mother, the poor little birds are so lonely, I am so
sorry for the poor little things.’”—M., p. 150.
And in this connection too comes the warning that feeling must
not be allowed to evaporate without action:

“If your child’s to love and cherish

Life that needs him day by day,
Give him things to tend that perish
If he ever stops away.”—M., p. 84.

The child is “to feel within himself Nature’s close

interdependence”:
“Whenever opportunity occurs, make this inner
dependence of life clear, visible, impressive, tangible
and perceptible to your child, even though it be in only
a few of the essential links of this great chain, until
you come to the last ring that holds all the rest, God’s
Father-love for all. The baker cannot bake if the miller
brings him no flour, the miller can grind no flour if the
farmer brings him no corn, the field can yield no crop if
Nature does not work towards it in harmony, and
Nature could not work in harmony if God had not
placed in her power and material, and if His love did
not guide everything to its fulfilment.”—M., p. 148.
 And again, as always, follows the need for expression of some
kind. The children are not to be disturbed while they “say grace”
over their doll’s feast.
“It is no drawing down of the sacred into outer life;
no, this is the germ which gives the outside actions of
life the inner meaning and higher consecration, which
life so much needs. For how is your child to cultivate
innocently in himself a lively feeling for what is holy, if
you will not grant that it takes form for him even in his
innocent games.”—M., p. 148.
It may be as well before leaving the subject to notice here one or
two other points in connection with feeling that are touched upon by
Froebel.
Though, as we have seen[23], the feeling side is always kept in
closest connection with those of knowledge and action, yet the
fundamental importance of the emotional side is stated quite
distinctly. The child is “living, loving and perceiving,” or “creating,
feeling and thinking,” still:
“The cultivation of boyhood rests wholly on that of
childhood; therefore activity and firmness of the will
rest upon activity and firmness of the feelings and of
the heart. Where the latter are lacking, the former will
scarcely be attainable.”—E., p. 97.
This is put more strongly in connection with the child’s imitation of
the music of the bell note, the “bim-baum” or “ding-dong” sung by
the mother, while she swings the ball to and fro, which according to
Froebel “serves the emotional side.”
“The children thus early and definitely point out that
the centre, the real foundation, the starting-point of
human development is the heart and the emotions,
but the training to action and thought, the corporeal
and mental, goes on constantly and inseparably by the
side of it; and thought must form itself into action, and
 action resolve and clear itself in thought; but both
have their roots in the emotional nature.”—P., p. 42.
Another point Froebel makes in this connection, is that feeling
alone can awaken feeling, and that those who complain of want of
feeling in their children have probably themselves to blame. Want of
good feeling and the prevalence among boys of egotism,
unfriendliness, etc., is explained as:
“clearly due not merely to the failure of arousing at
an early period, and of subsequently cultivating in the
child a feeling of common sympathy, but also to the
early annihilation of this feeling between parents and
children.”—E., p. 122.
The elders must show sympathy with the child’s thoughts and
feelings, they must not rest content with caring for his bodily
welfare. If the child fails to find sympathy, for example in connection
with his interest in Nature, if he “fails to find the same feelings
among adults who suppress his germinating inner life” then, says
Froebel:
“a double effect follows, loss of respect for the elder
and a recoil of the original anticipation.”—E., p. 164.
“Mothers and Fathers, is it not almost incredible how
early the child appears to distinguish inner intellectual
and loving gifts from outer bodily ones, or, rather, to
be conscious of the heart and mind of the giver to feel
the giving spirit? Who does not see this in the effect of
a friendly glance, of a sympathizingly spoken word, of
a tender care which often affords little more than
sympathy and companionship?… It is a remarkable fact
that the mere love for the outward person, the mere
bodily care, does not satisfy him; indeed, the nobler
the child is in his nature the less does he cling to the
giving person. Through this consideration we have
found and recognized what we sought, namely, that
 the respect and love—yea, the reverence—of children
and youth are gained and secured to parents in
proportion to what the latter are doing for the
education of the mental life of the children.… If the
lively appreciation of what has been done to cultivate
his inner world fill the soul of a child, then will true
love and gratitude towards parents, respect and
veneration for age, germinate in the mind of a child.”—
P., p. 111.
We have spoken in this chapter of what is popularly called the
instinct of imitation, and we have seen that Froebel makes much of
what he calls the instinct or impulse of activity (Thätigkeitstrieb), or
the instinct for employment (Beschäftigungstrieb).
It may be well now to consider what, considering the ideas of his
day and generation, Froebel could find to say on a subject so
important as the instinctive activities of human beings and of other
animals, concerning which so much has now been written and
which, according to Professor Dewey, Froebel regarded and rightly
regarded as the foundation-stones of educational method.
 CHAPTER VI
Instinct and Instincts
“The older writings on Instinct are ineffectual wastes of words,”
writes Professor James, “because their authors never came down to
this simple and definite idea (that the nervous system is to a great
extent a pre-organized bundle of reactions), but smothered
everything in vague wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic power
of animals—so superior to anything in Man.”[24]
Froebel was certainly not in a position to know much of the
nervous system, but what he wrote about instinct cannot be classed
with these older writings. For even without modern knowledge, he
waxes indignant over the opinions of those who created James’
“ineffectual wastes of words.” Far from allowing that instinct in the
lower animals is superior to anything in man, Froebel maintains that
the very weakness, indefiniteness of man’s instincts or impulses
(Triebe) is a sign of his superiority.
“Notwithstanding the early manifestation in the
human infant of the impulse to employment
(Beschäftigungstriebe), much has been said from an
entirely wrong point of view about man’s helplessness
at birth, and his slow development to independence,
which necessitates for so long a period the care and
help of the mother. It has even been said, that, in this
respect, man’s position is behind and below that of
other animals. But that very point, which has been
cited as evidence of man’s imperfection, is a proof of
his worth. For we recognize through this helplessness,
that man is called to ever higher self-consciousness.”—
P., p. 24.
 At the same time it should be pointed out that Froebel does not
make the opposite mistake of supposing that man has no instincts.
Since he approached psychology from the biological side, so far as it
could be known to him, Froebel was bound to have faith in instinct,
in race-habit, in tendencies which, because they have been of use to
the race, are bedded in the nature of each individual. It is to
Froebel’s later writings and especially to the little paper, on “The First
Action of a Child,” that we must turn to see how wonderfully correct
are his views on the whole question of instinct.
It may be better to give first the position of modern writers on the
subject by quoting from the last chapter of Professor Lloyd Morgan’s
“Habit and Instinct,” a clear and concise passage showing that the
contrary schools of thought represented on the one hand by the
Darwin and Romanes and on the other by Professors James and
Wundt, can after all be resolved into a matter of definition.
“If, then, the question be asked, whether man has a large or a
small endowment of instinct, the answer will depend upon the
precise definition of ‘instinct.’ If we take congenital definiteness as
characteristic of instinct, we shall agree with Darwin, that ‘the
fewness and the comparative simplicity of the instincts of the higher
animals are remarkable as compared with those of lower animals;’
and with Romanes that ‘instinct plays a larger part in the psychology
of many animals than it does in the psychology of man.’ If, on the
other hand, a broader definition of instinct be accepted, so as to
include what is innate, in the sense before defined, we shall agree
with Professor Wundt that human life is ‘permeated through and
through with instinctive action, determined in part, however, by
intelligence and volition;’ and shall not profoundly disagree with
Professor Wm. James, who says that man possesses all the impulses
that they (the lower animals) have and a great many more besides.”
In Mr. McDougall’s important contribution to the discussion of
human instinct, he says that the view which is rapidly gaining
ground is that the gradual evolution of intelligence “did not supplant
and lead to the atrophy of the instincts, but controlled and modified
their operation.” As Mr. McDougall goes on to state his belief “that
the recognition of the full scope and function of the human instincts
will appear to those that come after us as the most important
advance made by psychology in our time,” it is important to the
purpose of this book, to make clear to what extent Froebel’s views
on the subject approach those of modern writers.
Mr. McDougall makes a very clear distinction between specific
tendencies to which he limits the word instinct, and non-specific or
general tendencies. Naturally Froebel did not reach this standpoint,
but he does seem to have thought out his terminology. He felt
strongly as to the use of words of foreign origin, and generally uses
“Trieb,” “Lebenstrieb,” “Drang” or “Lebensdrang,” where we might
use instinct. But he does occasionally use “instinct,” notably in a
passage quoted below “whose impulses, powers and abilities, whose
instincts as they are called” (dessen Lebenstriebe Kräfte und
Anlagen, dessen Instincte wie man es nennt), where he seems to be
feeling about for the right expression. Other words in constant use
are “Neigung,” “Streben” and “Richtung,” probably best translated by
“tendency.” It can be argued, however, that to the word Trieb
Froebel does seem to have attached a more definite meaning, and
his use of this word is certainly limited.
Professor James’ account of instinct begins with the statement
that “Every instinct is an impulse,” a driving to action, but the use of
the words “Trieb” and “Drang” makes such a pronouncement
unnecessary to a German writer, and if this root idea is not implied
by the noun, it generally, in Froebel’s writings, makes its appearance
in the verb. Thus we frequently read of “a longing which drives the
child to,” etc. (die Sehnsucht die das Kind treibt).
The merest glance through Froebel’s writings is enough to show
his belief in the existence of instinct in the human being. His
references to it are constant. It is an impulse (Trieb) “which the child
did not give himself, which came without his will, in later life even
against his will,” but which “urges to action” (drängt ihn dazu). It is
a force so strong, that it “holds captive mind and body.” The child is
described as “driven by impulse” (des von Lebensdrang getriebenen
Kindes). The boy again is “held captive by harmless, even
praiseworthy, impulses” (sogar lobenswerten Triebe), or “gives
himself up entirely to the impulses of his inner life” (dem Treibenden
innern Leben).
In his earlier work, “The Education of Man,” Froebel is first
concerned with urging that the young human being, “a product of
Nature,” has instincts quite as trustworthy as those of any other
young animal, and the following eloquent passage is very well
known:
 “The undisturbed working of the Divine Unity is
necessarily good, and this implies that the young
human being, still as it were in the process of creation,
would seek as a product of Nature, though still
unconsciously, yet decidedly and surely that which is in
itself best: and, moreover, in a form wholly adapted to
his condition, disposition, powers and means. Thus the
duckling hastens to the pond, while the young chicken
scratches the ground, and the young swallow catches
his food upon the wing and scarcely ever touches the
ground. We grant space and time to young plants and
animals because we know that in accordance with the
laws that live in them they will develop properly and
grow well. Arbitrary interference with their growth is
avoided because it is known that this would disturb
their development; but the young human being is
looked upon as a piece of wax, a lump of clay, which
man can mould into what he pleases.… Thus, O
parents, could your children, on whom you force in
tender years forms and aims against their nature, thus
could your children too unfold in beauty and develop in
harmony.”—E., p. 7.
It is true that to Froebel evolution is “the working of Divine Unity.”
But there seems to be no special reason why this should invalidate
what Froebel has to say, any more than Sir Oliver Lodge should be
disqualified as a scientist, because he has produced a book in which
he writes: “Development means unfolding latent possibilities …
growth and development are in accordance with the law of the
universe … the law of the universe and the will of God are here
regarded as in some sort synonymous terms.”
This is exactly Froebel’s position; he writes that
“Nature and man have their origin in one and the
same eternal Being, and their development takes place
 in accordance with the same laws, only at different
stages.”—E., p. 161.
That Froebel not only recognized the presence of instinct in
human beings, but that he also saw, as Professor Wundt puts it, that
this is “determined in parts by intelligence and volition,” he states
very plainly:
“Natural instinct and good example will do much,
but here, as in all human concerns, one must proceed
by extension of knowledge, and by careful scrutiny, or
both the one and the other may mislead or be
misdirected. Experience cries aloud to us, to warn us
of this danger. Assuredly man ought not to neglect his
natural instincts, still less abandon them, but he must
ennoble them through his intelligence, purify them
through his reason.”—L., p. 222.
“In the progress of development three stages
differentiate themselves and fall apart; and these
stages are seen both in individual men, and in the race
as a whole. They are:
(1) Unconsciousness, the merely instinctive stage;
(2) Vague Feeling, the tendency upwards towards
consciousness; and
(3) Relatively clear Conscious Intelligence.
Everything that is acquired by a great unity, say by a
family, a community, a nation, must in its beginnings
be acquired by the single members of that unity; and
further it will take them in one of the three grades of
development, either that of mere unconsciousness, or
of vague feeling, or in the third and highest grade, that
of conscious intelligence, so far as it has been
maintained by mankind up to the present time.”—
(Letter to Madame D. Lutkens, dated March, 1851.)
 It is in “The First Action of a Child” that we find Froebel
contrasting the instincts of the lower animals with those of man.
Here curiously enough, Froebel, according to Professor Stout, is
almost more correct than Professor Lloyd Morgan himself, whose
statement “that animals do not perceive relations” Professor Stout
regards as misleading. His correction is, “unless an artificial
restriction is put on the meaning of the term relation, this statement
would imply that animals cannot perceive the position of objects in
space or their motion.… Hence we should say, not that the
perception of relation is deficient in animals, but only that definite
perception of relations is deficient which depends on comparison.”
Now it is this very point of comparison which Froebel takes as the
essential intellectual difference between the animal independent
from birth thanks to fully developed instinct, and the child helpless
and apparently inferior at first, yet destined for progress “self-active
and free.” He writes:
“The animal whose life impulses, powers and
abilities, whose instincts as they are called (dessen
Lebenstriebe, Kräfte und Anlagen, dessen Instincte wie
man es nennt) are at once so definite and strong, that
in natural conditions it never fails, indeed cannot fail to
overcome every hindrance within its life’s reach, the
animal just on this account can never arrive at a
knowledge of its powers, its qualities, its nature … for
it lacks all points of comparison. It lacks all points of
comparison, which, in the case of man proceed from
the fact that the weakest output of strength meets
with obstacles which increase as the strength
increases, and which will only with difficulty be
conquered or overcome and annihilated.
“It is quite different in the life of man, in the
beginning of which practically nothing can be
accomplished without help from without. Nothing
especially can be accomplished through a
 preponderance of inner power such, for example, as
the newly hatched duckling shows on the water. Thus
everything external must, by Man, with his
preponderance of helplessness, be overcome as an
obstacle solely through inner advancing, and outer
strengthening and increasing of power through free
activity of the will.”—P., p. 25.
With this passage from “The First Action of a Child” we can
compare the following from Stout’s “Analytic Psychology”:
“The peculiar feature in the life of animals which prevents
progressive development is the existence of instincts which do for
them what the human being must do for himself. Their inherited
organization is such, that they perform the movements adapted to
supply their needs on the mere occurrence of an appropriate
external stimulus.… In man, a blind craving has to grope its way
from darkness into light in order to become effective; in the animal
the means of satisfaction are provided ready made by Nature at the
outset.”
After having stated that “Every instinct is an impulse,” Professor
James goes on to say that instinct depends upon the biological fact
that the nervous system is “a pre-organized bundle of re-actions,”
and that when impulses block one another, an animal with many
impulses, and whose mind is elevated enough to discriminate, “loses
the instinctive demeanour and appears to live a life of hesitation and
choice, an intellectual life.”
Notwithstanding the very obvious fact that Froebel could know but
little of the nervous system and its re-actions, it is still quite evident
that his observation had led him to a clear recognition of the earlier
stage, when “hesitation and choice” are impossible. The child, he
says, “acts in obedience to an instinct which holds captive mind and
body,” he is “incredibly short-sighted in his obedience to instinct.”
That he also recognized the beginning of hesitation and choice is
shown in his defence of the child who “in spite of abandonment to
momentary impulse,” may have “an intense inner desire for
goodness,” which, “if it could be appreciated in time,” would make of
him a good man (E., p. 125); and also in his plea for the early
awakening and training “of judgment and of that reflection which
avoids so many blunders and which, in a natural way (i.e. without
training), does not come to man sufficiently early.”—E., p. 79.
“Another source of boyish faults is in the
precipitation, want of caution, indiscretion, in a word
the thoughtlessness, the acting according to an
impulse quite blameless, even praiseworthy, which
holds captive all activity of mind and body, but whose
consequences have not as yet entered into his
experience, indeed it has not yet entered into his mind
to define the consequences.”—E., p. 122.
Froebel gives from real life a few well-chosen examples of what
the boy so “incredibly short-sighted in his obedience to impulse” may
do; telling how one deliberately aims a stone at a window “with
earnest effort to hit it, yet without even saying to himself that if it
does so, the window must be broken,” and how he “stands rooted to
the spot” when this happens. Another, a “very good-hearted boy,
who dearly loved and took care of pigeons, aimed at his neighbour’s
pigeon on the roof, without considering that if the bullet hit it the
dove must fall.” No wonder that he urges the early awakening of
that reflection (Nachdenken) which would avoid so much, and in this
connection it must be remembered too that Froebel emphasized the
indefiniteness of human instinct which makes comparison possible.
It is also worth remarking that Froebel knew that it is only by noting
consequences of actual deeds that reflection comes, and this he
shows in one of his quaint parallels between “the history of creation
and the development of all things.”
“Similarly in each child there is repeated the deed
which marks the beginning of moral and human
emancipation, of the dawn of reason—essentially the
same deed that marked the dawn of reason in the race
as a whole.”—E., p. 41.
 It must have been a somewhat unorthodox view in 1826, but
some pages further on Froebel speaks even more boldly of “the fall
or—since the result is the same—the ascent of the mind of man
from simple emotional development into the development of
externally analytic and critical reason.”—E., p. 193.
Professor James goes on to state two other principles which make
for non-uniformity of instinct. The first of these is that instincts are
inhibited by habits, and the second that instincts are transitory.
The physiological fact of “plasticity” in which these principles are
grounded, was of course quite out of Froebel’s ken. Nevertheless,
the principles themselves do not escape his shrewd observation. Mr.
McDougall points out that even acquired habits of thought and
action, so important as springs of action in the developed human
mind, are in a sense derived from and secondary to instincts. He
goes on to say that “in the absence of instincts no habits could be
formed,” so it is interesting to find Froebel arguing that the
phenomena of habit is a proof of the existence of what in the infant
he calls the impulse to activity or to self-employment.
“The helplessness of the new-born human being in
regard to all outer things is the opposite of his future
ability—since life is a whole—to help himself through
the enhancing of his will-power.… Helplessness and
personal will, therefore, become the two points
between which the child’s life turns, and the fulcrum is
free activity. Herein lies for the educator a key to
phenomena of child-life which seem to contradict each
other. For out of the impulse to activity
(Thätigkeitstriebe) and to free self-employment, or
rather out of the united three—helplessness, personal
will, and self-employment—soon proceed custom and
habit, often indolence and too facile yielding.
“Consideration of custom, and of the spontaneous
acquiring of habit in the child, especially in regard to
what causes it, and to its effect upon the child, is just
 as important for the educator, as is the consideration
and guidance of his instinct of activity. This very
phenomenon that the child so early accustoms and
inures himself to something, this early phenomenon of
child life, the growing together and becoming one, as
it were, with his surroundings, is a proof of the
existence and inner working, even thus early, of the
impulse for activity or employment, even where the
child appears outwardly inactive and passive: in that
the child accommodates himself to outer surroundings,
relations and requirements in order to provide more
scope for his inner activity.”—P., p. 27.
This proof may not be quite so clear to others as it was to Froebel,
but at least the passage shows the close connection in his mind
between instinct—the impulse towards activity and employment—
and habit, and that he had noted the interaction between the two.
There are many references to the transitory nature of at least
childish impulses.
“What delight a child takes in noticing what is
smooth, woolly, hairy, sparkling, round, etc.… But if
you do not cherish this and do not set it going in the
right way, it becomes a lost thing; it grows rusty, and
loses its power as a magnet loses its power when it is
not sufficiently used. Power that is not at once used,
effort that does not at once meet the right object—
perishes.”—M., p. 181.
“Now, at last, we would fain give another direction
to the energies, desires and instincts (Kräfte,
Neigungen und Triebe) of the child growing into
boyhood; but it is too late. For the deep meaning of
child-life passing into boyhood we not only failed to
appreciate, but we misjudged it; we not only failed to
nurse it, but we misdirected and crushed it.”—E., p. 75.
 “See parents, the first impulse to activity, the first
constructive impulse (Bildungstrieb) comes from man
according to the nature of the working of his mind,
unconsciously, unrecognized, without his will, as man
can indeed perceive in himself in later life. If, however,
this inner summons to activity (diese innere
Aufforderung zur Thätigkeit) meets with outer
hindrance, especially such a one as the will of the
parents, which cannot be set aside, the power is at
once weakened in itself, and with many repetitions of
this weakening, falls into inaction.”—E., p. 100.
“The neglect of inner power causes the inner power
itself to vanish.”—E., p. 133.
“It is true there are few such children; but there
would be more, were we not ignorantly blunting so
many tendencies in our children, or starving them into
inanition.”—E., p. 220.
Writing of the origin of boyish faults Froebel says:
“When we look for the sources of these
shortcomings … we find a double reason, first,
complete neglect of the development of certain sides
of human life, secondly early misdirection, early
unnatural stages in development, and distortion,
through arbitrary interference with human powers,
qualities and tendencies good in their source.…
Therefore at the bottom of every shortcoming in man,
lies a crushed, frustrated quality or tendency,
suppressed, misunderstood or misguided.”—E., pp.
119-121.
When we come to the enumeration of the various human instincts
we find that Froebel can hardly be said to have omitted any that are
important from an educational point of view, except perhaps the
instinct of fear, and to this he would be loth to appeal.[25] Moreover,
it can be shown that his explanation of certain tendencies suggests a
better basis of classification than is supplied by certain recent
writers, who might be expected to surpass him with ease.
Before the publication of Mr. McDougall’s “Social Psychology,” there
were but few attempts at any classification of instincts within at least
the reach of English readers. In July, 1900, there appeared an article
in “The Pedagogical Seminary” in which Mr. Eby proposed to
reconstruct the Kindergarten on the basis of natural instinct. The
writer had apparently no dawning idea that this was the original
basis[26] of the institution he proposes to reform, but Froebel’s
account of Instinct shows in certain ways a clearer understanding of
the subject than does his own.
Mr. Eby’s tabulation was:

I. Language—with gesture and expression.

II. Curiosity, or Instinct for Knowledge.
III. Play Instinct.
(a) Motor Plays.
(b) Hunting and Wandering.
(c) Imitative.
(d) Constructive.
(e) Agricultural.
(f) Improvised.
IV. Artistic and Aesthetic Instincts.
V. Social Instinct.
VI. Instinct of Acquisition and Ownership.
VII. Number Instinct.
VIII. Interest in Stories.

Another classification, well known at least to teachers, is that

given by Mr. Kirkpatrick in his “Fundamentals of Child Study.”[27]
His list comprises:
 I. Individual or Self-preserving Instincts.
(Feeding, Fear and Fighting.)
II. Parental Instincts.
III. Social or Group Instincts.
(Gregariousness, Sympathy, Love of Approbation,
Altruism.)
IV. Adaptive Instincts.
(Imitation, Play, Curiosity.)
V. Regulative.
(Moral, Religious.)
VI. Resultant and Miscellaneous.
(Including such tendencies as those of collecting and
constructing, and the tendency to adornment, with the
æsthetic pleasure of contemplating beautiful objects.)

Interesting, helpful and suggestive as these lists are, they both

serve as examples of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of any hard-
and-fast lines of classification. For example, regulative instincts,
which Mr. Kirkpatrick divides into moral and religious, must be
derived from social instincts; gregarious instincts cannot be
satisfactorily separated from instincts of self-preservation, and surely
all instincts must be adaptive.
Froebel’s account of the instincts of a child in some ways
resembles that of Mr. McDougall, and it is certainly in some points
more enlightening than either of the others.
Under the heading of Investigation, Froebel brings both the
Number Instinct, and the Interest in Stories, to which Mr. Eby gives
a position as fundamental as that of the Social Instinct. The
constructive instinct which Mr. Kirkpatrick brings under “Resultant
and Miscellaneous,” has a very special place in Froebel’s account, as
being one way of imitating, that is another mode of investigating the
surroundings, and also what is equally important, a way by which
the child gains a knowledge of his own power, reaches Self-
Consciousness.
 It is because of the emphasis Froebel continually lays upon the
developing self-consciousness that his views somewhat tend to
resemble those of Mr. McDougall, though it would be absurd to
attempt to draw any parallel. For Froebel, though he in no way
minimizes the importance of Imitation, and although it is as the
apostle of Play that he is most widely known, yet, like Mr. McDougall,
he never speaks either of an Instinct of Play nor of Imitation, that is,
he never uses for these his special word Trieb; nor has he any
Instinct for Religion. Curiously enough, too, Froebel, with his
constant insistence on the threefold aspect of mind, partly forestalls
Mr. McDougall’s view that “instinctive action is the outcome of a
distinctly mental process, one which is incapable of being described
in purely mechanical terms, … and one which, like every other
mental process, has and can only be fully described in terms of the
three aspects of all mental process, the cognitive, the affective, and
the conative aspects.”
It is in connection with the very earliest activity that Froebel
writes:
“The first phenomenon of awakening child-life is
activity. It is an inner activity, showing itself by
consideration of and working with what is outer, by
overcoming hindrances and subduing the outer. The
nature of man as growing towards, and destined to
reach self-consciousness, is shown in the quite peculiar
character of childish activity even as early as when the
infant awakes from its so-called three months’ slumber.
It is shown in the child’s impulse to busy himself (in
dem Triebe sich zu beschäftigen) in the instinct, one
with feeling and perception, to be active for the
progressive development of his own life.
“We are repeatedly impressed with the conviction
that everything that is to be done for the specifically
human development of the child must be connected
with the fostering of this instinct to employ himself. For
 this instinct corresponds to man’s triune activity of
doing, feeling and thinking. It corresponds to the
essential nature of humanity, which is to have power
and understanding, to become ever more and more
self-conscious and self-determining.”—P., p. 24.
In the last sentence of this passage, which refers to the merest
infant, and which immediately precedes Froebel’s comparison of
human instincts with those of the lower animals, are indicated the
lines on which we may say Froebel classified though he never did so
formally. He deals only with the “purely” or “specifically” human, as
he never tires of reiterating, so that fundamental animal instincts,
self-preserving and race-preserving, such as feeding and the sexual
impulse, are little noticed, and only in connection with the necessity
for self-control.
But, as with Mr. McDougall much is made to depend on self-
feeling, so with Froebel still more does everything centre round that
self-consciousness which to him is of the very nature of man, and
which is made possible by the undefined or undeveloped character
of human instinct.
The instincts and impulses noted by Froebel, all, be it clearly
understood, in the service of the growing self-consciousness, and
self-determination are: the instinct to independent activity (der Trieb
zur Frei- und Selbst-thätigkeit), the instinct to investigation
(Forschungstrieb), with which Froebel deals very thoroughly and by
which he explains a great deal, the impulse of acquisition, the
instinct of construction or formation (Bildungstrieb Gestaltungstrieb),
the social instinct and the maternal instinct.
Froebel himself never tabulates, yet his apparently careful use of
the word Trieb, taken along with his convincing explanations of
various tendencies (Richtungen, Neigungen, Streben) seems to show
that in relation to instinct there were in his mind two pairs of ideas,
so closely related as to be inseparable, viz.:
 (a) Investigation and Control of Surroundings, and ( b)
Consciousness of Self and Self-Determination.
It is impossible to become conscious of one’s self except by
becoming conscious of a world of objects.[28] It is equally impossible
to become self-determining without gaining control over these
objects, over the surroundings. In order to control the surroundings,
one must first investigate them, and this investigation brings with it
self-consciousness, knowledge of one’s own powers and consequent
self-determination. All this seems fully in accordance with what has
been already stated as to the close connection between volitional
and intellectual development.
The two main lines on which instinctive action must run, if it is to
be, as it must be, adaptive, are given in Froebel’s words, “to have
power and understanding.” To adapt ourselves to our surroundings
we must first know them, and secondly, have power over them.
Even this separation into firstly and secondly is more a matter of
words than of reality. No one knew more clearly or emphasized more
strongly than Froebel that action, by which alone we gain power, is
also the child’s royal road to knowledge. This he states very plainly
in the “Plan” which he drew up for the school at Helba, which
unfortunately never came into existence.
“The institution will be fundamental inasmuch as in
training and instruction it will rest on the foundation
from which proceed all genuine knowledge and all
genuine practical attainments; it will rest on life itself
and on creative effort, on the union and
interdependence of doing and thinking, representation
and knowledge, art and science. The institution will
base its work on the pupil’s personal efforts in work
and expression, making these, again, the foundation of
all genuine knowledge and culture. Joined with
thoughtfulness these efforts become a direct medium
of culture; joined with reasoning, they become a direct
 means of instruction and thus make of work a true
subject of instruction.”—E., p. 38.
Knowledge of his surroundings is however not the only knowledge
that the child gains through action; this is his only way of gaining
knowledge of himself, of his power and of his weakness. It is
through outward activity that, as Froebel says, he “comes to self-
consciousness and learns to order, determine and master himself,”
and it is in connection with the earliest Impulse to Activity that
Froebel writes:
“The present effort of mankind is an effort after
freer self-development, freer self-formation, freer
determining of one’s own destiny.… Therefore the
more or less clear aim of the individual is
Consciousness, the attaining of clearness about himself
and about life in its unity as well as in its thousand
ramifications, to attain to comprehension and right use
of life.… That this highest aim may be accomplished,
the present time lays upon the educator the
indispensable obligation—to understand the earliest
activity, the first action of the child, the impulse (Trieb)
to spontaneous activity, which appears so early; to
foster the impulse (Trieb) for self-culture and self-
instruction, through independent doing, observing and
experimenting.”—P., p. 15.
“The first spontaneous employments of the child are
noticing his environment, and play, that is,
independent outward action, living outside himself.…
The deepest foundation of all the phenomena, of the
earliest activity of the child is this; that he must
exercise the dim anticipation of conscious life, and
consequently must exercise power, test and thus
compare power, exercise independence, test and thus
compare the degree of independence.”—P., pp. 29-31.
 “All outer activity of the child has its distinctive and
ultimate ground in his inmost nature and life. The
deepest craving of this inner life, this inner activity, is
to behold itself mirrored in some external object. In
and through such reflection the child learns to know
his own activity, its essence, direction and aim, and
learns also to order and determine his activity in
correspondence with the outer phenomena. Such
mirroring of the inner life, such making of the inner life
objective is essential, for through it the child comes to
self-consciousness, and learns to order, determine and
master himself. The child must perceive and grasp his
own life in an objective manifestation before he can
perceive and grasp it in himself.”—P., p. 238.
It may seem very presumptuous to venture to discuss here the
classification of instincts adopted by Mr. McDougall, yet there are in
it a few points which would not have appealed to Froebel, and it is
conceivable that Mr. McDougall might make alterations in a future
edition and attach even more importance to positive self-feeling as
Froebel would undoubtedly have done. It is impossible to imagine
Froebel having any dealings with an Instinct of Self-Abasement,
though the Instinct of Self-Assertion is in full accordance with his
ideas. And while it is hard to see the biological utility of an Instinct
of Self-Abasement, it does seem as if the frustration of the Instinct
of Self-Assertion might be made to cover all that is brought under its
opposite.
It is difficult, too, to imagine Froebel allowing an Instinct of
Pugnacity, and Mr. McDougall allows that this presupposes the other
instincts, and that it cannot strictly be brought under his own
definition of instinct. He allows, too, that this instinct is “lacking in
the constitution of the females of some species,” and it seems
impossible not to notice the difference between little boys and girls
in this respect. Surely it puts too much to the credit of mere
pugnacity to say: “A man devoid of the pugnacious instinct would
not only be incapable of anger, but would lack this great source of
reserve energy, which is called into play in most of us by any
difficulty in our path.”[29] The Instinct of Self-Assertion, if it is worth
anything, ought to be sufficient not only to produce anger,[30] but
also to call up reserve energy to deal with difficulties. Certainly
Froebel would have said so. No doubt it is because of her weaker
physique that the woman has not the pugnacity of the man, but
Froebel too wrote mainly of the boy, and he puts boyish tussling and
fighting down to the instinctive desire to measure and to increase
power and this can easily be matched on the female side, though
the power measured may not be that of muscle.
“At this age the healthy boy brought up simply and
naturally never evades an obstacle, a difficulty; nay he
seeks it and overcomes it. ‘Let it lie,’ the vigorous
youngster exclaims to his father, who is about to roll a
piece of wood out of the boy’s way—‘let it lie, I can get
over it.’ With difficulty, indeed, the boy gets over it the
first time; but he has accomplished the feat by his own
strength. Strength and courage have grown in him. He
returns, gets over the obstacle a second time, and
soon he learns to clear it easily.… The most difficult
thing seems easy, the most daring thing seems without
danger to him, for his prompting comes from the
innermost, from his heart and will.”—E., p. 102.
“Many of the plays and occupations of boys at this
age are predominantly mere practice and trials of
strength, and many aim simply at display of
strength.… The boy tries to see himself in his
companions, to feel himself in them, to weigh and
measure himself by them, to know and find himself
with their help.”—E., pp. 112-114.
In passing, it may be suggested that it hardly seems worth while
to postulate an Instinct of Repulsion with the impulses or actions of
rejecting evil-tasting substances from the mouth and of shrinking
from objects which are slimy or slippery. Surely the rejection of
unsuitable food might be a compound reflex action tending to the
preservation of health; while shrinking from slimy objects, and even
from the touch of fur, might have had their uses in the case of
children left in caves, and might be drawn under the instinct of fear.
There does not seem to be anything to which Mr. McDougall would
take exception in what Froebel has to say about Play or about
Imitation.
As to play, Froebel must be regarded as a pioneer in the attempt
to explain a subject all important to educators, and by his
explanation certain kinds, and notably imitative play find an
appropriate place under his instinct of investigation
(Forschungstrieb).
“The means of shadowing forth to the child his own
nature and that of the cosmos are his play and
playthings.”—P., p. 201.
As the word Investigation certainly implies activity, it may be
permissible to wonder why Mr. McDougall has not made use of the
terms “The Instinct of Investigation and the Emotion of Curiosity,”
the more so that he himself has clearly a strong inclination to use
the word curiosity to express emotion.[31]
Imitation, as we have seen,[32] is, according to Froebel, action
which renders a child conscious of what is around him, conscious of
his inner life of perceptions, ideas and feelings, conscious of his own
power. Froebel also points out that imitation, as well as habit, is the
outcome of a more fundamental impulse to activity.
“It is just as important to notice the habits of a child,
especially with regard to cause and effect, as it is to
notice and to foster its impulse to activity.… As now
habit springs from free and spontaneous activity, so
too does imitation, and it is no less important for the
fostering of child-life to keep in view this origin of
imitation, than it is to keep in view the phenomena of
habit, custom and independent activity. For we see the
 whole inner life of the child manifest itself as a tri-unity
in the threefold phenomenon of spontaneous activity,
habit and imitation. These three phenomena are
closely united in early childhood, and give us most
important discoveries concerning child-life, as to
foundation and result and surest guides for the early
correct treatment of the child.”—P., p. 27.
Mr. McDougall notes “at least three distinct classes” of imitative
actions. The first class consists of expressive actions, secondary to
the sympathetic induction of the emotions they express, as when a
child responds to a smile with a smile, and here we remember how
Froebel notes the child’s first smile to his mother as the earliest sign
of what he calls “the feeling of community.” The third class is the
deliberate and voluntary imitation of an admired person, which does
not concern us here. The second class are “simple ideo-motor
actions evoked by the visual presentation of a movement,” and as a
parallel to this we have Froebel’s “working of the inner activity
wakened by the sight of outer activity.”
“The smallest child moves joyfully, springs gaily,
hops up and down, or beats with his arms when he
sees a moving object. This is certainly not merely
delight in the movement of the object before him, but
it is the working of inner activity wakened in him by
the sight of outer activity. Through such vision the
inner life has been freed.…”—P., pp. 239-40.
A point to which exception may well be taken is that in the infant
Froebel notes what he seems to regard as a fundamental tendency,
the impulse or instinct of activity, or as he frequently puts it, the
impulse to busy oneself, which, however, soon differentiates into two
more specific tendencies, viz. the impulse to investigate and the
constructive impulse.
“What formerly the child did only for the sake of
activity, the boy now does for the sake of the result or
product of his activity. The child’s impulse to activity
 (Thätigkeitstrieb) has in the boy become a
constructive, a formative impulse (Bildungs-
Gestaltungstriebe), in which the whole outer life of the
boy finds at this stage its outlet.”—E., p. 99.
It may be worth mentioning that Groos would like to assume a
“universal impulse to activity,” and though he “can only hold fast to
the primal need for activity,” yet according to him Ribot approaches
this assumption.—(“The Play of Man,” p. 3).
Even in the infant, however, this instinct or impulse to activity is
devoted to “penetrating what is outer,” and the Kindergarten, meant
for children from three to six, is intended to foster the three
instincts, activity, investigation and construction, as well as to
cultivate the social instinct by placing a little child among his equals.
Froebel describes it in his plan as:
“An Institution for fostering of family life and for
shaping the life of the nation and human life generally,
through cultivating the human instincts of activity, of
investigation (Forschungstrieb), and of construction in
the child, as a member of the family, of the nation, and
of humanity.…”—P., p. 6.
As regards the child, the word Trieb, which is exactly equal to
impulse, seems to be applied only in one other direction, to what we
would call the social instinct, and here again Froebel shows his
recognition of the vagueness and indefiniteness of early
consciousness. As he attributes to the infant the one impulse to
activity which differentiates later into Investigation and Construction,
so in the infant he recognizes a “feeling of community”
(Gesammtgefühl), but says that it differentiates later into something
more definite.[33]
“The development of man constitutes an unbroken
whole, steadily and continuously progressing, gradually
ascending. The feeling of community (Gemeingefühl)
awakened in the infant, develops in the child into
 impulse, inclination (entwickelt sich in dem Kinde der
Trieb, die Neigung).”—E., p. 95.
Under the important Instinct of Investigation, or the Instinct for
Self-Instruction, Froebel includes a great deal. Many different
activities until recently somewhat carelessly talked of collectively as
“play,” Froebel has separated and explained as the child’s way of
investigating his surroundings. Even “the earliest activity and first
action of the child,” Froebel says, shows “the instinct to self-teaching
and self-instruction.”
Imitative action or imitative play is always referred to as action
which helps towards understanding of the surroundings. In the
“Mother Songs” we read:
“Your child will certainly understand all the better if
you make him take a part—though it be only by
imitation—in what grown-up people are doing in their
anxiety to maintain life.…”—M., p. 141.
“I have already said that this little game arose
because people felt that a child’s love of activity, and
his striving to get the use of his limbs, ought to be
carried on in such a way as to lift him at once into the
complexity of the life which surrounds him.… Pray do
not disturb them in their ingenious charming play
(saying grace over the dolls’ feast), but rather avoid
noticing it if you cannot identify yourself with its
charm.… For how is your child to cultivate in himself
the feeling of what is holy, if you will not grant that it
takes form for him in all its purity in his innocent
games.”—M., p. 148.
“What man tries to represent he begins to
understand.”—E., p. 76.
Representation, however, may be carried out in many ways, by the
use of material, as well as by bodily action so that the constructive
instinct also subserves that of investigation.
 “To grasp a thing through life and action is much
more developing, cultivating and strengthening than
merely to receive it through the verbal communication
of ideas. Similarly, representation of a thing by
material means, in life and action, united with thought
and speech, is more developing than merely verbal
representation of ideas.”—E., p. 279.
“The child must perceive and grasp his own life in an
objective manifestation before he can perceive and
grasp it in himself. This law of development, prescribed
by Nature and by the essential character of the child,
must always be respected and obeyed by the true
educator. Its recognition is the aim of my gifts and
games apprehended relatively to the educator.”—P., p.
38.
Here Froebel has plainly stated the main object of his specially
selected play-material. The ordinary parent not being “the man
advanced in insight,” who “makes clear to himself the purpose of
playthings,” Froebel often saw children supplied with expensive but
unsuitable toys, toys which would not bring the child any nearer his
destination, “to have power and understanding, to become ever
more and more self-conscious and self-determining.”
“Here, then, we meet as a great imperfection in
ordinary playthings, a disturbing element which
slumbers like a viper under roses, viz. that it is too
complex, too much finished. The child can begin no
new thing with it, cannot produce enough variety by it;
his power of creative imagination, his power of giving
outward form to his own idea is thus actually
deadened. When we provide children with too finished
playthings, we deprive them of the incentive to
perceive the particular in the general (P., p. 122).…
What presents are most prized by the child? Those
which afford him a means of unfolding his inner life
 most freely and of shaping it in various directions.”—P.,
p. 142.
“The man, advanced in insight, should be as clear as
possible in his own mind about all this before he
introduces his child into the outer world. Even when he
gives the child a plaything, he must make clear to
himself its purpose, and the purpose of playthings and
occupation material in general. This purpose is, to aid
the child freely to express what is in him and to bring
the phenomena of the outer world nearer to him.”—P.,
p. 171.
“To realize his aims, man, and more particularly the
child, requires material, if it be only a bit of wood or a
pebble with which he makes something or which he
makes into something. In order to lead the child to the
handling of material, we gave him the soft ball, the
wooden sphere and cube, etc., discussed in the
chapters on the Kindergarten Gifts. Each of these gifts
incites the child to free spontaneous activity, to
independent movement.”[34]—P., p. 237.
As the child grows older his constructions advance, but still they
connect themselves with investigating:
“Here he makes a little garden under the hedge;
there he represents the course of the river in his
furrow and in his ditch; there he studies the effects of
the fall or pressure of water upon his little water-
wheel.”—E., p. 105.
Investigating naturally leads to exploring, “external objects invite
him who would bring them nearer to move toward them,” and so the
child once he is able to stand begins to travel:
“When the child makes his first attempts at walking
he frequently tries to go to some particular object. This
effort may have its source in the child’s desire to hold
 himself firm and upright by it, but we also observe that
it gives him pleasure to be near the object, to touch it,
to feel it, and perhaps also—a new phase of activity—
to be able to move it. Hence we see the child hops up
and down before it and beats on it with his little
hands, in order to assure himself of the reality of the
object, and to notice its qualities.… Each new
phenomenon is a discovery in the child’s small and yet
rich world—e.g. one can go round the chair, one can
stand before, behind, beside it, but one cannot go
behind the bench or the wall. He likes to change his
relationship to different objects, and through these
changes he seeks self-recognition and self-
comprehension, as well as recognition of the different
objects which surround him, and recognition of his
environment as a whole. Each little walk is a tour of
discovery; each object is an America—a new world,
which he either goes around to see if it be an island,
or whose coast he follows to discover if it be a
continent.”—P., p. 243.
The boy has lost none of this tendency to explore, but he goes
further afield, and it is worth noting that because the boy has a
distinct purpose in view his exploring is distinctly called work.
“If activity brought joy to the child, work now gives
delight to the boy. Hence the daring and venturesome
feats of boyhood; the explorations of caves and
ravines; the climbing of trees and mountains; the
searching of heights and depths; the roaming through
fields and forests.… To climb a new tree means to the
boy the discovery of a new world.… Not less significant
of development is the boy’s inclination (Neigung) to
descend into caves and ravines, to ramble in the shady
grove and dark forest.”—E., pp. 102-5.
 Even the baby shows trace of the collecting or acquiring instinct,
but to Froebel this still falls under the head of investigation. The
child who has just learned to walk is:
“attracted by the bright round smooth pebble, by the
quaint brilliant leaf, by the smooth piece of wood, and
he tries to get hold of these with the help of the newly
acquired use of his limbs. Look at the child that can
scarcely keep himself erect and that can walk only with
the greatest care—he sees a twig, a bit of straw;
painfully he secures it.… See the child laboriously
stooping and slowly going forward under the eaves.
The force of the rain has washed out of the sand
small, smooth, bright pebbles, and the ever-observing
child gathers them.”—E., p. 72.
The boy, still only from six to eight years old, keeps up the
collecting habit with more method and with a wider range, and he
demands assistance.
“Not less full of significance, nor less developing, is
the boy’s inclination to descend into caves and ravines,
to ramble in the shady grove and in the dark forest. It
is the effort (Streben) to seek and find the new, to see
and discover the hidden, the desire to bring to light
and to appropriate that which lies concealed in
darkness and shadow.
“From these rambles the boy returns with rich
treasures of unknown stones and plants, of animals—
worms, beetles, spiders and lizards, that dwell in
darkness and concealment. ‘What is this? What is its
name?’ etc., are the questions to be answered; and
every new word enriches his world and throws light
upon his surroundings. Beware of greeting him with
the exclamation, ‘Fie, throw that down, that is horrid!’
or ‘Drop that, it will bite you!’ If the child obeys, he
 drops and throws away a considerable portion of his
power.”—E., p. 104.
This quotation brings us to another mode of investigation, that of
asking questions, which Froebel was not likely to miss.
“The child, your child, ye fathers, follows you
wherever you go. Do not harshly repel him. Show no
impatience about his ever-recurring questions. Every
harshly repelling word crushes a bud of his tree of
life.… Question upon question comes from the lips of
the boy thirsting for knowledge—How? Why? When?
What for? and every satisfactory answer opens to him
a new world.”—E., p. 86.
Professor O’Shea has an interesting section on what he calls “The
Sense of Location,” which he says is “at the bottom of one of the
most interesting and important phenomena of adjustment—the
questioning activity.” So it may be worth while to notice that Froebel,
whom the Professor has dismissed with one slighting reference, has
been beforehand with him here, and has dealt with this same early
beginning in one of his earliest Mother Songs, viz. “It’s all Gone,”
where he says to the mother:
“How can the child understand that anything is “all
gone,” yet he must see sense in it or he will not be
satisfied. What he saw just now is there no longer,
what was above is below, what was there has
vanished.”—M., p. 18.
Questioning implies language, but Froebel has no language
instinct. He does, however, call speech immediate (unmittelbar),
usually translated “innate,” and he does say that because others talk
to him, the child’s capacity for speech will develop of necessity and
will break forth spontaneously.
It is in connection with the child’s earliest investigations that
Froebel brings in the learning to speak. In “The Education of Man,”
he notes how the young child brings all his discoveries, “his