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Table of Contents
Preface
1. Introduction
1.1 What managers should know about
Scala
1.2 Java Scala integration
1.3 About this book
1.4 Typographical and other conventions
2 Setting up the work environment
2.1 The Scala shell and the command
line
2.1.1 The Scala interpreter
2.1.2 The Scala (de) compilers
2.1.3 The documentation generator
2.2 Build tools
2.2.1 The Maven Scala plugin
2.2.2 Simple Build Tool
2.3 IDE support
2.3.1 Eclipse
2.3.2 NetBeans
2.3.3 IntelliJ IDEA
3 basics
3.1 A little bit of syntax
3.2 Imperative programming
3.3 An executable program
3.4 Annotations
4 Pure object orientation
4.1 Classes and Objects
4.1.1 Fields and methods
4.1.2 What else classes can contain
4.1.3 Constructors
4.1.4 Enumerations
4.1.5 Inheritance and subtyping
4.1.6 Abstract classes
4.2 Code organization
4.2.1 Packages
4.2.2 Package Objects
4.2.3 Imports
4.3 traits
4.3.1 RichInterfaces
4.3.2 Stackable modifications
4.4 Implicits and Rich wrappers
5 Functional programming
5.1 LazyEvaluation
5.2 Functions and recursions
5.3 Higher order functions
5.4 Case classes and pattern matching
5.4.1 Case classes
5.4.2 Sealed classes
5.4.3 Partial functions
5.4.4 Variable names for (partial)
patterns
5.4.5 ExceptionHandling
5.4.6 Extractors
5.4.7 Pattern matching with regular
expressions
5.5 Currying's own control structures
5.6 For expressions
5.7 Type system
5.7.1 Standard types
5.7.2 Parametric Polymorphism and
Variance
5.7.3 Upper and Lower Bounds
5.7.4 Views and ViewBounds
5.7.5 ContextBounds
5.7.6 Arrays and @ specialized
5.7.7 GeneralizedTypeConstraints
5.7.8 Self-type annotation
5.7.9 Structural and existential types
6 The Scala Standard Library
6.1 Overview and the Predef Object
6.2 The Collection Framework
6.3 Scala and XML
6.4 Combining parsers
6.5 A little bit of GUI
7 Actors - Concurrency and
Multicore Programming
7.1 One thread is one Actor
7.2 Receive and react
7.3 Demons and Reactors
7.4 Scheduler
7.5 RemoteActors
8 Software Quality - Documenting
and Testing
8.1 Scaladoc
8.2 ScalaCheck.
8.2.1 Basics.
8.2.2 Generators.
8.2.3 Automated testing with SBT
8.3 ScalaTest
8.3.1 ScalaTestundJUnit
8.3.2 ScalaTestundTestNG
8.3.3 ScalaTestundBDD
8.3.4 Functional, integration and
acceptance tests
8.3.5 DieFunSuite
8.4 Specs
8.4.1 A Specs specification
8.4.2 Matchers
8.4.3 MockswithMockito
8.4.4 LiterateSpecifications
9 Web programming with the lift
9.1 Quick start with lift
9.2 Bootstrapping
9.3 Rendering templates and snippets
9.4 User management and SiteMap
9.5 Persistence
9.6 Implementation of the snippets
10 Lightweight web programming
with Scalatra
10.1 Quick start with Scalatra
10.2 The Final Grade Calculator
11 Akka – Actors and
SoftwareTransactionalMemory
11.1 Quick start with battery
11.2 The MovieStore
11.3 User and Session Management
Preface
Scala: A programming language that uniquely supports object-
oriented Programming merges with the functional 1 that is preparing
to move Java from To throne and to program with that is really fun.
In the summer semester of 2010, in addition to Haskell, I also
taught Scala for the reading “Advanced Functional Programming”
and many I have had good experiences. I saw how my students
medium functional concepts with Scala could be transferred very
well to the JVM. ten. From the 2010/11 winter semester, I started
using Scala instead of Java for the Use programming training of the
freshman students. In Scala there arele things have been
implemented in a simpler and cleaner way. For example, the Printout
println ("Hello World") all by itself in a file as a script or type directly
into the interactive Scala interpreter. In Scala you can Let's stay so
close to Java at first that a later switch is hardly possible Likely to
cause problems 2 . That I also distributed Scala for programming
Discussing systems goes without saying thanks to the actors and
akka. With this book I would like to bring you closer to everything
Scala has to offer, in which, in addition to the programming language
itself, I also give you the essentials I will introduce tools and
frameworks. My warmest thanks go to everyone who made this book
possible and to me in this one Supported the project: Above all my
family. Important discussions and Patrick Baumgartner, Jürgen
Dubau, Christoph Schmidt, Heiko Seeberger and Bernd Weber
contributed. Thanks a lot for this. For the good I thank Margarete on
behalf of the cooperation with the Hanser Verlag
Metzger and Irene Weilhart.
Chapter 1
introduction
Another new programming language, although: Scala is no longer
like that New. The development began in 2001 at the École
polytechnique fédérale de La- sanne (EPFL) in Switzerland by a team
led by Professor Martin Odersky. The
first release was published in 2003. Version 2.0 followed in 2006 In
2010, while this book is being written, version 2.8 will be released.
which, according to Odersky, should actually be 3.0 1 . Professor
Odersky is no stranger to the Java world. 1995 he started with Phi-
lip Wadler 2 with the development of the functional programming
language Pizza 3 , which can be translated into bytecode for the Java
Virtual Machine (JVM). These Work led to GJ 4 and finally to the new
javac compiler and the one with Java 5 introduced Java Generics 5 .
When Odersky came to EPFL in 1999, he shifted his focus a little. He
had still the goal of object-oriented and functional programming
tooconnect, but no longer wanted to be burdened with the
restrictions of Java. After developing the programming language
Funnel 6 , he took on additional goals the practicality and
interoperability with standard platforms and designed Scala 7 .
Scala is a hybrid language that uniquely combines features of
objective connects entertaining and functional programming
languages. Scala design goal is a concise, elegant and type-safe
programming. Scala isn't just inBytecode compiled for the JVM, any
Java code can also be extracted directly Use the Scala and vice
versa.
Scala is a purely object-oriented programming language. That
means, in Scala everythe value of an object. Scala uses a concept of
classes and traits. With traits Rich interfaces can be implemented,
because traits can already be implemented
mentions included. Classes are extended through inheritance, traits
are mixed into a class or an object. So as not to get into typical
problems running with multiple inheritance, traits are linearized.
Whether Scala may call itself a functional programming language
has been shortened on the web. lich first discussed in detail.
Odersky finally refers to Scala in [Ode10a]as post-functional
language. What is certain is that Scala has a number
has features that are either attributable to functional programming
or come from their environment.
In Scala, each function is a value of 8 and can be equated with other
values. th are treated. This means, for example, that a function can
ment or result of another function 9 , functions can be in lists and
functions can be nested within one another.
In addition, Scala also supports features such as Pattern Matching 10
and Cur- rysing 11 .
In contrast to many modern and trendy programming languages,
Sca- la statically typed. That is, the type of all expressions becomes
compile-time checked and not at runtime, as is the case with
dynamically typed languages
the case is. After a large number of programming errors type errors,
we believe that static typing is generally preferable.
to draw. The main disadvantage, namely the need to have types
everywheremust be specified is countered in Scala with a type
inference mechanism.net. This means that it is not necessary to
specify types in most places. At the
When translating, the type is then inferred and it is checked whether
everything fits together. Scala has a very sophisticated type system
that, in addition to generic classes and polymorphic methods also
include variance annotations, upper and lower bounds and much
more.
Another feature of Scala, which by the way stands for Scalable
Language, is the easy expandability. Scala is therefore predestined
for the creation of do- main Specific Languages ​(DSLs). Last but not
least, Scala can also work with support for the .NET platform. But
that's still the case not a stand that can be described as “production
ready”.
Scala on the JVM has long since grown up and can in all situations,
can also be used in a business-critical manner. The further
development of Scala is very active, from bug fix releases to new
features will be announced in the next
Expect some more time. For the coming years, the focus of the
Scala- Teams on the even better support of multicore architectures.

1.1 What managers should know

about Scala
Scala is a mature, very well thought-out programming language.
With Scala you can You can do everything that can be done with
Java without restriction.
After Scala is compiled in bytecode for the JVM, i.e. in Java
bytecode, you can of course also use the Scala code created once
from Java. Zen. In summary, this means: Scala can be tried out
safely. Even if you should switch back to Java, working in Scala is
otherwise. And the entire range of tools used for Java development
such as Eclipse, NetBeans or Maven, is used to develop Scala- Code
just continued to use.
But why should you switch to Scala at all? Scala increases
productivity vity! Scala offers a variety of features that allow you to
use shorter and elegant write other code. Certainly the sheer
number of lines of code is not very meaningful, but with less code
there is at least statistical also seen fewer errors. Scala is typed
more strictly than Java. Also because of that
fewer errors slip through. And a major advantage when starting with
Sca- la is that it feels almost like java and added features gradually
can be braided.
Why then Scala and not one of the countless other languages? I
would like to Let us give only a few quotations:
"If I were to pick a language to use today other than Java, it would
be Scala."
James Gosling, creator of Java "Scala, it must be stated, is the
current heir apparent to the Java throne. No other
language on the JVM seems as capable of being a “replacement for
Java” as Sca-
la, and the momentum behind Scala is now unquestionable. While
Scala is not a
dynamic language, it has many of the characteristics of popular
dynamic language-
ges, through its rich and flexible type system, its sparse and clean
syntax, and its
marriage of functional and object paradigms. "
Charles Nutter, creator of JRuby
"Though my tip though for the long term replacement of javac is
Scala. I'm very
impressed with it! I can honestly say if someone had shown me the
programming
in Scala book by Martin Odersky, Lex Spoon & Bill Venners back in
2003 I'd
probably have never created Groovy. "
James Strachan, creator of Groovy
Who still uses Scala? Scala is now in a number of companies such as
Sony,
Siemens and Xerox arrived. Let us consider two examples of success
layers:
1. Électricité de France Trading (EDFT) is a subsidiary of France
largest energy company EDF, which deals with the energy market. In
the last n years ago, EDFT held a substantial portion of the 300,000
lines of Java code for “Trading and Pricing” successfully replaced by
Scala. EDFT speaks of a A significant increase in productivity and
much improved Interfaces for your dealers. Team leader Alex
McGuire has meanwhile le EDFT and founded his own company,
Scala-Consulting for Financial service providers and trading
companies offers.
2. Twitter 12 offers a very popular real-time messaging service, the
world- well over 70 million users use it. The Twitter infrastructure
processes ture, which now largely consists of Scala code in the
backend, over 50 Millions of short messages, so-called tweets. And
what about commercial support? There is already a wide variety of
them Shape. There is a very active Scala community and first, also
German, companies,
who provide Scala Consulting. An essential step was the
establishment of the companyma ScalaSolutions by Martin Odersky
himself. The company offers Scala support,
-Consulting and training. And last but not least, interested and good
Java programmers turned into good Scala developers within a very
short time
be trained.

1.2 Java Scala integration

Even if you have not yet got to know Scala, we want to take it here
for further motivation, already read something about the seamless
integration with Java
gen. From Scala you can use Java classes and libraries in the same
way
how you would do that directly in Java 13 .
The reverse is almost as easy. Only in a few small places
sen to know a bit more about the internals. Scala is what language
features
as far as more powerful than Java. However, all features are
represented by Java bytecode.
sent. So we can get anywhere from Java, the only question is how.
In Scala, in contrast to Java, everything is an object. For better
performance
the objects that are represented in Java as primitive types, if
possible
Lich converted into a primitive value, e.g. the Scala Int into the Java
int.
If this is not possible, e.g. because primitive data types are not used
as type parameters in Java
meter are allowed for generic classes, the value is in the appropriate
Wrapper instance converted. For example, the Scala Int is in a list
translated into an instance of the java.lang.Integer class.
Scala's pure object orientation does not allow static class members.
Instead of-
Scala has singleton objects. From a singleton object named
MyObject a class with the name MyObject $ is created that contains
the object
can be used via the static field MODULE $.
If there is no associated class for the singleton object, it is is a so-
called standalone object, there is also a class se named MyObject
creates the static members for all members of the Scala object. This
then points to member x of the Scala object
MyObject is accessed in Scala as well as in Java with MyObject.x. It's
a bit more complicated with Scalas Traits as Java doesn't have one
Knows construct. A trait always becomes a Java interface and thus a
Type generated. All methods of the Scala objects be used. However,
implementing a trait in Java is not practical. tikabel, unless the trait
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
review some of the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed
the Austrian Federal Army under his command and required all
members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their
Supreme Commander (2936-PS). Public officials of the Province of
Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing obedience
to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and People; Jewish officials,
as defined, were not permitted to take the oath. (2311-PS)
Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich
laws, including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and
the 1933 law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-
PS). Hitler, Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the
Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of
Austria with the German Reich. (1060-PS)
In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to
ensure acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a
Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna (2935-PS). The ballot, addressed
to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked
the voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and
“ratification” on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with
Germany (1659-PS). The groundwork was fully laid before the
holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria”
promised in the basic law of March 13. (2307-PS)

(3) The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions. Germany’s

desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its
determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that it
did (with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risks),
was due to the importance of Austria in its further plans of
aggression. The conference of the conspirators held on November 5,
1937, which laid plans for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as
objectives in Austria the conquest of food, through expulsion of a
million people, and an increase in fighting strength in part through
the improvement in frontier. (386-PS)
Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready
cash, taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. One
of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by
Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to
the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. (2313-PS)
Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss,
there was enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for
active military service. (1660-PS)
And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic
position of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl,
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November
1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in
1938:

“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only

the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect
both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially
improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing
way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of
France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia),
Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own
strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she
was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with
rigor before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to
arrive.” (L-172)

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second
part of their second phase of their aggressions. Czechoslovakia was
next.

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO

AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA
Document Description Vol. Page

Charter of the International Military

Tribunal, Article 6 (a). I 5
 International Military Tribunal,
Indictment Number 1, Sections IV 23-24,
(F) 3 (a, b); V. I 29
—————
Note: A single asterisk (*) before a
document indicates that the
document was received in evidence
at the Nurnberg trial. A double
asterisk (**) before a document
number indicates that the document
was referred to during the trial but
was not formally received in
evidence, for the reason given in
parentheses following the
description of the document. The
USA series number, given in
parentheses following the
description of the document, is the
official exhibit number assigned by
the court.
—————
*386-PS Notes on a conference with Hitler in
the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5
November 1937, signed by Hitler’s
adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10
November 1937. (USA 25) III 295
*812-PS Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart,
22 August 1939 and report from
Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar
Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on
events in the NSDAP of Austria from
1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) III 586
**1060-PS Order pursuant to law concerning III 717
Reunion of Austria with German
Reich, 16 March 1938. 1938
 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 249.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.)
*1544-PS Von Papen’s notes, 26 February
1938, on his parting visit with
Chancellor Schuschnigg. (USA 71) IV 103
**1659-PS Second Order concerning Plebiscite
and Election for the Greater German
Reichstag of 24 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) IV 170
1660-PS Decree for registration for active
service in Austria in the year 1938 of
16 June 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 631. IV 171
*1760-PS Affidavit of George S. Messersmith,
28 August 1945. (USA 57) IV 305
*1775-PS Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14
February 1938. (USA 73) IV 357
*1780-PS Excerpts from diary kept by General
Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939.
(USA 72) IV 360
*2219-PS Excerpt from letter from Seyss-
Inquart to Goering, 14 July 1939.
(USA 62) IV 854
*2246-PS Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1
September 1936, concerning
Danube situation. (USA 67) IV 930
*2247-PS Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17
May 1935, concerning intention of
Austrian government to arm. (USA
64) IV 930
 *2248-PS Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27
July 1935, concerning National
Socialism in Austria. (USA 63) IV 932
*2307-PS Law concerning reunion of Austria
with German Reich, 13 March 1938.
1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
237. (GB 133) IV 997
**2310-PS First Decree of Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor concerning Introduction
of German Reich Law into Austria,
15 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 247.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) IV 1004
**2311-PS Decree of Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor concerning
Administration of the Oath to
Officials of Province of Austria, 15
March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 245. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) IV 1005
**2313-PS Order for Transfer of Austrian
National Bank to Reichsbank, 17
March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 254. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) IV 1006
**2367-PS Hitler’s speech of 1 May 1936,
published in Voelkischer Beobachter,
Southern German edition, 2-3 May
1936. (Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) IV 1101
*2385-PS Affidavit of George S. Messersmith,
30 August 1945. (USA 68) V 23
 *2461-PS Official German communique of
meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg,
12 February 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics,
1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (GB 132) V 206
*2463-PS Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to
Hitler, 11 March 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics,
1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (USA 703) V 207
**2464-PS Official Austrian communique of the
reorganization of the Austrian
Cabinet and general political
amnesty, 16 February 1938,
published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) V 208
**2465-PS Announcement of appointment of
Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor,
11 March 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics,
1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to
but not offered in evidence.) V 209
**2466-PS Official communique of resignation
of Austrian President Miklas, 13
March 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics,
1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to
but not offered in evidence.) V 209
2467-PS Hitler’s telegram to Mussolini from
Linz, 13 March 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics,
1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. V 210
**2469-PS Official German and Austrian
communique concerning equal rights
of Austrian National Socialists in
Austria, 18 February 1938, published
in Documents of German Politics,
1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to
but not offered in evidence.) V 210
**2484-PS Official German communique of visit
of Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to
Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938,
published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) V 234
**2485-PS Address by Federal Chancellor
Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City
Hall at Linz, 12 March 1938,
published in Documents of German
Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 144-145.
(Referred to but not introduced in
evidence.) V 234
2510-PS Hitler letter to Mussolini, 11 March
1938, published in Documents of
German Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp.
135-7, No. 24. V 244
**2799-PS Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26
July 1934, published in Documents
of German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No.
38. (Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) V 441
2831-PS Letter from Office of Extraordinary V 498
and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of
German Government to Reich
Chancellery, inclosing report on
 Political situation in Austria, 14
January 1937.
*2832-PS Entry for July 26, 1934 from
Ambassador Dodd’s diary. (USA 58) V 500
2909-PS Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9
November 1945. V 578
**2935-PS Order concerning establishment of
Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna,
31 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 350.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) V 604
**2936-PS Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor, concerning the Austrian
Federal Army, 13 March 1938,
published in Documents of German
Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150.
(Referred to but not offered in
evidence.) V 604
*2949-PS Transcripts of telephone calls from
Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA
76) V 628
*2968-PS Memorandum from U. S. Army
officer concerning plaque erected in
Austrian Chancellery in memoriam to
killers of Dollfuss. (USA 60) V 677
2985-PS Telephone message of Mr. Hadow,
British Legation, Vienna, to Sir John
Simon, 26 July 1934. V 687
**2994-PS Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,
former Chancellor of Austria,
concerning Austrian-German Treaty
of 11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection
to admission in evidence upheld) V 703
 2995-PS Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,
former Chancellor of Austria,
concerning his visit to
Berchtesgaden on 12 February
1938. V 709
2996-PS Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,
former Chancellor of Austria,
concerning events of 11 March
1938. V 713
*3045-PS Letter, 12 March 1938, to British
Embassy enclosing letter from
Henderson to Halifax, 11 March
1938. (USA 127) V 765
*3054-PS “The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion
picture composed of captured
German film. (USA 167) V 801
3062-PS Memorandum found in Goering’s
office, 19 November 1936,
concerning Guido Schmidt, Foreign
Minister of Austria under
Schuschnigg. V 868
*3254-PS The Austrian Question, 1934-1938,
by Seyss-Inquart, 9 September
1945. (USA 704) V 961
*3270-PS Goering’s speech on 27 March in
Vienna, published in Documents of
German Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p.
183. (USA 703) V 1047
*3271-PS Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Himmler, 19 August 1939. (USA 700) V 1047
*3287-PS Letter from von Neurath to
Henderson, 12 March 1938. (USA
128) V 1090
*3308-PS Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav
Schmidt, 28 November 1945. (GB
288) V 1100
3390-PS Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 25 October 1937. VI 105
3392-PS Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 3 September 1937. VI 109
3395-PS Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 3 September 1937. VI 113
*3396-PS Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr.
Jury. (USA 889) VI 114
*3397-PS Letter from Keppler to Seyss-
Inquart, 8 January 1938. (USA 702) VI 115
3400-PS Minutes of meeting of German
Association, 28 December 1918, and
Constitution and By-Laws thereof
found in personal files of Seyss-
Inquart for period of 1918 to 1943. VI 118
*3425-PS Voluntary statement made by Seyss-
Inquart with advice of counsel, 10
December 1945. (USA 701) VI 124
3467-PS Law on Limitation of travel to
Republic Austria 29 May 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p.
311. VI 169
*3471-PS Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz,
21 February 1938, with enclosures
noting activity of Leopold as leader
of Austrian Nazis and possible
appointment of Klausner as his
successor. (USA 583) VI 195
*3472-PS Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 VI 196
February 1938, requesting that
Leopold be forbidden to negotiate
 with Schuschnigg except with
approval of Reich authorities. (USA
582)
*3473-PS Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6
January 1938, giving details of Nazi
intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) VI 197
3574-PS Filing notice regarding discussion
between Chief of CI and Chief of
Foreign CI on 31 January 1938, 2
February 1938, signed Canaris. VI 265
3576-PS Letter from Keppler to Goering, 19
February 1938, with enclosure
reporting on situation in Austria as
of 18 February. VI 271
3577-PS Letter presumably from Buerkel to
Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March
1938, concerning Aryanization of
Jewish-held business in Austria and
disposition of resulting funds. VI 275
*C-102 Document signed by Hitler relating
to operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938.
(USA 74) VI 911
*C-103 Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March
1938, on conduct towards Czech or
Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) VI 913
*C-175 OKW Directive for Unified
Preparation for War 1937-1938, with
covering letter from von Blomberg,
24 June 1937. (USA 69) VI 1006
*C-182 Directive No. 2 from Supreme
Commander Armed Forces, initialled
Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA 77) VI 1017
*L-150 Memorandum of conversation VII 890
between Ambassador Bullitt and von
 Neurath, German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1936. (USA
65)
*L-151 Report from Ambassador Bullitt to
State Department, 23 November
1937, regarding his visit to Warsaw.
(USA 70) VII 894
*L-172 “The Strategic Position at the
Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a
lecture delivered by Jodl on 7
November 1943 at Munich to Reich
and Gauleiters. (USA 34) VII 920
*L-273 Report of American Consul General
in Vienna to Secretary of State, 26
July 1938, concerning anniversary of
assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss.
(USA 59) VII 1094
L-281 Text of Schuschnigg radio address of
11 March 1938, contained in
telegram from American Legation in
Vienna to the Secretary of State, 11
March 1938. VII 1096
L-291 Telegram from American Embassy
Berlin to Secretary of State, 11
March 1938, concerning Austrian
situation. VII 1097
*L-292 Telegram of American Consul
General in Vienna to Secretary of
State, 12 March 1938, concerning
propaganda dropped over Vienna.
(USA 78) VII 1098
L-293 Telegram from American Legation in
Vienna to Secretary of State, 12
March 1938. VII 1098
 *TC-22 Agreement between Austria and
German Government and
Government of Federal State of
Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) VIII 369
*TC-26 German assurance to Austria, 21
May 1935, from Documents of
German Politics, Part III, p. 94. (GB
19) VIII 376
TC-47 Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of
Austria, 12 March 1938. VIII 398
Affidavit H Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22
November 1945. VIII 643
**Chart No. 11 Aggressive Action 1938-39.
(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) VIII 780
**Chart No. 12 German Aggression. (Enlargement
displayed to Tribunal.) VIII 781
**Chart No. 13 Violations of Treaties, Agreements
and Assurances. (Enlargement
displayed to Tribunal.) VIII 782

4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression.
In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a program
of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength
and political bargaining power to be used against other nations.
Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a
preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last
until March 1939. This program was intended to shorten Germany’s
frontiers, to increase its industrial and food-reserves, and to place it
in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis
could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of
aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when the
Nazi conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for the conquest
of Czechoslovakia they had reached approximately the halfway point
in this preliminary program.
The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs
Chancellery on 5 November 1937, Hitler had set forth the program
which Germany was to follow. The events of this conference are
contained in the so-called Hossbach minutes. The question for
Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at
this meeting, is where the greatest possible conquest can be made
at the lowest cost (386-PS). At the top of his agenda stood two
countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March 1938 Austria
was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was
annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of
German intentions toward Czechoslovakia.
A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to discuss
plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State.
On 21 April 1938, Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretexts which
Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and
overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of
diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to
the excuse for war. In the alternative, and this alternative they found
to be preferable, they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the
result of an “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given
to the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague to create
the requisite incident. The necessity of propaganda to guide the
conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs
was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed
with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within four
days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling
outside intervention. (388-PS, Item 2)
Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators to
conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical
planning.

B. The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations.

This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of
amicable German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they had in
the fall of 1937 determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the
leaders of the German government were bound by a treaty of
arbitration and by assurances freely given to observe the sovereignty
of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16
October 1925, Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain
exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice,

“* * * all disputes of every kind between Germany and

Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict
as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible
to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy. * * *”
(TC-14)

The preamble of this treaty stated:

“The President of the German Empire and the President of

the Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to maintain
peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the
peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between
the two countries; declaring that respect for the rights
established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is
obligatory for international tribunals; agreeing to recognize
that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its
consent; and considering that sincere observance of the
methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes
permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions
which may become the cause of division between States;
have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions
in this respect. * * *” (TC-14)

Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward

Czechoslovakia were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators as late
as March 1938. On 11 and 12 March 1938, at the time of the
annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in
inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time Goering
assured M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of
the German Government that German-Czech relations were not
adversely affected by the developments in Austria and that Germany
had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of his
sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement:
“Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort” (“I give you my word of honor”)
(TC-27). At the same time von Neurath, who was handling German
foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured M.
Mastny on behalf of Hitler and the German government that
Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention
of 1925 (TC-27).

C. Planning for Aggression.

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators
proceeded with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever
since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate
aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and
Czechoslovakia. In both countries the Nazi conspirators planned to
undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by fifth column
activities, while the actual military preparations were being
developed. The Austrian operation, which received priority for
political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and
March 1938. Thenceforth Wehrmacht planning was devoted to Case
Green (Fall Gruen), the designation given to the operation against
Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline
form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret “Directive for the
Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War”, signed by von
Blomberg on 24 June 1937 and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and
Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July 1937, included as a probable
warlike eventuality, for which a concentration plan was to be drafted,
Case Green (“War on two fronts with the main struggle in the
southeast”) (C-175). The original section of this directive dealing
with the “probable war” against Czechoslovakia—it was later revised
—opens with this supposition:
“The war in the east can begin with a surprise German
operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the
imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary
conditions to justify such an action politically and in the eyes
of international law must be created beforehand.” (C-175)

After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such

action, the directive continues as follows:

“2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their

preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can
break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the
greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is
provided as rear cover for this attack.
“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German
Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning,
and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia
to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from
the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its
operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the
defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia.” (C-175)

The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding

principles the following statement:

“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude

surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war
on the part of the German Armed Forces * * * to make
possible the military exploitation of politically favorable
opportunities should they occur.” (C-175)

It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without public

announcement “in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be
able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise
both as regards strength and time of attack.” (C-175). This directive
is, of course, a directive for staff planning. But the nature of the
planning, and the very tangible and ominous developments which
resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in
another setting.
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward
during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938. On the political
level this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the
approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military
commanders-in-chief on 5 November 1937 (386-PS). In early March
1938, before the march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were
concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against
Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938
Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel’s confidential
cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the Hungarian
ambassador to Germany, who had suggested an interchange of
views (2786-PS). An acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter
was signed by Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop
said:

“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we

should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against
Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well
would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if
you would notify me briefly whether any commitments were
made here in any respect.” (2786-PS)

D. Development of Specific Plans.

At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific plans
for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time
(388-PS, Item 2). This meeting was followed in the late spring and
summer of 1938 by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing
Case Green. These notes and communications were carefully filed at
Hitler’s headquarters by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer’s military
adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at
Obersalzberg, Hitler’s headquarters, near Berchtesgaden. This file,
preserved intact, is document (388-PS).
 The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any
narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an
unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi
leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning
Czechoslovak armament and defense. This interest is reflected in
Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in
General Jodl’s office of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler’s
headquarters; Item 12, Short survey of Armament of the Czech
Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed “Z” for Zeitzler; and
Item 13, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated Berlin, 9 June 1938 and
classified “Most Secret”. The following are four of the questions on
which Hitler wanted authoritative information:

“Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

“Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the
West for the construction of emplacements?
“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
occupied in unreduced strength?
“Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?” (388-PS, Item
13)

These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed

by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.
As a precaution against French and British action during the
attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators
to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western
frontier of Germany. A telegram, presumably sent from Schmundt in
Berchtesgaden to Berlin, read in part as follows:

“Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Keitel: *

* * The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of
pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the west.”
(388-PS, Item 8)

In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between

Hitler and his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance
of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack. It was
decided that preparations for X-day, the day of the attack, should be
completed no later than 1 October.
On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his
principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the
Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This conference was the occasion on
which Hitler made known to the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators
the outlines of his plan to attack Czechoslovakia and issued the
necessary instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of
Fritz Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler’s adjutant:

“FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and

says as follows:
“From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I served
as adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties were to handle
correspondence and complaints addressed to the Fuehrer’s
office. Occasionally I attended conferences held by the
Fuehrer.
“I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a
conference in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery of
all the people who were important, from the Foreign Office,
the Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this
conference, as I recall, included Goering, Ribbentrop, von
Neurath, General Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and
General von Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the
following statement: ‘It is my unshakable will that
Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map.’ Hitler then
revealed the outlines of the plan to attack Czechoslovakia.
Hitler addressed himself to the Generals, saying: ‘So, we will
first tackle the situation in the East. Then I will give you three
to four years’ time, and then we will settle the situation in the
West.’ The situation in the West was meant to be the war
against England and France.
“I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on
leaving the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath:
‘Well, what do you say to these revelations?’ Neurath thought