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Project Management
for Small Projects
Second Edition
Sandra F. Rowe, PhD, PMP
8230 Leesburg Pike, Suite 800
Tysons Corner, VA 22182
(703) 790-9595
Fax: (703) 790-1371
www.managementconcepts.com

Copyright © 2015 by Management Concepts, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher, except for brief quotations in review articles.

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014954267

ISBN 978-1-56726-474-6
eISBN 978-1-56726-475-3
 About the Author
Sandra Rowe, PhD, PMP, MBA, MSCIS, has more than 25 years of project management
experience. Her responsibilities have included leading information technology and process
improvement projects; developing project management processes, tools, and techniques;
and designing, developing, and delivering project management training programs. She has
also taught graduate-level project management courses.
Dr. Rowe speaks regularly at project management conferences on a variety of topics
related to project management processes, project management for small projects, the
project office, knowledge sharing, and lessons learned.
Dr. Rowe is a member of PMI and received her PMP in 1995. Her educational background
includes a doctor of philosophy in business with a specialization in project management, a
bachelor of science in business, a master’s of business administration, and a master’s of
science in computer and information systems.
To my mother, Minnie Rowe
In memory of my aunts Celia Carruthers,
Mary Johnson, and Ida Booker
 Contents
Preface

Acknowledgments

Part 1 Project Management Discipline

Chapter 1 Introduction to Project Management
Project Overview
What Is Project Management?
The Value of Using Project Management on Small Projects
Chapter 2 Concerns for Small Projects
Challenges for Small Projects
Problems Resulting from Not Using Project Management
Chapter 3 Managing and Leading Small Projects
The Difference Between Management and Leadership
Managing Small Projects
Leading Small Projects
Managing and Leading a Project
Managing and Leading Simple Projects
Chapter 4 Pre-Project Activities
Statement of Work
Project Request

Part 2 Project Management Process for Small Projects

Chapter 5 Process Overview
Project Life Cycle
Deliverables
Project Management Process for Small Projects
PALM Principle
Chapter 6 Initiating
Initiating Process Summary
 Initiating Process Steps
Project Charter
Project Roles and Responsibilities
INITIATION PROCESS GUIDE

Chapter 7 Planning for Small Projects

Planning Process Summary
Planning Process Steps
PLANNING PROCESS GUIDE

Chapter 8 Planning for Simple Projects

Planning Steps
Step 1: Prepare for Planning Activities
Step 2: Collect Requirements
Step 3: Develop Scope Statement
Step 4: Develop a WBS
Step 5: Develop an Action Plan or To-Do List
Step 6: Plan Project Communications
PLANNING PROCESS GUIDE FOR SIMPLE PROTECTS

Chapter 9 Controlling
Controlling Process Summary
Controlling Process Activities
Action Items
CONTROLLING PROCESS GUIDE

Chapter 10 Closing
Closing Process Summary
Closing Process Steps
CLOSING PROCESS GUIDE

Part 3 Additional Discipline

Chapter 11 Managing Multiple Small Projects
Multiple Project Overview
Small Project Portfolios
Problems with Managing Multiple Projects
SPM Multiple-Project Management Process
Chapter 12 Projects as Part of a Program
Project Activities and Collaboration
Knowledge Sharing
Chapter 13 Building Effective Teams
 Teams for a Small Project
Team Charter
Effective Team Meetings
The Tuckman Model
Facilitation Tools
Chapter 14 The Power of One
What Is the Power of One?
Roles and Responsibilities
Realizing the Power of One
Time Management
Chapter 15 Transitioning to Larger Projects
Project Management Skills
Leadership Skills
People, Process, and Technology
PROTECT MANAGEMENT KEYS FOR SUCCESS

Glossary

Index
FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Comparison of Projects and Operations

Figure 4.1 Statement of Work

Figure 4.2 Project Request

Figure 5.1 Generic Project Life Cycle

Figure 5.2 Small and Simple Project Management Process

Figure 5.3 PALM Principle

Figure 6.1 Project Charter

Figure 6.2 Project Charter Lite

Figure 7.1 Work Breakdown Structure

Figure 7.2 WBS Outline Format

Figure 7.3 Deliverable Task List

Figure 7.4 Detailed Deliverable Task List

Figure 7.5 Risk Register

Figure 7.6 Probability Impact Risk Matrix

Figure 7.7 Risk Responses

Figure 7.8 Updated Risk Register

Figure 7.9 Communications Matrix

Figure 7.10 Responsibility Matrix

Figure 8.1 WBS with Resources and Hours

Figure 8.2 Action Plan

Figure 9.1 Status Report

Figure 9.2 Deliverable Review and Approval Log

Figure 9.3 Scope Change Request

Figure 10.1 Project Closure Checklist

Figure 10.2 Project Survey

Figure 10.3 Lessons Learned Process

Figure 10.4 Lessons Learned Report

Figure 10.5 Project Closure Report

Figure 11.1 Overview of Projects, Programs, and Portfolios

Figure 11.2 Example WBS

Figure 12.1 Comparative Overview of Projects and Programs

 Preface
Managing projects requires time, effort, and discipline, regardless of the project size. The
difference between managing larger and smaller projects is not only the amount of time,
effort, and discipline but also the processes and tools. Project Management for Small
Projects provides scalable processes and simplified tools for immediate use in managing
small projects.
This is an exciting time to enter the project management profession. Project management
provides opportunities for professional and personal growth. If you are new to managing
small projects or currently manage small projects and need more structure, Project
Management for Small Projects is for you. My desire is that you become so engaged in the
use of these processes and tools that project management discipline becomes as much fun
for you as it is for me. I have combined easy-to-follow steps with practical application tips
to facilitate your learning.
Because my intention is for you to use project management on small projects in preparation
for eventually managing larger projects, I am using the Project Management Institute
standard, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, Fifth Edition
(PMBOK® Guide), as the base to build off. I have used PMI’s project management terms
and definitions wherever possible. The PMBOK® Guide is inclusive and describes the
sum of knowledge within the profession of project management. The complete project
management body of knowledge includes proven, traditional practices that are widely
applied and innovative practices that are emerging in the profession. In this book, I take the
traditional practices used for larger projects and tailor them for small projects, while
staying true to PMI’s project management standards.
This second edition has been updated to align with A Guide to the Project Management
Body of Knowledge, Fifth Edition, and provides new tools, templates, and techniques to
support the revised processes. The second edition is organized in three parts. Part I sets the
stage by providing a foundation for project management discipline. Part II defines a project
management process for small projects. This part includes both management and leadership
activities. Finally, Part III provides additional discipline on several project management
topics.
I hope this updated edition helps readers have continued success in managing their small
projects.
—Sandra F. Rowe
sandrarowe@comcast.net
sandrarowe@projectwise-solutions.com
www.projectwise-solutions.com
 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my sister, Shannon, for her ability to get me to relax and have fun.
I would like to thank Elena Garcia for her ongoing support and encouragement.
Special thanks to the Management Concepts editors, who were patient and committed
throughout the writing of this book.
 PART
I

Project
Management
Discipline
 CHAPTER

Introduction to Project Management

Most organizations rely on a variety of projects, both large and small. Although small
projects have unique challenges that are not present in large projects, small projects can
still benefit from a defined project management methodology. To achieve maximum
benefits, the process, tools, and techniques must be scalable and adaptable. The more
successful you are with managing small projects, the more opportunities you will have to
obtain larger projects.
Almost everyone, to some degree, is involved with projects and should be prepared to
manage them effectively. Project Management for Small Projects suggests an approach
that allows the project manager to apply structure and discipline to managing small
projects while balancing the needs of the project with the project management
methodology.

Project Management Best Practices

A best practice is an activity that has proven to be successful over time. Some project management best practices include:
• Developing a project charter
• Documenting project requirements
• Using a project schedule to plan and monitor project activities
• Managing project risks
• Communicating to project stakeholders.

PROJECT OVERVIEW
Projects are a more important part of business now than they ever have been. They exist at
all levels of every organization and must be managed proactively, regardless of size.
Normally when we think of projects, we think of large initiatives such as developing a new
product or service, developing a new information system or enhancing an existing one,
constructing a building, or preparing for a major sports event. Small projects are not
always viewed as projects and therefore are not always treated as projects—especially
smaller, more informal projects, which are often called assignments.
Definition of a Project
As stated in the PMBOK® Guide, Fifth Edition, a project is a temporary endeavor
undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result. A project can create:
• A product that can be a component of another item, an enhanced item, or an end item in
itself
• A service or a capability to perform a service
• A result, such as an outcome or document.
A project has three distinct characteristics.
1. A project is temporary in that it has a beginning and an end. A project always has a
defined start and end date. The project begins with a statement of work or some form
of description of the product, service, or result to be supplied by the project, and it
ends when the objectives are complete or it is determined that the objectives cannot
be met and the project is canceled.
2. A project is unique in that the product, service, or result created as a result of the
project is different in some distinguishing way from all similar products, services, or
results. Unique also indicates that although a project might appear to be similar to
another project because you are producing the same type of deliverable, it really is
not. In both projects you are creating something that did not exist before. Even a
revision to an existing deliverable is considered unique because the revised product
is something that did not exist before.
3. A project is characterized by progressive elaboration. This means the project
develops in steps and grows in detail. Progressive elaboration is continually
improving and detailing a plan as more detailed and specific information and more
accurate estimates become available as the project progresses. When you are first
given a project, you have limited information to work with, usually in the form of a
high-level project description, the project objective, and some assumptions and
constraints. The scope might need to be further defined, and the work activities for the
project need will have to be planned in detail as more specific information becomes
available. Progressive elaboration allows you to manage to a greater amount of detail
as the project evolves.
Another way to view a project is to see a project as something we do one time, as opposed
to operational work, which is continuous and repetitive and is undertaken to sustain the
business. Operational activities have no real completion date; they are ongoing. An
example of a project would be to develop or enhance an accounting system. The
operational activity would be to process biweekly payroll or pay monthly expenses. Both
operational activities and projects are constrained by resources and are planned, executed,
and controlled (Figure 1.1). However, projects, due to their temporary nature, are initiated
and closed.
FIGURE 1.1 Comparison of Projects and Operations

Projects can intersect with operations:

• When developing a new product or result for an existing system
• While developing new or enhancing existing procedures
• When a project is completed and transferred to operations.

Why Use Project Management on Small Projects

Imagine being assigned a project to revise an existing process. You have a team of three subject matter experts to assist
with the design and implementation. Where do you begin? What are you planning to deliver? When will this project be
completed? And what are the team members’ roles and responsibilities? The use of project management provides the
discipline and tools for answering these questions.

Definition of a Small Project

Small projects are perceived to be relatively easy, but other than this there is no one way to
define when a project is a small project. In some cases small could be defined on the basis
of cost, such as costing less than $1 million. Cost is relative, however, and depends on the
income of the organization. Small could also be defined by time, for example, taking less
than six months to complete. For the purpose of this book, we will use the following
guidelines to define small projects. A small project generally:
• Is short in duration, typically lasting less than six months, and usually part-time in
effort hours
• Has 10 or fewer team members
 • Involves a small number of skill areas
• Has a single objective and a solution that is readily achievable
• Has a narrowly defined scope and definition
• Affects a single business unit and has a single decision-maker
• Has access to project information and will not require automated solutions from
external project sources
• Uses the project manager as the primary source for leadership and decision-making
• Has no political implications with respect to proceeding or not proceeding
• Produces straightforward deliverables with few interdependencies among skill areas
• Costs less than $75,000 and has available funding.
If the project involves a few skill areas but the deliverables are complex, it is not a small
project. If the scope is broad, the project usually involves more skill areas, so it would not
be considered a small project. The more skill areas involved, the more effort will be
required to manage the project.
A small project can be a portion of a larger project. For example, if a team lead is
responsible for planning and controlling specific project activities and then reporting
results to the project manager, the team lead is, in effect, running a small project. Most
small projects center on changes in organizational processes or enhancements to existing
systems. Other examples of small projects include:
• Developing a training course
• Implementing a project office
• Implementing a purchased software application
• Enhancing an existing information system
• Developing a website
• Evaluating an existing practice
• Developing a strategy
• Developing a project proposal.
The following are detailed descriptions of two small projects.

Characteristics Criteria

Duration Six months

Team members Five part-time team members: project manager, instructional

designer, two trainers, and an administrative assistant

Single objective Develop Introduction to Project Management training course

 Narrowly defined Training materials in alignment with other project management
scope courses

Single decision- Sponsor: corporate education director

maker

Straightforward PowerPoint presentation, facilitator’s manual, participant’s

deliverables manual, and case study

Interdependencies Project Management Office

among skill areas

Characteristics Criteria

Duration Three months

Team members Four part-time team members: project manager and three subject
matter experts

Single objective Revise the planning process to include changes made to the
corporate project management process and to be consistent with
the current version of the PMBOK® Guide

Narrowly defined Planning process description and templates

scope

Single decision- Sponsor: Project Management Office director

maker

Straightforward Planning process description, work breakdown structure process

deliverables and example, brainstorming techniques, project-planning
templates

Interdependencies None
among skill areas

A small project can also be part of a program. (Refer to Chapter 12 for a discussion on
Projects as Part of a Program.)
Scenario
Kenny is an analyst with ambitions of becoming a project manager. He is aware of the definition of a project and the
importance of using project management on small projects. He has been working on assignments and wonders if he could
be more successful with completing his assignments if he used project management methods and tools. Can project
management be used on an assignment?
The answer is yes. An assignment can be treated as a simple project.

Definition of a Simple Project

This book differentiates between small and simple projects. Many of the best practices for
small projects and simple projects are similar. When small projects and simple projects
require different approaches, this book explains where and how.
Simple projects are even more straightforward than small projects. Simple projects are
often called assignments. We usually do not think of assignments as projects, but
assignments, like projects, have a definite beginning and end and produce a unique output.
Assignments are usually short in duration and are completed by a small team consisting of
three or fewer team members. Often only one person completes an assignment. (Refer to
Chapter 13, The Power of One, for more details on one-person assignments.)
Because we do not think of assignments as projects, we do not treat them as projects.
Assignments, because of their size and duration, do not need all the formality required by
projects; however, they can still benefit from a simplified form of project management.
Treating assignments as projects provides you with the opportunity to clearly define
expectations, better use resources, and eliminate the frustration of wasted effort and
unnecessary rework.
Examples of simple projects include:
• Developing procedures or a reference guide
• Revising a business process
• Developing an electronic filing system to store departmental documents
• Developing a presentation to communicate a new process
The factors that distinguish a small project from a simple project are duration, team size,
and degree of formality required to effectively meet stakeholders’ expectations. The project
manager must determine what combination of processes and tools fits the needs of the
project.

WHAT IS PROJECT MANAGEMENT?

Project management is the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to meet
project requirements. It includes identifying requirements for the project, defining and
planning the necessary work, scheduling the activities to complete the work, monitoring
and controlling project activities, communicating project progress among project
stakeholders, and finally conducting activities to end the project.
Project management involves coordinating the work of other people. A project manager
and a project team are involved in the project. The project manager is the person assigned
by the organization to achieve the project objectives. Project manager might not be the
person’s formal job title, but for the purpose of this book we will use the term for the
person responsible for completing the project. The project team members are the people
responsible for performing project work. They complete the project deliverables. They
might or might not report directly to the project manager. For small projects team members
usually work part-time on the project.
Is project management an art or a science? It is both.
Project management is an art because of the human element. The involvement of
interrelationships among diverse groups requires the use of leadership skills, which are
applied on the basis of the project situation and are unique to each project. Some of these
skills are communicating, negotiating, decision-making, and problem-solving. The art of
project management requires the project manager to gain agreement between technical and
business resources, the project team and the customer, and multiple stakeholders.
(Stakeholders are people and organizations that are actively involved in the project or
whose interests might be positively or negatively affected as a result of project execution
or project completion.) To effectively master the art of project management, you must have
a degree of proficiency with the science of project management
Project management is a science because it is based on repeatable processes and
techniques. The project manager has an array of tools, templates, and standards to assist
with planning a project. In addition, the project manager has an assortment of metrics and
status reports for monitoring and controlling a project. Mastering the science of project
management is dependent on the effectiveness and efficiency of applying the appropriate
project management processes and techniques.
It’s been said that project managers spend about 75 to 80 percent of their time on the art of
project management and 20 to 25 percent of their time on the science.
Project Management Is Both an Art and a Science
Art: Leadership Skills
• Establish and maintain vision, strategy, and communications
• Foster trust and team building
• Influence, mentor, and monitor team performance
• Evaluate team and project performance
Science: The process necessary to successfully complete a project

The Power of Project Management

A team was assigned to work on a project to revise an existing system. Since the changes were minor and the project was
expected to last only five weeks, the project manager was lax in the use of project management processes and tools.
Needless to say, the project got into trouble. The project work was not completed on time and the team was discouraged.
A new project manager who insisted on the use of project management best practices was assigned. A project charter that
gave the team a clear understanding of what was included in the project was developed. The team then worked together to
develop the project schedule, which included the name of the resource responsible for completing the work along with the
planned start and end dates. The team became reenergized and engaged in completing the project activities.

THE VALUE OF USING PROJECT MANAGEMENT ON

SMALL PROJECTS
For larger projects, success is measured by product and project quality, timeliness, budget
compliance, and degree of satisfaction. Larger projects must balance competing project
constraints, including scope, quality, schedule, budget, resources, and risk. However, for
small projects, success can be defined as on time, within budget, and meeting the
requirements of the project stakeholders. Managers of small projects need to be concerned
with meeting this triple constraint, with an understanding that other project constraints may
also need to be managed.
The value project management offers is the use of standard processes and tools. Project
management is even more valuable when the processes and tools can be tailored to fit the
different types and sizes of small projects. By using a methodology, the project manager is
more prepared to define and manage the project scope, obtain project requirements, and
provide ongoing communications. Stakeholders are engaged early and expectations are
known. Add to this the ability to produce realistic estimates and schedules, and to
effectively manage issues and risks, and you have a means of managing project constraints.
When you can manage project constraints, you improve your chances for project success.
Finally, using project management on small projects will provide models for future
projects. Most small projects tend to be similar in structure or outcome. If a template or
model is developed, it can be used for future projects. This saves the project manager time
and provides a basis for continuous process improvement.

Why Use Project Management

Project management:
• Provides processes and tools that create discipline and a means for organizing project data
• Provides a means to define scope and control scope changes
• Defines project roles and responsibilities
• Allows the project manager to manage stakeholder expectations
• Allows the team to focus on priorities
• Manages project constraints, at a minimum, time, cost, and requirements.

Scenario
Kenny has learned that project management is both an art and a science and has concluded that project managers need to
constantly balance people and processes.
 CHAPTER

Concerns for Small Projects

We have determined that a project is a series of activities that must be performed to
achieve a specific goal, within a specific timeframe, and that small projects require a
degree of discipline to be successful. Now we look at the challenges and problems
associated with managing small projects.

CHALLENGES FOR SMALL PROJECTS

A challenge is a call to action. Some challenges the project manager should respond to are
identified below.

Planning
Planning is necessary to define and mature the project scope, develop the project
management plan, and identify and schedule the project activities that occur within the
project. It ensures that you request the appropriate amount of time and resources to
complete the work. Planning is a challenge for a project of any size. Getting the right
people together at the right time to discuss the project details can be painful.
Planning for a small project is even more of a challenge. The project is already perceived
as being easy to deliver because of its size. Small equals easy. Because of that perception,
adequate time is not set aside for detailed planning. (Why waste time planning when you
could be creating project deliverables?) The first reaction after receiving the small project
is to jump right in and start performing the project activities without planning. Even the
most experienced project manager has fallen into this trap at least once. By not planning,
you start out thinking the project is small and then end up hoping that the project really is
small. Also, by not planning you may overlook a critical component of the project.
The project manager should always make sure the scope, work effort, and costs are
defined. With a loosely defined scope, the project manager runs the risk of it constantly
changing, and scope creep could become a problem. The project manager should also make
time to plan because the plan provides direction for the project, is a means for control, and
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the other cases of which it was to have cognizance; and by providing
for the election of the executive by the legislature, and confining its
powers and duties to those prescribed for it by the resolutions.
It is scarcely necessary to pause for the purpose of commenting on
the practical inconveniences of some of these arrangements.
However proper it may be, in a limited and republican government,
to vest the power of declaring war in the legislative department, the
negotiation of treaties by a numerous body had been found, in our
own experience, and in that of other republics, extremely
embarrassing. However wise may be a jealousy of the executive
department, it is difficult to say that the same authority that is
intrusted with the appointment to all other offices should not be
permitted to make an ambassador or a judge. However august may
be a proceeding that is to determine a boundary between sovereign
States, it is nothing more and nothing less than a strictly judicial
controversy, capable of trial in the ordinary forms and tribunals of
judicature, besides being one that ought to be safely removed from
all political influences. However necessary it may be that an
impeachment should be conducted with the solemnities and
safeguards of allegation and proof, it is not always to be decided by
the rules with which judges are most familiar, or to be determined by
that body of law which it is their special duty to administer. However
desirable it may be, that an elective chief magistracy should be filled
with the highest capacity and fitness, and that popular tumults
should be avoided, no government has yet existed, in which the
election of such a magistrate by the legislative department has
afforded any decided advantage over an election directly or indirectly
by the people; and to give a body constituted as the American
Senate is a negative in the choice of the executive, would be
certainly inconvenient, probably dangerous.
But the position of the Senate as an assembly of the States, and
certain opinions of its superior fitness for the discharge of some of
these duties, had united to make it far too powerful for a safe and
satisfactory operation of the government. It was found to be
impossible to adjust the whole machine to the quantity of power that
had been given to one of its parts. It was eminently just and
necessary that the States should have an equal and direct
representation in some branch of the government; but that a
majority of the States, containing a minority of the people, should
possess a negative in the appointment of the executive, and in the
question of peace or war, and the sole voice in the appointment of
judges and ambassadors, was neither necessary nor proper.
Theoretically, it might seem appropriate that a question of boundary
between any two of the States represented in it should be
committed to the Senate, as a court of the peers of the sovereign
parties to the dispute; but practically, this would be a tribunal not
well fitted to try a purely judicial question. It became necessary,
therefore, to discover the true limit of that control which the nature
of the representation in the Senate was to be allowed to give to a
majority of the States. There had been some effort, in the progress
of the controversy respecting the representative system, to confine
the equal power of the States, in matters of legislation, to particular
questions or occasions; but it had turned out to be impracticable
thus to divide or limit the ordinary legislative authority of the same
body. If the Senate, as an equal assembly of the States, was to
legislate at all, it must legislate upon all subjects by the same rule
and method of suffrage. But when the question presented itself as to
the separate action of this assembly,—how far it should be invested
with the appointment of other functionaries, how far it should
control the relations of the country with foreign nations, how far it
should partake both of executive and judicial powers,—it was much
less difficult to draw the line, and to establish proper limits to the
direct agency of the States. Those limits could not indeed be
ascertained by the mere application of theoretical principles. They
were to be found in the primary necessity for reposing greater
powers in other departments, for adjusting the relations of the
system by a wider distribution of authority, and for confiding more
and more in the intelligence and virtue of the people; and therefore
it is, that, in these as in other details of the Constitution, we are to
look for the clew that is to give us the purpose and design, quite as
much to the practical compromises which constantly took place
between opposite interests, as to any triumph of any one of opposite
theories.
The first experiment that was made towards a restriction of the
power of the Senate, and an adjustment of its relations to the other
departments, was the preparation of a plan, by which the President
was to have the making of treaties, and the appointment of
ambassadors, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers
not otherwise provided for, by and with, the advice and consent of
the Senate. The trial of impeachments, of the President included,
was transferred to the Senate, and the trial of questions of boundary
was placed, like other controversies between States, within the
scope of the judicial power. The choice of the President was to be
made in the first instance by electors appointed by each State, in
such manner as its legislature might direct, each State to have a
number of electors equal to the whole number of its senators and
representatives in Congress; but if no one of the persons voted for
should have a majority of all the electors, or if more than one person
should have both a majority and an equal number of votes, the
Senate were to choose the President from the five highest
candidates voted for by the electors. In this plan, there was certainly
a considerable increase of the power of the President; but there was
not a sufficient diminution of the power of the Senate. The President
could nominate officers and negotiate treaties; but he must obtain
the consent of the body by whom he might have been elected, and
by whom his re-election might be determined, if he were again to
become a candidate. It appeared, therefore, to be quite necessary,
either to take away the revisionary control of the Senate over
treaties and appointments, or to devise some mode by which the
President could be made personally independent of that assembly.
He could be made independent only by taking away all agency of the
Senate in his election, or by making him ineligible to the office a
second time. There were two serious objections to the last of these
remedies,—the country might lose the services of a faithful and
experienced magistrate, whose continuance in office would be highly
important; and even in a case where no pre-eminent merit had
challenged a re-election, the effect of an election by the Senate
would always be pernicious, and must be visible throughout the
whole term of the incumbent who had been successful over four
other competitors.
And after all, what necessity was there for confiding this vast power
to the Senate, opening the door of a small body to the corruption
and intrigue for which the magnitude of the prize to be gained and
to be given, and the facility for their exercise, would furnish an
enormous temptation? Was it so necessary that the States should
force their equality of privilege and of power into every department
of the Constitution, making it felt not only in all acts of legislation,
but in the whole administration of the executive and judicial duties?
Was nothing due to the virtue and sense and patriotism of a majority
of the people of the United States? Might they not reasonably be
expected to constitute a body of electors, who, chosen for the
express purpose, and dissolved as soon as their function had been
discharged, would be able to make an upright and intelligent choice
of a chief magistrate from among the eminent citizens of the Union?
Questions like these, posterity would easily believe, without the clear
record that has descended to them, must have anxiously and deeply
employed the framers of the Constitution. They were to consider, not
only what was theoretically fit and what would practically work with
safety and success, but what would be accepted by the people for
whom they were forming these great institutions. That people
undoubtedly detested everything in the nature of a monarchy. But
there was another thing which they hated with equal intensity, and
that was an oligarchy. Their experience had given them quite as
much reason for abhorring the one as the other. Such, at least, was
their view of that experience. A king, it is true, was the chief
magistrate of the mother country against which they had rebelled,
against which they had fought successfully for their independence.
The measures that drove them into that resistance were executed by
the monarch; but those measures were planned, as they believed,
by a ministry determined to enslave them, and were sanctioned by a
Parliament in which even the so-called popular branch was then but
another phase of the aristocracy which ruled the empire. The worst
enemy our grandfathers supposed they had in England, throughout
their Revolution, was the ministerial majority of that House of
Commons, made up of placemen sitting for rotten boroughs, the
sons of peers, and the country gentlemen, who belonged to a caste
as much as their first-cousins who sat by titles in the House of Lords.
Our ancestors did not know—they went to their graves without
knowing—that in the hard, implacable temper of the king, made
harder and more implacable by a narrow and bigoted
conscientiousness, was the real cause for the persistency in that
fatal policy which severed these Colonies from his crown.
That long struggle had been over for several years, and its result
was certainly not to be regretted by the people of America. But it
had left them, as it naturally must have left them, with as strong
prejudices and jealousies against every aristocratic, as against every
monarchical institution. Public liberty in England they knew might
consist with an hereditary throne, and with a privileged and powerful
aristocracy. But public liberty in America could consist with neither.
The people of the United States could submit to restraints; they
could recognize the necessity for checks and balances in the
distribution of authority; and they understood as much of the
science of government as any people then alive. But an institution,—
however originating and however apparently necessary its peculiar
construction might be,—embracing but a small number of persons,
with power to elect the chief magistrate, with power to revise every
appointment from a chief justice down to a tidewaiter, with power to
control the President through his subordinate agents, with power to
reject every treaty that he might negotiate, and with power to sit in
judgment on his impeachment, they would not endure. "We have, in
some revolutions of this plan of government," said Randolph, "made
a bold stroke for monarchy. We are now doing the same for an
aristocracy."
How to attain the true intermediate ground, to avoid the substance
of a monarchy and the substance of an aristocracy, and yet not to
found the system on a mere democracy, was a problem not easy of
solution. All could see, that a government extended over a country
so large, which was to have the regulation of its commerce, the
collection of great revenues, the care of a vast public domain, the
superintendence of intercourse with hordes of savage tribes, the
control of relations with all the nations of the world, the
administration of a peculiar jurisprudence, and the protection of the
local constitutions from violence, must have an army and a navy,
and great fiscal, administrative, and judicial establishments,
embracing a very numerous body of public officers. To give the
appointment of such a multitude of public servants, invested with
such functions, to the unchecked authority of the President, would
be to create an executive with power not less formidable and real
than that of some monarchs, and far greater than that of others. No
one desired that a sole power of appointment should be vested in
the President alone; it was universally conceded that there must be
a revisionary control lodged somewhere, and the only question was
where it should be placed. That it ought to be in a body independent
of the executive, and not in any council of ministers that might be
assigned to him, was apparent; and there was no such body,
excepting the Senate, which united the necessary independence
with the other qualities needful for a right exercise of this power.
The negotiation of treaties was obviously a function that should be
committed to the executive alone. But a treaty might undertake to
dismember a State of part of its territory, or might otherwise affect
its individual interests; and even where it concerned only the general
interests of all the States, there was a great unwillingness to intrust
the treaty-making power exclusively to the President. Here, the
States, as equal political sovereignties, were unwilling to relax their
hold upon the general government; and the result was that provision
of the Constitution which makes the consent of two thirds of the
Senators present necessary to the ratification of a treaty.
But if it was to have these great overruling powers, the Senate must
have no voice in the appointment of the executive. There were two
modes in which the election might be arranged, so as to prevent a
mutual connection and influence between the Senate and the
President. The one was, to allow the highest number of electoral
votes to appoint the President;[164] the other was, to place the
eventual election—no person having received a majority of all the
electoral votes—in the House of Representatives. The latter plan was
finally adopted, and the Senate was thus effectually severed from a
dangerous connection with the executive.
This separation having been effected, the objections which had been
urged against the length of the senatorial term became of little
consequence. In the preparation of the plan marked out in the
resolutions sent to the committee of detail, the Senate had been
considered chiefly with reference to its legislative function; and the
purpose of those who advocated a long term of office was to
establish a body in the government of sufficient wisdom and
firmness to interpose against the impetuous counsels and levelling
tendencies of the democratic branch.[165] Six years was adopted as
an intermediate period between the longest and the shortest of the
terms proposed; and in order that there might be an infusion of
different views and tendencies from time to time, it was provided
that one third of the members should go out of office biennially.[166]
Still, in the case of each individual senator, the period of six years
was the longest of the limited terms of office created by the
Constitution. Under the Confederation, the members of the Congress
had been chosen annually, and were always liable to recall. The
people of the United States were in general strongly disposed to a
frequency of elections. A term of office for six years would be that
feature of the proposed Senate most likely, in the popular mind, to
be regarded as of an aristocratic tendency. If united with the powers
that have just passed under our review, and if to those powers it
could be said that an improper influence over the executive had
been added, the system would in all probability be rejected by the
people. But if the Senate were deprived of all agency in the
appointment of the President, it would be mere declamation to
complain of their term of office; for undoubtedly the peculiar duties
assigned to the Senate could be best discharged by those who had
had the longest experience in them. The solid objection to such a
term being removed, the complaint of aristocratic tendencies would
be confined to those who might wish to find plausible reasons for
opposition, and might not wish to be satisfied with the true reasons
for the provision.
Having now described the formation and the special powers of the
two branches of the legislature, I proceed to inquire into the origin
and history of the disqualifications to which the members were
subjected.
The Constitution of the United States was framed and established by
a generation of men, who had observed the operation upon the
English legislature of that species of influence, by the crown or its
servants, which, from the mode of its exercise, not seldom
amounting to actual bribery, has received the appropriate name of
parliamentary corruption. That generation of the American people
knew but little—they cared less—about the origin of a method of
governing the legislative body, which implies an open or a secret
venality on the part of its members, and a willingness on the part of
the administration to purchase their consent to its measures. What
they did know and what they did regard was, that for a long
succession of years the votes of members of Parliament had been
bought, with money or office, by nearly every minister who had
been at the head of affairs; that, if this practice had not been
introduced under the prince who was placed upon the throne by the
revolution of 1688, it had certainly grown to a kind of system in the
hands of the statesmen by whom that revolution was effected, and
had attained its greatest height under the first two princes of the
house of Hanover; that it was freely and sometimes shamefully
applied throughout the American war; and that, down to that day,
no British statesman had had the sagacity to discover, and the virtue
to adopt, a purer system of administration.[167] Whether this was a
necessary vice of the English constitution; whether it was inherent or
temporary; or whether it was only a stage in the development of
parliamentary government, destined to pass away when the
relations of the representative body to the people had become better
settled,—could not then be seen even in England. But to our
ancestors, when framing their Constitution, it presented itself as a
momentous fact; whose warning was not the less powerful, because
it came from the centre of institutions with which they had been
most familiar, and from the country to which they traced their origin,
—a country in which parliamentary government had had the fairest
chances for success that the world had witnessed.
Yet it would not have been easy at that time, as it is not at the
present, and as it may never be, to define with absolute precision
the true limits which executive influence with the legislative body
should not be suffered to pass. Still less is it easy to say that such
influence ought not to exist at all;[168] although it is not difficult to
say that there are methods in which it should not be suffered to be
exercised. The more elevated and more clear-sighted public morality
of the present age, in England and in America, condemns with equal
severity and equal justice both the giver and the receiver in every
transaction that can be regarded as a purchase of votes upon
particular measures or occasions, whatever may have been the
consideration or motive of the bargain. But whether that morality
goes, or ought to go, farther,—whether it includes, or ought to
include, in the same condemnation, every form of influence by which
an administration can add extrinsic weight to the merits of its
measures,—is a question that admits of discussion.
It may be said, assuming the good intentions of an administration,
and the correctness of its policy and measures, that its policy and its
measures should address themselves solely to the patriotism and
sense of right of the members of the legislative department. But an
ever active patriotism and a never failing sense of right are not
always, if often, to be found; the members of a legislative body are
men, with the imperfections, the failings, and the passions of men;
and if pure patriotism and right perceptions of duty are alone relied
upon, they may, and sometimes inevitably will be, found wanting.
On the other hand, it is just as true, that the persons composing
every administration are mere men, and that it will not do to assume
their wisdom and good intentions as the sole foundations on which
to rest the public security, leaving them at liberty to use all the
appliances that may be found effectual for gaining right ends, and
overlooking the character of the means. One of the principal reasons
for the establishment of different departments, in the class of
governments to which ours belongs, is, that perfect virtue and
unerring wisdom are not to be predicated of any man in any station.
If they were, a simple despotism would be the best and the only
necessary form of government.
All correct reasoning on this subject, and all true construction of
governments like ours, must commence with two propositions, one
of which embraces a truth of political science, and the other a truth
of general morals. The first is, that, while the different functions of
government are to be distributed among different persons, and to be
kept distinctly separated, in order that there may be both division of
labor and checks against the abuse of power, it is occasionally
necessary that some room should be allowed for supplying the want
of wisdom or virtue in one department by the wisdom or virtue of
another. In matters of government depending on mere discretion,
unlimited confidence cannot with safety be placed anywhere.[169]
The other proposition is the very plain axiom in morals, that, while in
all human transactions there may be bad means employed to effect
a worthy object, the character of those means can never be altered,
nor their use justified, by the character of the end. With these two
propositions admitted, what is to be done is to discover that
arrangement of the powers and relations of the different
departments whose acts involve, more or less, the exercise of pure
discretion, which will give the best effect to both of these truths; and
as all government and all details of government, to be useful, must
be practically adapted to the nature of man, it will be found that an
approximation in practice to a perfect theory is all that can be
attained.
Thus the general duties and powers of the legislative and the
executive departments are capable of distinct separation. The one is
to make, the other is to execute the laws. But execution of the laws
of necessity involves administration, and administration makes it
necessary that there should be an executive policy. To carry out that
policy requires new laws; authority must be obtained to do acts not
before authorized; and supplies must be perpetually renewed. The
executive stands therefore in a close relation to the legislative
department;—a relation which makes it necessary for the one to
appeal frequently, and indeed constantly, to the discretion of the
other. If the executive is left at liberty to purchase what it believes or
alleges to be the right exercise of that discretion, by the
inducements of money or office applied to a particular case, the rule
of common morals is violated; conscience becomes false to duty, and
corruption, having once entered the body politic, may be employed
to effect bad ends as well as good. Nay, as bad ends will stand most
in need of its influence, it will be applied the most grossly where the
object to be attained is the most culpable. On the other hand, if the
members of the legislative body, by being made incapable of
accepting the higher or more lucrative offices of state, are cut off
from those inducements to right conduct and a true ambition which
the imperfections of our nature have made not only powerful, but
sometimes necessary, aids to virtue, the public service may have no
other security than their uncertain impulses or imperfect judgments.
In the midst of such tendencies to opposite mischiefs, all that human
wisdom and foresight can do is, to anticipate and prevent the evils
of both extremes, by provisions which will guard both the interests
of morality and the interests of political expediency as completely as
circumstances will allow.
I am persuaded it was upon such principles as I have thus
endeavored to state, that the framers of our national Constitution
intended to regulate this very difficult part of the relations between
the executive and the legislature. During a considerable period,
however, of their deliberations on the disabilities to which it would
be proper to subject the members of the latter department, they had
another example before them besides that afforded by the history of
parliamentary corruption in England. The Congress of the
Confederation had of course the sole power of appointment to
offices under the authority of the United States; and although there
is no reason to suppose that body at any time to have been justly
chargeable with corrupt motives, there were complaints of the
frequency with which it had filled the offices which it had created
with its own members. In these complaints, the people overlooked
the justification. They forgot that the nature of the government, and
the circumstances of the country, rendered it difficult for an
assembly which both made and filled the offices, and which
exercised its functions at a time when the State governments
absorbed by far the greater part of the interests and attention of
their citizens, to find suitable men out of its own ranks. In that
condition of things, it might have been expected,—and it implies no
improper purpose,—that offices would be sometimes framed or
regulated with a view to their being filled by particular persons. But
the complaints existed;[170] the evil was one that tended constantly
to become worse; and, in framing the new government, this was the
first aspect in which the influence of office and its emoluments
presented itself to the Convention.
For when the Virginia members, through Edmund Randolph, brought
forward their scheme of government, they not only gave the
executive no power of appointment to any office, but they proposed
to vest the appointment of both the executive and the judiciary in
the legislature. Hence they felt the necessity of guarding against the
abuse that might follow, if the members of the legislature were to be
left at liberty to appoint each other to office,—an abuse which they
knew had been imputed to the Congress, and which they declared
had been grossly practised by their own legislature.[171] They
proposed, therefore, to go beyond the Confederation, and to make
the members of both branches ineligible to any office established
under the authority of the United States, (excepting those peculiarly
belonging to their own functions,) during their term of service and
for one year after its expiration. This provision passed the committee
of the whole; but in the Convention, on a motion made by Mr.
Gorham to strike it out, the votes of the States were divided. An
effort was then made by Mr. Madison to find a middle ground,
between an eligibility in all cases and an absolute disqualification. If
the unnecessary creation of offices and the increase of salaries was
the principal evil to be anticipated, he believed that the door might
be shut against that abuse, and might properly be left open for the
appointment of members to places not affected by their own votes,
as an encouragement to the legislative service. But there were
several of the stern patriots of the Convention who insisted on a
total exclusion, and who denied that there was any such necessity
for holding out inducements to enter the legislature.[172] This was a
question on which different minds, of equal sagacity and equal
purity, would naturally arrive at different conclusions. Still, it is
apparent that the mischiefs most apprehended at the time of Mr.
Madison's proposition would be in a great degree prevented, by
taking from the legislature the power of appointing to office; and
that this modification of the system was what was needed, to make
his plan a true remedy for the abuses that had been displayed in our
own experience. The stigma of venality cannot properly be applied
to the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices of a free
government; and if the opportunity to create places, or to increase
their emoluments, and then to secure those places, is taken away,
by vesting the appointment in the executive, the question turns
mainly on the relations that ought to exist between that department
and the legislature. But Mr. Madison's suggestion was made before it
was ascertained that the executive would have any power of
appointment, and it was accordingly rejected;—a majority of the
delegations considering it best to retain the ineligibility in all cases,
as proposed by the Virginia plan.[173] In this way, the disqualification
became incorporated into the first draft of the Constitution, prepared
by the committee of detail.[174]
But by this time it was known that a large part of the patronage of
the government must be placed in the hands of the President; for it
had been settled that he was to appoint to all offices not otherwise
provided for, and the cases thus excepted were those of judges and
ambassadors, which stood, in this draft of the Constitution, vested in
the Senate. A strong opposition to this arrangement, however, had
already manifested itself, and the result was very likely to be,—as it
in fact turned out,—that nearly the whole of the appointments would
be made on the nomination of the President, even if the Senate
were to be empowered to confirm or reject them. Accordingly, when
this clause came under consideration, the principle of an absolute
disqualification for office was vigorously attacked, and as vigorously
defended. The inconvenience and impolicy of excluding officers of
the army and navy from the legislature; of rendering it impossible
for the executive to select a commander-in-chief from among the
members, in cases of pre-eminent fitness; of refusing seats to the
heads of executive departments; and of closing the legislature as an
avenue to other branches of the public service,—were all strenuously
urged and denied.[175] At length, a middle course became
necessary, to reconcile all opinions. By a very close vote, the
ineligibility was restrained to cases in which the office had been
created, or the emolument of it increased, during the term of
membership;[176] and a seat in the legislature was made
incompatible with any other office under the United States.[177]
Some at least of the probable sources of corruption were cut off by
these provisions. The executive can make no bargain for a vote, by
the promise of an office which has been acted upon by the member
whose vote is sought for; and there can be no body of placemen,
ready at all times to sell their votes as the price for which they are
permitted to retain their places. At the same time, the executive is
not deprived of the influence which attends the power of appointing
to offices not created, or the emoluments of which have not been
increased, by any Congress of which the person appointed has been
a member. This influence is capable of abuse; it is also capable of
being honorably and beneficially exerted. Whether it shall be
employed corruptly or honestly, for good or for bad purposes, is left
by the Constitution to the restraints of personal virtue and the
chastisements of public opinion.
A serious question, however, has been made, whether the interests
of the public service, involved in the relations of the two
departments, would not have been placed upon a better footing, if
some of the higher officers of state had been admitted to hold seats
in the legislature. Under the English constitution, there is no practical
difficulty, at least in modern times, in determining the general
principle that is to distinguish between the class of officers who can,
and those who cannot, be usefully allowed to have seats in the
House of Commons. The principle which, after much inconsistent
legislation and many abortive attempts to legislate, has generally
been acted on since the reign of George II., is, that it is both
necessary and useful to have in that House some of the higher
functionaries of the administration; but that it is not at all necessary,
and not useful, to allow the privilege of sitting in Parliament to
subordinate officers.[178] The necessity of the case arises altogether
from the peculiar relations of the ministry to the crown, and of the
latter to the Commons. If the executive government were not
admitted, through any of its members, to explain and vindicate its
measures, to advocate new grants of authority, or to defend the
prerogatives of the crown, the popular branch of the legislature
would either become the predominant power in the state, or sink
into insignificance. This is conceded by the severest writers on the
English government.
But when we pass from a civil polity which it has taken centuries to
produce, and which has had its departments adjusted much less by
reference to exact principles than by the results of their successive
struggles for supremacy over each other, and when we come to an
original distribution of powers, in the arrangements of a constitution
made entire and at once by a single act of the national will, we must
not give too much effect to analogies which after all are far from
being complete. In preparing the Constitution of the United States,
its framers had no prerogative, in any way resembling that of the
crown of England, to consider and provide for. The separate powers
to be conferred on the chief magistracy—aside from its concurrence
in legislation—were simply executive and administrative; the office
was to be elective, and not hereditary; and its functions, like those
of the legislature, were to be prescribed with all the exactness of
which a written instrument is capable. There was, therefore, little of
such danger that the one department would silently or openly
encroach on the rights or usurp the powers of the other, as there is
where there exists hereditary right on the one side and customary
right on the other, and where the boundaries between the two
departments are to be traced by the aid of ancient traditions, or
collected from numerous and perhaps conflicting precedents. There
was no such necessity, therefore, as there is in England, for placing
members of the administration in the legislature, in order to
preserve the balance of the Constitution. The sole question with us
was, whether the public convenience required that the
administration should be able to act directly upon the course of
legislation. The prevailing opinion was that this was not required.
This opinion was undoubtedly formed under the fear of corruption
and the jealousy of executive power, chiefly produced—and justly
produced—by the example of what had long existed in England.
That the error, if any was committed, lay on the safer side, none can
doubt. It is possible that the chances of a corrupt influence would
not have been increased, and that the opportunities for a salutary
influence might have been enlarged,—as it is highly probable that
the convenience of communication would have been promoted,—if
some of the higher officers of state could have been allowed to hold
seats in either house of Congress. But it is difficult to see how this
could have been successfully practised, under the system of
representation and election which the framers of the Constitution
were obliged to establish: and perhaps this is a decisive answer to
the objection.[179]
Among the powers conceded by the Constitution to the legislature of
each State is that of prescribing the time, place, and manner of
holding the elections of its senators and representatives in Congress.
This provision[180] originated with the committee of detail; but, as it
was reported by them, there was no other authority reserved to
Congress itself than that of altering the regulations of the States;
and this authority extended as well to the place of choosing the
senators, as to all the other circumstances of the election.[181] In
the Convention, however, the authority of Congress was extended
beyond the alteration of State regulations, so as to embrace a power
to make rules, as well as to alter those made by the States. But the
place of choosing the senators was excepted altogether from this
restraining authority, and left to the States.[182] Mr. Madison, in his
minutes, adds the explanation, that the power of Congress to make
regulations was supplied, in order to enable them to regulate the
elections, if the States should fail or refuse to do so.[183] But the
text of the Constitution, as finally settled, gives authority to
Congress at "any time" to "make or alter such regulations"; and this
would seem to confer a power, which, when exercised, must be
paramount, whether a State regulation exists at the time or not.
There is one other peculiarity of the American legislature, of which it
is proper in this connection to give a brief account; namely, the
compensation of its members for their public services. In the plan
presented by the Virginia delegation, it was proposed that the
members of both branches should receive "liberal stipends"; but it
was not suggested whether they were to be paid by the States, or
from the national treasury. The committee of the whole determined
to adopt the latter mode of payment; and as the representation in
both branches, according to the first decision, was to be of the same
character, no reason was then suggested for making a difference in
the source of their compensation. But when the construction of the
Senate was considered in the Convention, the idea was suggested
that this body ought in some way to represent wealth; and it was
apparently under the influence of this suggestion, that, after a
refusal to provide for a payment of the senators by their States,
payment out of the national treasury was stricken from the
resolution under debate.[184] There was thus introduced into the
resolutions sent to the committee of detail, a discrepancy between
the modes of compensating the members of the two branches; for
while the members of the House were to be paid "an adequate
compensation" out of "the public treasury," the Senate were to
receive "a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public
service," but the source of payment was not designated. But when
the whole body of those resolutions had been acted on, the
character of the representation in the Senate had been settled, and
the idea of its being made a representation of wealth, in any sense,
had been rejected. The committee of detail had, therefore, in giving
effect to the decisions of the Convention, to consider merely whether
the members of the two branches should be paid by their States, or
from the national treasury; and for the purpose of making the same
provision as to both, and in order to avoid the question whether the
Constitution should establish the amount, or should leave it to be
regulated by the Congress itself, they provided that the members of
each house should receive a compensation for their services, to be
ascertained and paid by the State in which they should be chosen.
[185]

This, however, was to encounter far greater evils than it avoided. If

paid by their States, the members of the national legislature would
not only receive different compensations, but they would be directly
subjected to the prejudices, caprices, and political purposes of the
State legislatures. Whatever theory might be maintained with
respect to the relations between the representatives, in either
branch, and the State in which they were chosen, or the people of
the States, to subject one class of public servants to the power of
another class could not fail to produce the most mischievous
consequences. A large majority of the States, therefore, decided
upon payment out of the national treasury,[186] and it was finally
determined that the rate of compensation should not be fixed by the
Constitution, but should be left to be ascertained by law.[187]
Among the separate functions assigned by the Constitution to the
houses of Congress are those of presenting and trying
impeachments. An impeachment, in the report of the committee of
detail, was treated as an ordinary judicial proceeding, and was
placed within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That this was
not in all respects a suitable provision, will appear from the following
considerations. Although an impeachment may involve an inquiry
whether a crime against any positive law has been committed, yet it
is not necessarily a trial for crime; nor is there any necessity, in the
case of crimes committed by public officers, for the institution of any
special proceeding for the infliction of the punishment prescribed by
the laws, since they, like all other persons, are amenable to the
ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of justice, in respect of offences
against positive law. The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly
beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The object
of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a
public officer from office. Such a cause may be found in the fact,
that, either in the discharge of his office, or aside from its functions,
he has violated a law, or committed what is technically denominated
a crime. But a cause for removal from office may exist, where no
offence against positive law has been committed, as where the
individual has, from immorality or imbecility or maleadministration,
become unfit to exercise the office. The rules by which an
impeachment is to be determined are therefore peculiar, and are not
fully embraced by those principles or provisions of law which courts
of ordinary jurisdiction are required to administer.
From considerations of this kind, especially when applied to the
impeachment of a President of the United States, the Convention
found it expedient to place the trial in the Senate. In fact, the whole
subject of impeachments, as finally settled in the Constitution,
received its impress in a great degree from the attention that was
paid to the bearing of this power upon the executive. Few members
of the Convention were willing to constitute a single executive, with
such powers as were proposed to be given to the President, without
subjecting him to removal from office on impeachment; and when it
was perceived to be necessary to confer upon him the appointment
of the judges, it became equally necessary to provide some other
tribunal than the Supreme Court for the trial of his impeachment.
There was no other body already provided for in the government,
with whom this jurisdiction could be lodged, excepting the Senate;
and the only alternative to this plan was to create a special tribunal
for the sole purpose of trying impeachments of the President and
other officers. This was justly deemed a manifest inconvenience; and
although there were various theoretical objections suggested against
placing the trial in the Senate, on the question being stated there
were found to be but two dissentient States.[188] This point having
been settled, in relation to impeachments of the President, the trial
of impeachments of all other civil officers of the United States was,
for the sake of uniformity, also confided to the Senate.[189] The
power of impeachment was confined, as originally proposed, to the
House of Representatives.[190]
The number of members of each house that should be made a
quorum for the transaction of business gave rise to a good deal of
difference of opinion. The controlling reason why a smaller number
than a majority of the members of each house should not be
permitted to make laws, was to be found in the extent of the
country and the diversity of its interests. The central States, it was
said, could always have their members present with more
convenience than the distant States; and after some discussion, it
was determined to establish a majority of each house as its quorum
for the transaction of business, giving to a smaller number power to
adjourn from day to day, and to compel the attendance of absent
members.[191]
Provisions making each house the judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members; that for any speech, or
debate in either house no member shall be questioned in any other
place; and that in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the
peace, the members shall be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at, and in going to and returning from, the sessions of
their respective houses,—were agreed to without any dissent.[192]
The power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings,
to punish its members for disorderly behavior, and to expel with the
concurrence of two thirds, was agreed to with general assent.[193]
Each house was also directed to keep a journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time to publish the same, excepting such parts as
may in their judgment require secrecy; and one fifth of the members
present in either house were empowered to require the yeas and
nays to be entered on its journal.[194]
The report of the committee of detail had made no provision for
such an officer as the Vice-President of the United States, and had
therefore declared that the Senate, as well as the House, should
choose its own presiding officer. This feature of their report received
the sanction of the Convention; but subsequently, when it became
necessary to create an officer to succeed the President of the United
States, in case of death, resignation, or removal from office, the plan
was adopted of making the former ex officio the presiding officer of
the Senate, giving him a vote only in cases where the votes of the
members are equally divided.[195] To this was added the further
provision, that the Senate shall choose, besides all its other officers,
a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or
when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.
[196] The House of Representatives were empowered to choose their

own Speaker, and other officers, as originally proposed.[197]

The mode in which laws were to be enacted was the last topic
concerning the action of the legislature which required to be dealt
with in the Constitution. The principle had been already settled, that
the negative of the President should arrest the passage of a law,
unless, after he had refused his concurrence, it should be passed by
two thirds of the members of each house. In order to give effect to
this principle, the committee of detail made the following
regulations, which were adopted into the Constitution;—that every
bill, which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it become
a law, be presented to the President of the United States; that, if he
approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his
objections, to the house in which it originated, who shall enter the
objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it;
that if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house agree to
pass the bill, it is to be sent with the objections to the other house,
by which it is likewise to be reconsidered, and, if approved by two
thirds of that house, it is to become a law; but in all such cases, the
votes of both houses are to be determined by yeas and nays entered
upon the journal. If any bill be not returned by the President within
ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him, it is
to become a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by adjourning prevent its return, in which case it is not to
become a law. All orders, resolutions, and votes to which the
concurrence of both houses is necessary, (except on a question of
adjournment,) are subject to these provisions.[198]
The two important differences between the negative thus vested in
the President of the United States and that which belongs to the
King of England are, that the former is a qualified, while the latter is
an absolute, power to arrest the passage of a law; and that the one
is required to render to the legislature the reasons for his refusal to
approve a bill, while the latter renders no reasons, but simply
answers that he will advise of the matter, which is the parliamentary
form of signifying a refusal to approve. The provision in our
Constitution which requires the President to communicate to the
legislature his objections to a bill, was rendered necessary by the
power conferred upon two thirds of both houses to make it a law,
notwithstanding his refusal to sign it. By this power, which makes
the negative of the President a qualified one only, the framers of the
Constitution intended that the two houses should take into
consideration the objections which may have led the President to
withhold his assent, and that his assent should be dispensed with, if,
notwithstanding those objections, two thirds of both houses should
still approve of the measure. These provisions, therefore, on the one
hand, give to the President a real participation in acts of legislation,
and impose upon him a real responsibility for the measures to which
he gives his official approval, while they give him an important
influence over the final action of the legislature upon those which he
refuses to sanction; and, on the other hand, they establish a wide
distinction between his negative and that of the King in England.
The latter has none but an absolute "veto"; if he refuse to sign a bill,
it cannot become a law; and it is well understood, that it is on
account of this absolute effect of the refusal, that this prerogative
has been wholly disused since the reign of William III., and that the
practice has grown up of signifying, through the ministry, the
previous opposition of the executive, if any exists, while the measure
is under discussion in Parliament. It is not needful to consider here
which mode of legislation is theoretically or practically the best. It is
sufficient to notice the fact, that the absence from our system of
official and responsible advisers of the President, having seats in the
legislature, renders it impracticable to signify his views of a measure,
while it is under the consideration of either house. For this reason,
and because the President himself is responsible to the people for
his official acts, and in order to accompany that responsibility with
the requisite power both to act upon reasons and to render them,
our Constitution has vested in him this peculiar and qualified
negative.[199]
The remaining topic that demands our inquiries, respecting the
legislature, relates to the place of its meeting. The Confederation
was a government without a capitol, or a seat; a want which
seriously impaired its dignity and its efficiency, and subjected it to
great inconveniences; at the same time, it was unable to supply the
defect. Its Congress, following the example of their predecessors,
had continued to assemble at Philadelphia, until June, 1783; when,
as we have already seen, in consequence of a mutiny by some of
the federal troops stationed in that neighborhood, against which the
local authorities failed to protect them, they left that city, and
reassembled at Princeton, in the State of New Jersey, in the halls of
a college.[200] There, in the following October, a resolution was
passed, directing that buildings for the use of Congress should be
erected at some suitable place near the falls of the Delaware; for
which the right of soil and an exclusive jurisdiction should be
obtained.[201] But this was entirely unsatisfactory to the Southern
States. They complained that the place selected was not central, was
unfavorable to the Union, and unjust to them. They endeavored to
procure a reconsideration of the vote, but without success.[202]
Several days were then consumed in fruitless efforts to agree on a
temporary residence; and at length it became apparent that there
was no prospect of a general assent to any one place, either for a
temporary or for a permanent seat. The plan of a single residence
was then changed, and a resolution was passed, providing for an
alternate residence at two places, by directing that buildings for the
use of Congress, and a federal town, should also be erected at or
near the lower falls of the Potomac, or Georgetown; and that until
both places, that on the Delaware and that on the Potomac, were
ready for their reception, Congress should sit alternately, for equal
periods of not more than one year and not less than six months, at
Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey, and at Annapolis, the
capital of the State of Maryland. The President was thereupon
directed to adjourn the Congress, on the 12th of the following
November, to meet at Annapolis on the 26th, for the despatch of
business. Thither they accordingly repaired, and there they
continued to sit until June 3, 1784. A recess followed, during which a
committee of the States sat, until Congress reassembled at Trenton,
on the 30th of the following October.
At Trenton, the accommodations appear to have been altogether
insufficient, and the States of South Carolina and Pennsylvania
proposed to adjourn from that place.[203] The plan of two capitols in
different places was then rescinded,[204] and an ordinance was
passed, for the appointment of commissioners to establish a seat of
government on the banks of the Delaware, at some point within
eight miles above or below the lower falls of that river. Until the
necessary buildings should be ready for their reception, the
ordinance provided that Congress should sit at the city of New York.
[205] When assembled there in January, 1785, they received and
accepted from the corporation an offer of the use of the City Hall;
and in that building they continued to hold their sessions until after
the adoption of the Constitution.[206]
It does not appear that any steps were taken under the ordinance of
1784, or under any of the previous resolutions, for the establishment
of a federal town and a seat of government at any of the places
designated. Whether the Congress felt the want of constitutional
power to carry out their project, or whether the want of means, or a
difficulty in obtaining a suitable grant of the soil and jurisdiction, was
the real impediment, there are now no means of determining. It
seems quite probable, however, that, after their removal to the city
of New York, they found themselves much better placed than they or
their predecessors had ever been elsewhere; and as the discussions
respecting a total revision of the federal system soon afterwards
began to agitate the public mind, the plan of establishing a seat for
the accommodation of the old government was naturally postponed.
The plan itself, on paper, was a bold and magnificent one. It
contemplated a district not less than two and not more than three
miles square, with a "federal house" for the use of Congress;
suitable buildings for the executive departments; official residences
for the president and secretary of Congress, and the secretaries of
foreign affairs, of war, of the marine, and the officers of the
treasury; besides hotels to be erected and owned by the States as
residences for their delegates. But, for this fine scheme of a federal
metropolis, an appropriation was made, which, even in those days,
one might suppose, would scarcely have paid for the land required.
The commissioners who were to purchase the site, lay out the town,
and contract for the erection and completion of all the public
edifices,—excepting those which were to belong to the States,—"in
an elegant manner," were authorized to draw on the federal treasury
for a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, for the
whole of these purposes. If we are to understand it to have been
really expected and intended that this sum should defray the cost of
this undertaking, we must either be amused by the modest
requirements of the Union at that day, or stand amazed at the
strides it has since taken in its onward career of prosperity and
power. From the porticos of that magnificent Capitol whose domes
overhang the Potomac, the eye now looks down upon a city, in
which, at a cost of many millions, provision has been made for the
central functions of a government, whose daily expenditure exceeds
the entire sum appropriated for the establishment of the necessary
public buildings and official residences seventy years ago.
In truth, however, there is not much reason to suppose that the
Congress of the Confederation seriously contemplated the
establishment of a federal city. They were too feeble for such an
undertaking. They could pass resolutions and ordinances for the
purpose, and send them to the authorities of the States;—and if a
more decent attention to the wants and dignity of the federal body
was excited, it was well, and was probably the effect principally
intended. If they had actually proceeded to do what their resolution
of 1783 proposed,—to acquire the jurisdiction, as well as the right of
soil, over a tract of land,—they must have encountered a serious
obstacle in the want of constitutional power. This difficulty seems to
have been felt at a later period; for the ordinance of 1784 only
directs a purchase of the land, and is silent upon the subject of
municipal jurisdiction. It is fortunate, too, on all accounts, that the
design was never executed, if it was seriously entertained. The
presence of Congress in the city of New York, where the legislature
of the State was also sitting, in the winter of 1787, enabled Hamilton
to carry those measures in both bodies, which led immediately to
the summoning of the national Convention.[207] And it was
especially fortunate that this whole subject came before the
Convention unembarrassed with a previous choice of place by the
old Congress, or with any steps concerning municipal jurisdiction
which they might have taken, or omitted.
For it was no easy matter, in the temper of the public mind existing
from 1783 to 1788, to determine where the seat of the federal, or
that of the national government, ought to be placed. The Convention
found this an unsettled question, and they wisely determined to
leave it so. The cities of New York and Philadelphia had wishes and
expectations, and it was quite expedient that the Constitution should
neither decide between them, nor decide against both of them. It
was equally important that it should not direct whether the seat of
the national government should be placed at any of the other
commercial cities, or at the capital or within the jurisdiction of any
State, or in a district to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
United States. These were grave questions, which involved the
general interests of the Union; but however settled, they would cost
the Constitution, in some quarter or other, a great deal of the
support that it required, if determined before it went into operation.
[208] Temporarily, however, the new government must be placed
somewhere within the limits of a State, and at one of the principal
cities; and as the Congress then sitting at New York would probably
invite their successors to assemble there, it became necessary to
provide for a future removal, when the time should arrive for a
general agreement on the various and delicate questions involved.
The difference of structure, however, between the two branches of
the proposed Congress, and the difference of interests that might
predominate in each, made a disagreement on these questions
probable, if not inevitable; and a disagreement on the place of their
future sessions, if accompanied by power to sit in separate places,
would be fatal to the peace of the Union and the operation of the
government.
The committee of detail, therefore, inserted in their draft a clause
prohibiting either house, without the consent of the other, from
adjourning for more than three days, or to any other place than that
at which the Congress might be sitting. Mr. King expressed an
apprehension that this implied an authority in both houses to
adjourn to any place; and as a frequent change of place had
dishonored the federal government, he thought that a law, at least,
should be made necessary for a removal. Mr. Madison considered a
central position would be so necessary, and that it would be so
strongly demanded by the House of Representatives, that a removal
from the place of their first session would be extorted, even if a law
were required for it. But there was a fear that, if the government
were once established at the city of New York, it would never be
removed if a law were made necessary. The provision reported by
the committee was therefore retained, and it was left in the power
of the two houses alone, during a session of Congress, to adjourn to
any place, or to any time, on which they might agree.[209]
Still it was needful that the Constitution should empower the
legislature to establish a seat of government out of the jurisdiction of
any of the States, and away from any of their cities. The time might
come when this question could be satisfactorily met. The time would
certainly come, when the people of the whole Union could see that
the dignity, the independence, and the purity of the government
would require that it should be under no local influences; when
every citizen of the United States, called to take part in the functions
of that government, ought to be able to feel that he and his would
owe their protection to no power, save that of the Union itself. Some
disadvantage, doubtless, might be experienced, in placing the
government away from the great centres of commerce. But neither
of the principal seats of wealth and refinement was very near to the
centre of the Union; and if either of them had been, the necessity
for an exclusive local jurisdiction would probably be found, after the
adoption of the Constitution, to outweigh all other considerations.
Accordingly, when the Constitution was revised for the purpose of
supplying the needful provisions omitted in its preparation, it was
determined that no peremptory direction on the subject of a seat of
government should be given to the legislature; but that power
should be conferred on Congress to exercise an exclusive legislation,
in all cases, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as
might, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of
Congress, become the seat of government of the United States. This
provision has made the Congress of the United States the exclusive
sovereign of the District of Columbia, which it governs in its capacity
of the legislature of the Union. It enabled Washington to found the
city which bears his name; towards which, whatever may be the
claims of local attachment, every American who can discern the
connection between the honor, the renown, and the welfare of his
country, and the dignity, convenience, and safety of its government,
must turn with affection and pride.
With respect to a regular time of meeting, no instructions had been
given to the committee of detail; but they inserted in their draft of
the Constitution a clause which required the legislature to assemble
on the first Monday of December in every year. There was, however,
a great difference of opinion as to the expediency of designating any
time in the Constitution, and as to the particular period adopted in
the report. But as it was generally agreed that Congress ought to
assemble annually, the provision which now stands in the
Constitution, which requires annual sessions, and establishes the
first Monday in December as the time of their commencement,
unless a different day shall be appointed by law, was adopted as a
compromise of different views.[210]
 CHAPTER X
Report of the Committee of Detail, continued.—The Powers of
Congress.—The Grand Compromises of the Constitution respecting
Commerce, Exports, and the Slave-Trade.

In the examination which has thus far been made of the process of
forming the Constitution, the reader will have noticed the absence of
any express provisions concerning the regulation of commerce, and
the obtaining of revenues. A system of government had been
framed, embracing a national legislature, in which the mode of
representation alone had been determined with precision. The
powers of this legislature had been described only in very general
terms. It was to have "the legislative rights vested in Congress by
the Confederation," and the power "to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States
were separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."
It might undoubtedly have been considered that, as the want of a
power in the Confederation to make uniform commercial regulations
affecting the foreign and domestic relations of the States was one of
the principal causes of the assembling of this Convention, such a
power was implied in the terms of the resolution, which had
declared the general principles on which the authority of the national
legislature ought to be regulated. Still, it remained to be determined
what kind of regulation of commerce was required by "the general
interests of the Union," or how far the States were incompetent, by
their separate legislation, to deal with the interests of commerce so
as to promote "the harmony of the United States." In the same way,
a power to obtain revenues might be implied on the same general
principles. But whether the commercial power foreshadowed in
these broad declarations was to be limited or unlimited; whether
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