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 Introduction to Logic
ird Edition

Michael Genesereth
Stanford University

Eric J. Kao
VMware, Inc.

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE #8

M
&C Morgan & cLaypool publishers
 Copyright © 2017 by Morgan & Claypool

Introduction to Logic, ird Edition

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao
www.morganclaypool.com

ISBN: 9781627056366 paperback

ISBN: 9781627059992 ebook

DOI 10.2200/S00734ED2V01Y201609CSL008

A Publication in the Morgan & Claypool Publishers series

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE

Lecture #8
Series ISSN
Synthesis Lectures on Computer Science
Print 1932-1228 Electronic 1932-1686
ABSTRACT
is book is a gentle but rigorous introduction to Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use
at the college level. However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it
can be used at the start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
e approach to teaching logic used here emerged from more than 20 years of teaching
logic to students at Stanford University and from teaching logic to tens of thousands of others
via online courses on the World Wide Web. e approach differs from that taken by other books
in logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content, the other with form.
Like many other books on logic, this one covers logical syntax and semantics and proof
theory plus induction. However, unlike other books, this book begins with Herbrand semantics
rather than the more traditional Tarskian semantics. is approach makes the material consider-
ably easier for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what logic
is all about.
In addition to this text, there are online exercises (with automated grading), online logic
tools and applications, online videos of lectures, and an online forum for discussion. ey are
available at
http://intrologic.stanford.edu//.

KEYWORDS
Formal Logic, Symbolic Logic, Propositional Logic, Herbrand Logic, Relational
Logic, deduction, reasoning, Artificial Intelligence
 Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Possible Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Logical Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Logical Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8 Reading Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Example–Natural Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Example–Digital Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 Logical Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Logical Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Logical Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Connections Between Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4 Propositional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Linear Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Hypothetical Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.5 Reasoning Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.6 Soundness And Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5 Propositional Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.5 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6 Relational Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.6 Example–Sorority World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.7 Example–Blocks World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.8 Example–Modular Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.9 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.10 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.11 Relational Logic and Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.12 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

7 Relational Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Truth Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3 Semantic Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.4 Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.5 Non-Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8 Relational Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.5 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

9 Herbrand Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.2 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.3 Evaluation and Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.4 Example–Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.5 Example–Linked Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.6 Example–Pseudo English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
9.7 Example–Metalevel Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
9.8 Undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

10 Herbrand Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
10.2 Non-Compactness and Incompleteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

11 Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.2 Domain Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
11.3 Linear Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11.4 Tree Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
11.5 Structural Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.6 Multidimensional Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
11.7 Embedded Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
11.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

12 Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.3 Unification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.4 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
12.5 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
12.6 Unsatisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12.7 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
12.8 Answer Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
12.9 Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
12.10 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
 Preface
is book is a first course in Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use at the college level.
However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it can be used at the
start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
ere are just two prerequisites. e book presumes that the student understands sets and
set operations, such as union, intersection, and so forth. It also presumes that the student is
comfortable with symbolic manipulation, as used, for example, in solving high-school algebra
problems. Nothing else is required.
e approach to teaching Logic used here emerged from more than 10 years of experience
in teaching the logical foundations of Artificial Intelligence and more than 20 years of experience
in teaching Logic for Computer Scientists. e result of this experience is an approach that differs
from that taken by other books in Logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content,
the other with form.
e primary difference in content concerns that semantics of the logic that is taught. Like
many other books on Logic, this one covers first-order syntax and first-order proof theory plus
induction. However, unlike other books, this book starts with Herbrand semantics rather than
the more traditional Tarskian semantics.
In Tarskian semantics, we define an interpretation as a universe of discourse together with
a function (1) that maps the object constants of our language to objects in a universe of discourse
and (2) that maps relation constants to relations on that universe. We define variable assignments
as assignments to variables. We define the semantics of quantified expressions as variations on
variable assignments, saying, for example, that a universally quantified sentence is true for a given
interpretation if and only if it is true for every variation of the given variable assignment. It is a
mouthful to say and even harder for students to understand.
In Herbrand semantics, we start with the object constants, function constants, and relation
constants of our language; we define the Herbrand base (i.e. the set of all ground atoms that can be
formed from these components); and we define a model to be an arbitrary subset of the Herbrand
base. at is all. In Herbrand semantics, an arbitrary logical sentence is logically equivalent to the
set of all of its instances. A universally quantified sentence is true if and only if all of its instances
are true. ere are no interpretations and no variable assignments and no variations of variable
assignments.
Although both approaches ultimately end up with the same deductive mechanism, we get
there in two different ways. Deciding to use Herbrand semantics was not an easy to choice to
make. It took years to get the material right and, even then, it took years to use it in teaching
Logic. Although there are some slight disadvantages to this approach, experience suggests that
the advantages significantly outweigh those disadvantages. is approach is considerably easier
for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what Logic is all
about. at said, there are some differences between Herbrand semantics and Tarskian semantics
that some educators and theoreticians may find worrisome.
First of all, Herbrand semantics is not compact—there are infinite sets of sentences that
are inconsistent while every finite subset is consistent. e upshot of this is that there are infi-
nite sets of sentences where we cannot demonstrate unsatisfiability with a finite argument within
the language itself. Fortunately, this does not cause any practical difficulties, since in all cases of
practical interest we are working with finite sets of premises.
One significant deficiency of Herbrand semantics vis a vis Tarskian semantics is that with
Herbrand semantics there are restrictions on the cardinality of the worlds that can be axioma-
tized. Since there is no external universe, the cardinality of the structures that can be axiomatized
is equal to the number of ground terms in the language. (To make things easy, we can always
choose a countable language. We can even choose an uncountable language, though doing so
would ruin some of the nice properties of the logic. On the positive side, it is worth noting that in
many practical applications we do not care about uncountable sets. Although there are uncount-
ably many real numbers, remember that there are only countably many floating point numbers.)
More significantly, recall that the Lowenheim-Skolem eorem for Tarskian semantics assures
us that even with Tarskian semantics we cannot write sentences that distinguish models of dif-
ferent infinite cardinalities. So, it is unclear whether this restriction has any real significance for
the vast majority of students.
Herbrand semantics shares most important properties with Tarskian semantics. In the ab-
sence of function constants, the deductive calculus is complete for all finite axiomatizations. In
fact, the calculus derives the exact same set of sentences. When we add functions, we lose this
nice property. However, we get some interesting benefits in return. For one, it is possible with
Herbrand semantics (with functions) to finitely axiomatize arithmetic. As we know from Godel,
this is not possible in a first-order language with Tarskian semantics. e downside is that we
lose completeness. However, it is nice to know that we can at least define things, even though
we cannot prove them. Moreover, as mentioned above, we do not actually lose any consequences
that we are able to deduce with Tarskian semantics.
at’s all for what makes the content of this book different from other books. ere is also
a difference in form. In addition to the text of the book in print and online, there are also online
exercises (with automated grading), some online Logic tools and applications, online videos of
lectures, and an online forum for discussion.
e online offering of the course began with an experimental version early in the 2000s.
While it was moderately successful, we were at that time unable to combine the online mate-
rials and tools and grading program with videos and an online forum, and so we discontinued
the experiment. Recently, it was revived when Sebastian run, Daphne Koller, and Andrew Ng
created technologies for comprehensive offering online courses and began offering highly suc-
cessful online courses of their own. With their technology and the previous materials, it was easy
to create a comprehensive online course in Logic. And this led to completion of this book.
anks also to Pat Suppes, Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, David-Barker Plummer, and
others at the Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information for their pioneering
work on online education in Logic. Language, Proof, and Logic (LPL) in particular is a wonder-
ful introduction to Logic and is widely used around the world. Although there are differences
between that volume and this one in theory (especially semantics) and implementation (notably
the use here of browser-based exercises and applications), this volume is in many ways similar to
LPL. In particular, this volume shamelessly copies the LPL tactic of using online worlds (like
Tarski’s World) as a teaching tool for Logic.
And thanks as well to the thousands of students who over the years have had to endure early
versions of this material, in many cases helping to get it right by suffering through experiments
that were not always successful. It is a testament to the intelligence of these students that they
seem to have learned the material despite multiple bumbling mistakes on our part. eir patience
and constructive comments were invaluable in helping us to understand what works and what
does not.
Finally, we need to acknowledge the enormous contributions of a former graduate
student—Tim Hinrichs. He is a co-discoverer of many of the results about Herbrand seman-
tics, without which this book would not have been written.

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao

October 2016
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Logic is one of the oldest intellectual disciplines in human history. It dates back to Aristotle. It
has been studied through the centuries by people like Leibniz, Boole, Russell, Turing, and many
others. And it is still a subject of active investigation today.
We use Logic in just about everything we do. We use the language of Logic to state observa-
tions, to define concepts, and to formalize theories. We use logical reasoning to derive conclusions
from these bits of information. We use logical proofs to convince others of our conclusions.
And we are not alone! Logic is increasingly being used by computers—to prove mathemat-
ical theorems, to validate engineering designs, to diagnose failures, to encode and analyze laws
and regulations and business rules.
Logic is also becoming more common at the interface between man and machine, in “logic-
enabled” computer systems, where users can view and edit logical sentences. ink, for example,
about email readers that allow users to write rules to manage incoming mail messages—deleting
some, moving others to various mailboxes, and so forth based on properties of those messages.
In the business world, eCommerce systems allow companies to encode price rules based on the
product, the customer, the date, and so forth.
Moreover, Logic is sometimes used not just by users in communicating with computer
systems but by software engineers in building those systems (using a programming methodology
known as logic programming ).
is chapter is an overview of Logic as presented in this book. We start with a discussion of
possible worlds and illustrate the notion in an application area known as Sorority World. We then
give an informal introduction to the key elements of Logic—logical sentences, logical entailment,
and logical proofs. We then talk about the value of using a formal language for expressing logical
information instead of natural language. Finally, we discuss the automation of logical reasoning
and some of the computer applications that this makes possible.

1.2 POSSIBLE WORLDS

Consider the interpersonal relations of a small sorority. ere are just four members—Abby, Bess,
Cody, and Dana. Some of the girls like each other, but some do not.
Figure 1.1 shows one set of possibilities. e checkmark in the first row here means that
Abby likes Cody, while the absence of a checkmark means that Abby does not like the other girls
(including herself ). Bess likes Cody too. Cody likes everyone but herself. And Dana also likes the
popular Cody.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü

Figure 1.1: One state of Sorority World.

Of course, this is not the only possible state of affairs. Figure 1.2 shows another possible
world. In this world, every girl likes exactly two other girls, and every girl is liked by just two girls.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü ü

Cody ü ü

Dana ü ü

Figure 1.2: Another state of Sorority World.

 As it turns out, there are quite a few possibilities. Given four girls, there are sixteen possible
instances of the likes relation—Abby likes Abby, Abby likes Bess, Abby likes Cody, Abby likes
Dana, Bess likes Abby, and so forth. Each of these sixteen can be either true or false. ere are
216 (65,536) possible combinations of these true-false possibilities, and so there are 216 possible
worlds.

1.3 LOGICAL SENTENCES

Let’s assume that we do not know the likes and dislikes of the girls ourselves but we have infor-
mants who are willing to tell us about them. Each informant knows a little about the likes and
dislikes of the girls, but no one knows everything.
Here is where Logic comes in. By writing logical sentences, each informant can express
exactly what he or she knows—no more, no less. For our part, we can use the sentences we have
been told to draw conclusions that are logically entailed by those sentences. And we can use logical
proofs to explain our conclusions to others.
Figure 1.1 shows some logical sentences pertaining to our sorority world. e first sentence
is straightforward; it tells us directly that Dana likes Cody. e second and third sentences tell us
what is not true without saying what is true. e fourth sentence says that one condition holds or
another but does not say which. e fifth sentence gives a general fact about the girls Abby likes.
e sixth sentence expresses a general fact about Cody’s likes. e last sentence says something
about everyone.

Dana likes Cody.

Abby does not like Dana.
Dana does not like Abby.
Bess likes Cody and Dana.
Abby likes everyone that Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.

Figure 1.3: Logical sentences describing Sorority World.

Sentences like these constrain the possible ways the world could be. Each sentence divides
the set of possible worlds into two subsets, those in which the sentence is true and those in which
the sentence is false. Believing a sentence is tantamount to believing that the world is in the first
set. Given two sentences, we know the world must be in the intersection of the set of worlds in
which the first sentence is true and the set of worlds in which the second sentence is true. Ideally,
when we have enough sentences, we know exactly how things stand.
Effective communication requires a language that allows us to express what we know, no
more and no less. If we know the state of the world, then we should write enough sentences to
communicate this to others. If we do not know which of various ways the world could be, we
need a language that allows us to express only what we know. e beauty of Logic is that it gives
us a means to express incomplete information when that is all we have and to express complete
information when full information is available.

1.4 LOGICAL ENTAILMENT

Logical sentences can sometimes pinpoint a specific world from among many possible worlds.
However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, a collection of sentences only partially constrains
the world. For example, there are four different worlds that satisfy the sentences in Figure 1.3,
viz. the ones shown in Figure 1.4.

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü Dana ü

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü Dana ü ü

Figure 1.4: Four states of Sorority World.

 Even though a set of sentences does not determine a unique world, it is often the case that
some sentences are true in every world that satisfies the given sentences. A sentence of this sort
is said to be a logical conclusion from the given sentences. Said the other way around, a set of
sentences logically entails a conclusion if and only if every world that satisfies the sentences also
satisfies the conclusion.
What can we conclude from the bits of information in Figure 1.3? Quite a bit, as it turns
out. For example, it must be the case that Bess likes Cody. Also, Bess does not like Dana. ere
are also some general conclusions that must be true. For example, in this world with just four
girls, we can conclude that everybody likes somebody. Also, everyone is liked by somebody.

Bess likes Cody.

Bess does not like Dana.
Everybody likes somebody.
Everybody is liked by somebody.

Figure 1.5: Conclusions about Sorority World.

One way to check whether a set of sentences logically entails a conclusion is to examine the
set of all worlds in which the given sentences are true. For example, in our case, we notice that,
in every world that satisfies our sentences, Bess likes Cody, so the statement that Bess likes Cody
is a logical conclusion from our set of sentences.

1.5 LOGICAL PROOFS

Unfortunately, determining logical entailment by checking all possible worlds is impractical in
general. ere are usually many, many possible worlds; and in some cases there can be infinitely
many.
e alternative is logical reasoning, viz. the application of reasoning rules to derive logical
conclusions and produce logical proofs, i.e., sequences of reasoning steps that leads from premises
to conclusions.
e concept of proof, in order to be meaningful, requires that we be able to recognize certain
reasoning steps as immediately obvious. In other words, we need to be familiar with the reasoning
“atoms” out of which complex proof “molecules” are built.
One of Aristotle’s great contributions to philosophy was his recognition that what makes a
step of a proof immediately obvious is its form rather than its content. It does not matter whether
you are talking about blocks or stocks or sorority girls. What matters is the structure of the facts
with which you are working. Such patterns are called rules of inference.
As an example, consider the reasoning step shown below. We know that all Accords are
Hondas, and we know that all Hondas are Japanese cars. Consequently, we can conclude that all
Accords are Japanese cars.
 All Accords are Hondas.
All Hondas are Japanese.
erefore, all Accords are Japanese.
Now consider another example. We know that all borogoves are slithy toves, and we know
that all slithy toves are mimsy. Consequently, we can conclude that all borogoves are mimsy.
What’s more, in order to reach this conclusion, we do not need to know anything about borogoves
or slithy toves or what it means to be mimsy.
All borogoves are slithy toves.
All slithy toves are mimsy.
erefore, all borogoves are mimsy.
What is interesting about these examples is that they share the same reasoning structure,
viz. the pattern shown below.
All x are y .
All y are z .
erefore, all x are z .
e existence of such reasoning patterns is fundamental in Logic but raises important ques-
tions. Which patterns are correct? Are there many such patterns or just a few?
Let us consider the first of these questions. Obviously, there are patterns that are just plain
wrong in the sense that they can lead to incorrect conclusions. Consider, as an example, the (faulty)
reasoning pattern shown below.
All x are y .
Some y are z .
erefore, some x are z .
Now let us take a look at an instance of this pattern. If we replace x by Toyotas and y by
cars and z by made in America, we get the following line of argument, leading to a conclusion that
happens to be correct.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are made in America.
erefore, some Toyotas are made in America.
On the other hand, if we replace x by Toyotas and y by cars and z by Porsches, we get a line
of argument leading to a conclusion that is questionable.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are Porsches.
erefore, some Toyotas are Porsches.
 What distinguishes a correct pattern from one that is incorrect is that it must *always* lead
to correct conclusions, i.e., they must be correct so long as the premises on which they are based
are correct. As we will see, this is the defining criterion for what we call deduction.
Now, it is noteworthy that there are patterns of reasoning that are sometimes useful but
do not satisfy this strict criterion. ere is inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, reasoning by
analogy, and so forth.
Induction is reasoning from the particular to the general. e example shown below illus-
trates this. If we see enough cases in which something is true and we never see a case in which it
is false, we tend to conclude that it is always true.
I have seen 1000 black ravens.
I have never seen a raven that is not black.
erefore, every raven is black.
Now try red Hondas.
Abduction is reasoning from effects to possible causes. Many things can cause an observed
result. We often tend to infer a cause even when our enumeration of possible causes is incomplete.
If there is no fuel, the car will not start.
If there is no spark, the car will not start.
ere is spark.
e car will not start.
erefore, there is no fuel.
What if the car is in a vacuum chamber?
Reasoning by analogy is reasoning in which we infer a conclusion based on similarity of
two situations, as in the following example.
e flow in a pipe is proportional to its diameter.
Wires are like pipes.
erefore, the current in a wire is proportional to diameter.
Now try price.
Of all types of reasoning, deduction is the only one that guarantees its conclusions in all
cases. It has some very special properties and holds a unique place in Logic. In this book, we
concentrate entirely on deduction and leave these other forms of reasoning to others.

1.6 FORMALIZATION
So far, we have illustrated everything with sentences in English. While natural language works
well in many circumstances, it is not without its problems. Natural language sentences can be
complex; they can be ambiguous; and failing to understand the meaning of a sentence can lead
to errors in reasoning.
 Even very simple sentences can be troublesome. Here we see two grammatically legal sen-
tences. ey are the same in all but the last word, but their structure is entirely different. In the
first, the main verb is blossoms, while in the second blossoms is a noun and the main verb is sank.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring sank.
As another example of grammatical complexity, consider the following excerpt taken from
the University of Michigan lease agreement. e sentence in this case is sufficiently long and
the grammatical structure sufficiently complex that people must often read it several times to
understand precisely what it says.

e University may terminate this lease when the Lessee, having made application and
executed this lease in advance of enrollment, is not eligible to enroll or fails to enroll in the
University or leaves the University at any time prior to the expiration of this lease, or for
violation of any provisions of this lease, or for violation of any University regulation rela-
tive to resident Halls, or for health reasons, by providing the student with written notice of
this termination 30 days prior to the effective date of termination, unless life, limb, or prop-
erty would be jeopardized, the Lessee engages in the sales of purchase of controlled substances
in violation of federal, state or local law, or the Lessee is no longer enrolled as a student,
or the Lessee engages in the use or possession of firearms, explosives, inflammable liquids,
fireworks, or other dangerous weapons within the building, or turns in a false alarm, in
which cases a maximum of 24 hours notice would be sufficient.

As an example of ambiguity, suppose I were to write the sentence ere’s a girl in the room
with a telescope. See Figure 1.6 for two possible meanings of this sentence. Am I saying that there
is a girl in a room containing a telescope? Or am I saying that there is a girl in the room and she
is holding a telescope?

Figure 1.6: ere’s a girl in the room with a telescope.

 Such complexities and ambiguities can sometimes be humorous if they lead to interpreta-
tions the author did not intend. See the examples below for some infamous newspaper headlines
with multiple interpretations. Using a formal language eliminates such unintentional ambiguities
(and, for better or worse, avoids any unintentional humor as well).

Crowds Rushing to See Pope Trample 6 to Death

Journal Star, Peoria, 1980

Scientists Grow Frog Eyes and Ears British Left Waffles On Falkland Islands
e Daily Camera, Boulder, 2000

Food Stamp Recipients Turn to Plastic Indian Ocean Talks

e Miami Herald, 1991 e Plain Dealer, 1977

Fried Chicken Cooked in Microwave Wins Trip

e Oregonian, Portland, 1981

Figure 1.7: Various newspaper headlines.

As an illustration of errors that arise in reasoning with sentences in natural language, con-
sider the following examples. In the first, we use the transitivity of the better relation to derive a
conclusion about the relative quality of champagne and soda from the relative quality of cham-
pagne and beer and the relative quality or beer and soda. So far so good.
Champagne is better than beer.
Beer is better than soda.
erefore, champagne is better than soda.
Now, consider what happens when we apply the same transitivity rule in the case illustrated
below. e form of the argument is the same as before, but the conclusion is somewhat less
believable. e problem in this case is that the use of nothing here is syntactically similar to the
use of beer in the preceding example, but in English it means something entirely different.
Bad sex is better than nothing.
Nothing is better than good sex.
erefore, bad sex is better than good sex.
Logic eliminates these difficulties through the use of a formal language for encoding infor-
mation. Given the syntax and semantics of this formal language, we can give a precise definition
for the notion of logical conclusion. Moreover, we can establish precise reasoning rules that pro-
duce all and only logical conclusions.
 In this regard, there is a strong analogy between the methods of Formal Logic and those
of high school algebra. To illustrate this analogy, consider the following algebra problem.

Xavier is three times as old as Yolanda. Xavier’s age and Yolanda’s age add up to twelve.
How old are Xavier and Yolanda?

Typically, the first step in solving such a problem is to express the information in the form
of equations. If we let x represent the age of Xavier and y represent the age of Yolanda, we can
capture the essential information of the problem as shown below.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12

Using the methods of algebra, we can then manipulate these expressions to solve the prob-
lem. First we subtract the second equation from the first.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12
4y D 12

Next, we divide each side of the resulting equation by 4 to get a value for y . en substi-
tuting back into one of the preceding equations, we get a value for x .

xD9
yD3

Now, consider the following logic problem.

If Mary loves Pat, then Mary loves Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves
Pat or Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, does Mary love Quincy?

As with the algebra problem, the first step is formalization. Let p represent the possibility
that Mary loves Pat; let q represent the possibility that Mary loves Quincy; let m represent the
possibility that it is Monday; and let r represent the possibility that it is raining.
With these abbreviations, we can represent the essential information of this problem with
the following logical sentences. e first says that p implies q , i.e., if Mary loves Pat, then Mary
loves Quincy. e second says that m and r implies p or q , i.e., if it is Monday and raining, then
Mary loves Pat or Mary loves Quincy.
 p ) q
m^r ) p_q

As with Algebra, Formal Logic defines certain operations that we can use to manipulate
expressions. e operation shown below is a variant of what is called Propositional Resolution. e
expressions above the line are the premises of the rule, and the expression below is the conclusion.
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ) q1 _ .. _ ql
r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) s1 _ ... _ sn
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ^ r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) q1 _ ... _ ql _ s1 _ ... _ sn
ere are two elaborations of this operation. (1) If a proposition on the left hand side of
one sentence is the same as a proposition on the right hand side of the other sentence, it is okay to
drop the two symbols, with the proviso that only one such pair may be dropped. (2) If a constant
is repeated on the same side of a single sentence, all but one of the occurrences can be deleted.
We can use this operation to solve the problem of Mary’s love life. Looking at the two
premises above, we notice that p occurs on the left-hand side of one sentence and the right-hand
side of the other. Consequently, we can cancel the p and thereby derive the conclusion that, if is
Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy or Mary loves Quincy.
p ) q
m^r ) p_q
m^r ) q_q
Dropping the repeated symbol on the right hand side, we arrive at the conclusion that, if
it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy.
m^r ) q_q
m^r ) q
is example is interesting in that it showcases our formal language for encoding logical
information. As with algebra, we use symbols to represent relevant aspects of the world in ques-
tion, and we use operators to connect these symbols in order to express information about the
things those symbols represent.
e example also introduces one of the most important operations in Formal Logic, viz.
Resolution (in this case a restricted form of Resolution). Resolution has the property of being
complete for an important class of logic problems, i.e., it is the only operation necessary to solve
any problem in the class.

1.7 AUTOMATION
e existence of a formal language for representing information and the existence of a corre-
sponding set of mechanical manipulation rules together have an important consequence, viz. the
possibility of automated reasoning using digital computers.
 e idea is simple. We use our formal representation to encode the premises of a problem
as data structures in a computer, and we program the computer to apply our mechanical rules
in a systematic way. e rules are applied until the desired conclusion is attained or until it is
determined that the desired conclusion cannot be attained. (Unfortunately, in some cases, this
determination cannot be made; and the procedure never halts. Nevertheless, as discussed in later
chapters, the idea is basically sound.)
Although the prospect of automated reasoning has achieved practical realization only in
the last few decades, it is interesting to note that the concept itself is not new. In fact, the idea of
building machines capable of logical reasoning has a long tradition.
One of the first individuals to give voice to this idea was Leibnitz. He conceived of “a
universal algebra by which all knowledge, including moral and metaphysical truths, can some day
be brought within a single deductive system.” Having already perfected a mechanical calculator
for arithmetic, he argued that, with this universal algebra, it would be possible to build a machine
capable of rendering the consequences of such a system mechanically.
Boole gave substance to this dream in the 1800s with the invention of Boolean algebra and
with the creation of a machine capable of computing accordingly.
e early twentieth century brought additional advances in Logic, notably the invention of
the predicate calculus by Russell and Whitehead and the proof of the corresponding completeness
and incompleteness theorems by Godel in the 1930s.
e advent of the digital computer in the 1940s gave increased attention to the prospects for
automated reasoning. Research in artificial intelligence led to the development of efficient algo-
rithms for logical reasoning, highlighted by Robinson’s invention of resolution theorem proving
in the 1960s.
Today, the prospect of automated reasoning has moved from the realm of possibility to that
of practicality, with the creation of logic technology in the form of automated reasoning systems,
such as Vampire, Prover9, the Prolog Technology eorem Prover, Epilog, and others.
e emergence of this technology has led to the application of logic technology in a wide
variety of areas. e following paragraphs outline some of these uses.
Mathematics. Automated reasoning programs can be used to check proofs and, in some
cases, to produce proofs or portions of proofs.
Engineering. Engineers can use the language of Logic to write specifications for their prod-
ucts and to encode their designs. Automated reasoning tools can be used to simulate designs and
in some cases validate that these designs meet their specification. Such tools can also be used to
diagnose failures and to develop testing programs.
Database Systems. By conceptualizing database tables as sets of simple sentences, it is pos-
sible to use Logic in support of database systems. For example, the language of Logic can be used
to define virtual views of data in terms of explicitly stored tables, and it can be used to encode
constraints on databases. Automated reasoning techniques can be used to compute new tables, to
detect problems, and to optimize queries.
 Data Integration e language of Logic can be used to relate the vocabulary and structure
of disparate data sources, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to integrate the data
in these sources.
Logical Spreadsheets. Logical spreadsheets generalize traditional spreadsheets to include log-
ical constraints as well as traditional arithmetic formulas. Examples of such constraints abound.
For example, in scheduling applications, we might have timing constraints or restrictions on who
can reserve which rooms. In the domain of travel reservations, we might have constraints on
adults and infants. In academic program sheets, we might have constraints on how many courses
of varying types that students must take.
Law and Business. e language of Logic can be used to encode regulations and business
rules, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to analyze such regulations for inconsis-
tency and overlap.

1.8 READING GUIDE

Although Logic is a single field of study, there is more than one logic in this field. In the three
main units of this book, we look at three different types of logic, each more sophisticated than
the one before.
Propositional Logic is the logic of propositions. Symbols in the language represent “condi-
tions” in the world, and complex sentences in the language express interrelationships among these
conditions. e primary operators are Boolean connectives, such as and, or, and not.
Relational Logic expands upon Propositional Logic by providing a means for explicitly talk-
ing about individual objects and their interrelationships (not just monolithic conditions). In order
to do so, we expand our language to include object constants and relation constants, variables and
quantifiers.
Herbrand Logic takes us one step further by providing a means for describing worlds with
infinitely many objects. e resulting logic is much more powerful than Propositional Logic and
Relational Logic. Unfortunately, as we shall see, many of the nice computational properties of
the first two logics are lost as a result.
Despite their differences, there are many commonalities among these logics. In particular,
in each case, there is a language with a formal syntax and a precise semantics; there is a notion of
logical entailment; and there are legal rules for manipulating expressions in the language.
ese similarities allow us to compare the logics and to gain an appreciation of the fun-
damental tradeoff between expressiveness and computational complexity. On the one hand, the
introduction of additional linguistic complexity makes it possible to say things that cannot be
said in more restricted languages. On the other hand, the introduction of additional linguistic
flexibility has adverse effects on computability. As we proceed though the material, our attention
will range from the completely computable case of Propositional Logic to a variant that is not at
all computable.
 One final comment. In the hopes of preventing difficulties, it is worth pointing out a poten-
tial source of confusion. is book exists in the meta world. It contains sentences about sentences;
it contains proofs about proofs. In some places, we use similar mathematical symbology both for
sentences in Logic and sentences about Logic. Wherever possible, we try to be clear about this
distinction, but the potential for confusion remains. Unfortunately, this comes with the territory.
We are using Logic to study Logic. It is our most powerful intellectual tool.

RECAP
Logic is the study of information encoded in the form of logical sentences. Each logical sentence
divides the set of all possible world into two subsets—the set of worlds in which the sentence
is true and the set of worlds in which the set of sentences is false. A set of premises logically
entails a conclusion if and only if the conclusion is true in every world in which all of the premises
are true. Deduction is a form of symbolic reasoning that produces conclusions that are logically
entailed by premises (distinguishing it from other forms of reasoning, such as induction, abduction,
and analogical reasoning ). A proof is a sequence of simple, more-or-less obvious deductive steps
that justifies a conclusion that may not be immediately obvious from given premises. In Logic, we
usually encode logical information as sentences in formal languages; and we use rules of inference
appropriate to these languages. Such formal representations and methods are useful for us to use
ourselves. Moreover, they allow us to automate the process of deduction, though the computability
of such implementations varies with the complexity of the sentences involved.

1.9 EXERCISES
1.1. Consider the state of the Sorority World depicted below.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü
 For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is true in this state of the world.
(a) Abby likes Dana.
(b) Dana does not like Abby.
(c) Abby likes Cody or Dana.
(d ) Abby likes someone who likes her.
(e) Somebody likes everybody.
1.2. Come up with a table of likes and dislikes for the Sorority World that makes all of the
following sentences true. Note that there is more than one such table.
Dana likes Cody.
Abby does not like Dana.
Bess likes Cody or Dana.
Abby likes everyone whom Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.
1.3. Consider a set of Sorority World premises that are true in the four states of Sorority
World shown in Figure 1.4. For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is
logically entailed by these premises.
(a) Abby likes Bess or Bess likes Abby.
(b) Somebody likes herself.
(c) Everybody likes somebody.
1.4. Say whether or not the following reasoning patterns are logically correct.
(a) All x are z . All y are z . erefore, some x are y .
(b) Some x are y . All y are z . erefore, some x are z .
(c) All x are y . Some y are z . erefore, some x are z .
 CHAPTER 2

Propositional Logic
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Propositional Logic is concerned with propositions and their interrelationships. e notion of a
proposition here cannot be defined precisely. Roughly speaking, a proposition is a possible condi-
tion of the world that is either true or false, e.g., the possibility that it is raining, the possibility
that it is cloudy, and so forth. e condition need not be true in order for it to be a proposition.
In fact, we might want to say that it is false or that it is true if some other proposition is true.
In this chapter, we first look at the syntactic rules that define the language of Propositional
Logic. We then introduce the notion of a truth assignment and use it to define the meaning
of Propositional Logic sentences. After that, we present a mechanical method for evaluating
sentences for a given truth assignment, and we present a mechanical method for finding truth
assignments that satisfy sentences. We conclude with some examples of Propositional Logic in
formalizing Natural Language and Digital Circuits.

2.2 SYNTAX
In Propositional Logic, there are two types of sentences—simple sentences and compound sen-
tences. Simple sentences express simple facts about the world. Compound sentences express log-
ical relationships between the simpler sentences of which they are composed.
Simple sentences in Propositional Logic are often called proposition constants or, sometimes,
logical constants. In what follows, we write proposition constants as strings of letters, digits, and
underscores (“_”), where the first character is a lower case letter. For example, raining is a propo-
sition constant, as are rAiNiNg, r32aining, and raining_or_snowing. Raining is not a proposition
constant because it begins with an upper case character. 324567 fails because it begins with a
number. raining-or-snowing fails because it contains hyphens (instead of underscores).
Compound sentences are formed from simpler sentences and express relationships among the
constituent sentences. ere are five types of compound sentences, viz. negations, conjunctions,
disjunctions, implications, and biconditionals.
A negation consists of the negation operator : and an arbitrary sentence, called the target.
For example, given the sentence p , we can form the negation of p as shown below.

(:p )
 A conjunction is a sequence of sentences separated by occurrences of the ^ operator and
enclosed in parentheses, as shown below. e constituent sentences are called conjuncts. For ex-
ample, we can form the conjunction of p and q as follows.

(p ^ q )

A disjunction is a sequence of sentences separated by occurrences of the _ operator and

enclosed in parentheses. e constituent sentences are called disjuncts. For example, we can form
the disjunction of p and q as follows.

(p _ q )

An implication consists of a pair of sentences separated by the ) operator and enclosed in

parentheses. e sentence to the left of the operator is called the antecedent, and the sentence to
the right is called the consequent. e implication of p and q is shown below.

(p ) q )

A biconditional is a combination of an implication and a reverse implication. For example,

we can express the biconditional of p and q as shown below.

(p , q )

Note that the constituent sentences within any compound sentence can be either simple
sentences or compound sentences or a mixture of the two. For example, the following is a legal
compound sentence.

((p _ q ) ) r )

One disadvantage of our notation, as written, is that the parentheses tend to build up and
need to be matched correctly. It would be nice if we could dispense with parentheses, e.g., sim-
plifying the preceding sentence to the one shown below.

p_q)r

Unfortunately, we cannot do without parentheses entirely, since then we would be unable

to render certain sentences unambiguously. For example, the sentence shown above could have
resulted from dropping parentheses from either of the following sentences.

((p _ q ) ) r )
(p _ (q ) r ))

e solution to this problem is the use of operator precedence. e following table gives a
hierarchy of precedences for our operators. e : operator has higher precedence than ^; ^ has
higher precedence than _; and _ has higher precedence than ) and ,.
 :
^
_
),
In sentences without parentheses, it is often the case that an expression is flanked by op-
erators, one on either side. In interpreting such sentences, the question is whether the expression
associates with the operator on its left or the one on its right. We can use precedence to make this
determination. In particular, we agree that an operand in such a situation always associates with
the operator of higher precedence. When an operand is surrounded by operators of equal prece-
dence, the operand associates to the right. e following examples show how these rules work in
various cases. e expressions on the right are the fully parenthesized versions of the expressions
on the left.
:p^q ((: p ) ^ q )
p ^ :q (p ^ (: q ))
p^q_r ((p ^ q ) _ r )
p_q^r (p _ (q ^ r ))
p)q)r (p )(q ) r ))
p)q,r (p ) (q , r ))
Note that just because precedence allows us to delete parentheses in some cases does not
mean that we can dispense with parentheses entirely. Consider the example shown earlier. Prece-
dence eliminates the ambiguity by dictating that the sentence without parentheses is an implica-
tion with a disjunction as antecedent. However, this makes for a problem for those cases when
we want to express a disjunction with an implication as a disjunct. In such cases, we must retain
at least one pair of parentheses.
We end the section with two simple definitions that are useful in discussing Propositional
Logic. A propositional vocabulary is a set of proposition constants. A propositional language is the
set of all propositional sentences that can be formed from a propositional vocabulary.

2.3 SEMANTICS
e treatment of semantics in Logic is similar to its treatment in Algebra. Algebra is unconcerned
with the real-world significance of variables. What is interesting are the relationships among the
values of the variables expressed in the equations we write. Algebraic methods are designed to
respect these relationships, independent of what the variables represent.
In a similar way, Logic is unconcerned with the real world significance of proposition con-
stants. What is interesting is the relationship among the truth values of simple sentences and the
truth values of compound sentences within which the simple sentences are contained. As with
Algebra, logical reasoning methods are independent of the significance of proposition constants;
all that matter is the form of sentences.
 Although the values assigned to proposition constants are not crucial in the sense just de-
scribed, in talking about Logic, it is sometimes useful to make truth assignments explicit and to
consider various assignments or all assignments and so forth. Such an assignment is called a truth
assignment.
Formally, a truth assignment for a propositional vocabulary is a function assigning a truth
value to each of the proposition constants of the vocabulary. In what follows, we use the digit
1 as a synonym for true and 0 as a synonym for false; and we refer to the value of a constant or
expression under a truth assignment i by superscripting the constant or expression with i as the
superscript.
e assignment shown below is an example for the case of a propositional vocabulary with
just three proposition constants, viz. p , q , and r .
pi D 1
qi D 0
ri D 1
e following assignment is another truth assignment for the same vocabulary.
pi D 0
qi D 0
ri D 1
Note that the formulas above are not themselves sentences in Propositional Logic. Proposi-
tional Logic does not allow superscripts and does not use the = symbol. Rather, these are informal,
metalevel statements about particular truth assignments. Although talking about Propositional
Logic using a notation similar to that of Propositional Logic can sometimes be confusing, it al-
lows us to convey meta-information precisely and efficiently. To minimize problems, in this book
we use such meta-notation infrequently and only when there is little chance of confusion.
Looking at the preceding truth assignments, it is important to bear in mind that, as far as
logic is concerned, any truth assignment is as good as any other. Logic itself does not fix the truth
assignment of individual proposition constants.
On the other hand, given a truth assignment for the proposition constants of a language,
logic does fix the truth assignment for all compound sentences in that language. In fact, it is
possible to determine the truth value of a compound sentence by repeatedly applying the following
rules.
If the truth value of a sentence is true, the truth value of its negation is false. If the truth
value of a sentence is false, the truth value of its negation is true.
' :'
1 0
0 1
e truth value of a conjunction is true if and only if the truth values of its conjuncts are
both true; otherwise, the truth value is false.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
platform of one of our street cars. Counsel, of course, are in wig and
gown, and if K. C.'s, in full bottomed wigs, but one may occasionally
see a litigant actually arguing his own case in propria persona. On
either side of the counsel's box is a very narrow standing place for
reporters and the public.
The court, consisting of the Lord Chancellor in gown and full
bottomed wig, and perhaps of five judges, in ordinary clothing, sit at
the floor level, and therefore considerably lower than counsel in the
elevated box. They are not placed in a row nor behind any bench or
table. On the contrary, though the presiding Lord Chancellor is vis-a-
vis to the counsel box, the others sit where they please. Sometimes
this is on the front row of benches and sometimes on one of the
higher tiers, with a foot propped up, perhaps, on the bench in front,
and their thumbs hitched to the armholes of their waist-coats, and,
necessarily, with their sides to the speaker. The members of the
court often have portable tables in front of them, piled with books
and papers. During the course of an argument they constantly
debate with each other across the House, or walk over to one of
their colleagues with some document or a book and talk of the case
audibly and perfectly freely. One may hear one of them, in a salt and
pepper suit, call across the floor to another Lord of Appeal who has
interrupted a barrister's argument, "I say, can't you give the man a
chance to say what he's got to say?"
These little circumstances show that judges and counsel in the
appellate courts of England behave as natural men without the
slightest restraint, formality or self-consciousness. Arguments are
delivered with surprising rapidity of utterance, in a conversational
tone, and with a crispness of articulation altogether delightful to the
ear. The drawling style of speech sometimes heard on the stage as
typical of a certain kind of Englishman, seems to have disappeared
in real life; it certainly is not to be found in the Courts. An American
stenographer reporting an English argument, would have to increase
his accustomed speed at least one-third.
The methods of the Divisional Court are the same as those of the
Court of Appeal, but the low limit of its jurisdiction renders it of little
interest.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—or, as it is colloquially
described by the lawyers, "The Privy Council"—is doubtless the most
interesting court in England because of the variety of the questions
there considered and owing to the fact that, geographically, the
litigations originate in nearly every quarter of the civilized world, for,
as noted above, this is the court of last resort for all of the British
Colonies. It should not be confused with the Privy Council itself—a
political adviser of the Crown—for the Judicial Committee's functions
are purely judicial and its personnel consists of the Lord Chancellor
and the other Law Lords, a few paid members, and some Ex-Colonial
Judges. Historically, indeed, it was but a sub-committee of the Privy
Council, which circumstance gives the Court its name and explains
why its judgments always conclude with the phrase that the
Committee "humbly advises His Majesty" to affirm or reverse the
judgment rendered in the Colony, instead of pronouncing the
conclusion in direct language, as do other courts.
This extraordinary body sits in a large second story chamber, not in
the least resembling a court room, of a building in Downing Street,
and rarely is there any audience other than the professional men
whose business takes them there.
Of course, most of the Colonies are equipped with their own court of
appeals—usually called the Supreme Court—but, nevertheless, an
appeal lies from their decisions to the Privy Council in certain
circumstances, although to define exactly the scope of this
jurisdiction would be too technical for present purposes.
Here are to be found, arguing their cases, lawyers from Colonies in
every corner of the globe in some of which the division of the
profession into barristers and solicitors hardly exists, or at least, the
line separating them is quite hazy—but they must all appear in wig
and gown.
Bearing in mind the fact that the Colonies of Great Britain are
scattered over the whole world and that it has always been the
policy, so far as possible, to accept the existing law of each and graft
it upon the English law system, the diversity and broadness of this
court's deliberations may be imagined.
The succession to an Indian Principality, to be determined under the
ancient law of that far Eastern land, will be followed by a question of
the legality of the adoption of a child in South Africa, to be
considered under the rules of Dutch law. The next case will,
perhaps, involve the effect upon an area much greater than that of
all England, of the diversion of a river in the Canadian North-West.
And the court may next turn its attention to the problem whether
the widow of a Scotchman who left two wills—one intended to
operate at home and the other to take effect in Australia—can take
her thirds against the will in Scotland but accept the benefits of the
other will as to property in Australia.
The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords deal with domestic
matters of the little Island, which, however important the principles
involved and however critical the issues to the litigants themselves,
seem almost petty in comparison with the broad field of the Privy
Council. Little as the average man knows of it, and rarely as it
figures in news of the day, no American lawyer can fail to perceive in
this great court something of the tremendous scope of his own
Supreme Court of the United States, to which tribunal only is the
Privy Council secondary.
 CHAPTER X
MASTERS: THE TIME SAVERS
CURRENT HEARINGS—MINOR ISSUES THRESHED OUT.

The numerous motions and interlocutory applications, supported by

affidavits and urged by argument, which consume so much of the
time of an American court, are disposed of in England by Masters—
competent barristers appointed by the Courts, who are paid salaries
of about £3,000 a year.
At a certain hour the Master takes his seat at a desk with a printed
list of "applications without counsel" or "applications with counsel."
He nods to the uniformed officer at the door who admits the
solicitors engaged in the cause which happens to be first on the list
of cases "without counsel." The solicitors stand before the Master
with a shelf upon which to rest books or papers; one side then
states its demand and the other its objection in the briefest and
most direct manner. The Master's immediate oral decision,
accompanied by imposition of the costs and a few scratches of his
pen on the back of the summons, indicates to the officer the
opening of the door to admit the next case. By actual count twenty-
seven cases may thus be disposed of in one hour and thirty-two
minutes—an average of a little more than three minutes each. Of
course there is a right of appeal, which, however, is rarely exercised.
As the door opens two solicitors hurry in. There are no salutations
nor introductory remarks and the business proceeds abruptly:

Plaintiff's solicitor: "Master, we claim £50 judgment for rent."

Master to defendant's solicitor: "Do you admit the amount?"
 Defendant's solicitor: "Yes, but we claim a set-off."
Master: (endorsing a few words on the summons) "Judgment
for rent £50 with stay of execution until counter claim is tried."
Defendant's solicitor: "If you please, Master."

This expression is the universal vernacular with which the defeated

party accepts the judgment of a master or judge in all courts. The
expression is not an interrogation but is equivalent to "as you
please."
Out they go and the next enter; here the defendant asks for delay,
and gets seven days which is endorsed on the summons and
requires a minute.
Then comes an application under "order XIV" for judgment for
£1,000. Defendant requires four days' delay.

Master: "What is the defence?"

Defendant's solicitor: "Master, I don't know—a recent agreement
has been made between the parties which I have not yet seen."
Master: "I'll give you four days, but you must pay the costs of
the adjournment; thirteen shillings and fourpence."
Defendant's solicitor: "If you please, Master."

The next summons for judgment. As this is denied, the parties agree
to try it before the Master on the following Thursday without a jury.
Then follows a summons by defendant upon plaintiff for particulars
of goods sold and delivered. Both parties are dealers in Japanese
bulbs, and the sale was made subject to arrival in England safe and
sound. The defendant demands particulars of the plaintiff as to who
were his customers. The plaintiff objects to disclosing his business
and the written summons, containing the request for particulars, is
gone over rapidly by the Master. Such parts of the request as, in his
opinion, ought not to have been demanded, because they pry into
the plaintiff's private affairs, are eliminated by a stroke of the
Master's pen and an order is made at the bottom in an abbreviated
form, imposing the costs of the summons upon the plaintiff. This
means that the plaintiff is obliged to furnish the defendant, in so
many days, all the particulars which the Master did not strike out,
and must pay the defendant the costs of the application.
A moment is consumed in giving judgment in an uncontested case
for £1,800 with costs of £8. 16s. 0d.
Then comes a breach of promise case. The defendant asks for an
order upon the plaintiff for a statement of claim and discovery of
correspondence, which is granted. As most of the witnesses are in
London, the defendant wants to try the case here, but the plaintiff
wishes to try it in Manchester where the parties live. The Master
thinks it is easier to bring two people up from Manchester than to
take a dozen down from London.
Next is a summons for directions:

Master: "Statement of claim in ten days."

Plaintiff's solicitor: "Yes, Master."
Master: "Defence in ten days."
Defendant's solicitor: "Yes, Master."
Master: "No counter claim?"
Defendant's solicitor: "No, Master."
Master: "Documents?"
Both solicitors: "Large number."
Master: "All parties in London?"
Both solicitors: "Yes."
 Master: "Any question of law?"
Both solicitors: "No."
Master: "Next case."

And he at once endorses a few words on the bottom of the

summons.
Then a defendant appears in person:

Master: "Do you owe the £26?"

Defendant: "Yes, sir."
Plaintiff's solicitor: "We only want judgment for £21 because this
morning he paid £5 on account, and he agrees to pay £3 a
week, so that we will not issue execution if he does this."
Master: "I'll give you judgment generally for £21, but you write
defendant a letter stating that you will not issue execution as
you have just stated."

Another defendant appears in person:

Defendant: "I've got no defence, all I want is time."

Plaintiff's solicitor: "We'll do nothing until Monday as we think
he means to pay."
Master: "All right, it is understood you will do nothing until
Monday."

The details of practice before these Masters would be beyond the

scope of the present writing, suffice it to say that rules have been
promulgated from time to time, and are constantly being improved
upon, having for their object the simplification of procedure, the
rapid despatch of business and the settling of all minor questions
which may arise in a case before actual trial. Thus, "Order XIV," just
referred to, enables a Master to enter judgment when the defence
averred, even if true, would not be effectual, or when the defence is
obviously frivolous, although, of course, the rights of the defendant
are preserved by the privilege of appeal, the judgment, meantime,
binding his property. Again, the "summons for directions" is to
enable the Master to give general directions as to how the parties
shall proceed, the intervals of time to be allowed for exchange of
copies of documents, taking foreign testimony and what not.
One of the cleverest contrivances in the practice before Masters is
the "tender of damages in tort without admitting liability." A
defendant may tender, say, £500. If plaintiff does not accept it, the
trial ensues—the jury, of course, being in ignorance of the tender. If
the judgment be for defendant, or for more than the tender, that is
the end of the matter. But if the judgment be for less than the
tender, a large deduction for costs is made from the judgment, and
inures to the defendant's benefit. This has enormously reduced the
volume of accident cases and has also curbed the often wildly
extravagant demands and unjust results in such actions generally
recognized as evils difficult to deal with.
In short, the system of Masters in England works admirably. It is
entirely adaptable to American courts, the details and modifications
which might prove necessary being fitted to local conditions, but in
any such adaptation, the general purpose should be kept in view,
namely, that when a case appears upon a trial list it shall have
already been pruned of all non-essential preliminary details and is
forthwith to be actually tried upon its merits; the court's time being
too precious to be expended upon the subsidiary side issues.
 CHAPTER XI
THE POLICE COURTS
CURRENT HEARINGS.

Upon arrest, a preliminary hearing is first held at a police station

where, as in most English proceedings, the testimony, with anything
the prisoner may say (after he has been warned of the consequence
of self-incrimination) is carefully reduced to longhand writing and
plays an important part at the subsequent stages of the prosecution.
The next step is the hearing before a Police Magistrate at Bow or
Marlborough Streets, or at any one of the like courts in London
which, although of minor importance, are dignified tribunals. The
court room is entered by two small doors, one for the witnesses and
audience, the other for officials and solicitors, and there is another
passage leading from the cells through which the prisoners are
brought to a dock. This dock, as in all criminal courts, is at the far
end of the room from the magistrate. The prisoner is thus isolated
and can only communicate with his solicitor, if he has been able to
retain one, by scrawling a note and passing it on to an officer.
The magistrate, appointed by the Crown or the Lord Chancellor
acting in its behalf, is almost invariably a man of standing and
repute, always a barrister, whose ready dispatch of business shows
great experience with crime, and whose kindness to the merely
unfortunate testifies to his charitableness of heart. He wears no wig
nor gown and is called in court, "Your Worship"; whereas judges of
the High Court are called in court, "My Lord," and those of the
County Courts, "Your Honor." All judges, however, are addressed in
private life as "Mr." or, if they have one, by a title. A Judge of the
High Court is always knighted on appointment and in private life is
addressed as "Mr. Justice ——" unless he is a Peer. Solicitors act for
the more important prisoners but barristers are rarely seen and
appear in ordinary street dress if at all.
The early morning run of business consists chiefly of the "drunks",
divided nearly equally as to sex, and of persons arrested for begging
and minor misbehavior. These cases are disposed of with great
rapidity.
A woman, looking very silly, and with her millinery somewhat awry,
is ushered into the dock charged with being "drunk and disorderly."

Magistrate: "Do you admit it?"

Woman: "Hi hadmit hi 'ad a little too much, but deny being
disorderly, Your Worship."
Police Constable: (sworn) "She was banging on the door of the
Black Horse at 2 A.M. screamin' for drink. I cautioned her and
then saw her repeat this at another closed 'pooblic', so I took
her in charge."
Magistrate: (To an officer with a book of records) "Is she
known?"
Officer: "No, Your Worship, she was never here before."
Magistrate: "Five shillings or five days."

As she is rapidly conducted through the passage and disappears in

the direction of the cells, one hears called from official to official the
words: "Five or five."
The next is an intelligent, elderly, but very shabby, man charged with
begging. The police officer had testified that a lady gave the prisoner
money and that he immediately entered the nearest "pooblic". The
prisoner's explanation was that he had been given the shilling
without his having asked for it, and that he had gone to the tavern
to get bread and cheese, which he greatly needed, and a glass of
beer. The magistrate rather rebuked the policeman for referring to
the visit to the public house as counting against the man, adding
that anybody had the perfect right to do as he had. Then,
addressing the prisoner, he said, kindly, that he was by no means
sure that actual solicitation by words was essential to constitute
begging and that his mere appearance was an appeal. It seemed as
though the man was about to get off, when the inevitable question
"Is he known?" brought the information that he had been in Court
upon the same charge on February 19th, on March 5th and again
the month following. The magistrate's manner quickly changed, as
he recognized an old offender, "Three months hard labor," he said,
and "three hard" was repeated like an echo down the corridor as the
prisoner slunk back to the cells.
The next was a well-dressed young man, apparently a clerk, charged
with being drunk and disorderly.

Prisoner: "It's quoite roight what the constable says."

Magistrate: "Seven shillings and sixpence or six days."
A voice down the corridor: "Seven and six or six."
 A Subject for the Police Court

After the early business, which is dispatched with great rapidity,

come the more serious cases, which, if well-founded, are to be held
for trial. An American was charged with obtaining money and goods
by false pretence. Soliciting advertisements from tradespeople for a
book intended for Americans visiting London, which never was
published; he had obtained money on account and at the same time,
procured millinery and garments for a woman whom he introduced
as his fiancée. He was represented by a barrister who would try his
case if he were held for trial. The witnesses consisted of milliners
and dressmakers who detailed the method of his operations. The
magistrate referred frequently to the memoranda of their evidence,
taken at the police station, and questioned them so as to elicit their
testimony, which he wrote down in longhand. The defendant's
barrister cross-examined and the magistrate added the substance of
the cross-examination to the deposition which was finally signed by
the witness, to be used by the trial judge as his guide, if the grand
jury should find a true bill. During the examination, one was struck
by the alacrity, and glibness of the replies, as in all London courts of
whatever degree. An American ear is impressed by the thought that
possibly these people, living in a densely packed community of five
millions, all speaking one language, are particularly facile in the use
of the mother tongue, unlike the English rustic who is apt to be
taciturn and awkward of speech. One is also struck, as in all courts,
by a certain ring of sincerity, an attitude of respect for the
administration of law and the quick and cheerful co-operation of all
concerned. The Englishman truly appears to the best advantage in
his court, where he leads the world.
If the accused be held for trial by the magistrate, the next step, as
with us, is the presentation of the charge to the grand jury. The
grand jury either throw out the indictment or find a true bill, in
which event a jury trial follows at the Central Criminal Court.
 CHAPTER XII
THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT;—THE OLD
BAILEY
CURRENT TRIALS.

At the corner of Newgate and Old Bailey streets, near Fleet street
and not far from Ludgate Hill, stands a modern building, officially
known as the Central Criminal Court, but popularly called "the Old
Bailey." It occupies the site of the ancient Newgate Gaol and Fleet
Prison, where, for nearly seven centuries the criminals of London
expiated their crimes. There they were tried and, if convicted,
hanged on the premises, or—a scarcely better fate—thrown into
Newgate Prison, which, from time immemorial, was so overcrowded,
so ill-ventilated and so poorly supplied with water that it was the
hot-bed of diseases designated as "prison fever." At a single session
of court the fever had been known to carry off fifty human beings;
not only prisoners, but such august personages as judges, mayors,
aldermen and sheriffs.
The present fine structure is exclusively a court house to which
prisoners are brought for trial and confined in sanitary cells beneath
the court rooms only while awaiting the call of their cases. There are
three courts: two presided over by judges called, respectively, the
Common Serjeant and the Recorder, together with the Lord Chief
Justice of England, or such other judge of the High Court as may be
designated for the month, who comes from his civil work in the
Strand Law Courts to try criminal cases at the Old Bailey. Each
month, also, two or three Aldermen and Sheriffs of the City of
London are scheduled for the complimentary duty of attending their
Lordships and entertaining them at luncheon.
The court rooms are rather small and nearly square. Like every
London court, they have oak panelled walls, and excellent
illumination from above by skylights; they are arranged with a high
dais—on which are the chairs and desks for the presiding judge, the
sheriffs, or for any guest—and they have the usual steep upward
slope of the benches for barristers on the one side and for the jury
on the other. Only the solicitors' table is at the floor level. This
arrangement brings all the participants in a trial more nearly
together than if they were distributed over a flat floor. At the end of
the room farthest from the judge is the prisoners' dock, a large
square box, elevated almost to the judge's level. This the prisoner
reaches by a stairway from the cells below (invisible because of the
sides of the dock), accompanied by officers, and he stands
throughout the trial—unless invited by the judge to be seated—
completely isolated from his barrister and from his solicitor and can
only communicate with his defenders by scrawling a lead pencil note
and passing it to an officer. A small area of sloping benches,
together with a very inadequate gallery, are the only
accommodations for the public.
If the visitor happens to be a guest of the Court, he will be ushered
in by a door leading to the raised dais and will sit at a desk beside
the judge. His eye will first be arrested by a small heap on his desk
of dried aromatic herbs and rose leaves and, while speculating as to
the purpose of these, he will discover similar little piles on the desks
of the presiding judge and sheriffs. He will also observe that the
carpet of the dais is thickly strewn with the same litter. Vaguely it is
suggested that the court room has been used over night for some
kind of a horticultural exhibition and that the sweeping has been
overlooked. Later, his astonishment, however, is redoubled when
enter the sheriffs and the judge each carrying a bright colored
bouquet of roses or sweet peas bound up in an old-fashioned, stiff,
perforated paper holder. The visitor ventures to whisper his curiosity
and he is then informed that, in the former times, these herbs, and
the perfume of fresh flowers, were supposed to prevent the
contagion of prison fever; and that the ancient custom has survived
the use of disinfectants and the modern sanitation of prisoners and
cells.
The opening of court in the morning and after luncheon is a curious
ceremony. The Bar and audience rise and, through a door
corresponding to the one by which the visitor has reached the dais,
enter the two sheriffs gowned in flowing dark blue robes trimmed
with fur. Then comes the under-sheriff in a very smart black velvet
knee breeches suit, white ruffled shirt, white stockings, silver
buckled shoes, cocked hat under arm and sword at side. The sheriffs
bow in ushering to his seat the judge, who is arrayed in wig and
robe, which, in the case of the Lord Chief Justice, or one of the
judges of the High Court, is of brilliant scarlet with a dark blue sash
over one shoulder, or in the case of the Common Sergeant, is of
sombre black. Each member of the court carries the bouquet
referred to and the whole group afford a dash of color strong in
contrast with the dark setting. The judge, having seated himself in a
chair—so cumbersome as to require a little track to roll it forward
sufficiently close to the desk—the sheriffs dispose themselves in the
seats not occupied by the judge or his guest, and, later, they quietly
withdraw. They have no part in the proceedings, their only function
being to usher in and out the judges, and to entertain them at
luncheon—the judges being by custom their guests. The judge
having taken his seat, the Bar and public do the same and the
business begins. There are usually two such courts sitting at the Old
Bailey—sometimes three of them.
At lunch time the sheriffs again escort the judges from their seats,
and all the judges, sheriffs and under-sheriffs, and any guests they
may invite, assemble in the dining-room of the court house for an
excellent, substantial luncheon served by butler and footman in blue
liveries with brass buttons, knee breeches and white stockings. The
luncheon table looks odd with the varied costumes, the rich blues,
the bright scarlets and the wigs of the party, who, no longer on duty,
relax into jolly sociability. Indeed one can not escape the impression
that he has in some way joined a group of "supes" from the opera
who are snatching a light supper between the choruses. These are
some of the picturesque features of the Old Bailey which, at the
same time, is the theatre of the most sensible and enlightened
application of law to the every day affairs of the largest aggregation
of human beings the world has ever seen.
While enjoying a cigar after luncheon with one of the under-sheriffs,
the voice of the Common Serjeant or Recorder is heard at the door
of the smoking room. Robed and armed with his bouquet, he
smilingly inquires if there are no sheriffs to escort him into court. A
hasty buckling on of sword, a snatching up of his bouquet and a
little dusting of cigar ashes from his velvet knee breeches, prepares
the under-sheriff for the function, and, preceded by the sheriffs in
their blue gowns, his Lordship bringing up the rear, the little
procession starts along the corridor and enters the door leading to
the judges' dais. The under-sheriff shortly returns to finish his cigar
but the guest tarries beside the judge.
The first case was a minor one—a charge of breaking and entering a
shop and stealing some goods. His name having been called, the
prisoner suddenly popped up into the dock at the far end of the
room with police officers on either side of him. Asked if he objected
to any of the jurors already seated in the box, he replied in the
negative and the trial began. The junior barrister opened very
briefly, merely stating the name, date, locality and nature of the
charge. Following him the senior barrister gave the details at much
greater length. These barristers were not, as with us, district
attorneys or state prosecutors. They are either retained by the
Treasury or, as the case may be, represent private prosecutors. The
judge was fully conversant with the evidence, as he had before him
the depositions taken at the Magistrate's Court.
In an English court, when counsel has finished the direct
examination of a witness, he does not say, as we do, "cross-
examine" or "the witness is yours", he simply resumes his seat as
the signal for the other side to cross-examine. Sometimes, a pause
of the voice simultaneously with a stooping of the barrister's head
for a word of suggestion from the solicitor below, leads his opponent
to believe he is seating himself and to begin to cross-examine
prematurely.
Although in this case the plea was "not guilty," the charge was
practically undefended, and a prompt verdict of "guilty" followed.
Then came the important query from the judge to the police as to
whether the prisoner "is known"—was there a record of former
convictions? Learning that there was not, a sentence to eighteen
calendar months at hard labor followed a caution that if he should
be brought again before the court, he would be sent to penal
servitude. With a servile "If your Lordship pleases" he turned to dive
down the stairs, and, as he did so, with a grinning leer, seized his
left hand in his right and cordially shook hands with himself—a bit of
a gesticular slang which led one to think that the police were not
very well informed as to his previous experiences.
The next was a more important case. A clever but sinister-looking
Belgian, the master of several languages, was charged with
obtaining a valuable pair of diamond earrings by an ingenious
swindle. Having a slight acquaintance with a dealer in stones, he
telephoned that a friend of his was coming over to London from
Paris to join his wife and desired to present her with a pair of
earrings. If the dealer had suitable stones and would allow a
commission, the Belgian said he would try to effect a sale for him.
He, therefore, arranged that the dealer, at a fixed hour the following
day, should bring the stones to his lodgings for the Frenchman's
inspection. The appointment was kept and the two men waited for
some time for the Frenchman. Finally the latter's wife appeared and
explained to the Belgian in French—which the Englishman did not
understand—that her husband had been detained but would come
by a later train, whereupon she withdrew, and the conversation was
interpreted to the disappointed dealer.
Then the Belgian suggested that, if the dealer cared to leave the
stones, he would give a receipt for them and would either return
them or the money by half-past four. The dealer replied that
although he was quite willing to do so, he had partners whose
interest he must consult. The Belgian then produced a certificate of
stock in some Newfoundland Company, saying that it was worth as
much as the diamonds. The dealer consented to receive this as
security and he then left. Just before half-past four he was called up
on the telephone and told by the Belgian that he had made the sale
and had received the money in French notes which he would have
changed into English money. The dealer told him to bring the French
notes, which would be acceptable to him. That, of course, was the
last he ever saw of the money, the diamonds or the swindler, until
the latter was arrested some months later.
The leading nature of the direct examination, so marked in all
English courts, was conspicuous in such questions as the following:

Q: "Did the defendant telephone you about 4.15?"

A: "Yes, sir."
Q: "Did you recognize his voice?"
A: "Yes, sir."
Q: "Did you send an assistant to the defendant's flat with a
letter and was it returned to you unopened?"
A: "Yes, sir."

The Secretary of the Newfoundland Company having been called,

was asked: "Were the shares in defendant's name formerly in the
name of John Smith?" A: "Yes." Q: "Was there an order of court
forbidding their transfer?" A: "Yes."
Two pawnbrokers testified that, shortly after four o'clock, the
prisoner had brought the earrings to their shops and asked how
much would be loaned upon them and that, the sum offered being
apparently unsatisfactory, the Belgian took the earrings away.
 Defendant's barrister: "My Lord, I submit, I've no case to
answer."
The Court: "Oh, yes, you have."
Barrister: "Well, if your Lordship thinks so."

The defence was cleverer than the original swindle in that it did not
attempt to deny the overwhelming evidence, but merely made the
story tally with an ostensibly innocent explanation. The Belgian
averred that he had himself been robbed by the Frenchman, with
whom he had but a slight acquaintance gained at the Paris races. He
said that the Frenchman had kept the deferred appointment and,
though he admired the stones, he thought them hardly worth the
price, whereupon the two had set off in a cab to obtain an opinion
as to their value. If thus assured, he was to make the purchase and
together they were to take them to his wife in a hotel near Piccadilly.
As it was late in the day, they failed to find a French-speaking
jeweller whom they sought, and it was suggested that, as
pawnbrokers were very cautious in loaning, two opinions of that
fraternity should be had. On stopping at the pawnbrokers' shops, the
Frenchman, being ignorant of English, said there was no use of his
going in as he would have to rely upon his companion's
interpretation and might as well sit in the cab. Thus, the visits by the
Belgian alone to the two pawnshops and the inquiry as to the
amount procurable as a loan, were duly accounted for.
According to the prisoner's story, the Frenchman, being satisfied,
proposed to pay in French notes and the Belgian entered a public
telephone booth to enquire of his principal if that would be
satisfactory, leaving the jewels with the Frenchman in the cab. When
he returned the cab was gone.
His intention having been to leave for the Continent the following
day, the Belgian said he had already notified the landlord of his flat—
which was apparently true—and had dispatched his effects in
advance. So, supposing that the Frenchman had gone to Paris, he
immediately followed on the evening train in the hope of identifying
him en route, or of finding him somewhere in that city. He swore he
did find him a few days later and caused his arrest, and that the
French magistrate declined to hold him because the crime had been
committed in England where there was no warrant out, and, hence,
no demand for extradition.
The weakest point in this ingenious fabrication was the prisoner's
failure to communicate with the owner of the diamonds during the
ensuing five months. This, and other discrepancies, having been
easily laid bare on cross-examination, a verdict of guilty was quickly
rendered.
The judge had hardly uttered the usual query whether the prisoner
was known, before an alert police inspector replied, "He is an
international swindler, well-known all over the Continent, wanted in
Berlin for a job of 20,000 marks, in Paris for another of 30,000
francs and elsewhere."

Judge: "Suppose we give him a few months and allow the

foreign police to apply for extradition?"
Inspector: "Well, Your Lordship, the trouble is that he claims to
have been born in Paris of English parents and that he is,
therefore, a British subject, and the French police will jolly well
accept his statement."
Judge: "That's very awkward. We'll give him twelve calendar
months and see what transpires."
 CHAPTER XIII
AN IMPORTANT MURDER TRIAL
Amongst the murder trials on the "Calendar of Prisoners" appeared
"No 38; Madar Lal Dhingra, 25, Student, wilful murder of Sir William
Hutt Curzon Wyllie and Dr. Cowas Lalcaca." This referred to the
cowardly assassination of an English gentleman who had devoted his
life to Indian administration and to benefiting the native races of
that country, and to the murder of an Indian doctor, who lost his life
in an effort to save him. The tragedy, the news of which had
profoundly shocked the world less than three weeks before, occurred
during an evening reception at the Imperial Institute. The prisoner, a
fanatical Indian student, was believed to have borne no personal
animosity to his victim.
No one knew exactly when the case would be reached, but it had
been expected for several days when, one morning, the Old Bailey,
in view of a possible disturbance by Indian sympathizers, was found
to be carefully guarded by detectives. Except a small audience
admitted by cards which were doubtless hard to procure and not
transferable, the public, clamoring at the doors, were excluded from
the Court, although one American lady, who appeared in one of the
back seats, seemed to have had information and influence necessary
to gain an entrée.
The barristers' benches, however, were so full that there was an
unusual array of bewigged heads on that side of the court. The jury,
already in place, and the small audience, waited in quiet but tense
expectation. While one was idly noting the usual dried herbs and
rose leaves on the desks and carpet of the judges' dais, the Lord
Chief Justice seated himself and rolled his chair forward, a shaft of
soft sun rays from the skylight accentuating his scarlet robe. The
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