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Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy

Andrea Iacona

LOGIC:
Lecture Notes
for Philosophy,
Mathematics, and
Computer Science
Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy
The Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy offers a series of self-contained
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Andrea Iacona

LOGIC: Lecture Notes for

Philosophy, Mathematics,
and Computer Science
Andrea Iacona
Center for Logic, Language and Cognition
University of Turin, Department of
Philosophy and Education
Torino, Italy

ISSN 2569-8737 ISSN 2569-8753 (electronic)

Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy
ISBN 978-3-030-64810-7 ISBN 978-3-030-64811-4 (eBook)
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Preface

This book is an introduction to logic. It starts from zero and covers the main topics
that are usually taught in elementary and advanced logic courses. Its measured
pace, its controlled level of technicality, and its constant search for clarity and
precision make it particularly suited for philosophy students. But also mathematics
or computer science students may appreciate its style of exposition, especially if
they have some inclination for pure theoretical issues.
The book is structured as follows. Chapters 1–3 provide some preliminary
clarifications and define the basic vocabulary of logic. Chapters 4–6 present a
propositional language and explain its semantics. Chapters 7 and 8 set out a natural
deduction system in that language. Chapters 9 and 10 outline a deductively equiv-
alent axiomatic system and prove its consistency, soundness, and completeness.
Chapters 11–13 present a predicate language and explain its semantics. Chap-
ters 14–15 outline an axiomatic system in that language and prove its consistency,
soundness, and completeness. Chapters 16–18 deal with some general results about
first-order theories. Chapter 19 is devoted to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
Finally, Chapter 20 introduces the fundamentals of modal logic.
Since it is practically impossible to study this entire material within a single
course, some selection of chapters must be made, depending on the kind of course
and the time available. One way to divide the book, perhaps the simplest way, is to
use Chapters 1–10 for an elementary course and Chapters 11–20 for an advanced
course. If instead the time available is not enough to cover ten chapters, which is
quite likely, one can use Chapters 1–8 for an elementary course and Chapters 9–
18 for an advanced course, leaving out Chapters 19 and 20. A third option, which
might be considered if one has only one course instead of two, and one wants to
include both propositional and predicate logic, is to use Chapters 1–6 and 11–13. In
this case, one will focus on the semantics of propositional and predicate languages,
leaving out the proof theory and the metatheory.
Each chapter includes ten exercises. Some of them are relatively simple and
mechanical, others require a firm grasp of the contents presented in the chapter and
a bit of creativity. The reader is not expected to solve all the exercises at first glance.

v
vi Preface

But at least it is worth trying. The solutions are listed at the end of the book, so one
can rely on them to measure one’s understanding and learn from one’s mistakes.
I drew from the following sources, which would be good for supplemental
reading and are listed in the final bibliography: G. S. Boolos, J. P. Burgess, and
R. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic (2010); H. B. Enderton, A Mathematical
Introduction to Logic (1972); G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, A New Introduction
to Modal Logic (1996); G. Hunter, Metalogic (1971); E. J. Lemmon, Beginning
Logic (1993); M. Sainsbury, Logical Forms (2001); and P. Smith, Introduction to
Gödel’s Theorems (2013). Further references on specific issues are mentioned in
the footnotes.
This book is based on a set of lecture notes that I have consistently used in my
logic courses at the University of Turin, and that I have revised year after year.
Due to innumerable corrections, adjustments, and modifications, I’m no longer in a
position to tell how many versions of the text circulated among students, and I don’t
have a list of all those who found errors or suggested improvements. But I know for
sure that I received a great deal of helpful comments from Gabriele Abate, Martina
Calderisi, Daniel Crowley, Gabriele Chiriotti, Paolo Grugnetti, Martino Paschetto,
Stefano Romeo, Giuliano Rosella, Cristina Sagafrena, Francesco Scarpiello, Davide
Sutto, and Martina Zirattu.
Among the many intellectual debts that I have acquired in the course of
writing this book, some deserve special mention. Pasquale Frascolla has been an
inspiring presence ever since we started discussing about the logic exams of our
doctoral students. Matteo Plebani and Eric Raidl gave me particularly extensive and
extremely helpful comments, which prompted numerous substantial improvements.
Finally, Diego Marconi revised the final version of the manuscript and spotted some
still remaining historical inaccuracies. I am very grateful to them all for the time
they spent on my work.

Torino, Italy Andrea Iacona

Contents

1 Basic Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 What Is Logic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Arguments and Their Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Complex Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Truth and Falsity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Bivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Some Set-Theoretical Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 True Premises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Validity as Necessary Truth Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Other Logical Properties and Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Important Facts About Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Validity Is Not Everything . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Formality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Formal Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Formal Invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Formal Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Formal System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Object Language and Metalanguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6 Further Set-Theoretical Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4 The Symbols of Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 Sentence Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2 Sentential Connectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3 Brackets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4 Expressive Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5 Truth-Functionality and Substitutivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6 Formalization in a Propositional Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5 The Language L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1 Formation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

vii
viii Contents

5.2 Syntactic Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

5.3 Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.4 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.5 Truth Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6 Logical Consequence in L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.1 Definition of Logical Consequence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.2 Other Logical Properties and Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.3 Important Facts About Logical Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.4 Logical Consequence as a Test for Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.5 Effective Computability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7 The System G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.1 Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.2 Rules for ∼ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.3 Rules for ⊃ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.4 Rules for ∧ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.5 Rules for ∨ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8 Derivability in G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.1 Derivability and Related Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.2 Important Facts About Derivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.3 Some Tips. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.4 Derived Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.5 Other Natural Deduction Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
9 The System L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.1 Axioms and Inference Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.2 Deduction Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9.3 Explosion, Double Negation, Contraposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.4 Substitution of Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.5 Reductio Ad Absurdum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
9.6 Deductive Equivalence Between G− and L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
9.7 Systems and Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
10 Consistency, Soundness, Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.1 Consistency of L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.2 Definitions of Soundness and Completeness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.3 Soundness of L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.4 Completeness of L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.5 Extension to G− . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
11 Quantification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
11.1 Quantified Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
11.2 A Brief Historical Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
11.3 Existential Import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
11.4 Multiple Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.5 Definite Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Contents ix

12 The Symbols of Predicate Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

12.1 Non-logical Expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
12.2 Logical Constants and Auxiliary Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
12.3 Other Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
12.4 Numerical Expressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
12.5 Multiple Generality and Scope Ambiguity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.6 Existence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
13 The Language Lq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
13.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
13.2 Basic Semantic Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
13.3 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
13.4 Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
13.5 Logical Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
13.6 Undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
14 The System Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
14.1 Axioms and Inference Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
14.2 Derivability in Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
14.3 Generalization Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
14.4 Validity and Derivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
14.5 Deduction Theorem and Other Syntactic Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
14.6 Alphabetic Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15 Consistency, Soundness, Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.1 Consistency of Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.2 Soundness of Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.3 Completeness of Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
15.4 Compactness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
15.5 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
16 Undecidability and Related Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
16.1 Undecidability of Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
16.2 Gödel Numbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
16.3 Effective Enumerability of the Theorems of Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
16.4 A Further Corollary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
16.5 Recursive Axiomatization and Decidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
17 First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
17.1 First-Order Languages and Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
17.2 First-Order Logic with Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
17.3 First-Order Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
17.4 The Language of Basic Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
17.5 Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
18 Theories and Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
18.1 Cardinality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
18.2 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
x Contents

18.3 Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

18.4 Isomorphic Models of a Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
18.5 Categoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
19 Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
19.1 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
19.2 The Arithmetization of Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
19.3 The Gödel Sentence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
19.4 First Incompleteness Theorem: Semantic Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
19.5 First Incompleteness Theorem: Syntactic Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
19.6 Second Incompleteness Theorem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
20 Rudiments of Modal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
20.1 Modal Operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
20.2 A Modal Propositional Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
20.3 The System K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
20.4 The Systems T, B, S4, S5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
20.5 A Modal Predicate Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
20.6 Systems of Modal Predicate Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
20.7 Soundness and Completeness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Solutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Chapter 1
Basic Notions

1.1 What Is Logic?

Logic has been defined in many ways in the course of its history, as different
views have been held about its aim, scope, and subject matter. But if there is one
thing on which most definitions agree, it is that logic deals with the principles of
correct reasoning. To explain what this means, we will start with some preliminary
clarifications about the terms ‘reasoning’, ‘correct’, and ‘principles’.
Here is a simple example of reasoning. Imagine that a detective investigates a
murder in a mansion. The suspects are the butler and the gardener. Once some clues
are collected, it turns out that the butler has an airtight alibi. The detective then
reasons as follows: either the butler or the gardener did it, but it can’t be the butler;
so it must be the gardener. In more explicit form,

(1) Either the butler or the gardener did it

(2) It’s not the butler who did it
(3) The gardener did it

The horizontal line indicates that (3) is inferred from (1) and (2), that is, (1) and (2)
are premises from which (3) is drawn as a conclusion. This means that the detective’s
reasoning can be phrased as an argument:
Definition 1.1 An argument consists of a set of sentences, the premises, and a
sentence which is inferred from them, the conclusion.
A sentence—in the sense of ‘sentence’ that matters here—is a string of words that
conveys a statement, so it is used to assert that things are a certain way. For example,
‘Snow is white’ is a sentence in this sense, while ‘Leave me alone!’ or ‘Are you

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

A. Iacona, LOGIC: Lecture Notes for Philosophy, Mathematics, and Computer
Science, Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64811-4_1
2 1 Basic Notions

there?’ are not. In other words, we will restrict consideration to sentences that are
usually classified as declaratives, as distinct from imperatives or interrogatives.
People commonly judge arguments as good or bad. For example, the detective’s
argument is intuitively good. In the situation described, it is reasonable to believe
that (1) and (2) are true. Moreover, (1) and (2) warrant (3), as the following notation
shows:

(1) Either the butler or the gardener did it

(2) It’s not the butler who did it
(3) The gardener did it 1,2

The argument below, instead, is intuitively bad:

(1) Either the butler or the gardener did it

(2) It’s not the butler who did it
(3) The Yeti exists

A good argument, unlike a bad argument, can justify what one thinks or says. The
detective can plausibly appeal to (1) and (2) to support his claim that the gardener
is the murderer. By contrast, the same premises provide no reason for believing that
the Yeti exists.
When an argument is used to support a claim, as in the case of the detective,
two key assumptions need be made about the argument: one is that its premises are
true, the other is that the inference from its premises to its conclusion is correct,
namely, that its premises warrant its conclusion. The argument is valid when the
second condition is satisfied, otherwise it is invalid. The argument is sound when
both conditions are satisfied, otherwise it is unsound. Intuitively, a good argument
is a sound argument.
Logic focuses on validity, which is one of the two constitutive conditions of
soundness. It does not deal with the other condition, the truth of the premises,
because whether a sentence is true depends on how things actually are, and it is
no business of the logician to tell how things actually are. Since the premisses of
an argument can pertain to all sorts of subjects—physics, history, biology, and so
on—their truth concerns the experts in those subjects. What the logician wants to
know is whether the premisses of an argument, assuming that they are true, provide
compelling grounds for accepting its conclusion. Thus, as far as logic is concerned,
it doesn’t really matter whether the premises of the detective’s argument are true.
The only question that matters is what follows from them, that is, what one can
rightfully conclude on the assumption that they are true.
Now it remains to be said how the principles of correct reasoning are understood.
The thought that underlies logic is that the validity of an argument can be explained
in terms of its form, a structural property that characterizes a whole class of valid
arguments. As we shall see, the intuitive difference between the two arguments
1.2 Arguments and Their Formulation 3

above can be explained in terms of their form: while the first instantiates a valid
pattern of inference, the same does not hold for the second.
This is the kind of explanation that characterizes logic as a theory. Through
the study of argument forms, which are expressed by using appropriate symbols,
logicians describe wide classes of valid arguments in a rigorous and systematic way.
So, the principles of correct reasoning they investigate are formal principles, that
is, principles that concern argument forms. The next two chapters provide detailed
explanations about validity and its relation to form. The rest of this chapter, instead,
offers some further clarifications about arguments and sentences.

1.2 Arguments and Their Formulation

An argument is properly formulated when it is phrased in the way illustrated above,

that is, as a vertical sequence of sentences whose last item is the conclusion.
However, this is not the way in which arguments are phrased when they are actually
used. Normally, what the proponent of an argument utters is a discourse—call it a
text—from which one can “extract” a properly formulated argument. The conclusion
of the argument expresses the claim made in the text, and its premises state the
reasons offered in support of that claim. Typically, the inference from the premises
to the conclusion is indicated by words such as ‘so’, ‘hence’, or ‘therefore’.
The proper formulation of an argument is the result of an analysis that may be
more or less demanding for a variety of reasons. In the first place, a text often leaves
room for implicit material. Suppose that the detective utters the following words:
It’s not the butler. So it’s the gardener.

In this case, the argument stated in Sect. 1.1 does not match exactly the detective’s
words, for it includes a premise that the detective does not utter, namely (1).
Nonetheless, that argument can plausibly be ascribed to the detective, on the
assumption that the detective takes (1) for granted. That is, (1) features as an implicit
premise.
In the second place, a text may contain expressions that are irrelevant from the
logical point of view. This is to say that if the text did not contain those expressions,
the reasoning conveyed would be essentially the same. Of course, ‘essentially’ is
not a precise term. But in many cases it is evident that certain expressions play no
substantial logical role. Consider the following text:
In fact, it’s not the butler who did it. So we can conclude that it is the gardener.

In this case the expressions ‘In fact’ and ‘we can conclude that’ are dispensable,
for the reasoning is exactly the same as in the previous text. So the argument, once
properly formulated, will not include these expressions.
In the third place, a text may contain obscure expressions which prevent it from
being immediately understandable. Consider the following text:
4 1 Basic Notions

The number of the suspects is the number that the Pythagoreans regarded as the dyad,
symbol of otherness. If it’s not the butler who did it, then we must subtract 1 from that
number and say that it is the gardener.

The complex expression ‘The number that etc.’ refers to the number 2, so the whole
sentence can be replaced by ‘There are two suspects: the butler and the gardener’.
In the proper formulation of an argument, obscure expressions should be replaced
with more intelligible expressions, when this is possible.

1.3 Complex Reasoning

The examples of reasoning considered so far are simple, in that each of them
boils down to a single argument. A complex reasoning, instead, is a structured set
of arguments. There are different ways in which two or more arguments can be
combined. One is chaining: two arguments are chained when the same sentence
occurs both as the conclusion of one of them and as a premise of the other. Suppose
that the detective, after concluding that the gardener is the murderer on the basis of
the argument stated in Sect. 1.1, uses this conclusion to obtain a further conclusion:

(1) If the gardener did it, the driver is innocent

(2) The gardener did it
(3) The driver is innocent

In this case the two arguments are chained, because (2) occurs in the former as
conclusion and in the latter as premise. The whole reasoning can be stated as
follows:

(1) Either the butler or the gardener did it

(2) It’s not the butler who did it
(3) The gardener did it 1,2
(4) If the gardener did it, the driver is innocent
(5) The driver is innocent 3,4

The numbers on the right display the two inferential steps involved in this reasoning.
When one reasons by chaining, one proceeds linearly through a series of arguments
each of which serves to justify the following, until one gets to a final conclusion.
Other kinds of complex reasoning are those in which some premises are
entertained only hypothetically, in order to show what consequences can be drawn
from them. The reasoning known as reductio ad absurdum belongs to this category,
as it occurs when a hypothesis that is contrary to the conclusion to be proved is
reduced to absurdity. For example, the detective might rule out that the butler is the
murderer by reasoning as follows. Suppose that the butler did it. Then, he must have
been in the mansion at 8 pm, the time of the murder. But a recorded phone call
1.3 Complex Reasoning 5

proves that he was at home at 8 pm, hence that he was not in the mansion at that
time. So, the hypothesis that the butler did it, together with other assumptions, leads
to the absurd conclusion that he was and he was not in the mansion at 8 pm. The
reasoning can be stated as follows:

(1) The butler did it

(2) If he did it, he was in the mansion at 8 pm
(3) He was in the mansion at 8 pm 1,2
(4) The butler made a phone call
(5) If he made it, he was not in the mansion at 8 pm
(6) He was not in the mansion at 8 pm 4,5
(7) It’s not the butler who did it 1,3,6

The first three lines show that (1), together with (2), yields (3). The next three lines
show that (4) and (5) yield (6). This means that, as long as (2), (4), and (5) are
granted, if one accepts (1), one gets (3) and (6). Since it is impossible for the butler
to be and not to be in the mansion at 8 pm, this justifies the rejection of (1), provided
that (2), (4), and (5) hold.
A paradigmatic example of reductio ad absurdum is the reasoning employed by
Euclid to prove that there are infinitely many prime numbers. A prime number, or
prime, is a natural number greater than 1 that can be divided only by 1 or by itself.
The natural numbers are 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . . Suppose that there are only finitely many
primes, that is, that the primes are exactly p1 , . . . , pn for some n. Now take the
number m such that m = (p1 × · · · × pn ) + 1. Since m differs from p1 , . . . , pn ,
by hypothesis it is not prime, so it must be divisible by some pi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This follows from the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, according to which every
integer greater than 1 is either a prime or can be represented as a unique product
of primes, where ‘unique’ means that there is only one set of primes that works. If
one divides m by some pi , however, one will get a remainder 1. So, the supposition
that there are only finitely many primes leads to an absurdity. The number of primes
must be infinite.1
As these two examples show, a reductio ad absurdum can take two distinct forms:
one is negative, the other is positive. In the first case one derives an absurdity
from a given sentence in order to justify the negation of that sentence: from the
absurd consequences of the hypothesis that the butler is the murderer, the detective
concludes that the butler is not the murderer. In the second case one derives an
absurdity from the negation of a given sentence in order to justify the sentence
itself: from the absurd consequences of the hypothesis that the number of primes is
not infinite, Euclid concludes that there are infinitely many primes.

1 Euclid (c.325–c.365 BC), the most prominent mathematician of antiquity, is best known for his
treatise on geometry, the Elements. The proof that there are infinitely many primes is there, book
IX, proposition 20.
6 1 Basic Notions

Since a complex reasoning results from the combination of two or more

arguments, to analyze a text which contains a complex reasoning is to make fully
explicit the arguments that constitute the reasoning. One way to do that is to mark
each inferential step in the way illustrated above, that is, by using numbers that refer
to the sentences from which a given sentence is obtained.

1.4 Truth and Falsity

When one utters a sentence, one asserts that things are a certain way. The sentence
is true if things are actually that way, false otherwise. Truth and falsity are distinct
truth values that a sentence can have. For example, ‘Snow is white’ is true, since
snow is white. Instead, ‘The earth is a star’ is false, since the earth is not a star.
These two sentences have different truth values.
The notion of truth value was explicitly introduced into logic by Gottlob Frege.
In his seminal article Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892), Frege draws a distinction
between the sense (‘Sinn’) of a sentence and its reference (‘Bedeutung’). Intuitively,
the sense of a sentence is its meaning, that is, what one grasps when one understands
the sentence. This sense determines a reference, which Frege identifies with the
sentence’s truth value.2
One coherent way to develop Frege’s distinction is to equate the sense of a
sentence with its truth conditions, that is, the conditions under which the sentence
is true. According to a widely held hypothesis, originally advanced by Ludwig
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), to understand a sentence
is to know its truth conditions. For example, to grasp the meaning of ‘Snow is white’
is to know that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if a certain state of affairs obtains,
namely, snow being white. The truth value of ‘Snow is white’—the fact that it is
true—depends on its truth conditions and on the obtaining of that state of affairs.3
The difference between truth values and truth conditions is easy to grasp. If two
sentences have the same truth conditions, then they have the same truth value, given
the way things are. For example, ‘Either the butler or the gardener did it’ and ‘Either
the gardener or the butler did it’ have the same truth conditions. So they must have

2 Frege [16]. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was a German logician, mathematician,
and philosopher who studied and taught at the University of Jena. He was primarily interested
in understanding the nature of mathematical truths and the means whereby they are ultimately
justified. With extreme clarity, rigour, and technical brilliance, he articulated some fundamental
ideas that have made possible the developement of modern logic and analytic philosophy.
3 Wittgenstein [68], 4.431, p. 95. Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951), one of the

most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, was an Austrian philosopher who taught at the
University of Cambridge and was primarily interested in logic and the philosophy of language.
His works have inspired a vast secondary literature and have done much to shape subsequent
developments in philosophy. In particular, they originated logical positivism and the philosophy
of ordinary language.
1.4 Truth and Falsity 7

the same truth value. But having the same truth value does not entail having the
same truth conditions. For example, ‘Snow is white’ and ‘The earth is a planet’ are
both true, yet they have different truth conditions.
Another way to phrase this distinction is to say that sentences have intension
and extension, where the latter depends on the former and on the way things
are. The notions of intension and extension apply to various kinds of linguistic
expressions, including singular terms, such as ‘the earth’, or predicates, such as
‘planet’. The intension of an expression is its sense or meaning, that is, what one
grasps when one understands the expression. Instead, the extension of an expression,
which is determined by its intension, is its reference or denotation, that is, the
semantic property that accounts for the relation between the expression and the
extra-linguistic reality. Thus, the extension of a singular term is the object it denotes,
and the extension of a predicate is the set of objects to which it applies. Following the
line of thought initiated by Frege and developed by Wittgenstein, it is now relatively
common to identify the intension of a sentence with its truth conditions and its
extension with its truth value.
Note that this way of talking does not imply that, for every sentence, there is a
unique intension that is “the” intension of the sentence. Different truth conditions
can be associated to the same sentence, for at least two reasons. First, a sentence
may be ambiguous, that is, it may have more than one meaning. For example, ‘Alf
goes to the bank’ is ambiguous because it can mean either that Alf goes to the edge
of a river or that Alf goes to a financial institution. Similarly, ‘Visiting relatives can
be boring’ is ambiguous because it can mean either that it can be boring to visit
relatives or that it can be boring to receive their visits. In the first case the ambiguity
is “lexical”, as it depends on the ambiguity of a single word, while in the second it
is “structural”, as it is explainable in terms of distinct syntactic structures.
Second, a sentence may contain context sensitive expressions, that is, expressions
whose content varies as a function of the context. A plain example is the pronoun
‘I’. If ‘I’ is used by Alf, it refers to Alf, while if it is used by Betty, it refers to
Betty. Thus, if Alf says ‘I like ice cream’, he asserts that Alf likes ice cream, while
if Betty says ‘I like ice cream’, she asserts that Betty likes ice cream. Assuming that
a context is a set of circumstances which includes a speaker, this is to say that ‘I like
ice cream’ has different truth conditions in different contexts. Similar considerations
hold for ‘you’, ‘now’, ‘here’, and many other kinds of expressions.
Since natural language is affected by ambiguity and context sensitivity, it cannot
be taken for granted that every sentence has a unique intension. The same sentence
may be understood in different ways on different occasions. So its truth conditions—
and consequently its truth value—may vary depending on how it is understood.
8 1 Basic Notions

1.5 Bivalence

But is it right to assume that every intension determines an extension? In general, it

is not. For example, it is entirely plausible to say that a meaningful singular term,
such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ lacks denotation, or that a meaningful predicate, such
as ‘unicorn’, applies to nothing. Therefore, one may wonder whether it should be
assumed that every sentence, once its ambiguity or context sensitivity is resolved, is
either true or false.
This question has been widely discussed in the history of logic, and is still
a source of constant controversy. Classical logic, the theory that is most widely
adopted and is usually taught in logic courses, rests on Bivalence, the principle
according to which truth and falsity are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
values. Bivalence is closely related to a distinct principle that Aristotle regarded as
indubitable, Excluded Middle: either things are a certain way or they are not that
way. To see the connection between these two principles it suffices to bear in mind
what has been said about truth conditions. If one thinks that either snow is white or
snow is not white, then, as long as one grants that ‘Snow is white’ is true if snow
is white and that ‘Snow is white’ is false if snow is not white, one must accept that
either ‘Snow is white’ is true or it is false, or so is reasonable to expect.4
However, Bivalence is far from being universally accepted, and it is often per-
ceived as more problematic than Excluded Middle. At least three major objections
have been raised against Bivalence. The first concerns future contingents, that is,
sentences about future events that can occur or not occur, such as ‘It will rain
tomorrow’. According to a line of argument that goes back to Aristotle himself,
future contingents are neither true nor false, because the supposition that they are
either true or false implies fatalism. If ‘It will rain tomorrow’ were true, then it
would be settled today that it will rain tomorrow, so the rain would be necessary.
Similarly, if it were false, it would be settled today that it will not rain tomorrow, so
the rain would be impossible. Since the rain is contingent, that is, neither necessary
nor impossible, this shows that ‘It will rain tomorrow’ is neither true nor false.5
The second objection concerns vagueness, a feature of natural language that is
distinct both from ambiguity and from context sensitivity. Vague expressions are
expressions that lack definite extensions. For example, the predicate ‘bald’ is vague.
This predicate definitely applies to a man with no hair at all, and it definitely does
not apply to a man with a huge amount of hairs. But there are men with a number of

4 Aristotle(c.384–c.322 BC), one of the greatest philosophers of all time, is widely recognized as
the founder of logic. When his works were collected by his pupils after his death, a number of his
treatises were grouped together, and the collection came to be called Organon, or instrument of
science. The term ‘logic’ was introduced about 500 years later, but the scope of the study denoted
by this term was determined by the contents of the Organon. Aristotle stated Excluded Middle in
Metaphysics, , 7, 1011b 23–24.
5 The original formulation of Aristotle’s argument is in De interpretatione IX, 18b23 ff. For an

introduction to the contemporary debate on future contingents see Iacona [31].

Exercises 9

hairs such that it is unclear whether ‘bald’ applies to them. If Alf has such a number,
then ‘Alf is bald’ is neither definitely true nor definitely false. More generally, vague
expressions admit borderline cases, that is, cases in which they neither definitely
apply nor definitely do not apply. So the sentences in which they occur may be
neither definitely true nor definitely false.6
The third objection comes from antirealism, the conception of truth that rejects
the commonsense idea that truth is correspondence with reality. Antirealism is often
associated with intuitionism, the view according to which the only intelligible way
to make sense of the truth conditions of mathematical sentences is to understand
them as proof conditions, where a proof is a mental construction of a certain kind.
This view implies that some mathematical sentences are neither true nor false.
Their status is currently undecided. Consider Goldbach’s conjecture that every even
number (other than two) is the sum of two primes. There is presently no proof of
this conjecture, nor is there a proof of its negation. So, for an intuitionist there is no
principled reason for asserting that Goldbach’s conjecture is either true or false.7
The three objections considered, just as many others, arouse thorny philosophical
questions that are far from being settled. But we can’t even begin to discuss these
questions here. We will have to follow standard practice and assume Bivalence. This
book focuses on classical logic, so any theory that implies rejection of Bivalence
falls outside its scope.

Exercises

1.1 What is the conclusion of this argument?

The butler is not the murderer, he was at home at 8 pm.

1.2 Are there arguments that nobody has ever uttered or thought?
1.3 Provide a proper formulation of the following argument:
If I’m innocent, I will appear before the judges. But I will appear before the judges. So, I’m
innocent.

1.4 Provide a proper formulation of the following argument:

If I appear before the judges, I’m guilty. But I will not appear before the judges. So I’m not
guilty.

1.5 Find the implicit premise:

You don’t love me! If you did, you would have come to my aunt’s dinner.

6 The reflection on vagueness started with Eubulides of Miletus (fourth century BC), a Greek
philosopher known as the inventor of the Sorites paradox. Williamson [66] provides a detailed
historical survey and discusses the main contemporary views of vagueness.
7 This line of thought was initiated by Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881–1966), a Duch

mathematician who worked in topology, set theory, and measure theory. De Swart [7], pp. 379–426,
articulates the intuitionist position and outlines its logic.
10 1 Basic Notions

1.6 Find the implicit conclusion:

If he is a surfer, I’m Napoleon.

1.7 According to a legend that circulated in ancient Greece, Córax of Syracuse

taught his pupil Tisias the art of rethoric, but then Tisias refused to pay him. Tisias
defended himself by saying that Córax had promised to teach him to persuade
anyone of anything. So, either Córax kept his promise, and admitted that Tisias
was able to persuade him to renounce his claim, or he didn’t keep his promise, and
Tisias did not have to pay him. What is exactly Tisias’ argument?
1.8 Can an argument have just one premise?
1.9 How many arguments do you see in this quote from David Hume?
Nothing is demonstrable unless its contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is
distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we
can also conceive as non-existent. So there is no being whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. So there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.8

1.10 Explain why each of these two sentences is plausibly true in one sense but
false in another sense:
(a) The end of a thing is its perfection
(b) Death is the end of life

8 Hume, [28], D 9.5, KS 189.

Chapter 2
Validity

2.1 Some Set-Theoretical Notions

In order to elucidate the understanding of validity that underlies logic, it is useful

to introduce some symbols that belong to the vocabulary of set theory. A set is a
collection of things, called its elements. We will write a ∈ A to say that a is an
element of A, and a ∈ / A to say that a is not an element of A. The main thing to
bear in mind about sets is that their identity is determined by their elements. If A
and B have the same elements, then A = B. The converse also holds: if A = B,
then A and B have the same elements, for identical objects cannot have different
properties.
The curly brackets are used to refer to sets by listing their elements. For example,
{1, 2} is the set whose elements are the numbers 1 and 2. Note that, when curly
brackets are used, it doesn’t really matter how the elements of a set are listed, or
how many times they occur in the list. For example, it makes no difference whether
we write {1, 2}, {2, 1}, or {1, 2, 2}: the set denoted is the same.
The symbol ⊆ expresses the subset relation. A is a subset of B, that is, A ⊆ B, if
and only if every element of A is an element of B. This means that nothing belongs
to A without belonging to B. For example, {1} ⊆ {1, 2}. Note that A ⊆ A, and that
if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A, then A = B. Another way to say that A is a subset of B is to
say that B is a superset of A.
The symbol ∪ indicates the union of two sets. The union of A and B, that is,
A ∪ B, is the set that contains all the elements of A and all the elements of B. For
example, {1, 2} ∪ {2, 3} = {1, 2, 3}. Note that A ∪ A = A and A ⊆ (A ∪ B).
The symbol ∅ denotes the empty set, the set that has no elements. It is easy to
see that ∅ ⊆ A for any A: since nothing belongs to ∅, nothing belongs to ∅ without
belonging to A. This is why the empty set is unique, that is, there are no distinct
empty sets. If A and B are both empty, then each of them is a subset of any set. It
follows that A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A, so that A = B.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 11

A. Iacona, LOGIC: Lecture Notes for Philosophy, Mathematics, and Computer
Science, Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64811-4_2
12 2 Validity

As explained above, the identity of a set does not imply an order among its
elements. However, there are cases in which it is useful to talk about ordered sets of
objects. The simplest case is that in which one wants to talk about two objects such
that one of them is the first and the other is the second: an ordered pair. Given two
objects x and y, the notation x, y indicates the ordered pair formed by x and y.
The identity condition for ordered pairs is the following: x, y = u, v if and only
if x = u and y = v. Thus, 1, 2 = 1, 2 , but 1, 2 = 2, 1 . Similarly, one can
talk about ordered triples, ordered quadruples, and so on. In general, an n-tuple is
constituted by n objects ordered in a certain way.
A binary relation is a set of ordered pairs. Given a binary relation R, the domain
of R is the set of all x such that x, y ∈ R for some y, and the range of R is the set
of all y such that x, y ∈ R for some x. For example, the less-than relation is the set
of ordered pairs of numbers x, y such that x < y, like 0, 1 , 1, 3 , 2, 4 , and so
on. Similarly, the less-than-or-equal relation is the set of ordered pairs of numbers
x, y such that x ≤ y, like 0, 0 , 0, 1 , 1, 3 , and so on. Another example is the
identity relation. This relation is the set of ordered pairs of objects x, y such that
x = y, that is, 0, 0 , 1, 1 , 2, 2 , and so on. Beside binary relations, we can talk
of ternary relations, quaternary relations, and so on. In general, an n-ary relation is a
set of n-tuples, and it is assumed that when n = 1 the relation is simply a set. From
now on, ‘relation’ will be used as a synonym for ‘binary relation’, unless otherwise
specified.
Some of the properties that a relation R may have deserve attention. First, R is
reflexive if and only if, for every x, x, x ∈ R. For example, = and ≤ are reflexive,
whereas < is not reflexive. Second, R is symmetric if and only if, for every x and
y, if x, y ∈ R then y, x ∈ R. For example, = is symmetric, whereas < and
≤ are not symmetric. Third, R is transitive if and only if, for every x, y, and z,
if x, y ∈ R and y, z ∈ R then x, z ∈ R. For example, the three relations
considered are all transitive. When a relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive,
it is an equivalence relation.

2.2 True Premises

Arguments may be described as ordered pairs of sets of premises and conclusions:

an argument is an ordered pair , α , where  is a set of sentences and α is a
sentence. To simplify the notation, we will write /α instead of , α . Moreover,
we will assume that  can contain any number of sentences, including zero
sentences. An argument with zero premises is an argument in which the conclusion
is inferred from nothing, for it is taken to justify itself. Self-evident truths, if there
are such truths, can be treated as conclusions of this kind.
As explained in Sect. 1.1, there are two distinct properties that an argument /α
can have: being valid and having true premises. The question whether /α is valid is
independent of the question whether its premises are true. The truth of the premises
of /α is neither necessary nor sufficient for its validity. That is, /α can be valid
2.3 Validity as Necessary Truth Preservation 13

even if some of (or all) the sentences in  are false, and it can be invalid even if the
sentences in  are all true.
The following example shows that the truth of the premises of an argument is not
necessary for its validity:

(1) Either the earth is a star or it is a planet

(2) The earth is not a planet
(3) The earth is a star

This argument has a false premise, namely, (2). But the inference from (1) and (2) to
(3) is compelling. Even though (3) is false, if (1) and (2) were both true, we would
be entitled to conclude that (3) is true.
The following example, instead, shows that the truth of the premises of an
argument is not sufficient for its validity:

(1) Either the earth is a star or it is a planet

(2) The earth is not a star
(3) The Yeti exists

Although (1) and (2) are true, the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is patently
unjustified.
More generally, four cases are possible: an argument can be valid and have true
premises, it can be valid and have (some) false premises, it can be invalid and have
true premises, or it can be invalid and have (some) false premises. Since logic deals
with validity, the difference between the first and the second case, or between the
third and the fourth case, does not really matter here. What matters is how the first
two cases differ from the other two. From now on we will focus on the distinction
between correct and incorrect inferences.

2.3 Validity as Necessary Truth Preservation

What is a correct inference? This question admits at least two distinct answers. In
one sense—the deductive sense—the inference from  to α is correct when the truth
of  fully guarantees the truth of α, in that it rules out the possibility that α is false.
This is to say that  provides a conclusive reason, or a non-defeasible reason, for
accepting α. In the other sense—the inductive sense—the inference from  to α is
correct when the truth of  guarantees to some extent, even if not fully, the truth
of α. This is to say that  provides a non-conclusive reason, or a defeasible reason,
for accepting α. For example, the inference in the first of the two arguments above is
correct in the deductive sense, while the following is correct in the inductive sense:
14 2 Validity

(1) Every cat I know loves milk

(2) Greg is a cat
(3) Greg loves milk

The truth of (1) and (2) makes improbable that (3) is false, that is, it makes the
probability of (3) higher than the probability of its negation. Yet it does not rule out
the possibility that (3) is false.
The notion of correctness that matters here is the deductive notion. Logic is
mainly concerned with validity understood as necessary truth preservation: if the
premises are true, the conclusion must be true as well. Necessary truth preservation
has always been regarded as a paradigm of validity. Here is a famous quote from
Aristotle:
Now a reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other
than these necessarily comes about through them.1

According to a widely shared reading of this passage, the distinctive feature of

correct reasoning is that it never takes us from truth to falsity: if the things “being
laid down” are true, then the thing “other than these” must also be true. This is the
idea expressed by the definition of validity that we will adopt:
Definition 2.1 An argument /α is valid if and only if it is impossible that the
sentences in  are true and α is false.
An equivalent formulation is the following: /α is valid if and only if, neces-
sarily, if the sentences in  are true, then α is true. This formulation is equivalent
because possibility and necessity are interdefinable: it is possible that things are a
certain way if and only if it is not necessary that things are not that way, and it is
necessary that things are a certain way if and only if it is not possible that things are
not that way.
Since validity is defined in terms of possibility, or equivalently in terms of
necessity, it is natural to wonder what need be assumed about these notions. In
ordinary talk, ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ admit different readings, and the same goes
for other modal expressions, such as ‘can’ or ‘must’. This has led philosophers
to distinguish different kinds of modality. However, we will not dwell on such
distinctions. All that we need to assume is that some intelligible notion of possibility
is suitably unrestricted, namely, not constrained by what we currently know about
the physical world or what our best scientific theories predict. For example, even
though it makes sense to say that nothing can move faster than light, given that the
laws of nature rule out superluminal motion, this is not the sense of ‘possible’ that
matters to logic. In the sense of ‘possible’ that matters to logic, superluminal motion
is possible, because the laws of nature are not inherently necessary. The same goes
for any hypothesis that is compatible with the kind of general truths that qualify as
logical principles.

1 Aristotle, Topics 100a25.

2.4 Other Logical Properties and Relations 15

So, Definition 2.1 is to be read as follows: /α is valid just in case it is not
possible even in the most generously inclusive sense—it is not even coherently
conceivable—that the sentences in  are true and α is false. Equivalently, /α is
valid just in case every coherently conceivable situation in which the sentences in 
are true is a situation in which α is also true.

2.4 Other Logical Properties and Relations

The same notion of possibility that occurs in Definition 2.1 is employed to define
other fundamental logical properties and relations. This section adds four definitions
to our repertory.
Definition 2.2 A set of sentences  entails a sentence α if and only if it is
impossible that the sentences in  are true and α is false.
When  contain a single sentence β, that is, when  = {β}, we simply say that β
entails α. As it turns out from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2, validity and entailment are
interdefinable: /α is valid if and only if  entails α.
Definition 2.3 A set of sentences  is consistent if and only if it is possible that all
the sentences in  are true.
Here, again,  can contain any number of sentences. We stipulate that  is consistent
when  = ∅, for in that case  does not contain sentences whose truth is impossible.
A set of sentences that is not consistent is inconsistent. For example, the set formed
by ‘It is cold’ and ‘It is raining’ is consistent, for it is possible that it is cold and
raining. Instead, the set formed by ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is not raining’ is inconsistent.
The second sentence is the negation of the first, so it cannot be true if the first is
true. From now on we will represent negation by using the symbol ∼, following a
convention that goes back to Giuseppe Peano, and we will assume that ∼α is false
if α is true, just as ∼α is true if α is false.2
Definition 2.4 Two sentences α and β are equivalent if and only if it is impossible
that one of them is true and the other is false.
To say that two sentences are equivalent is to say that they entail each other. For
example, ‘It is not the case that it is not raining’ is equivalent to ‘It is raining’. In
general, according to the principle of Double Negation, first elucidated by the Stoics,
the double negation of a sentence is equivalent to the sentence itself. Since ∼α is

2 Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932) was an Italian mathematician who studied and taught at the
University of Turin. He aimed at developing mathematics in its entirety from a set of fundamental
postulates, using new symbols and a simplified language of his own invention called Latino sine
flexione. The symbol ∼ occurs in Peano [48].
16 2 Validity

false if and only if α is true, and ∼∼α is true if and only if ∼α is false, ∼∼α is true
if and only if α is true.3
Definition 2.5 Two sentences α and β are contradictory if and only if it is
impossible that they are both true or both false.
To say that two sentences are contradictory is to say that each of them entails
the negation of the other. For example, ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is not raining’
are contradictory: if one of them is true, the other must be false. According
to the principle of Non-Contradiction, originally formulated by Aristotle, two
contradictory sentences form an inconsistent set, so it is correct to deny that both of
them hold. Thus, for example, it is correct to say ‘It is not the case that it is raining
and not raining’.4
As the examples in Sect. 1.3 show, the absurdity involved in a reductio ad
absurdum is a contradiction: to reduce a hypothesis to absurdity is to show that
it entails a contradiction. This is why the principle that underlies a reductio may
be called Proof by Contradiction: if a sentence α, together with other assumptions,
entails two contradictory sentences, then α can be rejected on the basis of those
assumptions. This principle directly justifies the first of the two forms of reductio
considered in Sect. 1.3, that in which one assumes α in order to prove ∼α. To justify
the second, that in which one assumes ∼α in order to prove α, it suffices to add
Double Negation. For if one starts with ∼α and obtains ∼∼α through a reasoning
of the first kind, then one can get α by Double Negation.5
Note that, although any set of sentences which includes a contradiction is
inconsistent, the converse does not hold. A set of sentences can be inconsistent even
if it does not contain a contradiction. For example, the set formed by ‘Alf is less
than 40 years old’ and ‘Alf is more than 40 years old’ is inconsistent. But these two
sentences are not contradictory, for they can both be false: it can be the case that Alf
is just 40 years old.

2.5 Important Facts About Validity

This section spells out some important facts about validity that follow from
Definition 2.1. Since validity and entailment are interdefinable, these facts can be
phrased as properties of entailment. From now on we will use the symbol , aligned
on the right, to mark the end of a proof.

3 Our knowledge of Stoic logic, including the acceptance of Double Negation, is based on indirect
sources, see Kneale and Kneale [33], p. 147.
4 Aristotle Metaphysics IV, , 3, 1005b 19–23. For Aristotle, first philosophy, or metaphysics, deals

with first principles, of which Non-Contradiction is the firmest: without this principle we could not
know anything that we do know.
5 The Stoics recognized the cogency of Proof by Contradiction, which was employed by the Eleatics

and the Megarians in some arguments that they held in high esteem, see Kneale and Kneale [33],
p. 172.
2.5 Important Facts About Validity 17

Let us start with three constitutive properties of entailment. The first is Reflexiv-
ity:
Theorem 2.1 α entails α
Proof Trivially, it cannot be the case that α is both true and false. 

The second is Monotonicity, understood as follows:
Theorem 2.2 If  entails α, and  ⊆ , then  entails α.
Proof Assume that  entails α and that  ⊆ . Now suppose that all the sentences
in  are true. Since  ⊆ , this implies that all the sentences in  are true. It
follows that α is true, given that  entails α. 

Theorem 2.2 says that no addition of premises to a valid argument can affect its
validity. Monotonicity characterizes validity as distinct from any inductive property
of the sort considered in Sect. 2.3. While validity is monotonic, such a property
would be non-monotonic. For example, assuming that the argument about the cat
Greg has a certain inductive strength, if one adds ‘Greg is allergic to lactose’ as a
premise, one gets an inductively weaker argument.
Note that Reflexivity and Monotonicity imply that any argument whose premises
include the conclusion is valid. Suppose that α ∈ . By Theorem 2.1, α entails α.
Since {α} ⊆ , by Theorem 2.2 it follows that  entails α.
Third, entailment satisfies a condition called Cut:
Theorem 2.3 If  entails α, and  ∪ {α} entails β, then  ∪  entails β.
Proof Assume that  entails α and that  ∪ {α} entails β. Now suppose that the
sentences in  ∪  are true. From the first assumption we get that α is true. So,
the sentences in  ∪ {α} are true. From the second assumption it follows that β is
true. 

Theorem 2.3 says that if two valid arguments are chained, then a third argument
formed by the premises of the first two and the conclusion of the second is valid.
This guarantees that, if a complex reasoning is formed by a set of chained arguments
and each of the arguments in the set is valid, the whole reasoning is valid as well.
Note that Cut implies transitivity, that is, if γ entails α, and α entails β, then
γ entails β. To see this it suffices to take Theorem 2.3 and suppose that  = {γ }
and  = ∅. So entailment is both reflexive and transitive, although it is clearly not
symmetric: it can be the case that α entails β but β does not entail α. For example,
‘The earth is a planet’ entails ‘Either the earth is a star or it is a planet’, but not the
other way round.
A fourth property of entailment is Proof by Contradiction:
Theorem 2.4 If  ∪ {α} entails β and ∼β, then  entails ∼α.
Proof Assume that  ∪ {α} entails β and ∼β. If the sentences in  ∪ {α} were
all true, β and ∼β would both be true. But β and ∼β cannot be true together. So,
 ∪ {α} is inconsistent. This is to say that it is impossible that the sentences in  are
18 2 Validity

true and α is true: if the sentences in  are true, α must be false. Equivalently, if the
sentences in  are true, ∼α must be true. 

A fifth property concerns consistency:
Theorem 2.5  entails ∼α if and only if  ∪ {α} is inconsistent.
Proof Assume that  entails ∼α. This means that, necessarily, if the sentences in 
are true, ∼α is true, and consequently α is false. Therefore,  ∪ {α} is inconsistent.
Now assume that  ∪ {α} is inconsistent. Then  entails ∼α for the reason stated in
the proof of Theorem 2.4, that is, if it is impossible that the sentences in  are true
and α is true, it is impossible that the sentences in  are true and ∼α is false. 

A direct corollary of Theorem 2.5 is that, for any inconsistent set of sentences ,
there is a set of sentences  and a sentence α such that  =  ∪ {α} and  entails
∼α. This holds because if  is inconsistent, by definition it is not empty. So, it
contains at least one sentence α such that  =  ∪ {α} for some . Note that it is
not necessary that  contains more than one sentence, for it can happen that  = ∅
and  = {α}.
Finally, two facts about entailment that deserve attention may be described as
cases of vacuous necessary truth preservation. One is the following:
Theorem 2.6 If  is inconsistent, then  entails α, for any α.
Proof Assume that  is inconsistent. Then it is impossible that the sentences in 
are true. So, for any α, it is impossible that the sentences in  are true and α is
false. 

Here the condition required by Definition 2.1 is vacuously satisfied: the argument
is valid simply because it is impossible that its premises are true, independently
of what its conclusion says. Theorem 2.6 warrants the principle of Explosion,
traditionally known as Pseudo Scotus, according to which anything follows from
a contradiction.6
The other case is the following:
Theorem 2.7 If α is necessarily true, then  entails α, for any .
Proof Assume that α is necessarily true. Then, for any , it is impossible that the
sentences in  are true and α is false. 

Here, again, the condition required by Definition 2.1 is vacuously satisfied: the
argument is valid simply because it is impossible that its conclusion is false,
independently of what its premises say. Note that α is entailed by any  just in
case it is entailed by ∅. On the one hand, if α is entailed by any , then it is entailed
by ∅, because ∅ is one possible . On the other, if α is entailed by ∅, then it is
entailed by any  in virtue of Monotonicity (Theorem 2.2), given that ∅ ⊆ .

6 The name ‘Pseudo Scotus’ refers to the unknown author of a book called In Universam Logicam

Quaestiones, formerly attributed to John Duns Scotus (1265–1308). In that book, the principle was
formulated and proved, in the context of a vast and original discussion of consequence relations.
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admitting that it were both constitutional and practicable, what
propriety would there be in it? If Carolina conceive that she has a
right to complain of the proceedings of the common agent of the
political partnership to which she belongs, and think that her
partners ought also to attend to the subject, is she not perfectly
capable of saying to them herself all that is necessary or proper on
the occasion? Is it not obvious that the agent, who is supposed to be
in fault, is the very last person who can be depended on to bring the
question before the tribunal which is to decide upon it? Is it
reasonable to expect that he will intermeddle in a matter in which he
has really no concern, for the mere purpose of denouncing himself
as a usurper of power, not granted by his commission? Is there not a
wanton and almost ludicrous absurdity in the very idea of such a
proceeding? And independently of all this, how ungraceful in the
General Government to apply for an augmentation of its own
powers, and this too at the very moment when it is accused of
exceeding them! Is it not apparent, that such an application would
come with infinitely greater propriety from any other quarter? We
can hardly believe that, on cool reflection, the Vice-President himself
would sanction with his final judgment a theory pregnant with so
many and such various incongruities.
It would therefore be the duty of the discontented State, instead of
proceeding to nullify and throwing upon the General Government the
responsibility of bringing the subject before the other States, to
begin by addressing herself directly to the other States in the way of
consultation. But in what form is this to be done? The Vice-President
tells us, that the subject must be brought before the States 'in the
only form in which according to the Constitution it can be, by a
proposition to amend in the manner prescribed by that instrument.'
But how does it appear, that this is the only or the proper form in
which the business can be done? The object is to ascertain the
meaning of the Constitution. Why resort for this purpose to a
process intended for a totally different one, and, as we have seen,
wholly unsuitable and ineffectual for this? Suppose that all the
insuperable preliminary objections to which we have adverted are
overcome;—that the General Government has applied for a grant of
the disputed power, and that the States, as the Vice-President would
of course desire, have refused the application;—how would the case
then stand? Precisely as it does now. The question would still be,
what is the meaning of the Constitution as it is? And after all that
had taken place, it would still be just as far from a solution as
before. Instead of resorting to a process intended for another
purpose, and wholly ineffectual for this, why not employ the one
which the Constitution provided and organized for this special
object? 'The judicial power,' says the Constitution, 'shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of
the United States and the treaties made or which shall be made
under their authority.' Why not submit the question at once to the
Supreme Court? This is the method by which the States, when they
established the Constitution, intended that all questions respecting
the construction of it should be decided. Nor does a resort to this
method involve, as some suppose, the inconvenience of making the
General Government the judge of its own powers. The Judiciary
department, though nominally a branch of the General Government,
is, and was for this express purpose meant and made to be, wholly
independent of the other branches of that Government. It is properly
a separate agency, established for specific purposes by the same
authority which for other purposes established the Executive and
Legislative branches. It has no community of interest, direct or
indirect, with these branches, and is in all respects the most
competent and capable, as it is the proper constitutional judge of
the extent of their powers, as defined by the great charter of the
Union.
But waving this point, upon which we are aware that the Vice-
President's views would not agree with ours, and admitting for the
moment and for argument's sake, that the Supreme Court is not the
proper tribunal to decide in this case, the question still returns, Why
resort to the form provided for making amendments? This is a form,
in which the States act for a certain purpose within the pale of the
Constitution. But this whole process of nullification,—if not, as we
believe it to be, unconstitutional,—is at least, and is admitted to be
by those who approve it, extra-constitutional. The State of Carolina
throws herself back, (such is the received phrase) upon her reserved
rights, and undertakes to decide, in her capacity as an independent
State and a party to the Union, which she considers as a
confederacy of independent States, whether the compact has been
faithfully observed. She satisfies herself that it has been violated,
and she now wishes to ascertain whether the other States agree
with her in opinion. But how are these States to be consulted and to
act in this matter? Obviously in the same capacity in which Carolina
proposes it. She appears in this affair as a sovereign and
independent power; as such she must address herself to the other
States, and it is only in their capacity as sovereign and independent
powers, resting on their reserved rights, that they can receive and
act upon her communication. The whole affair, reasoning of course
on the principles of the Vice-President, is extra-constitutional. Why
then resort to a process, intended for the direction of the States
while acting within the pale of the Constitution for its ordinary
purposes? The Vice-President, in proposing this course, obviously
forgets his own principles. The true one, on his system, would be
very different. Having taken her stand upon her reserved rights and
assumed the attitude of a sovereign power, Carolina should exhibit a
little more of the lion port and awe-commanding face. Instead of
resorting to a paltry humiliating process, which supposes throughout
the subordination of all the parties concerned in it to the common
authority of the Union, our soi-disant sovereign, in order to be
consistent, should send ambassadors to all the other States to
communicate the business in hand. These again, being thus called
on, must in like manner throw themselves back upon their reserved
rights, and assume, for the time, the attitude of independent States.
If a consultative meeting be deemed expedient, it must be a
congress of ambassadors held by arrangement among the States,
and in which they will appear by their ministers as independent
powers. At such a meeting, the rule of deciding questions according
to the opinion of the majority has of course no application. Although
three-fourths or even all the States, except Carolina, should agree
that the compact had not been violated, she would still be at liberty
as a sovereign power to adhere to her own construction, and to hold
herself in future exempt from the obligation imposed by the articles
of union. Such, as we conceive, is the only process consistent with
the theory of nullification, which the Vice-President, with submission
to his better judgment, does not follow out to its proper and natural
conclusion. We find accordingly that Georgia, who, although she has
said but little about nullification, has, to do her justice, practised it
for two or three years past with a vigor and consistency that rather
put to shame the Carolina doctors of the science,—having thought
proper to consult the other Southern States upon the propriety of
assembling an anti-Tariff Convention,—instead of depending upon
the General Government to bring the subject before them in the
form provided for amending the Constitution, forthwith despatches
her ambassadors to their several seats of Government to
communicate her sovereign intentions, where, for aught we know to
the contrary, they have been carrying on their negotiations up to this
day.
So much for the first reason, why the doctrine, that a principal has,
in ordinary cases, an unlimited right to construe the powers, and
disavow the acts of his agent,—were it even true, as we have shown
that it is not,—would in no way help the Vice-President's argument.
Carolina is one of a number of principals, composing a partnership
concern; and if she have any doubts about the propriety of the
proceedings of the common agent, her only course is to consult with
her co-partners, and to acquiesce in the opinion of the majority. But
there is another reason still more substantial, why the doctrine in
question, even if true, would be of no service to the Vice-President:
—a reason leading at once to the heart of the whole argument, of
which the matters thus far touched upon are merely the 'limbs and
outward flourishes;' and that is, that a Government, although it may
in a certain sense be called an agency, is an agency of a peculiar
kind, carrying with it rights and obligations, of which the nature and
extent cannot be deduced by analogy from those which are incident
to the relation of agent and principal in private life, and can only be
determined by a correct analysis of the structure of society and the
original principles of the human constitution.
That the Government of the United States, though described as an
agency, is to all intents and purposes a real Government, is frankly
admitted by the Vice-President himself. 'In applying the term agent
to the General Government, I do not intend to derogate in any
degree from its character as a Government. It is as truly and
properly a Government as are the State Governments themselves. I
have applied it simply because it strictly belongs to the relation
between the General Government and the States, as in fact it does
also to that between a State and its own Government. Indeed,
according to our theory, Governments are in their nature but trusts,
and those appointed to administer them trustees or agents to
execute the trust powers. The sovereignty resides elsewhere,—in the
people, and not in the Government.' 'The Constitution of the United
States, with the Government it created, is truly and strictly the
Constitution of each State, as much so as its own particular
Constitution and Government, ratified by the same authority in the
same mode, and having, as far as its citizens are concerned, its
powers and obligations from the same source.'
In these principles we fully concur, but in laying them down in this
distinct and unequivocal manner, the Vice-President has, as we
humbly conceive, conceded the whole matter in controversy, and
given up every inch of ground which he had to stand upon. If it
could be made out that the two Houses of Congress, the President,
and the various executive and judicial officers acting under them, are
not a proper Government, but a mere agency constituted by four
and twenty mutually independent States for certain specific objects,
it would follow, not precisely that the theory of nullification is true,
for this, as we have seen, is, at least as stated by the Vice-President
in the document before us, not merely unconstitutional, but in itself
essentially impracticable, incongruous and absurd:—but that any
State which might be, for any or no reason, tired of the
arrangement, would have a perfect right, after such consultation and
advisement with the other parties as might be necessary to secure
their interests, to revoke its powers. But the moment it is admitted
that the two Houses of Congress, the President and the executive
and judicial officers acting under them,—by whatever name they
may be called,—are a real Government:—that the instrument by
which they hold their powers is a real Constitution, the case
changes. By the Constitution of Government, is meant, in every
community, the great social compact which binds together the
individual members into one body politic or political society.
Whatever may be its form, character, or origin,—whether it be
written or unwritten;—free, limited, or despotic;—whether founded
in force, fraud, or voluntary association;—whether created by a
number of previously independent States or by a number of
previously independent individuals, so long as it is and is admitted to
be a real Constitution of Government, it carries with it certain
incidents which belong to it as such, and which are inseparable from
its nature. Of these incidents, essential properties or characteristics
of the social compact, the first in order are that the parties to it have
not a moral right to withdraw from it at discretion, or to construe at
discretion the powers of the Government created by it, but are
bound to remain parties to it, and to acquiesce in the acts of the
Government created by it, excepting in those extreme cases which
justify open rebellion. These are principles universally acknowledged.
No one has ever questioned them; no one has ever undertaken to
maintain that the members of a political society have a right to
withdraw from it at discretion, or that the laws of the land are not in
ordinary cases binding on the citizens. The principle is equally true
under all forms of government, as the Vice-President himself very
correctly intimates, when he states that the relation between the
General Government and the States is the same with that between
the States and their own Governments, or in general between all
Governments and the societies in which they are established.
Such are the principles which, by universal acknowledgment,
determine the relations between Governments and the political
societies in which they exist. When therefore the Vice-President fully
and formally admits that the two Houses of Congress, the President,
and the executive and judicial officers acting under them are a real
Government;—that the instrument by virtue of which they hold their
powers is a real Constitution or social compact, he admits,—if he
choose at the same time to describe them as an agency,—that they
are an agency which the parties that constituted it, whether States
or individuals, have not a right to revoke at discretion; an agency
which construes its own powers, and has a right to enforce its own
construction of them upon its principals, excepting in the extreme
cases which justify a violent resistance to the law: he admits that
nullification is either wholly unjustifiable or justifiable only as
resistance: he admits, in a word, that nullification, if it have any
proper and intelligible meaning at all, is only another name for
rebellion. This is, in fact, the real truth of the whole business.
And this being the case, it is apparent that, even if the acts which
the nullifiers propose to perform were justifiable, it would be on
principles other than those which they profess; that their theory
would still be erroneous, and their language incongruous and
absurd. In certain extreme cases, the citizen is justified in resisting
the execution of the law; but even then he has neither the right nor
the power to annul or repeal it. This is an operation, which from its
nature can only be performed by the same authority which enacted
the law, viz: the Government of the country. The supposition made
by the nullifiers, that in certain cases a citizen or a certain number of
citizens have a right to annul or repeal the law of the land, is not
merely an error, but a manifest absurdity, involving a contradiction in
terms. In the cases which justify resistance, the principle upon which
the citizen proceeds, is not that he has a legal or constitutional right
to annul or repeal the offensive law,—which is the doctrine of the
nullifiers,—but that he has a right, which he admits to be illegal and
unconstitutional, but which he claims as a natural one, to make a
violent opposition to its execution.
Such is the second reason, why the doctrine that a principal has, in
ordinary cases, an unlimited right to construe the powers and
disavow the acts of his agent,—were it even true, as we have shown
that it is not,—would in no way help the Vice-President's argument.
The General Government, if it be an agency, is an agency of a
peculiar kind, which, from its nature, is not revocable at the
discretion of the parties that constituted it, which construes its own
powers, and which has a right to enforce its construction of them
against that of its principals, excepting in those extreme cases that
authorize rebellion.
This, as we have said, is the principal and leading consideration
which governs the whole subject. Once admit, what the Vice-
President fully recognises, and what no man in his senses can deny,
that the General Government, call it agency or what you will, is a
real Government;—that the instrument from which it derives its
power is a real Constitution or social compact, and the argument is
brought to a close; there is not a word more to be said about the
matter. The acts of the Government are, as such, the law of the
land. This results from the nature of the case, and is also affirmed in
the Constitution, which, in order to avoid all doubt or difficulty about
the point immediately in controversy in the present instance,
expressly provides that the acts of the General Government shall be
the Supreme Law of the land, any thing in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. But to say that a
citizen, or any number of citizens, can annul or repeal the law of the
land, is, we repeat, a manifest absurdity. Resist it they can, and in
certain extreme cases may: but that they should annul or repeal it,
is a thing not illegal or unconstitutional, but impossible and
unimaginable. The repeal of a law is as much an exercise of
legislative power as the enactment of it, and from its very nature
cannot be performed, unless by some person or persons invested
with that power, in other words, by the Government. To assert the
contrary, is in substance to assert that the same person can be
sovereign and subject, or in a free State, in and out of office, at one
and the same time.
We have thus endeavored, by a few plain considerations, to show,
first, that the doctrine of nullification is not only unsanctioned by the
Constitution, but wholly impracticable, and that its results, if it could
be carried into effect, would be of the most disastrous character:—
secondly, that the only semblance of argument, by which the Vice-
President attempts to sustain it in the document before us, is
entirely without foundation. It follows from the view which we have
taken of the subject, that the controversy respecting the origin of
the Constitution, which has been often agitated in connexion with
this question, is in a great measure foreign to it. Whether the
General Government had its origin in the will of the State
Governments, of the people of the States, or of the people of the
United States is a point of no importance in the present inquiry, for
those who admit that it is the real and rightful Government of the
country. For those, if any such there be, who wish to establish the
proposition that the Union is a confederacy of independent States,
subject to no common Government, the question of the origin of the
Constitution is an essential one, because it is in the circumstances
attending it, that they must look for the proofs of their theory. But
for those who believe that that instrument is a social compact, and
the Government created by it a real Government, it is unnecessary,
for the present purpose, to go beyond that fact, which proves, of
itself, that its acts are the law of the land, and that in respect to
them there is no middle course between obedience and rebellion.
As respects the origin of the Constitution, we will therefore merely
remark, without enlarging on the subject, that we agree with the
Vice-President in the opinion that it derives its authority from the
States acting as distinct communities, and not from the aggregate
mass of the people of the United States. The latter theory receives
some countenance from the opening words of the preamble:—We
the people of the United States;—but is obviously inconsistent with
the facts attending the formation and adoption of the Constitution.
Throughout the whole proceedings, the States appeared as distinct
communities. Those States, which did not at first approve the
Constitution, considered themselves and were considered by the
other States as at liberty to remain without the pale, and actually did
so remain for some years. This could not have happened if all the
States had previously constituted one people, that is, one body
politic. In that case the decision of the body, in whatever form it
might have been collected, must have been obligatory upon all the
members. Indeed, the preceding instrument of Union, commonly
called the Old Confederation, expressly recognises the sovereignty
and independence of the States, and describes the Union as a
league. The Congress which assembled under this Confederation
was not a General Government, but a meeting of delegates or
ambassadors, in which each State had an equal vote, and which
merely recommended to the States the adoption of certain
measures, which being adopted by them and in that case only,
obtained the character and force of laws. It is obviously impossible
to reconcile this condition of things with the theory, that the States,
at the period immediately preceding the adoption of the
Constitution, constituted one people. We find accordingly, that
President J. Q. Adams, who, in his late Fourth of July Oration,
professes the doctrine that the acts of Union which preceded the
declaration of Independence combined the States into one people,
and that they never existed as separate sovereignties, treats the old
Confederation as a temporary departure from the true political
system of the country. In other words, he admits that the character
of it is inconsistent with his theory. But this Confederation, whatever
may be thought of its value, undoubtedly determined for the time
being the actual relation of the parties to it. There is reason to
suppose, from the tenor of another late publication by Mr. Adams,
that he considers the union of Great Britain and Ireland as a
departure from the true political system of those countries; but he
would probably not think of maintaining, as a consequence of that
opinion, that Ireland is at this moment an independent State. On our
view of the subject, therefore, the States, from the period of the
Declaration of Independence to that of the establishment of the
Constitution, existed, in form at least, as distinct communities,
independent of each other, and, though confederated for certain
purposes, not subject to a common Government. The Constitution,
by which they subjected themselves to a common Government, was
the act which gave them the character of one people. The form of
distinct communities, under which they existed during the period
alluded to, may have been, as we agree with President Adams that it
was, an unfortunate expression of the substantial condition of the
population of this continent; but this is a question not of substance
but of form, and such undoubtedly was, for the time being, the form
of their political existence.
We are therefore disposed to agree with the Vice-President in the
opinion, that the parties to the great social compact, entitled the
Constitution, were not the individual citizens composing the whole
people of the United States, but the several distinct communities
into which they are divided, and which were at that time,—to use
the ordinary language,—sovereign and independent States. We may
remark en passant that the phrase Sovereign State, which certain
persons employ so frequently and appear to consider as pregnant
with important political conclusions, though it may, perhaps, be
sufficiently authorized by usage to be received as good English, is
not, in the strict and proper use of language, admissible, and is
therefore better avoided in all precise and scientific discussion. The
word sovereign has the same etymology with supreme, of which it is
another form, and properly implies, as that does, comparison with
something else. Thus the Supreme Being is the highest of all beings:
the Supreme Court is the highest of all the Courts: the Sovereign
power in a State is the highest political authority. But States, being
as such politically independent of each other, cannot in the nature of
things stand towards each other in the relation of superiority or
inferiority, and can of course be neither sovereign nor subject. We
find, accordingly, that in the Declaration of Independence,—a
document remarkable throughout for great propriety in the use of
language,—although it was once quoted by Governor Hamilton, on
some public occasion, as saying that the United Colonies are, and of
right ought to be, free, sovereign and independent States, the word
sovereign is not employed. The language used is that the colonies
are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States. As
applied to States, the word sovereign, if it have any meaning at all,
can only mean independent. In this sense it is no longer applicable
to the several States composing the Union, which, since the
adoption of a common Government, are not politically independent
of each other. This is not a merely verbal criticism. Words are things;
and we strongly suspect that the frequent use of this incorrect,
ambiguous, and,—to recur again to the language of Governor
Lumpkin,—mystical phrase Sovereign State, has created a good deal
of embarrassment, which the substitution of the more correct and
intelligible term independent would have in part prevented.
To return, however, from this digression:—although we agree with
the Vice-President in the opinion, that the Constitution had its origin
in the will of the States acting as distinct communities, we cannot
acquiesce in the conclusions which he deduces from this fact, or
admit that, for the present purpose, it makes any difference
whatever in the case. Independent States may form themselves into
a body politic, as well as independent individuals. Such is in fact the
historical origin of most of the communities now existing throughout
the world. They are in general aggregations of smaller communities,
previously existing in an independent form. Where the States, so
forming themselves into one body politic, retain for certain purposes
a distinct name and character, their position in the body politic, of
which they form a part, is precisely the same with that of the
individual citizens in an ordinary community. This, as we have seen,
is fully and distinctly admitted by Mr. Calhoun himself. He admits that
the General Government is as fully and properly a Government as
are the State Governments themselves, and that the relation
between the General Government and the States is precisely the
same with that between the Governments and citizens of the States,
or in general between the Governments and citizens of any other
community. How then can he possibly claim for the States a right of
annulling the acts of the General Government, when he certainly
would not think of claiming such a right for the citizens of the
several States, or of any other political societies, in reference to their
respective Governments?
It may be true, as Mr. Calhoun intimates, that a State Government
has no right to enforce its construction of the Constitution of the
State against the people of the State, appearing in their sovereign
capacity; or, more generally, that in our theories of government the
people of any country, acting in their sovereign capacity, have a right
to construe, alter or totally destroy the Constitution at discretion. But
supposing this to be true, would it follow that every individual citizen
has a right to annul the Constitution, or any part of it, at discretion?
Would Mr. Calhoun himself think of drawing such a conclusion, in
reference to the individual citizens of the States, or of other
communities?—Undoubtedly not. How then can he with the least
regard for consistency draw it in reference to the individual States,
which, as he tells us himself, stand in precisely the same relation to
the General Government, in which the individual citizens of the
States and of other communities stand in relation to their respective
Governments?
The right claimed for the States of annulling the Constitution and
laws of the United States, must, says the Vice-President, belong to
them, unless they have expressly surrendered or transferred it. We
have already seen, that no member of a body politic, whether
composed of States or individuals, does or can possess a right to
annul or repeal the law; and that the contrary proposition involves a
contradiction in terms. Were the Constitution wholly silent on the
subject, the mere fact that they had formed themselves, by a
solemn social compact, into one great people, subject to a common
Government, though retaining, as distinct communities, no
inconsiderable share of the legislative power,—this fact alone, we
say, would have carried with it a peremptory obligation upon the
States to obey the law as construed by the courts of justice,
excepting in the extreme cases that justify resistance. It would,
however, be natural enough for independent States, in forming a
compact of this description, to introduce an expression of this
obligation; and it may be a matter of curiosity to consider for a
moment what language could have been used, in order to express
the idea in the most direct and unequivocal manner. To one who was
seeking for such an expression, some such phrase as the following
would probably occur. No State shall have a right, either in the
exercise of the sovereign (constitution-making) or the ordinary
legislative (law-making) power, to annul or arrest the execution of
this Constitution, or any law made in pursuance of it by the General
Government. This, we say, or something like it would probably be
the language, which would occur to any one who was seeking for
the most direct and unequivocal expression of the idea, that the
States have no right to set up their authority against that of the
General Government. Now the language of the Constitution on this
subject is still more decisive, because it expresses the same ideas
conveyed by that here supposed in two forms, the one positive and
the other negative. This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land. This positive
declaration carries with it, as we have said, by implication, the full
import of the negative one which we have supposed above: but in
order to make assurance doubly sure, the framers of the
Constitution added a negative declaration, which, though more
concise than the one we have supposed, is of precisely the same
meaning; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding. This declaration, we repeat, though more concise,
is equivalent in meaning to the more extended expression of the
same idea, which we have imagined as the most direct and
unequivocal that could possibly be used.—Any thing in the laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.—No State, in the exercise
of its ordinary law-making power, shall have a right to annul or
arrest the execution of this Constitution, or the laws made in
pursuance thereof by the United States. Any thing in the Constitution
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.—No State, in the
exercise of her sovereign or constitution-making power; no State,
acting in her sovereign capacity, shall have a right to annul or arrest
the execution of this Constitution, or the laws made in pursuance
thereof by the United States. Any act that may be done for this
purpose is to be, ipso facto, null and void. The judges shall not be
bound by it. Will the Vice-President or any person of plain common
sense undertake to say, that this is not a correct paraphrase of the
negative clause in the Constitution? If it be admitted that it is, will
the Vice-President or any man of plain common sense undertake to
say, that if the framers of the Constitution had employed the
language of this paraphrase instead of the concise equivalent phrase
which they used, there could be any doubt respecting the character
of the present proceedings in Carolina? There is, in fact, no doubt
about it.
It is painful to see a person so distinguished for talent, and, as we
have hitherto been willing to believe, for uprightness of purpose, as
Mr. Calhoun is, attempting to escape by a side path from the plain
and obvious meaning of this clause, which he shrinks from meeting
in the face. He alludes to several propositions that had previously
been submitted to the Convention which framed the Constitution, for
the purpose of making the acts of the General Government
paramount to those of the States; and because these were rejected,
he concludes, that the one which was adopted is not to be carried
into effect according to its plain and natural sense. Is this fair
argument? Is it even plausible? It is impossible, within the narrow
compass of an article, to go fully into every part of this vast subject;
but any one, who will take the trouble to examine the proceedings of
the Convention, will readily see why they rejected the first
propositions, and why they adopted the last. As the States retain a
very considerable portion of the legislative power, and remain, for
many purposes, distinct communities, it was thought important that,
in regard to the exercise of the powers so retained, they should not
be under the formal control of the General Government:—in other
words, that so far as they were sovereign, they should not be
subject. Hence the rejection of the proposal of General Hamilton to
give the President a negative on all State laws; and hence
subsequently the amendment of the Constitution, by which it was
ordained that no State should be sued at law. This was all perfectly
proper: but it was also essential that the paramount authority of the
acts of the General Government should be secured, and the object
was attained by the proposition finally adopted, which declares
distinctly, both in a positive and negative form, that such is the
understanding of the Convention, and leaves it to the Courts of
Justice to enforce the provision. This plan is just as effectual as the
other would have been, because the decisions of the courts may and
must be sustained, if the occasion require it, by the whole military
force of the country; while at the same time it removes the
possibility of any actual collision between the two law-giving powers,
in the regular performance of their functions. Each exercises a
complete and uncontrolled discretion as to the objects and extent of
its own legislation;—puts its own construction upon its own powers;
—passes, in short, any laws which it deems constitutional and
expedient. Neither, in this form of action, has any control over the
proceedings of the other.—The General Government has no more
right to annul an act of the State of South Carolina, than the State of
South Carolina has to annul an act of the General Government. But
when the proceedings of the two powers come into collision,—as it
may well be supposed that, under such circumstances, they
occasionally will,—the silent operation of the Courts of Justice gives
the ascendancy, where the Constitution declares that it belongs, to
those of the General Government. The provision, like most others in
the Constitution, is obviously the simplest and best that could have
been adopted. The rejection of other propositions of similar
tendency only proves that the Convention considered the subject
very maturely, and successively laid aside the several imperfect and
inexpedient methods of effecting the great object in question, which
were proposed to them, until they finally hit upon one that was
satisfactory.
In alluding to this decisive clause in the Constitution, the Vice-
President omits entirely the negative part of it, and quotes it in the
following form:—This Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof shall be the supreme law of the land. He then adds that he
shall not go into a minute examination of its effect, the subject
having been already so frequently and so ably investigated, that he
deems it unnecessary. This might have been a good reason for not
discussing it at all; but if it was expedient to discuss it at all, it
seems hardly proper that the most material point in the argument
should be passed over in silence. The omission looks very much like
conscious weakness. For ourselves, we have met with no suggestion,
whether made on this or any former occasion, which, according to
our views, has thrown even the shadow of a doubt upon the
meaning of the passage. The pretext for a question would probably
be sought in the qualification, made in pursuance of the
Constitution. It may be said that, under this qualification, laws not
made in pursuance of the Constitution are not paramount to those of
the States. But this phrase has obviously no bearing on the point in
question. The meaning is, that the Constitution and the laws of the
United States, made in the manner prescribed by it, or for the
purpose of carrying it into effect, shall be the paramount law of the
land, just as in the other part of the phrase it is said, that treaties
made under the authority of the United States shall also form a part
of this paramount law. In both cases, there is no reference to the
question, whether the law or the treaty has been made in a rightful
or wrongful exercise of the legislative or treaty-making power. It is
merely affirmed that the acts of the General Government, performed
in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution, are
paramount to those of the States. The same language is used in the
Ordinance of Nullification, which declares that 'this Ordinance and
the laws made in pursuance thereof by the legislative power of the
State, shall be binding on the citizens.' It is obviously not intended,
that the citizen shall judge for himself whether the laws so made are
or are not agreeable to the tenor of the Ordinance, but merely that
the laws which the assembly,—acting under this Ordinance or in
consequence of the recommendation contained in this Ordinance,—
may pass, shall be obligatory.
This qualification, which has sometimes, we believe, been regarded
as very significant, has therefore no bearing on the point in
question, nor is it, as Mr. Calhoun imagines, by the clause conferring
on the Supreme Court the power of deciding in all cases arising
under the Constitution, that the States are supposed to be deprived
of their right of putting their own construction upon the powers of
the General Government. The right of deciding on the
constitutionality of the laws of the United States, belongs, from the
nature of the case, to the courts, and is expressly given to the
Supreme Court by the Constitution; but the possession of this right
by the courts does not carry with it that of deciding, that an act of
the General Government is of paramount authority to one of a State.
On this subject, we are quite surprised at the looseness of the Vice-
President's reasoning, and its apparent inconsistency with the
general scope of his doctrine. 'Where there are two sets of rules,' he
remarks, 'prescribed in reference to the same subject, one by a
higher and the other by an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal
called on to decide the case, must unavoidably determine, should
they conflict, which is the law; and that necessarily compels it to
decide that the rule prescribed by the inferior power, if, in its
opinion, inconsistent with that of the higher, is void.'—This doctrine
is strange indeed in the mouth of the Prince of nullifiers and great
champion of State Sovereignty. Where, we would ask, has the Vice-
President learned that the State Governments are inferior and the
General Government a superior power?—We must inform him, that
without being nullifiers, and without believing in the doctrine of
State Sovereignty, we make no such admission for Massachusetts.
The State and General Governments, each of which exercises,
independently of the other, a portion of the sovereign or legislative
power of the people, are neither superior nor inferior to each other:
they are precisely on a level. The right of deciding on the
constitutionality of the acts of the General Government would no
more of itself authorize the judges to decide that they are
paramount to those of the States, than it would authorize them to
decide that the acts of the States are paramount to those of the
General Government. The two Governments, considered as distinct
legislative powers, are on a footing of perfect equality. The question,
which shall prevail when their acts come into collision, must be
decided by the nature of the case, and by the specific provisions of
the Constitution. It follows, from the nature of the case, that the
acts of the General Government, which represents the body politic of
which all the States are members, must have an authority
paramount to any other existing in the community; and this
conclusion is confirmed by the letter of the Constitution, which
expressly declares, in so many words, that the acts of the General
Government are paramount to those of the States. It was by forming
themselves into one body politic, and by expressly stipulating with
each other in the compact by which this body politic was formed,
that the acts of the General Government representing it should be
paramount to their own, that the States surrendered the right of
putting their own construction on the powers of the General
Government; and this is the foundation of the authority possessed
by the judges, when, by virtue of a different clause, they take
cognisance of cases arising under the Constitution, to decide, as
they undoubtedly must and would do, that any act of a State,
whether in its sovereign or legislative capacity, pretending to annul
an act of the General Government, is of itself, ipso facto, null and
void.
Finally, says the Vice-President, 'it belongs to the authority which
imposes an obligation, to declare its extent, as far as those are
concerned on whom the obligation is placed. The obligation upon
the individual citizens of the United States to obey the laws, results
from the acts of their respective States, by which they became
parties to the Union; and a similar act of the same authority
declaring the extent of the obligation must be of equal authority, and
of course releases the citizen from the obligation which he came
under, by the effect of the former one.'
This is a point of great importance. It is here admitted, that the
individual citizens are under an obligation to obey the law which the
State is attempting to annul; but it is affirmed, that they may be
discharged from this obligation by an act of the State annulling the
law, because the same authority which imposed the obligation upon
them has a right to release them from it. It is a matter of high
concern for all who wish to know, and knowing, mean to perform
their duties, to inquire how far this principle is true, or, if true,
applicable to the present case.
The same authority which imposes an obligation must of necessity
possess the right of dispensing with it, or declaring its extent. This
principle, properly explained, may be received as true. But what is
the authority which imposes the obligation,—for example, to execute
a contract? Does the Vice-President suppose that it is the will of the
parties who make the contract, and that the same will which brought
each of them under the obligation, can, at any time, release him
from it? Does he suppose, for example, that it is the will of the two
parties to a contract of marriage which imposes upon them the
obligations incident to that contract, and that either party can, by a
mere act of the will, exempt him or herself from these obligations?
We are quite sure, that Mr. Calhoun would not himself think of
maintaining a doctrine so monstrous. What then is the authority
which imposes the obligation? The answer is plain. The authority
imposing the obligation is the one which makes the law, from which
the obligation results. In ordinary cases, when the obligation results
from the laws of the land, the authority imposing it is the
Government of the country. In the case of contracts between parties
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