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Disembodied Brains
Disembodied Brains
Understanding Our Intuitions on
Neuro-​Chimeras and Human-​Brain
Organoids

J O H N H . EVA N S
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2024
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Evans, John Hyde, 1965– author.
Title: Disembodied brains : understanding our intuitions on
neuro-chimeras and human-brain organoids / John H. Evans.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2024] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023033836 (print) | LCCN 2023033837 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197750704 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197750728 (epub) |
ISBN 9780197750711 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197750735 (ebook other)
Subjects: MESH: Neurosciences—ethics | Brain | Chimeras | Organoids | Bioethical Issues
Classification: LCC QP 376 (print) | LCC QP 376 (ebook) |
NLM WL 21 | DDC 612 . 8/2—dc23/eng/20230830
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023033836
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023033837
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197750704.001.0001
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
 Contents

Acknowledgments  vii

1. The Science and Public Ethics of Neuro-​Chimeric

Animals and Human-​Brain Organoids  1

2. What We Know about the Public’s Views of Humans  24

3. The Public’s View of Human-​Brain Organoids and

Neuro-​Chimeric Animals  50

4. Consciousness, the Human-​Animal Foundational

Distinction, and Ephemeral Connections to Humans  72

5. Views of Nature, Religion, and the Cultural Authority

of Science  96

6. What Is to Be Done?  129

Methodological Appendix  163

Notes  173
Works Cited  205
Index  219
 Acknowledgments

In my previous contributions to the field of public bioethics, I have

examined both the expert debate and what the general public
thinks about a given topic. I have largely focused on what is now
called human gene editing, and a large part of that debate is, as one
would expect, focused on what a human being actually is. Over
the years I was always aware of an adjacent debate about human-​
animal hybrids and chimeras but never read deeply into the debate.
In 2020 I was asked to be a member of the Committee on Ethical,
Legal, and Regulatory Issues Associated with Neural Chimeras
and Organoids, sponsored by the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine. Unfortunately, since these reports
have deadlines, I was unable to spend many months thinking about
all the implications of the technologies considered, and certainly
lacked the time to create my own empirical research project. Now
I have finally had the time and distance to conduct an empirical
examination.
I greatly appreciate my fellow committee members, with
whom I have had such productive conversations and respectful
disagreements: Bernie Lo, Josh Sanes, Paola Arlotta, Alta Charo,
Rusty Gage, Hank Greely, Pat King, Bill Newsome, Sally Temple,
Larry Zipursky, and Anne-​Marie Mazza. If only we could have met
live instead of on Zoom.
Thanks also to Ross Graham for general research assistance,
to Mike McCullough and Seth Hill for advice on the survey, and
to Richard Pitt for helping to interpret some survey findings.
viii Acknowledgments

Additional thanks to reviewers from the Press for suggesting

improvements in the original text, and to Peter Ohlin for
shepherding this process. And, as always, thanks to Ronnee
Schreiber for continuing to put up with me and my strange aca-
demic interests for more than three decades now.
 1
The Science and Public Ethics
of Neuro-​Chimeric Animals and
Human-​Brain Organoids

In one of the most successful films of 1968, moviegoers saw Charlton

Heston star as an astronaut who travels to a strange planet,1 where
he encounters a species of intelligent talking apes who dominate
the mute and primitive humans who share the planet. Surely this
movie was popular at least partly because of the acting and the
story, but Planet of the Apes was also, in its time, the latest example
of our society’s fascination with animals having human qualities,
which I will call human-​animal chimeras. This fascination has been
with us for thousands of years.
The term chimera comes from ancient mythology and refers to
the mixing of any two or more diverse animals. The original myth-
ological chimera was a mix of lion, bird, and snake. But the cate-
gory of chimera in mythology also includes human-​animal mixes
such as sphinxes (half human, half lion), centaurs (half human, half
horse), satyrs (half human, half goat), minotaurs (half human, half
bull), and sirens (half human, half sea monster).2
Contemporary culture has produced an enormous number
of an even more specific type of chimera—​that is, an animal who
thinks and acts like a human, like those on Planet of the Apes. If
the movie’s apes had had human stomachs nobody would have
cared, but neuro-​chimeras (NCs) mix in the human brain, which is
considered by many to be what makes us human.

Disembodied Brains. John H. Evans, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197750704.003.0001
2 Disembodied Brains

In popular culture, NCs are not necessarily evil. An older genera-

tion will remember the 1960s TV show about the talking horse Mr.
Ed, whose speech could only be heard by his human friend Wilbur.
And cartoons are filled with animals that act like humans: Mickey
Mouse, Daffy Duck, Bugs Bunny, Stuart Little, and many more.
The fascination with the Planet of the Apes is just the latest in-
stallment of a long story. If that movie had concerned standard
apes, it would obviously not have had the same sensational im-
pact. Chimeras, by contrast, have cultural power and provoke fas-
cination. In Robert Klitzman’s summary: “the long history of such
images across multiple, disparate cultures suggests how humans
have long seen the boundaries between species as fluid, but in
differing ways, as either good or bad—​as gods or monsters—​in
both cases as special and possessing power.”3
I am usually loath to use the term “impossible” when it comes to
scientific developments, but an animal body that thinks and speaks
exactly like a human, such as Mr. Ed or Bugs Bunny, will probably
always be impossible. These fictional entities would need a human
brain, and we are only one tiny step down the path to Mr. Ed.
In this book one of my foci will be human-​animal NCs, which
are animals with some human brain tissue. While we do not know
how Mr. Ed came into being, presumably he is an NC, because he
thinks and speaks like a human, albeit trapped in a horse body that
limits his human-​like abilities. While Mr. Ed was fascinating and
entertaining, an actual Mr. Ed would be unsettling and intensely
controversial.
Let me turn to another trope from popular culture: the brain in
the vat. The poster for the 1962 B-​movie The Brain That Wouldn’t Die
shows a woman’s head and a brain in a large vat, with wires running
between the head and the vessel, and the words “Alive . . . Without
a body . . . Fed by an unspeakable horror from hell!”4 In the more
contemporary movie The Matrix, computers have enslaved human
bodies, having plugged their brains into a simulation where these
brains all think that they are having normal human lives even as
 Science and Public Ethics 3

they actually remain immobile in a vat.5 While the brain in the vat,
unlike the chimeras, has not been a source of centuries-​long fas-
cination, it reflects a host of longtime cultural distinctions, such
as the mind-​body problem, the limitations of human perception,
and the horror of perceiving social life without being able to en-
gage in it.
There are reasons why the talking apes and the brain in the vat sell
movie tickets. They touch on the deepest questions of human exist-
ence, and their stories allow us to work out these deep questions
without completing a PhD in the philosophy of mind. But they
also permit the viewer to walk out of the theater without a sense of
looming disaster, because they are just stories, right?

Is the Fictional Becoming Real?

What happens when human-​animal NCs and disembodied brains

in a vat stop being quite so fictional? We have been on the path
of nonneural chimeras for centuries, depending on which histor-
ical claims you believe and what you include in that category. For
example, taking a part of an animal and putting it in a human, or
xenotransplantation, results in a type of human-​animal mix. It has
been claimed that a bone from a dog was put into a human in 1501,
producing the first known (non-​neural) human-​animal chimera.
In 1667 a man was infused with lamb’s blood. In the following
centuries doctors would continue to attempt similar feats, without
much success.6
To turn to the modern era, in the early 1960s various Americans
experimentally received organs from baboons and rhesus monkeys,
though even the most successful transplants resulted in patients
surviving only a few months. In 1984 a highly publicized transplant
of a baboon heart into a baby named Fae failed; according to one
historical summary, “Most of the hopes put on xenotransplantation
died with Baby Fae.”7
4 Disembodied Brains

Nevertheless, the invention of better immunosuppressive drugs,

and the creation of genetically modified animals whose organs are
more compatible with humans, led to further attempts. In 1992 the
first transgenic pig, with genetically engineered DNA, was born,
and the success would lead to the widespread use of pig organs in
humans.8 Today, implanting heart valves from both pigs and cows
is standard medical practice, and scientists continue working on
genetically modifying pigs to make their organs more compatible
with humans.9 Other nonneural chimeras include rodents whose
immune systems have been altered to more closely resemble the
human immune system.10
Since blood, livers, and the immune system do not raise foun-
dational questions about humanity, I will put these human-​animal
combinations aside for the rest of this book. Our concern here will
instead be the brain. In modern times it is the brain that is seen
as the core of what makes us different from other life-​forms and
the seat of the self. With brain death as the legal standard for being
dead, the brain is also how we decide which human bodies live
or die.
We should naturally ask why scientists are doing this research.
Over the past few hundred years, the scientific motive has largely
been to save lives by replacing dysfunctional human parts with
functional animal parts. But the new research on NCs and brains
in a vat has a slightly different motivation, which is to create ex-
perimental animal models for studying human neurological
disease.
Since we cannot experiment on actual live human brains because
they are residing in live humans, alternative experimental models
are needed. The brains of lab mice are quite different from those of
humans, so these experiments do not tell us as much about human
neurological disease as we would like. There is an inherent tension
in employing such human-​brain substitutes: the more they re-
semble human brains, the more useful they are for human research,
but also the more ethical issues are raised.
 Science and Public Ethics 5

Development of Human-​Brain Organoids

To better understand these new technologies, let us start with the

brain in the vat: that is, a human brain organoid, or HBO. An HBO
is a three-​dimensional aggregation of human neural cells grown
from pluripotent stem cells. A stem cell is a cell that makes other
cells, and a pluripotent stem cell can be used to make a range of spe-
cific cell types.
Scientists have successfully grown cells that make up one small
part of a brain (not an entire brain) to produce a clump of tissue
about 4 mm across that can be kept alive in a dish. And researchers
can now take HBOs of different parts of the brain and coax them
into fusing to become “assembloids.” Importantly, these entities are
kept in a petri dish except when they are placed in an animal brain
(see below). The concern of ethicists and scientists about HBOs in a
dish is that they could achieve a modicum of consciousness (about
which much more below). Philosophers would say that an entity
cannot have higher-​level consciousness without experiences; thus,
with no way of interacting with the world, HBOs will remain lumps
of tissue.11 However, HBOs representing tissue from different parts
of the human brain have recently been connected, and, in a 2017 ar-
ticle, scientists reporting an experiment on HBOs with retinal cells
found that a burst of electrical activity followed from shining light
on the HBOs.12 Scientists have also had success in growing optic
components of the brain.13 In 2019, researchers found that the elec-
troencephalogram activity of an HBO resembles the activity seen
in 25-​to 39-​week-​old premature infants.14 This all has researchers
wondering whether HBOs might be more capable of acquiring
abilities than previously assumed.
One of the primary HBO researchers has created a small spider-​
like robot whose movement is stimulated by the electrical activity
of the HBO, and he recently announced that he is working on
“closing the loop” so that the perceptions of the robot will be fed
back to the HBO. Another scientist, working in conjunction with
6 Disembodied Brains

Microsoft Corporation to improve machine learning, has said he is

pursuing the problem of connecting the “wetware” of the HBO to
the “hardware” of a computer to make a more efficient computer.15
Perhaps it is not too far-​fetched to predict that within ten years an
HBO in a dish could be having rudimentary experiences.
This research has received a lot of media attention, partly be-
cause there had not previously been any research like it. Of course,
scientists have been growing human tissue from stem cells for quite
some time, and the HBO techniques have built on that research.
But culturally the brain is something altogether different from
a liver or even a heart. The headlines suggest the potential explo-
siveness of the continuing experimental progress. A headline from
Scientific American, “Lab-​Grown ‘Mini-​Brains’ Can Now Mimic
the Neural Activity of a Preterm Infant,”16 evokes the image of a
baby trapped in a petri dish. So we can see why attention has been
focused on HBOs.

Development of Human-​Animal
Neuro-​Chimeras

Scientists’ ability to create human-​ animal NCs has recently

increased markedly. The first technology that implied the pos-
sibility of a NC was “human-​ to-​
animal embryonic chimeras,”
produced by putting human neural stem cells into the brain of a
developing monkey and putting human genetic material into rabbit
eggs.17 A 2005 report of the National Research Council and the
Institute of Medicine urged restraint on developing these and sim-
ilar NCs, stating that “perhaps no organ that could be exposed to
[human embryonic stem cells] raises more sensitive questions than
the animal brain, whose biochemistry or architecture might be af-
fected by the presence of human cells.”18
Scientists have since implanted human glial cells into mice,
who then—​not to get too ahead of myself—​performed better on
 Science and Public Ethics 7

learning tests.19 In 2018 HBOs were first implanted into the brains
of adult mice to create a NC, combining the two technologies under
examination in this book.20 In an experiment reported in the fall
of 2022, scientists made striking progress in both HBO and NC
research by implanting HBOs in the brains of two-​to three-​day-​
old rats.21 While HBOs in a dish are not vascularized, and thus the
middle of the HBO cannot receive oxygen and nutrients, limiting
its growth, an HBO in a rat becomes part of the rat’s circulatory
system and thus can grow larger. In the 2022 experiment, each cell
in the organoid grew six times longer than it would have grown in
a dish, and the cells became about as active as neurons in human
brains.22 This seemed to solve the problem that HBOs in a dish
would always be small and limited, in that the rat could become the
vat that allowed the HBO to grow to a more human level. Another
problem with the HBO in the dish is that brain neurons develop
with experiences, and it is hard to have experiences in a dish—​but
as the rat has experiences, its HBO becomes more developed and
human-​like.
What the experiment showed about brain integration, and thus
about the development of NCs, is even more morally relevant than
what it showed about HBOs. The experiment suggested a true
mix of human and rat brain, instead of an HBO simply residing,
unintegrated, in the vat of the rat brain. When implanted, the HBOs
spontaneously wired themselves with even distant parts of the rat
brain. The human component also reacted to stimulation of the
rat’s whiskers, and even directed rat behavior, with the organoids
“apparently sending messages to the reward-​seeking regions of the
rats’ brains.” Unlike in the earlier experiments, however, these rats
did not become any smarter.23
The New York Times report of the research quotes a scientist
assuring us that the rats are still rats and are not human. But, the
writer notes, “that might not hold true if scientists were to put
human organoids in a close relative of humans like a monkey or a
chimpanzee.” The author of the study pointed out to the reporter
8 Disembodied Brains

that the similarity between primates and humans might allow the
organoids to grow larger and take on a larger role in the animal’s
mental processes, but added that “it’s not something that we would
do, or would encourage doing.”24 But while this particular re-
searcher would not do such research, we can be confident that the
ability to make a monkey brain more like a human one will attract
other researchers trying to relieve the suffering from human brain
diseases.
A second method of creating an NC occurs much earlier in the
life of the animal: putting human embryonic stem cells into an-
imal blastocysts (advanced-​stage embryos), resulting in an an-
imal with some human cells. While this has not yet been done
with brain cells, recent research has made such experiments more
possible.25 For example, by means of a technique called blasto-
cyst complementation, a pig blastocyst could be modified to open
a developmental niche that would otherwise have developed
into a pig pancreas. Human stem cells could be placed into that
niche, and the resulting pancreas in the pig would be like a human
pancreas.26
In 2018 researchers first conducted neural blastocyst comple-
mentation, taking the developmental niche that would have devel-
oped a mouse brain and replacing it with stem cells from another
type of mouse.27 This opens the door for future experiments in
which a mouse could develop with human brain tissue.
Scientists have begun research on nonhuman primate NCs using
monkeys. This research is motivated by the familiar problem with
using rodents for human research, which is that rodents diverged
from humans in evolution so many millions of years ago that we
humans are really not like lab rats, particularly in our brains.28 This
frustration is exemplified by the common quip by scientists that it
is a great time to be a mouse with Alzheimer’s, since so many drugs
have been shown to be efficacious on Alzheimer’s in mice even
though they do not end up working in humans. By contrast, non-
human primates have not only greater genetic similarity to humans
 Science and Public Ethics 9

but also more similar skull size and gestation time than other
mammals, and their bodily form also means that they could have
more humanlike experiences.
In 2021 scientists in China announced that they had successfully
added human cells to monkey blastocysts and that these human
cells had survived far into development.29 Though these were not
specifically neural cells, this research produced the proof of concept
that it is possible to create monkey-​human chimeras by merging
cells in a blastocyst.
A third method of creating an NC is engineering a human-​animal
transgenic hybrid through genetic modification. For decades
researchers have been producing “humanized mice,” mice genet-
ically modified to have human qualities.30 Even NCs have been
created, such as mice genetically engineered to have Alzheimer’s
disease and monkeys with human autism.31 In 2019 scientists put
a human gene that is thought to affect intelligence into a monkey
genome, and the altered monkeys were reported to be smarter than
comparable unaltered monkeys.32 Scientists are pressing forward
with developing transgenic hybrid nonhuman primate models for
human neurological disease.33
These experiments have been deeply controversial. Again, a few
headlines will make the point. “Chinese Scientists Have Put Human
Brain Genes in Monkeys—​and Yes, They May Be Smarter” was the
title of an article in one science magazine.34 “The Smart Mouse with
the Half-​Human Brain” was a headline in The New Scientist.35
To make my point about how controversial these technologies
will be, I would request that you describe HBOs and NCs to
someone in your home and ask what they think about them. I pre-
dict you will hear expressions of both shock and disgust that such
research exists (of which more below). We can expect this research
to become increasingly controversial as the public finds out more
about it.
From this point forward I will not focus on the details of how
NCs and HBOs are created, because the exact method lacks moral
10 Disembodied Brains

valence. The central question at this point is: Should this research
continue? The answer will depend upon our ethics.

What Should We Do?

Whose ethics get to shape public policy regarding biomedical tech-

nology? Before roughly the 1960s in the United States, the answer
would have been simple: scientists’ ethics. But since the 1960s the
answer has changed, and it is now, at least officially: the public’s
ethics. The reader will then ask how—​in a morally and religiously
pluralistic society, where even summarizing the ethics of all the
citizens would be extremely difficult—​it is possible to allow the
public’s ethics to decide such policy, even assuming that the regular
public had the time to stay up to date on these technologies.
In order to determine the public’s ethical stance, the tradition
has been to use a group of experts who ostensibly represent the
public’s views to mediate between the public and policy makers. At
present, elected officials and the officials they appoint ultimately
make policy decisions on these issues; however, critically, the eth-
ical choices considered to be legitimate are filtered, discarded, or
promoted by the experts before policy makers rule on an issue.
This filtering of possible legitimate ethical stances very powerfully
influences what policy is made, and ultimately what technologies
are pursued. In the United States, this structuring occurs in “public-​
policy bioethical debate”—​that is, the debate about the ethics of the
technology engaged in among elite experts, essentially all of whom
have doctoral degrees, making recommendations about what an
ethical policy should be. Such debate occurs largely in specially
created commissions, conferences, and academic publications.36
When the public-​policy bioethical debate began in the 1960s and
1970s, a broader range of elites was involved. Of those previously
involved, those currently absent include, most notably, the plural-
istic theologians, who spoke a secular language in public and were
 Science and Public Ethics 11

focused on the deeper implications of technologies. Today the de-

bate is instead dominated by scientists and bioethicists.
The profession of bioethics is like philosophy in that it makes
normative claims, but it is distinct from philosophy in the types
of arguments it makes.37 A typical debate occurs when a new
and controversial technology arrives on the scene, and a group
of scientists and bioethicists (with scattered others) is convened
to ascertain what the ethical policy should be. They start with the
public-​policy bioethical debate, which is published in academic
journals. They write reports, which scientific agencies use to set
policy and practicing scientists generally follow voluntarily. On
the topics of HBOs and NCs, there have been National Institutes
of Health committees, committees of scientific associations, and
committees of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine.38
The scientists and the bioethicists generally agree on the values
and goals that should drive the ethics of technologies. To under-
stand the ethical policies about HBOs and NCs that have already
been recommended—​and to some extent enacted—​we must un-
derstand the values advanced by both groups in these debates.
Before making a statement about these two groups, I need to
say that this book is based in sociology, which means that it will
be making generalizations. When a sociologist says that “people in
Alabama are more conservative than people in California,” he or
she simply means that on average Alabamans are more conserva-
tive than Californians. Similarly, when a sociologist refers to the
opinion of “scientists,” he or she means the average or dominant
scientists. No group is monolithic.
That said, the bioethicists and scientists advocate for the use
of only a few purportedly universal goals or values: autonomy
(freedom), beneficence (doing good), non-​maleficence (avoiding
harm), and justice (equal treatment).39 To oversimplify: If a tech-
nology does not harm but helps, if people are free to use or not use
it, and if it is equally available to all—​then it is morally acceptable.
12 Disembodied Brains

In contrast, scholars who do not participate in the public-​policy

bioethical debate are often using other values. The bioethical de-
bate about HBOs and NCs that is currently engaged in for guiding
policy is focused only on the value of non-​maleficence. Beneficence
is assumed to be advanced in medical research, while justice and
autonomy are only relevant for persons as opposed to animals. The
question in the present debate is: Is HBO technology harmful for
the HBO, and is the inclusion of human tissue in an animal harmful
for the NC?
I do not think bioethicists and scientists are being nefarious in
limiting the values under consideration. In many cases, this limited
set of values comprises the only ones that these experts truly believe
in. In other cases, the experts believe that, in a liberal democratic
society, only nearly consensual imperatives such as “Don’t harm
people” can be imposed. My point is that these are actually not the
only values important to the public.

Public Input to the Public-​Policy

Bioethical Debate

From the end of the twentieth century, the academic experts in the
public-​policy bioethical debate have recognized that they have a
legitimacy problem. On what grounds should this unusual group
of citizens—​all of whom have PhDs—​get to structure government
policy? They are not elected, and they are not representative of the
general public. There has been a slowly growing recognition that,
since the debate provides input to public policy, it should there-
fore promote not simply the values of scientists and bioethicists but
more broadly the values of the public. This is not simply for general
democratic reasons but also because most of this research is paid
for by the public.
In recognition of this problem, bioethicists and scientists
now regularly call for the input of the public’s ethics into policy
 Science and Public Ethics 13

deliberation through public-​engagement exercises. Each of the

aforementioned bioethics reports has a passage at the end calling
for such engagement. However, such exercises do not actually in-
fluence policy, since they lack “teeth.” According to one interpreta-
tion from prominent science-​communication scholars, they simply
give the appearance that the public’s values are being followed.40
Moreover, despite the ubiquitous call for such public-​engagement
exercises, they never seem to happen, leaving the expert ethics of
the bioethicists and scientists to continue setting the agenda.
I have elsewhere proposed a solution to this problem, which
is that the values of the public should serve as the raw mate-
rial from which bioethicists can derive more detailed ethical
recommendations.41 The values of the public on a particular issue
would be described by social science. It is in that spirit that this
book will proceed, contrasting the public’s views with those of the
bioethicists and scientists who dominate the public-​policy bioeth-
ical debate.

Defining the Human

To understand the difference between the public’s ethics regarding

HBOs and NCs and those of the bioethicists and scientists, we
have to briefly delve into an admittedly abstract concept that is al-
most never explicitly discussed in these debates. This concept is
the definition of the human, and we have to explicitly raise it be-
cause the public-​policy bioethical debate presumes that the defi-
nition used by bioethicists and scientists is an undebatable fact.
HBOs and NCs are controversial because of their connection to ac-
tual humans, so it should not surprise us that one’s perspective on
these technologies is dependent on what a human actually is. The
“avoiding harm” value that is most prominent in the debate applies
centrally to humans (and, to a lesser extent, to animals with more
human-​like capacities).
14 Disembodied Brains

Among academics in the Western intellectual tradition,

there are three prominent definitions of the human, also called
“anthropologies”: the theological, the philosophical, and the bio-
logical.42 These definitions can be based on the physical form of the
human, the moral status of the physical form, or both, and they typ-
ically contrast humans with other animals.

Theological Anthropology

Among the various theological anthropologies, I focus on the

Christian anthropology, because Christian beliefs, unlike those
of other religions, have historically influenced the public culture
and law in the United States, even for nonreligious people. (Due
to Christianity’s emergence from Judaism, the Christian anthro-
pology is very similar to the Jewish version.) Christianity is also by
far the largest religious tradition in the United States, and, as I will
describe below, it is likely the source of the greatest variation in the
public’s views. More pragmatically, when I later turn to obtaining
the views of the public, it will be evident that non-​Christian
U.S. religious groups are too small to make claims about using the
methods employed in this book.
For the Christian theological anthropology, the central idea
is that humans are defined by being made in the image of God.
The account of human origins in the book of Genesis (1:26-​28)
reads: “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and
over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth,
and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him;
male and female he created them” (Revised Standard Version). Note
that this critical biblical passage not only gives the definition of a
human but also more broadly includes a description of the human
relationship to animals and nature, which I will discuss below.
 Science and Public Ethics 15

There are undoubtedly many thousands of pages of academic

theological texts devoted to what exactly the image of God is, but
it is not the case that a Christian theologian identifies physical
humans by using a checklist of attributes of God. Rather, to iden-
tify a physical “human,” the Christian anthropology relies upon the
pre-​DNA biological definition of a human, in which humans are
those born from other humans (of which more below). In the very
traditional version, humans are the descendants of Adam and Eve,
the first two humans.
The first component of this anthropology is that humans are not
limited to physical form, but also have a “soul.” When creating each
human, one by one, God gives them each a soul. This soul is, for
the academic theologians, essentially communicative—​it is how a
human relates to other humans and to the divine.43 Traditionally,
this soul can separate from the body and will travel to heaven (or
hell) after death. Thus, humans are not just material; they are also
spiritual beings. This is the one anthropology that is not materialist,
maintaining that there are true features of the world beyond atoms,
electricity, and other phenomena that can ultimately be explained
with physics.
This anthropology defines not only physical form but moral
status as well. First, physical humans are not animals, which were
created separately by God, with humans as their stewards. This an-
thropology has traditionally emphasized that humans are special
compared to other animals, as it is only humans who are made in
God’s image and only humans who communicate with God. In this
view, each human is individually ensouled by God, often described
as occurring at fertilization.
Of course, perspectives on the moral status of humans compared
to animals are not uniform. Protestants typically make a categorical
distinction between human and nonhuman animals. One evangel-
ical scholar writes that “Evangelicalism is influenced by long held
Christian and social traditions which emphasize a categorical dis-
tinction between humans and animals: imago dei that sets humanity
16 Disembodied Brains

apart from the rest of creation; whereby humans are given dis-
pensation to use animals under God.” Many Conservative Jewish
scholars agree, with one scholar writing that there is “admiration
for each of the various species God has made, with no hierarchy
of value among them—​except for humans, who are, according to
Genesis (1:27; 5:1; 9:6), uniquely created in the image of God. This
special status permits us to use animals for our purposes.”44
Catholicism is a bit more ambiguous, as exemplified by St. Francis
of Assisi and the blessing of the animals that is widely conducted in
Catholic churches today. Many contemporary Catholic theologians
want to at least lessen the distinction between human and non-
human animals by saying that both bear the image of God. In this
account, humans and animals are still distinct, but animals are not
solely for human use. Nonhuman animals were created by God
(on the same day, in the Genesis account), and each animal has its
own telos that must be respected. As two theologians write: “God
created animals “good,” period, to flourish in their own right as the
good kinds of things that they are.”45 We then cannot think of ani-
mals as tools for human use.
The second moral status component of this anthropology is be-
tween humans. To return to the Christian consensus: since each
human was created individually by God, and communicates with
God, all humans have equal value—​an ethic that adherents of this
anthropology have obviously not always upheld. It then emphasizes
that being made in the Image—​and thus being human—​is not de-
pendent upon any capacities of the human. One classic explanation
is that humans have “alien dignity,” because their dignity does not
come from any capacity they possess but rather from God.46 This
explains the tendency for Christians to less readily accept that bio-
logically human entities that lack certain capacities, like fetuses or
the comatose, can be destroyed.
The theological anthropology is then both biological (a def-
inition of the physical difference between humans and ani-
mals) and moral: all humans are to be treated as equals without
 Science and Public Ethics 17

regard to capacities and are in a superior position to all animals.

This definition of the human, while more abstract than the other
anthropologies, has had enormous influence in the West, such as
being the origin of secular human rights,47 and is widely held by
Americans.48

Philosophical Anthropology

The philosophical anthropology ignores the physical form of the

entity and the distinction between humans and animals while fo-
cusing on moral status. It does not talk about the human, but about
persons. According to Peter Singer, its best-​known proponent, “the
concept of a person is distinct from that of a member of the species
Homo sapiens, and . . . it is personhood, not species membership,
that is most significant in determining when it is wrong to end a
life.”49
Personhood is the moral status an entity reaches if it has enough
valued capacities. There is rough agreement about at least the
most basic capacities required for personhood. In one list of 17
capacities, highlights include “possesses consciousness,” “can ex-
perience pleasure and pain,” “has thoughts,” “has preferences,” “is
capable of rational deliberation,” and “has a sense of time.”50 For
Peter Singer, personhood requires being, “at minimum, a being
with some level of self-​awareness.”51
Using this anthropology, human fetuses and those in perma-
nent vegetative states are not persons because they lack important
capacities, and there is thus no prohibition on ending their lives.
Chimpanzees and some other nonhuman animals, on the other
hand, are often thought to have the capacities required for person-
hood and therefore should be treated accordingly.
The philosophical anthropology is interwoven with a wide
range of bioethical policies. For example, a living will contains
a list of capacities in whose absence the person does not want to
18 Disembodied Brains

be kept alive. All regulations concerning the treatment of ani-

mals are loosely based on this anthropology, within which, for ex-
ample, you can do anything you want to ants, which have no valued
capacities, but cannot experiment on chimpanzees, who have many
of the valued capacities. The critical question is how many valued
capacities a life-​form has.

Biological Anthropology

The biological anthropology is resolutely materialist, with no con-

ception of soul or spirit. It has classically been concerned only with
physical form—​with distinguishing the human species from other
animals. Ernst Mayr’s classic “biological species concept” holds that
a species is defined by reproductive isolation: if two entities cannot
breed, they are from separate species. If we start with those who
are consensually considered humans, then any entity that can breed
with those people would also be human. Since chimps cannot breed
with humans, they are not human. A related classic definition, the
“evolutionary species concept,” emphasizes continuity: “a species is
a single lineage of ancestral descendant populations of organisms
which maintains its identity from other such lineages, and which
has its own evolutionary tendencies and historical fate.”52 That is,
humans are those born from humans, which is akin to the biolog-
ical components of the theological anthropology.
However, these anthropologies are no longer dominant among
biologists. As Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis write, “As
against what was once commonly presumed, there would appear
to be no such thing as fixed species identities” for biologists. Post-​
DNA biology has emphasized the evolutionary idea that humans
are not distinct but are on the same continuum with other animals.
One critic has assembled statements from influential biologists to
this effect: “Humans are more like worms than we ever imagined,”
“The worm represents a very simple human,” “In essence, we are
 Science and Public Ethics 19

nothing but a big fly,” “We share 99 percent of our genes with mice,
and we even have the genes that could make a tail,” “We humans ap-
pear as only slightly remodeled chimpanzee-​like apes,” and so on.53
While in principle the biological anthropology makes no moral
status claims, and it is part of the ideology of science to be mor-
ally neutral, the species-​continuum view of physical form coincides
nearly perfectly with the philosophical anthropology. The ranking
of capacities that are critical to the philosophical anthropology map
onto evolutionary differences, and therefore the evolutionary con-
tinuum (microbes to insects to mammals to humans) very closely
coincides with the valued-​capacities continuum. It is the biolog-
ical forms of life most evolutionarily distant from humans that
have the least-​valued capacities, and those evolutionarily closest
(chimpanzees) that have the most-​valued capacities.

Becoming Human through Capacities?

Armed with these definitions of the human, we can now properly

describe the public-​policy bioethical debate about HBOs and NCs
that is dominated by bioethicists and scientists. This debate largely
assumes the philosophical anthropology and is concerned with
whether HBOs or NCs could obtain the requisite capacities to “be-
come human.” Of course, no one in the mainstream debate thinks
that an NC mouse or an HBO could become a physical or biological
human; however, the biological distinction between species is not
relevant for those using the philosophical anthropology. Since de-
veloping enough valued capacities to qualify for full personhood—​
to be morally treated like other humans—​is unlikely, another
question becomes whether the entity has enough valued traits to be
treated like we treat more advanced animals.
The base capacity discussed in this debate is “consciousness” or
“sentience,” as well as the related concept of “cognitive ability.”54
Henry Greely is the most prominent bioethicist examining NCs
20 Disembodied Brains

and HBOs, and his work reflects the anthropological assumptions

among bioethicists in the bioethical debate. Greely is concerned
with the “humanization” of NCs, and he defines humanization
as having “some human cognitive abilities”—​a topic he marks as
the most significant part of the debate.55 Greely similarly writes
of HBOs: “If it looks like a human brain and acts like a human
brain, at what point do we have to treat it like a human brain—​or
a human being?”56 In other anthropologies, by contrast (as I will
discuss below), a disembodied brain would never be considered a
human being.
A section of another paper from Greely is titled “Conferring
Humanity on Mice,” which suggests that mice could obtain human
moral status. Greely and his colleagues set the standard for whether
you could “transform a mouse into a man” by whether it was “a
creature with some aspects of human consciousness or some dis-
tinctively human cognitive abilities.”57 This anthropology is not
only used by Greely. H. Isaac Chen and colleagues write that “One
of the primary concerns centers on the possibility that animals
transplanted with human brain organoids would become more
‘human.’ ” Their ethical concerns about HBOs are due to HBOs’
being “increasingly similar to the human brain, the source of the
higher-​order cognitive capacities that are most often equated with
being human.”58
The assumption that consciousness is the primary moral consid-
eration is also evident in the work of the bioethics commissions ded-
icated to this topic. The National Academies Committee assigned
to study HBOs and NCs was given a list of questions to answer.
The first question on the list was “How would researchers define or
identify enhanced or human awareness in a chimeric animal?” The
second was “Do research animals with enhanced capabilities re-
quire different treatment compared to typical animal models?” The
fifth was “How large or complex would the ex vivo brain organoids
need to be to attain enhanced or human awareness?” The ethical
 Science and Public Ethics 21

concerns of the public, which I describe below, are not mentioned

as topics to be considered.59
Media stories also tend to take this perspective and use the philo-
sophical anthropology to compare the capacities of HBOs and NCs
with those of born humans, partly because they rely on bioethicists
as their experts. For example, the New York Times article reporting
on the discovery that brain waves in HBOs resemble those of pre-
mature babies is centrally concerned with whether this means that
the two entities are effectively the same. In the article, the scientist
whose lab made the discovery stated his concern that HBOs could
become “conscious,” and neuroscientist Christof Koch worried
about a “brain that is capable of sentience and of feeling pain, agony
and distress.”60
Similarly, in a news article describing the NC mice that resulted
from the insertion of HBOs in their brains, Greely identified a ca-
pacity that mice will not achieve, and then states that the impor-
tant question is “whether you are creating something human-​ish
that you have to take seriously in terms of according it dignity
and respect—​and figuring out what that even means.” The term
“human-​ish” obviously puts a born human and the HBO on the
same spectrum of capacities.
Another ethicist quoted in the article asks, “if we give [NCs]
human cerebral organoids, what does that do to their intelli-
gence, their level of consciousness, even their species identity?”
The journalist describes the problem of NCs as the possibility that
“the animals might become too human” due to the human brain
components.61 Finally, a Guardian article says that HBOs could
“gain consciousness, feel pleasure, pain and distress, and deserve
rights of their own.” Since only humans have rights at present, this
too emphasizes that the HBOs could “become human.” Greely states
that, with enough complexity, “we potentially edge towards the
ethical problems of human experimentation,” which assumes that
HBOs could obtain the protected status of humans in research.62
22 Disembodied Brains

In sum, if we follow the public-​policy bioethical debate, in-

cluding the media reports citing experts from this debate, the pri-
mary or only reason to be concerned about HBOs and NCs is that
if enough capacities are added to them, they could become morally
human. Importantly from this perspective, there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with creating an HBO or NC with human-​level con-
sciousness if we are prepared to treat it like we treat a human. But
an HBO with human-​level consciousness could not be kept in the
prison of the petri dish, any more than a monkey with human-​level
consciousness could be confined to a cage. The tension in this re-
search, from this anthropological perspective, is between making
these entities enough like humans to be useful for medical research,
but not so much like humans that we have to treat them as such,
which would obviously preclude experimenting on them in the first
place. As Greely notes: “if we make our models ‘too good,’ they may
themselves deserve some of the kinds of ethical and legal respect
that have limited brain research in human beings.”63
We may wonder why bioethicists and scientists only use the phil-
osophical anthropology to approach this issue, and why they focus
on the problem of consciousness. I will largely leave this question
about the source of expert knowledge to the side so as to focus on
the public’s stance on the issue.64 Other reasons to support or op-
pose HBOs and NCs that are not incorporated into the bioethical
debate will be enumerated below.

Conclusion

HBOs and NCs are developing rapidly. Each development will

make the technology more controversial, despite the fact that
the technologies are being developed with the most noble of
intentions. I have so far described the technology and established
that ethical policy must be set. This ethical policy is at present
framed by the public-​policy bioethical debate, which assumes that
 Science and Public Ethics 23

the main value at risk is that an entity could be harmed, and the
only entity that could be harmed is one that has, at minimum, “con-
sciousness.” I have also established that all agree that the public’s
values should influence ethical policy; however, although ethical
recommendations are already being issued, nobody has yet tried to
determine what the public’s values are on this issue.
In Chapter 2 I turn to examining the public by reporting what
existing social-​science and humanities scholarship says about the
public’s definition of a human and how that would impact its eval-
uation of entities like NCs and HBOs. In Chapter 3 I begin to re-
port on my empirical research by describing the public’s overall
views of these technologies. In Chapter 4 I turn to the heart of the
matter: whether and how the public’s views of a human affect its
evaluation of these technologies, and how these views differ from
the public-​policy bioethical debate. HBOs and NCs are instances
of the broader category of biotechnology, and subgroups in so-
ciety are more or less supportive of biotechnology in general.
Therefore, in Chapter 5 I examine whether subgroups defined by
their orientation toward nature, their attitudes toward scientific au-
thority, and their religion have distinct views of HBOs and NCs.
In the concluding Chapter 6, I examine what social-​science and
humanities scholars think is at stake in the creation of HBOs and
NCs and propose ways to mitigate the risks they identify. I focus
on the social slippery-​slope problem: How do we take advantage
of the positives of this research now without beginning the descent
toward a dystopia that none of us want?
 2
What We Know about the Public’s
Views of Humans

There are good reasons why the public-​policy bioethical debate

advances the value of avoiding harm and embraces the values of
the academic philosophical or biological anthropologies.1 But it is
important not to assume that the current public-​policy bioethical
debate reflects how the public itself would actually see an issue—​
especially when experts are calling for the public to provide input
to that debate.
This book will attempt to compare the US public’s views of
HBOs and NCs with those expressed in the public-​policy bioeth-
ical debates. I limit this study to the United States because of meth-
odological limitations and because I lack the required knowledge
of other cultures. The methodology I use will allow me to make
generalizations about all adult residents of the United States.
Additional analyses of some subgroups will help to further develop
my points.
In this chapter I examine the humanistic and social-​science lit-
erature that discusses the public’s view of humanity, but not specifi-
cally NCs and HBOs. The existing scholarship will help us interpret
what I have found in my own study. I do expect that the public will
share the positive reason for engaging in this research, which is the
alleviation of human suffering. However, as we will see, existing
research suggests that the public’s concerns will be different from
those of bioethicists.

Disembodied Brains. John H. Evans, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197750704.003.0002
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 25

The Public’s Definition of a Human

To understand the public’s perspective on HBOs and NCs, we need

to understand what the public thinks a human is (an anthropology)
and how this differs from the academic definitions in the previous
chapter.
A number of years ago I conducted an empirical study of what
the US public thinks a human is. Let us start with some basics. The
anthropologies of ordinary citizens do not perfectly map onto those
of academics.2 Moreover, whereas an ordinary individual may ad-
here to multiple anthropologies (while often tending toward one or
another), academics see anthropologies as mutually exclusive. The
public, unlike the academic community, is not rewarded for being
logically consistent.3
When the various anthropologies were described in a survey,
the one that garnered the most agreement was the theological,
followed by the biological and then the philosophical.4 The theo-
logical anthropology endorsed by the public was, at the level of de-
tail necessary for this book, more or less the same as the academic
version described in the previous chapter. One difference is that
the soul was regarded as less like a means of communication than
like one’s “essence” or “true self.” For example, it was common for
respondents to say that the body is the container of the soul. As one
respondent said, “a human is what God gives us to contain, like be a
container on the earth, a home for the soul.”5
In the philosophical anthropology used by the public, the par-
ticular capacities defining a human tended to be different from
those of the bioethicists. The bioethicists tend to cite individual-
istic capacities like consciousness, rationality, and a sense of time.
In contrast, the public tended to focus on more advanced social
capacities of the kind that have also been identified by feminist
ethicists, such as experiencing feelings, compassion, and the ability
to make moral decisions and to communicate with others.6
26 Disembodied Brains

The biological anthropology conceived by the public does not fit

with the evolutionary continuum view of contemporary biology,
but does fit tightly with the classic biological species concept and
the evolutionary species concept, which emphasize human lin-
eage and distinctiveness from animals. When the public talks
about how biology makes us human, their explanations have three
components. The first is that a human is an entity with a human
body—​an entity that looks like a human. The second is that a
human is the offspring of two humans. The third is that a human
always remains a human.7 Though the public’s definition could be
called tautological, requiring a definition of a human to provide a
definition of a human, it is probably better thought of as reflecting
the older evolutionary species concept, in which humans are those
who are in historical continuity with previous humans.
The main overall difference between the views current in the
public-​policy bioethical debate and those expressed by the public
is that the public considers humans to be distinct from animals,
which reflects the pervasive influence of the theological anthro-
pology on US culture. Indeed, humans and animals are often not
regarded as belonging on the same continuum. Even if the concept
of the continuum is conceded, the public sees a sizable gap between
animals and humans that makes humans special. This is evident in
the survey from that earlier project which asked, “Which statement
comes closest to your view about comparing humans to animals?”
The possible answers were: “Are humans incomparably special,
special, somewhat special, or not special at all compared to ani-
mals?” The first two options were selected by 73 percent, while only
10 percent selected “not special at all.” That is, very few people view
animals as having close to human-​level moral status.8
To summarize, the definitions of a human used by the public
emphasize human distinctiveness from animals, both physi-
cally and morally. This is reflected in the very prevalent theolog-
ical anthropology that places humans on a different spectrum
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 27

from the nonhuman animals, as well as a biological anthropology

that emphasizes human biological distinctiveness. To a critic,
this means that ordinary citizens believe in “speciesism,” which
“entails favoring members of a particular species (usually one’s
own) which is selected without naming any objective merits of
that biological group.”9 The public’s position could also be called
“anthropocentric.”
Moreover, the most commonly relied-​on anthropology, the the-
ological, is not materialist but instead assumes that we consist of a
separable body and soul. Due to Christianity’s influence on secular
culture, the biological anthropology used by the public is similar to
the theological anthropology; as we will later see, members of the
public tend to implicitly rely on the theological anthropology, but
in secular form.10
To get a fuller understanding of the public’s anthropologies, let
us see how someone who relies on the theological anthropology
regards NCs. From this perspective, and in contrast to the concerns
expressed in the public-​policy bioethical debate, an HBO or an
NC mouse cannot become a human either physically or morally.
John D. Loike is a biologist who writes from the Orthodox Jewish
perspective, which is similar to the Christian perspective. He con-
cisely describes a view that I think most closely represents the ma-
jority view of the public. He writes that while secular bioethicists
use “capacities based definitions” of personhood, “human status
and personhood have different meanings. Biologically, the term
‘human being’ refers to an animal that genetically belongs to the
species Homo sapiens. Many religious scholars include ‘ensoul-
ment’—​defined as the instant a human being attains a soul—​as a
characteristic of human status.”
In contrast to secular ethics, he continues, “any living or-
ganism that has human status also attains personhood status. But
conferring personhood does not necessarily confer human status.”
That is, if a mouse obtains personhood, it does not become, morally
28 Disembodied Brains

or biologically (physically), a human. “Second, human status is

given to any individual born from a human being and/​or derived
from human gametes regardless of its capacity-​based functions or
cognitive capabilities.” This is the evolutionary species definition of
the physical human preferred by the public, in which a human is the
offspring of a human, combined with the morality in the theolog-
ical anthropology. Therefore, “an animal that has been engineered
with human brain cells or human neural organoids does not neces-
sarily attain a human state. Being human requires the creation of an
embryo from human gametes or being born from a human.”11 To
take the most extreme case, a chimpanzee with a fully human brain,
one that might stop you on the corner to ask about the weather and
the stock market, is not human—​although humans may grant it
higher moral standing compared to other animals.

The Foundational Distinction

between Humans and Animals

This section focuses on research that informs us about NCs. I hy-

pothesize that the primary concern for the public is not the moral
status of NCs per se, but rather that the existence of NCs violates
the foundational cultural distinction between humans and ani-
mals. NCs are literally a cognitive threat to foundational beliefs
about the world embodied in the public’s definition of a human.
The public varies in the extent to which it believes in this distinc-
tion; thus, those who believe more intensely in the distinction will
be more opposed to creating NCs.
I am not the first to propose that this will be the source of public
opposition. The most influential version of this argument in the lit-
erature is Robert and Baylis’s claim that NCs will result in “moral
confusion” for the public.12 In their description of possible moral
confusion, they roughly identify the public’s anthropology, saying
that “we explore the strong interest in avoiding any practice that
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 29

would lead us to doubt the claim that humanness is a necessary (if

not sufficient) condition for full moral standing.”
More strongly, they write that violating this foundational cultural
distinction will have negative consequences for society. They write
that human-​animal chimeras (neurological or otherwise) “threaten
our social identity, our unambiguous status as human beings. . . .
Hybrids and chimeras made from human beings represent a meta-
physical threat to our self-​image.”13 In a key passage they state:

Indeed, asking—​ let alone answering—​ a question about the

moral status of part-​human inter-​species hybrids and chimeras
threatens the social fabric in untold ways; countless social
institutions, structures, and practices depend upon the moral
distinction drawn between human and nonhuman animals.
Therefore, to protect the privileged place of human animals
in the hierarchy of being, it is of value to embrace (folk) essen-
tialism about species identities and thus effectively trump sci-
entific quibbles over species and over the species status of novel
beings. The notion that species identity can be a fluid construct
is rejected, and instead a belief in fixed species boundaries that
ought not to be transgressed is advocated.”14

In the public-​policy bioethical debate dominated by bioethicists

and scientists, this perspective is very marginal, because it is not
consistent with the anthropologies used by these professions. On
the rare occasions when it is mentioned, it is not taken as a serious
position that should influence policy but merely as something the
public may believe.15

Foundational Distinctions in Studies of Culture

To proceed, we need to further understand foundational

distinctions. Robert and Baylis did not invent this concept to use
30 Disembodied Brains

for NCs; rather, it represents an application of a long scholarly tra-

dition in cultural anthropology. Anthropologists have long shown
that societies embrace foundational cultural distinctions that are so
deeply assumed that they are difficult for members of the society to
even notice. These distinctions differ by society; in the contempo-
rary West, some foundational distinctions are man-​woman, mind-​
body, nature-​ culture, inside-​ outside the body, human-​ object,
16
and human-​animal. Such distinctions have been most famously
described by anthropologist Mary Douglas, who writes that the ban
in Judaism on eating shellfish and bats is not the result of ancient
wisdom about disease transmission, but rather that ancient Israelite
foundational distinctions were based on these entities being cate-
gorically distinct.17 A lobster lives in the water yet walks, and bats
fly but are not birds. Cultural taboos are invoked when there is a
blending of two foundational categories.18 Thus, although Jews
may eat both fish and beef, they are not supposed to eat lobsters.
You know you are looking at a violation of a foundational dis-
tinction in a culture when there is a taboo against bridging the
distinction for which there is no other explanation, such as a
mixing that produces something actually harmful. The mixes are
often considered abominations, which are “anomalous or ambig-
uous with respect to some system of concepts.”19 For example,
the Western taboo against necrophilia reflects a violation of the
categories of living and dead; transgenderism was previously
thought to violate the categories of man and woman; and incest
violates categories of parent and child.
These foundational distinctions and their associated taboos
cannot be easily discarded by the public. In one of my favorite
examples of how deeply assumed these distinctions are, American
anthropologist Matthew Engelke describes a visit to rural Africa
during which his host offered him crickets to eat. Upon eating,
Engelke vomited. In his interpretation, “I didn’t throw up because
I had a stomach virus. It wasn’t a ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ reaction in
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 31

this sense. I threw up because my body is cultural, or enculturated,

itself. And in my culture we don’t eat crickets.”20 For Engelke,
crickets violated the American food/​not food distinction. I hypoth-
esize that NCs are generating a similar reaction.
Taboos from crossing distinctions, and the visceral reactions
they engender, are stronger when they involve “us” humans. The
philosopher of religion Jeffrey Stout sees a picture of a “cabbit,”
supposedly part cat and part rabbit, and calls it an “abomination”
that disgusts him. But what would really disgust him would be an
“anomaly with social significance,” such as that which “straddles
the line between us and them.”21 For Stout, “us” means humanity.
As you might have anticipated from my description of the public’s
anthropologies, one of the absolutely foundational distinctions in
Western society is between humans and animals. Indeed, nearly all
cultures make a distinction between humans and nonhuman an-
imals, suggesting to some scientists that we have evolved to make
this distinction.22 This foundational distinction is indicated by dis-
gust at bestiality. Bestiality might not hurt the human or the animal
but is an object of disgust because it violates “one of the categorical
distinctions most central to our society: the line between human
and animal.” Bestiality is not dangerous to those involved, but to
society.23
To return to NCs, we know that chimeras violate foundational
distinctions because they generate a visceral “yuck” response from
the public. A recent study compared people’s response to the dif-
ferent possible sources of replacement organs: mechanical organs,
3D bio-​printed organs, human donor organs, and pig organs. It
turns out that people really do not want the pig organs. “Pig organs
invoke a ‘yuck’ factor,” writes the author, and the organs express
“concerns about pollution behavior, mixing up human and an-
imal bodies, and blurring the boundaries between species.” Using
pig organs also “challenges known schemata of what it is to be a
‘pig’ and what it is to be a ‘human.’ ” The author concludes that
32 Disembodied Brains

“respondents’ views on xenotransplantation thus demonstrate con-

cern both about policing species boundaries and—​significantly—​
about protecting the individual’s subjective identity.”24 So, as other
scholars have noted, since chimeras mix humans and animals, we
can expect opposition on those grounds alone. A possible research
project to test whether chimeras really violate the distinction—​a
project unlikely to be approved by my university—​would involve
volunteers eating a chimeric pig, which they would presumably
enjoy until told it was “part human.” An important finding would
be how many then vomit.

Belief in Foundational Distinctions Is Rational

It is important to not dismiss beliefs in foundational distinctions as

emotional or irrational. Mary Douglas wrote the original study on
this topic to show that such distinctions are found in both “prim-
itive” and modern societies.25 In the words of an interpreter of
Douglas, “some central pairs of categories are widely shared: for
example, man and woman, nature and culture, human and an-
imal, organism and machine, life and death.”26 Moreover, the basic
response of disgust is thought to be universal, selected by evolu-
tion because it was adaptive.27 Therefore, “we need to take those
categories and their resulting moral intuitions quite seriously, for
we cannot do without our categories.”28
Foundational distinctions are more powerful and consequential
versions of cultural distinctions in general.29 All distinctions are
culturally determined, essentially chopping up the endless chaos of
perceived experience to make it intelligible. Of course, societies—​
and individuals within societies—​differ on the extent to which such
distinctions are important. For example, Roma and Jewish cultures
are particularly focused on maintaining distinctions.30 I expect to
find that members of the public vary greatly in the extent to which
they believe in the human-​animal foundational distinction.
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 33

The Jewish and Christian traditions may be particularly focused

on making foundational distinctions. As Eviatar Zerubavel writes
about Judaism (from which Christianity emerged), “No wonder
this culture has thought up a purist God who actually spends the
first three of only six days he has in which to create a world just
making distinctions.” Moreover, the Jewish and Christian traditions
train adherents to make divides through ritualistic distinctions be-
tween the sacred and the profane, with particular rituals around sa-
cred objects to make sure they are not contaminated.31 On the other
hand, Zerubavel also points out that at least the early Christians
broke the distinctions of the time with their ethnic and social uni-
versalism, and they did, after all, believed in someone who was both
man and God.32
Subgroups of a population can train themselves to not see partic-
ular distinctions that are otherwise dominant in a culture. I suspect
that one reason why bioethicists and scientists do not write about
the visceral reaction to violating the human-​animal distinction is
that they do not hold to this distinction. The scientists who create
chimeras have been taught, with some effort, to ignore distinctions
between life-​forms that they most likely experienced as children.
One summary of how biologists unlearn the human-​animal dis-
tinction says that “The hybrid-​generating power of the life sciences
is rarely experienced by the scientists themselves as unnatural or
disturbing because the techniques they use have long since been
normalised within the field. This perspective is the result of years of
training to seek knowledge in a particular manner.”33
As one scientist in an interview study put it, “We all got used to
the idea that life is a continuum. You can take something from yeast
and put it in a mouse and something else from a chimpanzee and
put it in a cow and more or less you can map things onto each other,
and they sort of work.” Another has said, “It’s all very well to say
people have been doing this [mixing] for forty years and every sci-
entist knows about it. But outside of the biologists doing this kind
of work nobody knows about it. It’s never spoken of.”34 Bioethicists
34 Disembodied Brains

who focus in this area are likewise exposed to so much of this scien-
tific work that it has been normalized for them as well.
Scholars who study foundational distinctions would conclude
that people who claim they do not acknowledge any of these foun-
dational distinctions and associated taboos see the distinctions
that they do in fact observe as so natural that they are simply “fact.”
Creating distinctions discourages the self-​reflection needed to rec-
ognize one’s own prejudices. Indeed, “we regard any inquiry into
the basis of the taboo as itself taboo.”35
I suspect that the biologists reading this book decline to acknowl-
edge a strong human-​animal distinction, having been trained in a
subculture that rejects it. They are therefore unlikely to experience
a yuck response to seeing an NC. But I suspect all readers believe in
many foundational distinctions and their associated taboos, such as
the dead-​alive distinction signaled by disgust with necrophilia. For
the same reason, zombies probably also fascinate almost everyone.
It is also hard to imagine that any reader lacks the inside/​outside-​
the-​body distinction. For example, piercings (which cross the skin
barrier) are the object of both disgust and fascination, which are
two sides of the same coin.
Finally, consider what your reaction to “plastinates” would be.
Plastinates are whole human cadavers, often with the skin removed,
sealed in plastic, and shown in museums. In one summary, viewers
find them fascinating because “they transgress the familiar
categories with which we usually make sense of the world: namely,
interior or exterior, real or fake, dead or alive, bodies or persons,
self or other. By refusing to occupy this familiar binary terrain,
plastinates recreate tensions that our traditional concepts find
difficult to encapsulate.”36 In sum, all societies recognize founda-
tional distinctions, although they may be different in each society.
Though people in the United States will vary, they generally believe
in the human-​animal distinction, and those who believe in it will,
I hypothesize, tend to oppose NCs as threatening the distinction.
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 35

Will All NCs Violate the Foundational Distinction

between Humans and Animals?

From the above discussion, we can be sure that if I created a horse

with the head of a human and brought it to the local shopping mall
to answer shoppers’ questions, I would violate the foundational dis-
tinction and generate a very strong disgust response. If I created
a mouse that stood up and said “Hi, I’m Mickey”—​as in Greely’s
amusing example—​I would get a similar reaction.37 If that were
what scientists are doing, then it seems quite evident that, for those
who maintain a foundational distinction between humans and ani-
mals, seeing an NC would generate opposition to NC research.
We can expect a more muted and subtle reaction. As Peter
Morriss points out, not all “blurring of boundaries is taboo.” For
example, “inviting animals into our homes, and families, as pets
causes little disquiet.”38 Yet bestiality invokes the taboo, presumably
either because sex is how new mammals are made or because sex is
seen as part of the core of being human. What about an NC would
represent a violation of the distinction? As we know, while using
animal hearts to replace malfunctioning human hearts probably
does generate disquiet, the reaction is not strong enough to lead
people to actually oppose the practice.
The centrality of the components to the definition of the animal
and the human that are mixed will matter. Violation of the distinc-
tion probably requires a mix of what is considered to be a core,
defining feature of the human and a core, defining feature of the
animal. By itself, inserting cells from a human into an animal will
not ultimately invoke the foundational distinction. Instead, human
appearance and behavior are probably key. As described above, the
public’s anthropology is based on not only the criterion of gene-
alogy (born of a human) but also on the “looks and behaves like a
human” criterion, which would be most likely to invoke a violation
of the foundational distinction.
36 Disembodied Brains

By contrast, in the philosophical anthropology used in the

public-​policy bioethics debate about NCs, what an entity looks like
or does has little relevance to its moral status. In fact, advocates of
the philosophical anthropology emphasize not letting appearance
and actions sway decisions about moral status. A late-​term fetus
may look like a born human, as might a person in a comatose state,
but what is important in the decision whether to keep either alive
is the entity’s capacities. Analogously, though a chimp or a dolphin
may not look like a human, its mental capacities give it moral status.
A few bioethicists have speculated that the public would be
most upset by the appearance of a chimera. While not giving moral
weight to appearance, Greely has stated that “chimeras with some
visible human characteristics could also be profoundly unsettling.”
I think he is right that people would be unsettled by chimeras with
“human features, such as non-​human primates with human faces
or hands.” He points out that this would “break the folk require-
ment of a strict separation between humans and other animals,”
and also possibly “create the kind of moral confusion” that is the
concern of some scholars.39 Similarly, according to a public con-
sultation by the British government, people are particularly con-
cerned with “cellular or genetic modifications which could result in
animals with aspects of human-​like appearance (skin type, limb or
facial structure) or characteristics, such as speech.”40 Research into
our reaction to the appearance of robots suggests the same.41
Along with appearance, behaviors are also key to triggering
a violation. In my earlier study of anthropologies, the public did
consider capacities to be part of their anthropology, but focused
on social capacities like the ability to make moral decisions, com-
municate with others, have relationships, and feel love—​that is,
capacities that lead to behaviors.42 Therefore, the strongest viola-
tion of the foundational distinction would come from endowing
an animal with human appearance and behavior. To return to my
dated cultural reference, Mr. Ed was fascinating for the public
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 37

not because he had the requisite consciousness to think about his

interests but because he could actually talk to Wilbur about them.
Whether the violation of the foundational distinction is weak or
strong may depend on which animal is combined with the human.
Animals that are evolutionarily farther from humans lack the basic
appearance and behavior of humans and will likely produce less of
a violation because the human qualities will not be expressed. One
study of people’s views of chimeras asserts that “some interspecies
entities undermine the human essence whereas others do not.
Here, non-​human animals considered closer to the human, such
as non-​human primates, are argued to be unacceptable sources
of biological material to be mixed with humans by a number of
participants. . . . Non-​human animals considered more different,
such as rabbits and cows, however, do not constitute the same cul-
tural risk to our sense of humanness.”43 This would make the dog
less acceptable than the rat, because dogs are considered capable
of all sorts of human emotions and reactions. Primates would pre-
sumably be considered even less acceptable.
Primates are particularly problematic because they already
encroach on the foundational distinction, and adding human
components would compound the threat. As Mary Midgley has
pointed out, the hostile reaction to Darwin in the nineteenth cen-
tury had to do with the views of apes at the time. To be equated with
an ape was particularly insulting, because as “inferior imitators”
of humans they were considered ridiculous. Physically they were
also seen as abominations, since “by having a number of human
characteristics, the ape was attacking our very conceptual frame-
work . . . blurring the boundary between the human and the an-
imal.”44 Apes were then considered evil or diabolical, as evidenced
by “the association of apes with the Devil” and in artistic depictions
of the Last Judgement “with ape-​like creatures showelling the
damned into hell.” Morriss wryly writes that he suspects “that there
would have been less opposition to evolutionism if Darwin had
38 Disembodied Brains

somehow managed to argue that we were descended from a noble

animal like a horse.”45
Armed with this sense of which NCs would lead to a violation
of the foundational distinction, we can probably conclude that
what scientists are currently capable of with NCs would not gen-
erate much of a response were the public to meet such an entity. For
example, the monkey modified with one human gene would not
behave differently or look any different. Even if the monkeys truly
got smarter, this would be by monkey standards, and no one would
say that they were capable of any humanlike interaction. The foun-
dational distinction would be more threatened if the NC monkeys
developed human behaviors, such as assembling machines in a
factory.
In sum, at present the public is not going to see a NC animal and
realize that it has a human component. But—​and this is a key so-
ciological insight—​while the public responds to its own senses,
its senses are mediated by our labeling. Therefore, even though
someone could look at an NC mouse and think it looks like all
other mice, the viewer could well experience a more limited sense
of violation of the foundational distinction if there were a sign next
to it that says “this mouse has a human brain in it” or more simply
“human-​mouse chimera.”
Similarly, if violation of the foundational distinction does drive
opposition to NCs, then naming the entity “part human-​part pig”
will remind people of the foundational distinction and generate
disgust and opposition. An entity of this kind that has been given a
made-​up name like “Cebir” will less likely invoke the distinction in
the viewer’s mind.
I do not want to give the impression that the names given to these
entities are all that matters for a perceived violation of the founda-
tional distinction, or that the effect requires looking at an NC. The
more general point is that talking about mixes of humans and ani-
mals will inevitably have that effect. In the passage I cite above from
Robert and Baylis, they write that “asking—​let alone answering—​a
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 39

question [about NCs] threatens the social fabric in untold ways.”

The more people read about an entity that is described as part
human-​part animal, even if they will never see the entity, the
stronger the effect. Even reading this book would produce a tiny
amount of the theorized effect.
To sum up this long section: I anticipate that, when I study the
views of the public, I will find that the levels of consciousness of
an entity are not very important to whether the public approves
of HBOs and NCs, because the public is using a different anthro-
pology than are the scientists and bioethicists. But I do expect to
find evidence that opposition to NCs is driven by adherence to the
foundational distinction between humans and animals. This op-
position will become stronger if the qualities that matter for the
public’s anthropology, such as appearing like a human or exhibiting
human behaviors, begin to be expressed in NCs.

Ephemeral Connections to
Human Body Parts

I now turn to another likely feature of the public’s anthropologies

that is likely to produce distinct views of HBOs. Unlike NCs, HBOs
are unlikely to ever be considered human by the public, because
they will always lack the indicators of humanhood that the public
recognizes. They will not be born of a human, they will not look
like a human, and they will not act like a human. Greely makes the
point: “the human tissues involved here, although they come from
arguably the organ most tied to human identity, are small masses of
disaggregated cells, suspended in fluid, contained in vials. An out-
sider looking at them would have no idea what they were. They do
not have the more obvious humanity of a severed head, a skull, or a
full skeleton.”46 And it goes without saying that, lacking a body, an
HBO will never be able to engage in any of the behaviors that de-
fine us as human. So if violations of our sense of humanity and the
40 Disembodied Brains

foundational distinction between humans and animals are not at

stake, what is?
Another foundational distinction is between humans and
objects. We can treat objects however we wish. This distinction is
indicated by the pervasive conversation about “objectification,”
which means treating a human like we treat an object. From the
perspective of the public-​ policy bioethical debate, HBOs are
objects. But if an HBO were somehow considered to be an ongoing
part of a human, it could threaten the human-​object distinction.
How would that be possible?

The Materialist View of the Human

Let us delve into another aspect of both the philosophical and bi-
ological anthropologies used by bioethicists and scientists in the
public-​policy bioethical debate about HBOs and NCs. These two
anthropologies assume that the human is only matter. “Material” or
“matter” essentially means “made from atoms,” and the belief that
nothing exists besides matter is called “materialism.” The body is
made of cells, and cells are ultimately made of atoms.
As a result, for the materialist, the mind and consciousness are
ultimately physical, reducible to chemicals in the brain. In one ac-
count of this position, “everything that exists, including all mental
states and properties, is entirely constituted by matter arranged in
particular ways.”47 A classic materialist statement comes from the
codiscoverer of the structure of DNA, Francis Crick, who said that
“you, your joys and sorrows, your memories and your ambitions,
your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more
than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associ-
ated molecules.”48 There is then no “spark,” there is no “soul,” and all
of mind and consciousness is part of the human body. The mind, its
thoughts, and the body are all one piece.
 What We Know about Public’s Views of Humans 41

Materialism, when applied to the human, “is the idea that human
beings are material objects—​brains, perhaps, or some part of the
brain—​without immaterial selves or souls.”49

Nonmaterial Part of the Human

In opposition to materialism (and monism more generally) is du-

alism, which holds that there is a distinction between body and
mind. I am interested in the version of dualism in which there is
a body made ultimately of material (atoms), and another feature
of the human that cannot be reduced to material and the body. As
one conservative Protestant philosopher puts it, “according to the
most popular form of dualism—​one embraced by Plato, Augustine,
Descartes and a thousand others—​a human person is an immate-
rial substance: a thing, an object, a substance . . . and a thing that
isn’t material, although, of course, it is intimately connected with a
material body.” He wants to defend the idea that “a human person is
not a material object.”50
Part of the public’s theological anthropology is that an existing
born human has a soul, given by God, that is not material. This
soul resides in your body until, at death, it goes elsewhere. In one
interviewee’s summary, “A human is a man or a woman created in
the likeness of God that has a spirit, body, and mind, and a heart.”
According to another interviewee, “We are a spiritual being that’s
having an earthly experience, or human experience. So we have the
human body . . . [and] we have the spiritual side.”51
It is not only Christians who believe this. A lot of religious ideas
become secularized over time, losing their explicitly religious con-
tent but retaining the basic form. My earlier study of the public’s
view of the human shows that many of the people who were not
relying on the theological anthropology nonetheless had a no-
tion that people have a nonmaterial soul. A minority held to a
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
self is a disease that, like influenza, falls on all constitutions. It is
allowable to speak of yourself, provided you do not continually
advance new arguments in your favor. But abuse of self is nearly as
bad, since we can not help suspecting that those who abuse
themselves are, in reality, angling for approbation.
Ofttimes we dislike egotism in others simply because of our own.
We feel it a slight, when we are by, that one should talk of himself,
or seek to entertain us with his own interests instead of asking us
ours. He who thinks he can find in himself the means of doing
without others is much mistaken. But he who thinks others can not
do without him is still more mistaken. Conceit is the most
contemptible and one of the most odious qualities in the world. It is
vanity drawn from all other shifts, and forced to appeal to itself for
admiration. It is to nature what paint is to beauty; it is not only
needless, but it impairs what it would improve. He who gives himself
airs of importance exhibits the credentials of impotence. He that
fancies himself very enlightened because he sees the deficiency of
others may be very ignorant because he has not studied his own. In
the same degree as we overrate ourselves we shall underrate
others; for injustice allowed at home is not likely to be corrected
abroad.
It is this unquiet love of self that renders us so sensitive. It is an
instrument useful, but dangerous. It often wounds the hand that
makes use of it, and seldom does good without doing harm. The sick
man who sleeps ill thinks the night long. We exaggerate all the evils
which we encounter; they are great, but our sensibility increases
them. Man should not prize himself by what he has; neither should
others prize him by what he professes to have, or what he by
vigorous talk constantly lays claim to possess. We should seek the
more valuable qualities which lie hidden in his true self. He mistakes
who values a jewel by its golden frame, or a book by its silver
clasps, or a man by reason of his estates or profession.
The true measure of success always lies between two extremes.
Egotism and overweening self-conceit are indeed deplorable
blemishes in any character; but we, perhaps, forget that he who is
totally destitute of them presents but a sorry figure in the world's
battle-field. He lacks individuality, and lacks the courage to push
forward his own interests. In this aggressive age it will not do to be
destitute of a right degree of self-confidence. Lacking this, men are
too often deterred from taking that position for which their talents
eminently fit them, and at last have only vain regrets as they
contemplate life's failures. Egotism is as distinct and separate from a
manly self-confidence in one's own powers as the unsightly block of
marble is to the finished statuette, which consists, indeed, of the
same materials as the former, but so softened and modified as to be
an object of admiration to all. Nor is it difficult to draw the dividing
lines. Egotism exultingly proclaims to all, "Look at me. What
strength, what ability, what talents are mine! Who so graceful? who
so gifted? who so competent to be placed in position of honor or
authority as I? I am sure of success. Behold my triumph!" The man
who is withal modest, yet feels that he possesses acquisitions and
gifts, says: "True, the way is long, the time discouraging, but what
has been done can be done. I can but make the effort, and go
forward to the best of my ability; and if so be I fail, with a brave
heart and a cheerful face I will do what duty points out; but if
success crowns my efforts, I will so use my advantages that all may
be benefited."
 HERE is no vice or folly that requires so much nicety and skill
to manage as vanity, nor any which, by ill-management,
makes so contemptible a figure. The desire of being thought
wise is often a hindrance to being so, for such a one is often
more desirous of letting the world see what knowledge he hath than
to learn of others that which he wants. Men are more apt to be vain
on account of those qualities which they fondly believe they have
than of those which they really possess Some would be thought to
do great things who are but tools or instruments, like the fool who
fancied he played upon the organ when he only blew the bellows.
Be not so greedy of popular applause as to forget that the same
breath which blows up a fire may blow it out again. Vanity, like
laudanum and other poisonous medicines, is beneficial in small,
though injurious in large, quantities. Be not vain of your want of
vanity. When you hear the phrase, "I may say without vanity," you
may be sure some characteristic vanity will follow in the same
breath. The most worthless things are sometimes most esteemed. It
is not all the world that can pull an humble man down, because God
will exalt him. Nor is it all the world that can keep a proud man up,
because God will debase him.
Vanity feeds voraciously and abundantly on the richest food that
can be served up, or can live on less and meaner diet than any thing
of which we can form a conception. The rich and the poor, learned
and ignorant, strong and weak,—all have a share in vanity. The
humblest Christian is not free from it, and when he is most humble
the devil will flatter his vanity by telling him of it. On the other hand,
it is with equal relish that it feeds upon vulgarity, coarseness, and
fulsome eccentricity,—every thing, in short, by which a person can
attract attention. It often takes liberality by the hand, prompts
advice, administers reproof, and sometimes perches visibly and gayly
on the prayers and sermons in the pulpit. It is an ever-present
principle of human nature—a wen on the heart of man; less painful,
but equally loathsome as a cancer. It is of all others the most
baseless propensity.
O vanity, how little is thy force acknowledged or thine operations
discerned! How wantonly dost thou deceive mankind under different
disguises! Sometimes thou dost wear the face of pity; sometimes of
generosity; nay, thou hast the assurance to put on the robes of
religion and the glorious ornaments that belong only to heroic virtue.
Vanity is the fruit of ignorance. It thrives most in those places never
reached by the air of heaven or the light of the sun. It is a deceitful
sweetness, a fruitless labor, a perpetual fear, a dangerous honor; her
beginning is without providence, but her end not without
repentance. Vanity is so constantly solicitous of self that even where
its own claims are not interested it indirectly seeks the aliment which
it loves by showing how little is deserved by others.
Charms which, like flowers, lie on the surface—such as preserve
figure and dress—conduce to vanity. On the contrary, those
excellencies which lie down, like gold, and are discovered with
difficulty—such as profoundness of intellect and morality—leave their
possessors modest and humble. Vanity ceases to be blameless, even
if it is not ennobled, when it is directed to laudable objects, when it
prompts us to great and generous actions. Vanity is, indeed, the
poison of agreeableness, yet even a poison, when skillfully
employed, has a salutary effect in medicine; so has vanity in the
commerce and society of the world.
Some intermixture of vainglorious tempers puts life into business,
and makes a fit composition for grand enterprises and hazardous
endeavors; for men of solid and sober natures have more of the
ballast than the sail. Vanity is, in one sense, the antidote to conceit,
for, while the former makes us all nerve to the opinions of others,
the latter is perfectly satisfied with its opinion of itself. A vain man
can not be altogether rude. Desirous as he is of pleasing he fashions
his manners after those of others. Therefore, let us give vanity fair
quarter wherever we meet with it, being persuaded that it is often
productive of good to its possessor, and to others who are within its
sphere of action.
Vanity pervades the whole human family to a greater or less
degree, as the atmosphere does the globe. It is so anchored in the
heart of man that not only in the lower walks of life but in the higher
all wish to have their admirers. Those who write against it wish to
have the glory of writing well, and those who read it wish the glory
of reading well. Vanity calculates but poorly on the vanity of others.
What a virtue we should distill from frailty! what a world of pain we
would save our brethren, if we would suffer our weakness to be the
measure of theirs!
We would rather contend with pride than vanity, because pride
has a stand-up way of fighting. You know where it is. It throws its
black shadow on you, and you are not at a loss where to strike. But
vanity is such a delusive and multified failing that men who fight
vanities are like men who fight midgets and butterflies. It is much
easier to chase them than to hit them. Vanity may be likened to the
mouse nibbling about in the expectation of a crumb; while pride is
apt to be like the butcher's dog, who carries off your steak and
growls at you as he goes. Pride is never more offensive than when it
condescends to be civil; whereas vanity, whenever it forgets itself,
naturally assumes good humor.
Extinguish vanity in the mind, and you naturally retrench the little
superfluities of garniture and equipage. The flowers will fall of
themselves when the root that nourishes them is destroyed. We
have nothing of which we should be vain, but much to induce
humility. If we have any good qualities they are the gift of God. Let
every one guard against this all-pervading principle, and teach their
children that it is the shadow of a shade.
 HERE is nothing in the world so malignant and destructive in
its nature and tendency as selfishness. It has done all the
mischief of the past, and is destined to do all the mischief of
the unseen future. It has destroyed the temporal and eternal
interests of millions in times past, and it is morally certain that it will
destroy the interests of millions yet to come. It is the source of all
the sins of omission and commission which are found in the world.
We shall not see a wrong take place but that the actor is moved by
his own private, personal, and selfish nature.
Selfishness is a vice utterly at variance with the happiness of him
who harbors it, for the selfish man suffers more from his selfishness
than he from whom that selfishness withholds some important
benefit. He that sympathizes in all the happiness of others perhaps
himself enjoys the safest happiness, and he who is warned by all the
folly of others has perhaps attained the soundest wisdom. But such
is the blindness and suicidal selfishness of mankind that things so
desirable are seldom pursued, things so accessible seldom attained.
The selfish person lives as if the world were made altogether for
him, and not he for the world; to take in every thing, and part with
nothing.
Selfishness contracts and narrows our benevolence, and causes
us, like serpents, to infold ourselves within ourselves, and to turn out
our stings to all the world besides. As frost to the bud and blight to
the blossom, even such is self-interest to friendship, for confidence
can not dwell where selfishness is porter at the gate. The essence of
true nobility is neglect of self. Let the thought of self pass in, and the
beauty of a great action is gone, like the bloom from a soiled flower.
Selfishness is the bane of all life. It can not enter into any life—
individual, family, or social—without cursing it. It maintains its
ground by tenacity and contention, and engenders strife and discord
where all before was peace and harmony.
Few sins in the world are punished more constantly or more
certainly than that of selfishness. It dwarfs all the better nature of
man. It takes from him that feeling of kindly sympathy for others'
good, which is one of the most pleasing traits of manhood, and in its
stead sets up self as the one whose good is to be chiefly sought. It
makes self the vortex instead of the fountain, so that, instead of
throwing out, he learns only to draw in. These withering effects are
to be seen not only in the high roads and public places of life, but in
the nooks and by-lanes as well. Not alone among conquerors and
kings, but among the humble and obscure; in the dissembling
artifices of trade; in the unsanctified lust of wealth; in the devoted
pursuit of station and power; confederated with the worst feelings
and most depraved designs.
In proportion as we contract and curtail our feelings, so do we
confine and limit our minds. If all our thoughts, plans, and purposes
tend only to the advancement of self, we may be sure they will
become as insignificant as their object, and instead of embracing in
their scope the welfare of many, rendering us an object of
endearment to others, they will become dwarfed and conceited, and
fall far short of the liberality and public spirit by which we attach
others to our cause. Unselfish and noble acts are the most radiant
epochs in the history of souls, points from which we date a larger
growth of thought and feeling. When wrought in earliest youth, they
lie in the memory of age, like the coral islands, green and sunny,
waving with the fruits of a southern clime amidst the melancholy
waste of water.
The vice of selfishness displays itself in many ways. In an extreme
form it is termed avarice, and shows itself in an insatiable desire to
gather wealth. As heat changes the hitherto brittle metal into the
elastic, yielding, yet deadly Damascus blade, so, when the demon of
avarice finds lodgment in the heart of man, it changes all his better
nature. It may find him delighting to do good and relieving the
wants of others; it leaves him one whose whole energy and power
are turned to the advancement of self alone. This is the grand center
to which all his efforts tend. There is no length to which an
avaricious man will not go in his mad career. In order that wealth
may be his he will run almost any risks, stand any privation, and will
sacrifice not only his own comfort and happiness, but that also of his
friends and associates, or even of his own family circle. His mind is
never expanded beyond the circumference of the almighty dollar. He
thinks not of his immortal soul, his accountability to God, or of his
final destiny. Selfishness in its worst form has complete possession
of his heart. It is the ruling principle of his life. One strange feature
about this form of selfishness is that it ultimately defeats its own
ends. Its possessor is an Ishmael in the community. He passes to
the grave without tasting the sweets of friendship or the comforts of
life. Striving for wealth in order that he may have wherewith to
procure happiness, he ends with the sacrifice of all the means of
enjoyment in order that he may augment his wealth more rapidly.
The closing hours of a life of selfishness must be clouded with
many painful thoughts. Chances for doing good passed unimproved.
In order that some slight personal advantage might be gained kindly
feelings were suppressed. The heart, which was intended to beat
with compassion for others, has become contracted to a narrow
circle, and life, that inestimable gift of Providence, instead of
drawing to its close a rounded and complete whole, has been stinted
and dwarfed, and passes on to the other world but illy prepared for
the great changes wrought by the hand of death.
 BSTINACY and contention are common qualities, most
appearing in and best becoming a mean and illiterate soul.
They arise not so much from a conscious defect of voluntary
power, as foolhardiness is not seldom the disguise of
conscious timidity. Obstinacy must not be confounded with
perseverance; for obstinacy presumptuously declines to listen to
reason, but perseverance only continues its exertion while satisfied
that good judgment sustains its course. There are few things more
singular than that obstinacy which, in matters of the highest
importance to ourselves, often prevents us from acknowledging the
truth that is perfectly plain to all.
There is something in obstinacy which differs from every other
passion. Whenever it fails it never recovers, but either breaks like
iron or crumbles sulkily away like a fractured arch. Most other
passions have their periods of fatigue and rest, their suffering and
their care; but obstinacy has no resources, and the first wound is
mortal. Narrowness of mind is often the cause of obstinacy; we do
not easily believe beyond what we see. Hence it is that the more
extensive one's knowledge of mankind becomes, the less inclined is
he to the vice of obstinacy; and an obstinate disposition, instead of
denoting a mind of superior ability, always denotes a dwarfed,
ignorant, and selfish disposition. An obstinate, ungovernable self-
sufficiency plainly points out to us that state of imperfect maturity at
which the graceful levity of youth is lost and the solidity of
experience not yet acquired.
Obstinacy is not only a result of a narrow, illiberal judgment, but it
is a barrier to all improvements. It casts the mind in a mold, and as
utterly prevents it from expanding as though it were a material
substance encased in iron. A stubborn mind conduces as little to
wisdom, or even to knowledge, as a stubborn temper to happiness.
Whosoever perversely resolves to adhere to plans or opinions, be
they right or be they wrong, because they have adopted them,
raises an impassable bar to information. The wiser we are the more
we are aware of the extent of our ignorance. Those who have but
just entered the vestibule of the temple of knowledge invariably feel
themselves much wiser than those who meekly worship in the inner
sanctuary. Positiveness is much more apt to accompany the
statement of the superficial observer than him whose experience has
been vast and profound. Sir Isaac Newton, who might have spoken
with authority, felt as a child on the shore of the great sea of human
knowledge. Doubtless many of his followers feel as though far out
on the tossing waves; for they act as if their opinion could by no
possibility be wrong.
Sometimes obstinacy is confounded with firmness, and under this
misnomer is practiced as a virtue. But the line between obstinacy
and firmness is strong and decisive. Firmness of purpose is one of
the most necessary sinews of character, and one of the best
instruments of success. Without it, genius wastes its efforts in a
maze of inconsistencies. Firmness, while not suffering itself to be
easily driven from its course, recognizes the fact that it is only
perfection that is immutable, but that for things imperfect change is
the way to perfect them. It gets the name of obstinacy when it will
not admit of a change for the better. Firmness without knowledge
can not be always good. In things ill it is not virtue, but an absolute
vice. It is a noble quality; but unguided by knowledge or humility, it
falls into obstinacy, and so loses the traits whereby we before
admired it.
Society is often dragged down to low standards by two or three
who propose, in every case, to fight every thing and every idea of
which they are not the instigators. There is nothing harder for a man
with a strong will than to make up his mind not always to have his
own way; to submit, in many cases, rather than to quarrel with his
neighbors. One must certainly make up his mind to lose much of
happiness who is not willing to give way at times to the wishes of
others. We must learn to turn sharp corners quietly, or we shall be
constantly hurting ourselves.
But we must not, in decrying obstinacy, overlook the fact that,
while it certainly is a great vice and frequently the cause of great
mischief, yet it has closely allied with it the whole line of masculine
virtues, constancy, fidelity, and fortitude, and that in their excess all
the virtues easily fall into it. Yet it is ever easy to determine the line
of demarkation where these virtues end and obstinacy begins. The
smallest share of common sense will suffice to detect it, and there is
little doubt that few people pass this boundary without being
conscious of the fault. The business of constancy chiefly is bravely to
stand by and stoutly to suffer those inconveniences which are not
otherwise possible to be avoided. But constancy does not adhere to
an opinion merely for the sake of having its own way, wherein it
differs from obstinacy.
There are situations in which the proper opinions and modes of
action are not evident. In such cases we must maturely reflect ere
we decide; we must seek for the opinions of those wiser and better
acquainted with the subject than ourselves; we must candidly hear
all that can be said on both sides; then, and then only, can we in
such cases hope to determine wisely. But the decision once so
deliberately adopted we must firmly sustain, and never yield but to
the most unbiased conviction of our former errors. But when such
conviction is secured, it is the part of true manliness to acknowledge
it, and of true wisdom to make the required change. There is no
principle of constancy or of perseverance or of fortitude that requires
us to continue in our former course when convinced that it is wrong.
 HERE is nothing which wings its flight so swiftly as calumny;
nothing which is uttered with more ease; nothing which is
listened to with more readiness, or dispersed more widely.
Slander soaks into the mind as water soaks into low and
marshy places, where it becomes stagnant and offensive. Slander is
like the Greek fire, which burned unquenched beneath the water; or,
like the weeds which, when you have extirpated them in one place,
are sprouting vigorously in another; or, it is like the wheel which
catches fire as it goes, and burns with fiercer conflagration as its
own speed increases.
The tongue of slander is never tired; in one form or another it
manages to keep itself in constant employment. Sometimes it drips
honey and sometimes gall. It is bitter now, and then sweet. It
insinuates or assails directly, according to circumstances. It will hide
a curse under a smooth word and administer poison in the phrases
of love. Like death, it "loves a shining mark," and is never so
available and eloquent as when it can blight the hopes of the noble-
minded, soil the reputation of the pure, and break down or destroy
the character of the brave and strong.
No soul of high estate can take delight in slander. It indicates
lapse, tendency toward chaos, utter depravity. It proves that
somewhere in the soul there is a weakness—a waste, evil nature.
Education and refinement are no proof against it. They often serve
only to polish the slanderous tongue, increase its tact, and give it
suppleness and strategy.
He that shoots at the stars may hurt himself, but not endanger
them. When any man speaks ill of us we are to make use of it as a
caution, without troubling ourselves at the calumny. He is in a
wretched case that values himself upon the opinions of others, and
depends upon their judgment for the peace of his life. The contempt
of injurious words stifles them, but resentment revives them. He that
values himself upon conscience, not opinion, never heeds
reproaches. When ill-spoken of take it thus: If you have not
deserved it you are none the worse; if you have, then mend. Flee
home to your own conscience, and examine your own heart. If you
are guilty it is a just correction; if not guilty it is a fair instruction;
make use of both; so shall you distill honey out of gall, and out of an
open enemy create a secret friend.
That man who attempts to bring down and depreciate those who
are above him does not thereby elevate himself. He rather sinks
himself, while those whom he traduces are benefited rather than
injured by the slander of one so base as he. He who indulges in
slander is like one who throws ashes to the windward, which come
back to the same place and cover him all over. To be continually
subject to the breath of slander will tarnish the purest virtue as a
constant exposure to the atmosphere will obscure the luster of the
finest gold; but in either the real value of both continues the same,
although the currency may be somewhat impeded. Dirt on the
character, if unjustly thrown, like dirt on the clothes, should be let
alone awhile until it dries, and then it will rub off easily enough.
Slander, like other poisons, when administered in very heavy doses,
is often thrown off by the intended victim, and thus relieves where it
was meant to kill. Dirt sometimes acts like fuller's earth—defiling for
the moment, but purifying in the end.
How small a matter will start a slanderous report! How frequently
is the honesty and integrity of a man disposed of by a smile or a
shrug! How many good and generous actions have been sunk in
oblivion by a distrustful look, or stamped with the imputation of
proceeding from bad motives by a mysterious and seasonable
whisper! A mere hint, a significant look, a mysterious countenance,
directing attention to a particular person, is often amply sufficient to
start the tongue of slander.
 Never does a man portray his own character more vividly than in
his manner of portraying another's. There is something unsound
about the man whom you have never heard say a good word about
any mortal, but who can say much of evil of nearly all he is
acquainted with. Never speak evil of another, even with a cause.
Remember we all have our faults, and if we expect charity from the
world we must be charitable ourselves. Most persons have visible
faults, and most are sometimes inconsistent; upon these faults and
mistakes petty scandal delights to feast. And even where free from
external blemishes envy and jealousy can start the bloodhound of
suspicion—create a noise that will attract attention, and many may
be led to suppose there is game where there is nothing but thin air.
A word once spoken can never be recalled; therefore it is prudent
to think twice before we speak, especially when ill is the burden of
our talk. Give no heed to an infamous story handed you by a person
known to be an enemy to the one he is defaming; neither condemn
your neighbor unheard, for there are always two sides of a story.
Hear no ill of a friend, nor speak any of an enemy. Believe not all
you hear, nor report all you believe. Be cautious in believing ill of
others, and more cautious in reporting it.
There is seldom any thing uttered in malice which returns not to
the heart of the speaker. Believe nothing against another but on
good authority, nor report what may hurt another, unless it be a
greater hurt to others to conceal it. It is a sign of bad reputation to
take pleasure in hearing ill of our neighbors. He who sells his
neighbor's credit at a low rate makes the market for another to buy
his at the same rate. He that indulges himself in calumniating or
ridiculing the absent plainly shows his company what they may
expect from him after he leaves them.
Deal tenderly with the absent. Say nothing to inflict a wound on
their reputation. They may be wrong and wicked, yet your
knowledge of it does not oblige you to disclose their character,
except to save others from injury. Then do it in a way that bespeaks
a spirit of kindness for the absent offender. Evil reports are often the
results of misunderstanding or of evil designs, or they proceed from
an exaggerated or partial disclosure of facts. Wait, learn the whole
story before you decide; then believe what the evidence compels
you to, and no more. But even then take heed not to indulge the
least unkindness, else you dissipate all the spirit of prayer for them,
and unnerve yourself for doing them good.
On many a mind and many a heart there are sad inscriptions
deeply engraved by the tongue of slander, which no effort can erase.
They are more durable than the impression of the diamond on the
glass, for the inscription on the glass may be destroyed by a blow,
but the impression on the heart will last forever. Let not the sting of
calumny sink too deeply in your soul. He who is never subject to
slander is generally of too little mental account to be worthy of it.
Remember that it is always the best fruits that the birds pick at, that
wasps light on the finest flowers, and that slanderers are like flies,
that overlook all a man's good parts in order to light upon his sores.
Know that slander is not long-lived, provided that your conduct does
not justify them, and that truth, the child of time, erelong will
appear to vindicate thee.
 EW characteristics are more unfortunate in their effects on the
character of their possessor than irritability, few more
repulsive and annoying to those with whom circumstances
bring him in contact. Irritable people are always unjust,
always exacting, always dissatisfied. They claim every thing of
others, yet receive their best efforts with petulance and disdain. This
habit has an unfortunate tendency of growth, until it renders a
person wholly incapable of conferring happiness upon others. As the
morning fog renders the most familiar objects uncouth in
appearance, so it distorts the imagination and disorders the mental
faculties, so that truth can not be distinguished from falsehood or
friendship from enmity.
It is one great spring-source of envy and discontent, poisoning the
fountain of life; it is a moral Upas-tree, scattering ruin and
desolation on every side. Its origin is not difficult to trace; activity
and energy are its correctives. Those who habitually occupy their
minds about things serviceable to others and to themselves are
seldom peevish or irritable; but those whose powers are enervated
by inertia, whose mental pabulum is fiction generated in a
disordered fancy, become misanthropic or grumblers, and speedily
give way to incessant fault-finding, as annoying as it is unjust. Did
irritable people know or could they feel the effect of their conduct
upon others, they would doubtless seek to refrain from the habit;
but the possessor of such a turn of mind is as selfish as he is unjust,
and cares for no one but himself. For others he cares nothing. While
he claims the greatest deference for himself, he will not defer to the
wishes of others in the slightest degree.
The personal sin of fretting is almost as extensive as any other
evil, and if not universal, it is at least very general. It is as vain and
useless a habit as any one can harbor. It is a direct violation of the
law of God, and its direful effects are fearful to contemplate. Nothing
so warps a man's nature, sours his disposition, and, sooner or later,
breaks up the friendly relationship of the domestic circle. It is sinful
in its beginning, sinful in its progress, and disastrous in its results.
Such a spirit in the family, in the school or Church is sure to become
contagious, and result in great injury.
A fretting, irritable disposition will not fail of finding frequent
opportunities for indulgence. It is not particular as to time, place, or
cause. Occasions literally multiply as the habit increases in strength.
Nothing seems to go right with its possessor. Instead of conquering
circumstances they control and conquer him. Fretting weakens one's
self-respect, dissipates the regards of others, and breaks asunder
the bonds of affection. If a scolder should, through deception and
ignorance of his true character, be for a time loved, still the canker is
there, the mine is sapped, and, sooner or later, the affections will be
sundered. Such a habit too frequently indulged in has drawn the
best of husbands into dissipation, rendered the most affectionate of
wives miserable, and estranged members of the same family circle.
It ruins all the relationships of life, it is a most pernicious disposition,
a dreadful inheritance.
It is ever the disposition of human nature to pattern more easily
after the evils by which we are surrounded than the good. There is
also an unfortunate disposition on our part to criticise the faults of
those around us which displease us. Did we always do this in a spirit
of true kindness it were well; but a confirmed grumbler is at heart so
thoroughly selfish that the spirit of charity is utterly foreign to his
complaints. Instead of earnest endeavor to discover and pattern
after the perfection of those by whom they are surrounded, they
seem bent only on learning the faults of others, and to take positive
pleasure in making them public. Such a spirit only displays our own
weakness; it shows to all keen observers that we have not patience
enough to bear with our neighbor's weakness. It defeats its own
ends, and instead of exposing the faults of our neighbors, serves
only to call attention to our own irritable, peevish, unlovable
disposition.
It is an unfailing sign of moral weakness to be constantly giving
way to fitful outbreaks of ill-temper. Fools, lunarians, the weak-
minded, and the ignorant are irascible, impatient, and possess an
ungovernable disposition; great hearts and wise are calm, forgiving,
and serene. To hear one perpetual round of complaint and
murmuring, to have every pleasant thought scared away by this evil
spirit, is a sore trial. It is, like the sting of a scorpion, a perpetual
nettle destroying your peace, rendering life a burden. Its influence is
deadly, and the purest and sweetest atmosphere is contaminated
into a deadly miasma wherever this evil genius prevails. It has been
truly said that, while we ought not to let the bad temper of others
influence us, it would be as reasonable to spread a blister upon the
skin and not expect it to draw, as to think a family not suffering
because of the bad temper of any of its inmates. One string out of
tune will destroy the music of an instrument otherwise perfect, so if
all the members of a family do not cultivate a kind and affectionate
disposition there will be discord and every evil work.
To say the least, such a disposition is a most unfortunate one. It
bespeaks littleness of soul and ignorance of mankind. It is far wiser
to take the more charitable view of our fellow-men. Life takes its hue
in a great degree from the color of our own minds. If we are frank
and generous the world treats us kindly. If, on the contrary, we are
suspicious, men learn to be cold and cautious toward us. Let a
person get the reputation of being touchy, and every body is under
more or less restraint in his or her presence. The people who fire up
easily miss a deal of happiness. Their jaundiced tempers destroy
their own comfort as well as that of their friends. They always have
some fancied slight to brood over. The sunny, serene moments of
less selfish dispositions never visit them. True wisdom inculcates the
necessity of self-control in all instances. Much may be affected by
cultivation. We should learn to command our feelings, and act
prudently in all the ordinary concerns of life. This will better prepare
us to meet sudden emergencies with calmness and fortitude.
 NVY is the daughter of Pride, the author of murder and
revenge, the beginner of secret sedition, and the perpetual
tormentor of virtue. Envy is the slime of the soul, a venom, a
poison or quicksilver, which consumeth the flesh and dryeth
up the marrow of the bones. It is composed of odious ingredients, in
which are found meanness, vice, and malice, in about equal
proportions. It wishes the force of goodness to be strained, and that
the measure of happiness be abated. It laments over prosperity,
pines at the visit of success, is sick at the sight of health. Like death,
it loves a shining mark; like the worm, it never runs but to the fairest
fruits; like a cunning bloodhound, it singles out the fattest deer in
the flock.
Envy is no less foolish than it is detestable. It is a vice which
keeps no holiday, but is always in the wheel and working out its own
disquiet. It loves darkness rather than light, because its deeds are
evil. Scorpions can be made to sting themselves to death when
confined within a circle of fire. Even such is envy; for when
surrounded on all sides by the brightness of another's prosperity it
speedily destroys itself. He whose heart is imbued with the spirit of
envy loseth much of the pleasures of life. The envious man is in pain
upon all occasions which ought to give him pleasure.
It were not possible for one to adopt a more suicidal course as far
as his own happiness is concerned. The relish of his life is inverted,
and the objects which administer the highest satisfaction to those
who are exempt from this passion give the quickest pangs to those
subject to it. As when we look through glasses colored all objects
partake of the glasses' color, so one moved and influenced by envy
sees not the perfection of his fellow-creatures, but that they are to
him odious. Youth, beauty, valor, and wisdom are, to their perverted
view, but objects calculated to provoke their displeasure. What a
wretched and apostate state is this—to be offended with excellence,
and to hate a man because we approve him! Were not its effects so
disastrous to personal character, the fit weapon wherewith to meet it
were the ridicule of all sensible people. But the evil is too deeply
seated to be spoken of lightly. As its cause is situated deep in the
character of the individual, so its effects are far-reaching in his life.
He that is under the dominion of envy can not see perfections. He
is so blinded that he is always degrading or misrepresenting things
which are excellent. This brings out strongly the difference between
the envious man and him who is moved by the spirit of benevolence.
The envious man is tormented, not only by all the ills that befall
himself, but by all the good that happens to another; whereas the
benevolent man is better prepared to bear his own calamities
unruffled, from the complacency and serenity he has secured from
contemplating the prosperity of all around him. For the man of true
benevolence the sun of happiness must be totally eclipsed before it
can be darkness around him. But the envious man is made gloomy,
not only by his own cloud of sorrow, but by the sunshine around the
heart of another.
Other passions have objects to flatter them, and seem to content
and satisfy them for a while. There is power in ambition, pleasure in
luxury, and pelf in covetousness; but envy can give nothing but
vexation. Envy is so base and detestable, so vile in its origin, and so
pernicious in its effects, that the predominance of almost any other
quality is to be preferred. It is a passion so full of cowardice and
shame that nobody ever had the confidence to own it. He that
envieth maketh another man's virtue his vice, and another man's
happiness his torment; whereas he that rejoiceth at the prosperity of
another is partaker of the same.
Envy is a sentiment that desires to equal, or excel, the efforts of
its compeers, not so much by increasing our own toil and ingenuity
as by diminishing the merits due to the efforts of others. It seeks to
elevate itself by the degradation of others; it detests the sound of
another's praise, and deems no renown acceptable that must be
shared. Hence, when disappointments occur, they fall with
unrelieved violence, and the consciousness of discomfited rivalry
gives poignancy to the blow. Whoever feels pain in learning the good
character of his neighbors will feel a pleasure in the reverse; and
those who despair to rise to distinction by their virtues are happy if
others can be depressed to a level with themselves.
Envy is so cruel in its pursuit that, when once hounded on, it rests
not till the grave closes over its victim. There is a secure refuge
against defamation, and one redeeming trait of human nature is that
there every man's well-earned honors defend him against calumny.
Honors bestowed upon the illustrious dead have in them no
admixture of envy; but these are about the only kind of honors
administered free from envy. Though the fact is to be deeply
lamented, it is unfortunately true, that such is the perversion of the
human heart that ofttimes the only reward of those whose merits
have raised them above the common level is to acquire the hatred
and aversion of their compeers. He who would acquire lasting fame,
and would be remembered as one who did his duty well, must
resolve to submit to the shafts of envy for the sake of noble objects.
Envy is a weed that grows in all soils and climates, and is no less
luxuriant in the country than in the court. It is not confined to any
rank of men or extent of fortune, but rages in the breast of those of
every degree. We are as apt to find it in the humble walks of life as
in the proud; as much in the sordid, affected dress as in all the silks
and embroideries which the excess of age and folly of youth delight
to be adorned with. Since, then, it keeps all sorts of company, and
infuses itself into the most contrary natures and dispositions, and yet
carries so much poison and venom with it that it ruins any life in
which it finds lodgment—alienating the affections from heaven, and
raising rebellion against God himself—it is worth our utmost care to
watch it in all its disguises and approaches, that we may discover it
at its first entrance, and dislodge it before it procures a shelter to
conceal itself, and work to our confusion and shame.
 "Thinkest thou the man whose mansions hold
The worldling's pomp and miser's gold
Obtains a richer prize
Than he who, in his cot at rest,
Finds heavenly peace a willing guest,
And bears the promise in his breast
Of treasures in the skies?"
—Mrs. Sigourney.

HE lot of the discontented is, indeed, wretched; and truly

miserable are those who live but to repine and lament, who
have less resolution to resent than to complain, or else,
mingling resentment and complaint together, perceive no
harmony and happiness around them. They discover in the bounty
and beauty of nature nothing to admire, and in the virtues and
capabilities of man nothing to love and respect. A contented mind
sees something good in every thing, and in every wind sees a sign of
fair weather; but a discontented spirit distorts and misconstrues all
things, resolutely refusing to see aught but ill in its surroundings.
The spirit of discontent is very unfortunate; it is even worse, for it
is wicked as well as weak. The very entertainment of the thought is
enervating, paralyzing, destructive of all that is worthy of success, in
the present business of the entertainer. To accomplish any thing
beyond what the common run of business or professional men
perform requires the utmost concentration of the mind on the matter
in hand. There is no room in the thoughts for repining over the
misfortunes of one's self, or wishes for an exchange of places with
another. Indeed, it might be truthfully predicated that the indulgers
of such wishes would fail utterly in the new sphere, could they
achieve their desires.
 Nearly every one we meet wishes to be what he is not, and every
man thinks his neighbor's lot happier than his own. Through all the
ramifications of society all are complaining of their condition, finding
fault with their particular calling. "If I were only this, or that, or the
other, I should be content," is the universal cry. Open the door to
one discontented wish and you know not how many will follow. The
boy apes the man; the man affects the ways of boyhood. The sailor
envies the landsman; the landsman goes to sea for pleasure. The
business man who has to travel about wishes for the day to come
when he can "settle down," whilst the sedentary man is always
wanting a chance to flit about and travel, which he thinks would be
his greatest pleasure. Town people think the country glorious;
country people are always wishing that they might live in town.
We are told that it is one property required of those who seek the
philosopher's stone that they must not do it with any covetous desire
to be rich, for otherwise they shall never find it. But most true it is,
that whosoever would have this jewel of contentment (which turns
all into gold; yea, want into wealth), must come with minds divested
of all ambitious and covetous thoughts, else they are never likely to
obtain it. The foundation of content must spring up in a man's own
mind, and he who has so little knowledge of human nature as to
seek happiness by changing aught but his own disposition will waste
his life in fruitless efforts, and multiply the griefs which he proposes
to remove.
Contentment is felicity. Few are the real wants of man. Like a
majority of his troubles they are more imaginary than real. If the
world knew how much felicity dwells in the cottage of the poor, but
contented, man—how sound he sleeps, how quiet his rest, how
composed his mind, how free from care, and how joyful his heart—
they would never more admire the noises and diseases, the throngs
of passions, and the violence of unnatural appetites that fill the
houses of the luxurious, and the hearts of the ambitious.
Enjoy the blessings if God sends them, and the evils of it bear
patiently and sweetly, for this day is ours. Always something of good
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