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Responsive Web Design with HTML5 and CSS3 2nd
Edition Ben Frain Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Ben Frain
ISBN(s): 9781784398934, 1784398934
Edition: 2
File Details: PDF, 7.61 MB
Year: 2015
Language: english
Responsive Web Design
with HTML5 and CSS3
Second Edition
Ben Frain
BIRMINGHAM - MUMBAI
Responsive Web Design with HTML5 and CSS3
Second Edition
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written
permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embedded in
critical articles or reviews.
Every effort has been made in the preparation of this book to ensure the accuracy
of the information presented. However, the information contained in this book is
sold without warranty, either express or implied. Neither the author, nor Packt
Publishing, and its dealers and distributors will be held liable for any damages
caused or alleged to be caused directly or indirectly by this book.
Packt Publishing has endeavored to provide trademark information about all of the
companies and products mentioned in this book by the appropriate use of capitals.
However, Packt Publishing cannot guarantee the accuracy of this information.
ISBN 978-1-78439-893-4
www.packtpub.com
Credits
Commissioning Editor
Edward Gordon Indexer
Mariammal Chettiyar
Acquisition Editors
Edward Gordon Production Coordinator
Nilesh R. Mohite
Subho Gupta
Cover Work
Content Development Editor
Nilesh R. Mohite
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Technical Editor
Ankita Thakur
About the Author
Ben Frain has been a web designer/developer since 1996. He is currently employed
as a Senior Front-end Developer at Bet365.
Before the web, he worked as an underrated (and modest) TV actor and technology
journalist, having graduated from Salford University with a degree in Media and
Performance.
He has written four equally underrated (his opinion) screenplays and still harbors
the (fading) belief he might sell one. Outside of work, he enjoys simple pleasures.
Playing indoor football while his body and wife still allow it, and wrestling with his
two sons.
His other book, Sass and Compass for Designers is available now. Visit Ben online at
www.benfrain.com and follow him on Twitter at twitter.com/benfrain.
I'd like to thank the technical reviewers of this book for giving up
their free time to provide valuable input. Thanks to them, this is a
better product.
I'd also like to thank the web community at large for their continued
sharing of information. Without them, I wouldn't be able to enjoy my
working days as a web developer.
Most importantly, a note of appreciation for my family. Many
episodes of sub-standard TV (wife), cups of tea (parents), and
piratical sword-fights (sons) were sacrificed for the writing of
this book.
About the Reviewers
Esteban S. Abait is a senior software architect and former PhD student. He has
experience devising the architecture of complex software products, and planning their
development. He has worked both onsite and offshore for clients such as Cisco, Intuit,
and Southwest. Throughout his career, he has worked with different technologies such
as Java, PHP, Ruby, and Node.js among others. In recent years, his main interests have
revolved around web, mobile and REST APIs. He has developed large, maintainable
web applications using JavaScript. In addition, he has worked to assess clients on REST
best practices. On the other hand, he has worked on high traffic websites, where topics
such as replication, sharding, or distributed caches are key to scalability.
Esteban is currently working at Globant as a technical director. In this role, he
works to ensure projects' delivery meet their deadlines with the best quality. He also
designs software program training, and interviews software developers. In addition,
he usually travels to clients to provide consultancy on web technologies.
Globant (http://www.globant.com/) is a new breed of technology service provider,
focused on delivering innovative software solutions by leveraging emerging
technologies and trends. Globant combines the engineering and technical rigor of IT
service providers with the creative and cultural approach of digital agencies. Globant
is the place where engineering, design, and innovation meet scale.
He was also a technical reviewer for HTML5 Multimedia Development Cookbook, Packt
Publishing. Chris is an avid reader and lover of books. When he's not pushing pixels
and writing code, he enjoys spending time with his wife and daughter exploring the
parks and trails of the beautiful Austin, Texas.
Mauvis Ledford is a full-stack founder and CTO specializing in the realm of the
web, mobile web, and scaling applications on the cloud.
Mauvis has contributed to products at Disney Mobile, Skype, Netflix, and many
start-ups in the San Francisco and New York City areas. He is currently CTO at
Pathbrite, an EdTech start-up specializing in free, responsive, multimedia e-portfolios
and digital resumes for everyone. Create your own at http://www.pathbrite.com.
Mauvis was also a technical reviewer for the first edition of Responsive Web Design
with HTML5 and CSS3, Packt Publishing and Building Hybrid Android Apps with Java
and JavaScript, O'Reilly Media.
Sophie Williams is a bit of a perfectionist and has a thing for typography. She has
a degree in graphic design and is currently a web/UI designer at www.bet365.com.
While she loves designing for the Web, she will always have a special place in her heart
for letterpress and print. Outside of work, she makes mean cupcakes, experiments with
arts and crafts, and loves to point out (to anyone who will listen) when anything in the
real world is misaligned.
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[i]
Table of Contents
[ ii ]
Table of Contents
[ iii ]
Table of Contents
[v]
Table of Contents
[ vi ]
Table of Contents
[ vii ]
Table of Contents
[ viii ]
Preface
A responsive web design provides a single solution that looks great on a phone,
desktop, and everything in-between. It will effortlessly respond to the size of the user's
screen, providing the best experience possible for both today's and tomorrow's devices.
This book covers every essential aspect of responsive web design. In addition,
it extends the responsive design methodology by applying the latest and most
useful techniques provided by HTML5 and CSS3, making designs leaner and more
maintainable than ever before. It also explains common best practice methods of
writing and delivering code, images, and files.
If you can understand HTML and CSS, you can build a responsive web design.
Chapter 2, Media Queries – Supporting Differing Viewports, covers everything you need
to know about CSS media queries: their capabilities, their syntaxes, and the various
ways you can wield them.
Chapter 3, Fluid Layouts and Responsive Images, shows you how to code proportional
layouts and responsive images, and provides a thorough exploration of
Flexbox layouts.
Chapter 4, HTML5 for Responsive Web Designs, covers all the semantic elements of
HTML5, text-level semantics, and considerations of accessibility. We also cover how
to insert video and audio into our pages with HTML5.
[ ix ]
Preface
Chapter 5, CSS3 – Selectors, Typography, Color Modes, and New Features, gets to grips
with the endless possibilities of CSS: selectors, HSLA and RGBA colors, web
typography, viewport relative units, and a whole lot more.
Chapter 6, Stunning Aesthetics with CSS3, covers CSS filters, box shadows, linear and
radial gradients, multiple backgrounds, and how to target background images to
high-resolution devices.
Chapter 7, Using SVGs for Resolution Independence, explains everything we need to use
SVGs inside documents and as background images, as well as how to interact with
them using JavaScript.
Chapter 9, Conquer Forms with HTML5 and CSS3, web forms have always been
tough but the latest HTML5 and CSS3 features make them easier to deal with than
ever before.
Chapter 10, Approaching a Responsive Web Design, explores the essential considerations
before embarking on a responsive web design and also provides a few last minute
nuggets of wisdom to aid you in your responsive quest.
You'll need some HTML and CSS knowledge to follow along, but everything you
need to know about responsive design and making great websites is included in
the book!
[x]
Preface
Conventions
In this book, you will find a number of text styles that distinguish between different
kinds of information. Here are some examples of these styles and an explanation of
their meaning.
Code words in text, database table names, folder names, filenames, file extensions,
pathnames, dummy URLs, user input, and Twitter handles are shown as follows:
"We can fix that prior problem easily by adding this snippet in the <head>."
New terms and important words are shown in bold. Words that you see on the
screen, for example, in menus or dialog boxes, appear in the text like this: "At its
simplest, you pick a URL and click on START TEST."
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this book—what you liked or disliked. Reader feedback is important for us as it helps
us develop titles that you will really get the most out of.
If there is a topic that you have expertise in and you are interested in either writing
or contributing to a book, see our author guide at www.packtpub.com/authors.
[ xi ]
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
condemning the "heart" and the "attitude of mind" which
recommends them, that would mean condemning our very
existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude of mind,
a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By our decrees
we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself
in a useless way—we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for
ourselves; we are also moral in so doing.... Have you no idea—
however vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-
control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to
exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we
even feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal
spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a
definition of morality?
282.
The weakness of the gregarious animal gives rise to a morality which
is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the
decadent man: they understand each other; they associate with
each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the
support of the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all
morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is
incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"—the
priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret enough;
the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the
gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?
283.
The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit: the
revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud,
and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride,
of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is
enormous: it is right that one should tremble and feel ill at ease,"
"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural—even
'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).
It is again the priests who exploit this condition, and who win the
"people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more
joy in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle
against "paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for
disturbing the harmony of the soul).
The hatred of the mediocre for the exceptions, and of the herd for
its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.")
The revulsion of feeling against "egotism": that only is worth
anything which is done "for another." "We are all equal";—against
the love of dominion, against "dominion" in general;—against
privilege;—against sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;—against
philosophy (a force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in
philosophers themselves—"the categorical imperative," the essential
nature of morality, "general and universal."
284.
The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity,
moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity,
honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, pity,
helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice,
generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from
envy, good nature, industry.
We must ascertain to what extent such qualities are conditioned as
means to the attainment of certain desires and ends (often an "evil"
end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality): or as the expressions of certain states of need—that
is to say, as preservative measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves,
women, etc.).
In short, every one of them is not considered "good" for its own
sake, but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed
either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the
latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and
also as the result of an actual gregarious instinct in the individual;
these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is
fundamentally different from these states of virtue. For the herd is
antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless to the outside world; it is full of a
love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.
In the "herdsman" this antagonism comes to the fore he must have
qualities which are the reverse of those possessed by the herd.
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all order of rank: its instinct
is in favour of the leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals (the
sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky,
disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious,
revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve
one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to
say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals,
etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The
instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they
merely preserve. They have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the
just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which
the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of
personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal
glorifies the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This
judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the
most beautiful words—and thus "morality" is born. Let any one
observe, however, the hatred of the herd for all truthful men.
286.
Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the
moral imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it,
he shows thereby that he belongs to the herd. When a man is
conscious of the opposite feelings,—that is to say, when he sees his
danger and his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,—then
he does not belong to the herd.
287.
My philosophy aims at a new order of rank: not at an individualistic
morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd—but
not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally
different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones
or the beasts of prey, etc.
[5] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE—Here is a broad distinction between
Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.
288.
Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride.—The
"Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow
the right upon man to regard himself as the cause of his highest
states and actions: it is a form of the growing feeling of pride.
Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a
will behind these states—otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue
is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as
the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of
happiness: if the will to certain actions is regularly present in
consciousness, a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result.
This is a merely psychological point of view, based upon the false
assumption that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies
upon the ingenuous psychological rule that the will is the only cause,
and that one must have been aware of having willed in order to be
able to regard one's self as a cause.
Then comes the counter-movement—that of the moral-philosophers.
These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible
only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a moral
value: thus morality becomes a causa prima; for this there must be
some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as prima
causa. The arrière pensée is always this: If man is not a causa prima
through his will, he must be irresponsible,—therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,—virtue or vice is automatic
and mechanical....
In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable
of becoming evil.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a
step in the development of the feeling of power itself to believe
one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
perfection) and to have willed them....
(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not
deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect and
often morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded as
determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as reason with
dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any degree
of consciousness renders perfection impossible. ... A form of
theatricalness.)
290.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view to justifying God, said:
evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the voluntariness of
goodness might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering
have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no
connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion
"punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act,
consequently an act proceeding from a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over all others: nobody
doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm—that is to
say, perfection was understood merely as moral perfection.
291.
How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what
has preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured
in the light of this supposition, as also criminality....
The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the
utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the
impossibility of knowing that origin.
But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can
tell what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As
the spark which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are
simpletons.... And finally, they would first of all have to know what is
useful; here also their sight can travel only over five stages or so....
They have no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense
with evil.
We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any
value?
We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness
that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its
performance: does the value of an action lie in the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be
measured according to the pleasure or displeasure which it
occasions in us ... which it gives to the composer. ...) Obviously
feelings of value must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint,
or impotence—for instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting
the question differently: could the value of an action be reduced to
physiological terms? could it be the expression of completely free or
constrained life?—Maybe its biological value is expressed in this
way....
If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, nor
its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its value
must be x unknown....
292.
It amounts to a denaturalisation of morality, to separate an action
from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe
that there are actions which are good or bad in themselves.
The re-establishment of "Nature": an action in itself is quite devoid
of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and the
same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the
other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges
which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to
whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its
degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).
293.
The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some
difficulties. Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself:
one would not dare to eliminate it completely; for everything is so
bound up with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean
to exclude the whole.
A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world
as a whole....
And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would
be reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that
condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in
practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part
of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.—In all correlations of
yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is
expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of a
certain type of living organism: everything that lives says yea by the
very fact of its existence.
294.
Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.—Conscience. Formerly
people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this
action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience
condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a
long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not
create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice
against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the
feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of
emotions as the artist's joy over his work—it proves nothing.... Self-
contentment proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it,
than its absence can prove anything against the value of the thing
which fails to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to
judge of the value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability
to regard things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we
do not do so as judges, but as adversaries.... When noble
sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its favour:
an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing,
though he be in the throes of the most exalted pathos during its
production. It were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading:
they actually beguile our eye and our power, away from criticism,
from caution and from suspicion, and the result often is that we
make fools of ourselves ... they actually make fools of us.
295.
We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two
thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest
efforts at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety;
we have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.
An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be
possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all
sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect,
and nature—in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which
were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.
296.
The great crimes in psychology:—
(1) That all pain and unhappiness should have been falsified by
being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed
of its innocence.)
(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph,
pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were
branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.
(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of cowardice, lack of
personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most
beautiful words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest
degree.
(4) That greatness in man should have been given the meaning of
disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people;
that even in the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of the greatest
knowledge and ability.
(5) That love should have been twisted round to mean submission
(and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of
bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the
wealth of a given personality. Only the wholest people can love; the
disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of the
"home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
(Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of the ego, altruism
as the pre-eminence of others.)
(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of
seduction); the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's
self as godless.
The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles, a sort of
barricade built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the
botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by
means of it, against the strong (and finally destroying them in their
growth ...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which
these classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in
honour by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.
297.
The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature through moral
transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism;
the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief
in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, were
the result of disinterestedness; the continuation of the Church's
sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate
misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to
morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the
latter is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that
pseudo-justification of history, that refusal to see history as the
pessimist sees it).
298.
"Morality for its own sake"—this is an important step in the
denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In this
phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for
instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in
which it separates itself from religion, and in which no God is
"moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is
how the case stands at present.
"Art for Art's sake": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this
means a false contrast is lent to things—it culminates in the slander
of reality ("idealising" into the hateful). When an ideal is severed
from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and calumniated.
"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," "Goodness for
Goodness' sake"—these are three forms of the evil eye for reality.
Art, knowledge, and morality are means: instead of recognising a
life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Life—with "God"—they have also been regarded as
revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires
through them....
"Beautiful" and "ugly," "true" and "false," "good" and "evil"—these
things are distinctions and antagonisms which betray the
preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man
alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a
definite stand against their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor: it is a means of separating things, leading to
stronger isolation....
299.
Moral naturalism: The tracing back of apparently independent and
supernatural values to their real "nature"—that is to say, to natural
immorality, to natural "utility," etc.
Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the
term moral naturalism: my object is to re-translate the moral values
which have apparently become independent and unnatural into their
real nature—that is to say, into their natural "immorality."
N.B.—Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is
the same in regard to the moral law which has been made
sovereign, emancipated from its real feature (until it is almost the
opposite of Nature).
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called
"Idealisation"):—
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge,
then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality to Life.)
300.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality.—Concepts:
paganism, master-morality, virtù.
301.
My problem: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals,
as also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
302.
Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to
which they alone have a right—as routinary values? Many species of
animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to
disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be
enough of a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (Nil admirari).
303.
Man, a small species of very excitable animals, which—fortunately—
has its time. Life in general on earth is a matter of a moment, an
incident, an exception that has no consequence, something which is
of no importance whatever to the general character of the earth; the
earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an
event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-consciousness—the
worst kind of necessity—foolish necessity.... Something in us rebels
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to our hearts, "All this
must be false because it is revolting.... Could not all this be
appearance? And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words"——
304.
Concerning the ideal of the moralist.—In this treatise we wish to
speak of the great politics of virtue. We wrote it for the use of all
those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming
virtuous as in that of making others virtuous—in how virtue is made
to dominate. I even intend to prove that in order to desire this one
thing—the dominion of virtue—the other must be systematically
avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming
virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a
sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!...
And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For
these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth
which is to be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the
dominion of virtue is absolutely attainable only by the use of the
same means which are employed in the attainment of any other
dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself....
As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of virtue:
it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it ought to
be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no
philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is
in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism
which is pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans
toute son âpreté, is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can
never be achieved by man—the most he can do is to approximate it.
Even in this narrower kind of politics—in the politics of virtue—the
ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered
upon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can
discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious moralists
(and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too
paid their tribute to human weakness. They all aspired to virtue on
their own account—at least in their moments of weariness; and this
is the leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist—
whose duty it is to be an immoralist in deeds. That he must not
exactly appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or rather it is not
another matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed
morally: dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the
moralist's canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can
never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which
rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate—
that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of virtue, as
also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to
virtue, when they lose control of virtue, when they themselves
become moral or true. A great moralist is, among other things,
necessarily a great actor; his only danger is that his pose may
unconsciously become a second nature, just like his ideal, which is to
keep his esse and his operari apart in a divine way; everything he
does must be done sub specie boni—a lofty, remote, and exacting
ideal! A divine ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that the
moralist thus imitates a model which is no less than God Himself:
God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who
nevertheless understands how to remain what He is, the good
God....
305.
The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself;
with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.
306.
The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral"
means as any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
307.
He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of
the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is
in itself a form of immorality.
The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction
between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is saved——
309.
There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When
they say: "this is wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with
or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear
concerning the immorality of any particular thing which happens to
come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.
310.
A. The ways which lead to power: the presentation of the new virtue
under the name of an old one,—the awakening of "interest"
concerning it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and vice versâ),
—artistic slandering of all that stands in its way,—the exploitation of
advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,—the
conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and
separations,—symbolism on a grand scale.
B. Power attained: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive
means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.
311.
By what means does a virtue attain to power?—With precisely the
same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining
of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing
of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, by
means of acts of general "immorality."
How does a desire behave towards itself in order to become a
virtue?—A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its
intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its
adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must
be purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with
enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be
won, which either triumphs or perishes—one must be unconscious
and naïf.
312.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so
that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to
the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish
attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness
becomes humility; the disease of the nervus sympathicus, for
instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.
313.
We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard
that he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should,
in any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain
cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to
refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such
an aspirant for virtue was in need of bad reasons in order to remain
respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him.
But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You
disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you
cannot believe in my bad reasons,—that is to say, in my God, in a
disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,—you put obstacles in the way
of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the
moralisation of the masses."
314.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us
concerning the highest values, are judgments emanating from our
muscles.
315.
Morality in the valuation of races and classes.—In view of the fact
that the passions and fundamental instincts in every race and class
express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves
(or at least the means which have enabled them to live for the
longest period of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means:
That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their
past.
It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves
from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs
and aspirations—or, more exactly, that they are declining....
It means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the tyranny
of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality,
over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general
levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to render
the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery"—a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in
truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the
undermining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or
class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has:
for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are
slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an
objection against them: but from their point of view we are
desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.
The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly
starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula
"What is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a
certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more
precisely, a very particular kind of instinct—the gregarious instinct.
"The equality of men": this is what lies concealed behind the
tendency of making ever more and more men alike as men.
The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people. (The trick
was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the
positions of protectors of virtue.)
To what extent do all kinds of business men and money-grabbers—
all those who give and take credit—find it necessary to promote the
levelling of all characters and notions of value? the commerce and
the exchange of the world leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.
The State exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of
ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; science acts in the
same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its
forces. And the priesthood does the same.
Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is
advantageous; and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence
are waged against immorality—with what "right"? Without any right
whatsoever; but in accordance with the instinct of self-preservation.
The same classes avail themselves of immorality when it serves their
purpose to do so.
316.
Observe the hypocritical colour which all civil institutions are painted,
just as if they were the offshoots of morality—for instance: marriage,
work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and rights. But as they
were all established in favour of the most mediocre type of man, to
protect him from exceptions and the need of exceptions, one must
not be surprised to find them sown with lies.
317.
Virtue must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst
enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal for all; they divest virtue
of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness, its
exceptional and non-average character—that is to say, of its
aristocratic charm. A stand must also be made against those
embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to
hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness—to demand great and
rare things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's
fellows, that they do not exist!—It is obvious, for instance, that a
marriage is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins—
that is to say, that on the whole it is something wretched and
indecent: no priest or registrar can make anything else of it.
Virtue[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is not
profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to passion,
and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character, the head,
and the senses—always, of course, subject to the medium standard
of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the lies
which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and all reality
—when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon others, it is
the worst of vices.
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being
recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue
everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does not suffer from
the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of
perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim
itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as
judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely
what is generally forbidden: virtue as I understand it is the actual
vetitum within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise
virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style—virtù—free from all
moralic acid....
[6] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Virtue is used here, of course, in the
sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian
negative virtue.
318.
In the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority
over us; we should like to make you take modesty a little more to
heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest
your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in
your bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of
virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly
what you are obliged to make,—that is to say, what your
circumstances force you to make,—partly what suits your pleasure
and seems useful to you. But if you do only what is in keeping with
your inclinations, or what necessity exacts from you,59 or what is
useful to you, you ought neither to praise yourselves nor let others
praise you!... One is a thoroughly puny kind of man when one is only
virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this regard! Men who have
to be considered at all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their
inmost instinct, that which determined their quantum of power, did
not find its reckoning thus: whereas with your minimum amount of
power nothing can seem more full of wisdom to you than virtue. But
the multitude are on your side: and because you tyrannise over us,
we shall fight you....
[7] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Here Nietzsche returns to Christian
virtue which is negative and moral.
319.
A virtuous man is of a lower species because, in the first place, he
has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a
certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He
has no independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals,
he must not be an individual.
Reckoning up the qualities of the good man, why is it they appear
pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to
caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness,
our good nature, and our levity, have a good time. This, our feeling
of well-being, is what we project into the good man in the form of a
quality, in the form of a valuable possession.
320.
Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of
stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not
been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which
is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot
meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day
that everything is in good hands—that is to say, in "God's hands":
and when it supports this proposition with that same modest
assurance as that with which it would assert that two and two are
four, we others naturally refrain from contradiction.
Why disturb this pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares
concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to do
so, we shouldn't succeed. In all things these people see the
reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them
the old God—deus myops— still lives); we others see something else
in everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our
deeper, more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.
321.
He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at
it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon
as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it—whither? Into
devilry.
Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have
become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They
are all fishhooks of knowledge!
322.
The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at last
one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its
associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser,
brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any
longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to
have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what
is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's
melody....
323.
The Patrons of Virtue.—Lust of property, lust of power, laziness,
simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it
stands so securely.
324.
Virtue is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead;
what is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the
market in the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of
dissipation. It exacts too much extravagance and narrow-
mindedness from its believers to allow of conscience not being
against it to-day. Certainly, for people, without either consciences or
scruples, this may constitute its new charm: it is now what it has
never been before—a vice.
325.
Virtue is still the most expensive vice: let it remain so!
326.
Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to
rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not
as qualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way;
they should be the most personal means of defence and most
individual needs—the determining factors of precisely our existence
and growth, which we recognise and acknowledge independently of
the question whether others grow with us with the help of the same
or of different principles. This view of the danger of the virtue which
is understood as impersonal and objective also holds good of
modesty: through modesty many of the choicest intellects perish.
The morality of modesty is the worst possible softening influence for
those souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that they become
hard betimes.
327.
The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step;
the names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must
be drawn into the light of day and honoured, after have lain all this
time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of
respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and
more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one
deny and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which
one can dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a
height may be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in
such a way as to be reminiscent of virtù—the virtue of the
Renaissance—free from moralic acid. But for the moment—how
remote this ideal seems!
The reduction of the domain of morality is a sign of its progress.
Wherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality,
thinking has taken a moral turn.
328.
After all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this
wonderful result: I have lent new charms to virtue—it now affects
one in the same way as something forbidden. It has our most subtle
honesty against it, it is salted in the "cum grano salis" of the
scientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old
fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and
to make them inquisitive—in short, it affects us like a vice. Only after
we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and
appearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this
most beautiful of all fictions—virtue. There will then remain no
further reason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown
virtue to be a form of immorality do we again justify it,—it then
becomes classified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the
profound and general immorality of all existence, of which it is then
shown to be a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order,
the most arrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have
robbed it of its grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have
delivered it from the importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have
deprived it of its ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false
hair, and its hieratic muscles.
329.
And is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?...
Just as little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been
shot at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For
thus it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a
better service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This—I
have done.
A. A Criticism of Ideals.
330.
It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away
with the word "Ideal": a criticism of desiderata.
331.
Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the
standpoint of desirability, in every "thus should it be, but it is not," or
even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of opinion
involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For there is
nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears the
largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of the
future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which is
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