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1. Solution Manual for Java How to Program,
Early Objects (11th Edition) (Deitel: How to
Program) 11th Edition
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Introduction to Java
Applications; Input/Output
and Operators 2
What’s in a name?
That which we call a rose
By any other name would
smell as sweet.
—William Shakespeare
Ob je cti v e s
In this chapter you’ll:
■ Write simple Java
applications.
■ Use input and output
statements.
■ Learn about Java’s primitive
types.
■ Understand basic memory
concepts.
■ Use arithmetic operators.
■ Learn the precedence of
arithmetic operators.
■ Write decision-making
statements.
■ Use relational and equality
operators.
jhtp_02_IntroToApplications.FM Page 2 Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:41 PM
Self-Review Exercises 2
Self-Review Exercises
2.1 Fill in the blanks in each of the following statements:
a) A(n) begins the body of every method, and a(n) ends the body of
every method.
ANS: left brace ({), right brace (} ).
b) You can use the statement to make decisions.
ANS: if.
c) begins an end-of-line comment.
ANS: //.
d) , and are called white space.
ANS: Space characters, newlines and tabs.
e) are reserved for use by Java.
ANS: Keywords.
f) Java applications begin execution at method .
ANS: main.
g) Methods , and display information in a command win-
dow.
ANS: System.out.print, System.out.println and System.out.printf.
2.2 State whether each of the following is true or false. If false, explain why.
a) Comments cause the computer to print the text after the // on the screen when the pro-
gram executes.
ANS: False. Comments do not cause any action to be performed when the program exe-
cutes. They’re used to document programs and improve their readability.
b) All variables must be given a type when they’re declared.
ANS: True.
c) Java considers the variables number and NuMbEr to be identical.
ANS: False. Java is case sensitive, so these variables are distinct.
d) The remainder operator (%) can be used only with integer operands.
ANS: False. The remainder operator can also be used with noninteger operands in Java.
e) The arithmetic operators *, /, %, + and - all have the same level of precedence.
ANS: False. The operators *, / and % are higher precedence than operators + and -.
2.3 Write statements to accomplish each of the following tasks:
a) Declare variables c, thisIsAVariable, q76354 and number to be of type int.
ANS: int c, thisIsAVariable, q76354, number;
or
int c;
int thisIsAVariable;
int q76354;
int number;
b) Prompt the user to enter an integer.
ANS: System.out.print("Enter an integer: ");
c) Input an integer and assign the result to int variable value. Assume Scanner variable
input can be used to read a value from the keyboard.
ANS: value = input.nextInt();
d) Print "This is a Java program" on one line in the command window. Use method
System.out.println.
ANS: System.out.println("This is a Java program");
jhtp_02_IntroToApplications.FM Page 3 Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:41 PM
e) Print "This is a Java program" on two lines in the command window. The first line
should end with Java. Use method System.out.printf and two %s format specifiers.
ANS: System.out.printf("%s%n%s%n", "This is a Java", "program");
f) If the variable number is not equal to 7, display "The variable number is not equal to 7".
ANS: if (number != 7)
System.out.println("The variable number is not equal to 7");
2.4 Identify and correct the errors in each of the following statements:
a) if (c < 7);
System.out.println("c is less than 7");
ANS: Error: Semicolon after the right parenthesis of the condition (c < 7) in the if.
Correction: Remove the semicolon after the right parenthesis. [Note: As a result, the
output statement will execute regardless of whether the condition in the if is true.]
b) if (c => 7)
System.out.println("c is equal to or greater than 7");
ANS: Error: The relational operator => is incorrect. Correction: Change => to >=.
2.5 Write declarations, statements or comments that accomplish each of the following tasks:
a) State that a program will calculate the product of three integers.
ANS: // Calculate the product of three integers
b) Create a Scanner called input that reads values from the standard input.
ANS: Scanner input = new Scanner(System.in);
c) Declare the variables x, y, z and result to be of type int.
ANS: int x, y, z, result;
or
int x;
int y;
int z;
int result;
d) Prompt the user to enter the first integer.
ANS: System.out.print("Enter first integer: ");
e) Read the first integer from the user and store it in the variable x.
ANS: x = input.nextInt();
f) Prompt the user to enter the second integer.
ANS: System.out.print("Enter second integer: ");
g) Read the second integer from the user and store it in the variable y.
ANS: y = input.nextInt();
h) Prompt the user to enter the third integer.
ANS: System.out.print("Enter third integer: ");
i) Read the third integer from the user and store it in the variable z.
ANS: z = input.nextInt();
j) Compute the product of the three integers contained in variables x, y and z, and assign
the result to the variable result.
ANS: result = x * y * z;
k) Use System.out.printf to display the message "Product is" followed by the value of
the variable result.
ANS: System.out.printf("Product is %d%n", result);
jhtp_02_IntroToApplications.FM Page 4 Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:41 PM
Exercises 4
2.6 Using the statements you wrote in Exercise 2.5, write a complete program that calculates
and prints the product of three integers.
ANS:
Exercises
NOTE: Solutions to the programming exercises are located in the ch02solutions folder.
Each exercise has its own folder named ex02_## where ## is a two-digit number represent-
ing the exercise number. For example, exercise 2.14’s solution is located in the folder
ex02_14.
2.7 Fill in the blanks in each of the following statements:
a) are used to document a program and improve its readability.
ANS: Comments.
b) A decision can be made in a Java program with a(n) .
ANS: if statement.
c) Calculations are normally performed by statements.
ANS: assignment statements.
d) The arithmetic operators with the same precedence as multiplication are and
.
jhtp_02_IntroToApplications.FM Page 5 Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:41 PM
Exercises 6
a) x = 7 + 3 * 6 / 2 - 1;
ANS: *, /, +, -; Value of x is 15.
b) x = 2 % 2 + 2 * 2 - 2 / 2;
ANS: %, *, /, +, -; Value of x is 3.
c) x = (3 * 9 * (3 + (9 * 3 / (3))));
ANS: x = ( 3 * 9 * ( 3 + ( 9 * 3 / ( 3 ) ) ) );
4 5 3 1 2
Value of x is 324.
2.19 What does the following code print?
System.out.printf("*%n**%n***%n****%n*****%n");
ANS:
*
**
***
****
*****
ANS:
*
***
*****
****
**
ANS:
***************
System.out.println("*****");
System.out.print("****");
System.out.println("**");
ANS:
****
*****
******
ANS:
*
***
*****
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
The author of “Pickwick” tells us that in America the sign vocal for
starting a coach, steamer, railway train, etc., is “Go Ahead!” while
with John Bull the ritual form is “All Right!”—and he adds that these
two expressions are somewhat expressive of the respective moods of
the two nations. The two phrases are, indeed, vivid miniatures of
John Bull and his restless brother, who sits on the safety valve that
he may travel faster, pours oil and rosin into his steam furnaces,
leaps from the cars before they have entered the station, and who
would hardly object to being fired off from a cannon or in a
bombshell, provided there were one chance in fifty of getting sooner
to the end of his journey. Let us hope that the day may yet come
when our “two-forty” people will exchange a little of their fiery
activity for a bit of Bull’s caution, and when our Yankee Herald’s
College, if we ever have one, may declare “All Right!” to be the motto
of our political escutcheon, with as much propriety as it might now
inscribe “Go Ahead!” beneath that fast fowl, the annexing and
screaming eagle, that hovers over the peaks of the Rocky Mountains,
dips its wings in two oceans, and has one eye on Cuba and the other
on Quebec.
A volume might be filled with illustrations of the truth that the
language of nations is a mirror, in which may be seen reflected with
unerring accuracy all the elements of their intellectual as well as of
their moral character. What scholar that is familiar with Greek and
Latin has failed to remark how indelibly the contrariety of character
in the two most civilized nations of antiquity is impressed on their
languages, distinguished as is the one by exuberant originality, the
other by innate poverty of thought? In the Greek, that most flexible
and perfect of all the European tongues,—which surpasses every
other alike in its metaphysical subtlety, its wealth of inflections, and
its capacity for rendering the minutest and most delicate shades of
meaning,—the thought controls and shapes the language; while the
tyrannous objectivity of the Latin, rigid and almost cruel, like the
nation whose voice it is, and whose words are always Sic volo, sic
jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas, coerces rather than simply syllables
the thought. “Greek,” says Henry Nelson Coleridge, “the shrine of the
genius of the old world; as universal as our race, as individual as
ourselves; of infinite flexibility, of indefatigable strength; with the
complication and distinctness of nature herself; to which nothing was
vulgar, from which nothing was excluded; speaking to the ear like
Italian, speaking to the mind like English; at once the variety and
picturesqueness of Homer, the gloom and intensity of Æschylus; not
compressed to the closest by Thucydides, not fathomed to the
bottom by Plato, not sounding with all its thunders, nor lit up with all
its ardors under the Promethean touch of Demosthenes himself. And
Latin,—the voice of Empire and of Law, of War and of the State,—the
best language for the measured research of History, and the
indignant declamation of moral satire; rigid in its constructions,
parsimonious in its synonyms; yet majestic in its bareness,
impressive in its conciseness; the true language of history, instinct
with the spirit of nations, and not with the passions of individuals;
breathing the maxims of the world, and not the tenets of the
schools; one and uniform in its air and spirit, whether touched by the
stern and haughty Sallust, by the open and discursive Livy, by the
reserved and thoughtful Tacitus.”
It is a noteworthy fact that, as the Romans were the most majestic
of nations, so theirs is the only ancient language that contains the
word “majesty,” the Greek having nothing that exactly corresponds to
it; and the Latin language is as majestic as were the Romans
themselves. Cicero, or some other Latin writer, finds an argument to
show that the intellectual character of the Romans was higher than
that of the Greeks, in the fact that the word convivium means “a
living together,” while the corresponding Greek term, συμπόσιον,
means “a drinking together.” While the Romans retained their early
simplicity and nobility of soul, their language was full of power and
truth; but when they became luxurious, sensual, and corrupt, their
words degenerated into miserable and meaningless counters, without
intrinsic value, and serving only as a conventional medium of
exchange. It has been said truly that “in the pedantry of Statius, in
the puerility of Martial, in the conceits of Seneca, in the poets who
would go into emulous raptures on the beauty of a lap-dog and the
apotheosis of a eunuch’s hair, we read the hand-writing of an
empire’s condemnation.”
The climate of a country, as well as the mind and character of its
people, is clearly revealed in its speech. The air men breathe, the
temperature in which they live, and the natural scenery amid which
they pass their lives, acting incessantly upon body and mind, and
especially upon the organs of speech, impart to them a soft or a
harsh expression. The languages of the South, as we should expect
them to be, “are limpid, euphonic, and harmonious, as though they
had received an impress from the transparency of their heaven, and
the soft sweet sounds of the winds that sigh among the woods. On
the other hand, in the hirrients and gutturals, the burr and roughness
of the Northern tongues, we catch an echo of the breakers bursting
on their crags, and the crashing of the pine branch over the
cataract.” The idiom of Sybaris cannot be that of Sparta. The Attic
Greek was softer than the Doric, the dialect of the mountains; the
Ionic, spoken in the voluptuous regions of Asia Minor, was softer and
more sinuous than the Attic. The Anglo-Saxon, the language of a
people conversant chiefly with gloomy forests and stormy seas, and
prone to silence, was naturally harsh and monosyllabic. The roving
sea-king of Scandinavia, cradled on the ocean and rocked by its
storms, could no more speak in the soft and melting accents of a
Southern tongue than the screaming eagle could utter the liquid
melody of a nightingale’s song.
It is said that in the South Sea Islands version of the New
Testament there are whole chapters with no words ending in
consonants, except the proper names of the original. Italian has
been called the love-talk of the Roman without his armor. Fuller,
contrasting the Italians and the Swiss, quaintly remarks that the
former, “whose country is called ‘the country of good words,’ love the
circuits of courtesy, that an ambassador should not, as a sparrow
hawk, fly outright to his prey, and meddle presently with the matter
in hand; but, like the noble falcon, mount in language, soar high,
fetch compasses of compliment, and then in due time stoop to game,
and seize on the business propounded. Clean contrary, the Switzers
(who sent word to the king of France not to send them an
ambassador with stores of words, but a treasurer with plenty of
money) count all words quite out which are not straight on, have an
antipathy against eloquent language, the flowers of rhetoric being as
offensive to them as sweet perfume to such as are troubled with the
mother; yea, generally, great soldiers have their stomachs sharp set
to feed on the matter; loathing long speeches, as wherein they
conceive themselves to lose time, in which they could conquer half a
country; and, counting bluntness their best eloquence, love to be
accosted in their own kind.”
It is in the idioms of a people, its peculiar turns of expression, and
the modifications of meaning which its borrowed words have
undergone, that its distinctive genius is most strikingly seen. The
forms of salutation used by different nations are saturated with their
idiosyncrasies, and of themselves alone essentially reveal their
respective characters. How clearly is the innermost distinction
between the Greek mind and the Hebrew brought out in their
respective salutations, “Rejoice!” and “Peace!” How vividly are
contrasted, in the two salutations, the sunny, world-enjoying temper
of the one people with the profound religious feeling of the other!
The formula of the robust, energetic, valiant Roman,—with whom
virtue was manliness, and whose value was measured by his valor,—
was Salve! Vale! that is, “Be well,” “Be strong.” In the expression, “If
God will it, you are well,” is betrayed the fatalism of the Arab; while
the greeting of the Turk, “May your shadow never be less!” speaks of
a sunny clime. In the hot, oppressive climate of Egypt perspiration is
essential to health, and you are asked, “How do you perspire?” The
Italian asks, Come sta? literally, “How does he stand?” an expression
originally referring to the standing of the Lombard merchants in the
market place, and which seems to indicate that one’s well-being or
health depends on his business prosperity. Some writers, however,
have regarded the word “stand” in this formula as meaning no more
than “exist”; mere life itself, in the land of far niente, being a
blessing. The Genoese, a trading people, and at one time the
bankers of Europe, used in former days to say, Sanita e guadagno, or
“Health and gain!” a phrase in which the ideals of the countrymen of
Columbus are tersely summed up. The dreamy, meditative German,
dwelling amid smoke and abstractions, salutes you with the vague,
impersonal, metaphysical Wie gehts?—“How goes it?” Another
salutation which he uses is, Wie befinden sie sich?—“How do you
find yourself?” A born philosopher, he is so absent-minded, so lost in
thought and clouds of tobacco smoke, that he thinks you cannot tell
him of the state of your health till you have searched for and found
it.
The trading Hollander, who scours the world, asks, Hoe vaart’s-ge?
“How do you go?” an expression eminently characteristic of a
trading, travelling people, devoted to business, and devoid of
sentiment. The thoughtful Swede inquires, “How do you think?” They
also inquire, Hur mär ni?—literally “How can you?” that is, “Are you
strong?” The lively, restless, vivacious Frenchman, who lives in other
people’s eyes, and is more anxious about appearances than about
realities,—who has never to hunt himself up like the German, and
desires less to do, like the Anglo-Saxon, than to be lively, to show
himself,—says frankly, Comment vous portez-vous?—“How do you
carry yourself?” In these few words we have the pith and essence,
the very soul, of the French character. Externals, the shapes and
shows of things,—for what else could we expect a people to be
solicitous, who are born actors, and who live, to a great extent, for
stage effect; who unite so much outward refinement with so much
inward coarseness; who have an exquisite taste for the ornamental,
and an almost savage ignorance of the comfortable; who invented,
as Emerson says, the dickey, but left it to the English to add the
shirt? It has been said that a man would be owl-blind, who in the
“Hoo’s a’ wi’ ye” of the kindly Scot, could not perceive the mixture of
national pawkiness with hospitable cordiality. “One sees, in the
mind’s eye, the canny chield, who would invite you to dinner three
days in the week, but who would look twice at your bill before he
discounted it.” What can be more unmistakably characteristic than
the Irish peasant’s “Long life to your honor; may you make your bed
in glory!” After such a grandiose salute, we need no mouser among
the records of antiquity to certify to us that the Hibernian is of
Oriental origin, nor do we need any other key to his peculiar vivacity
and impressionableness of feeling, his rollicking, daredevil,
hyperbole-loving enthusiasm. Finally, of all the national forms of
salutation, the most signally characteristic,—the one which reveals
the very core, the inmost “heart of heart” of a people,—is the
Englishman’s “How do you do?” In these four little monosyllables the
activity, the intense practicality of the Englishman, the very
quintessence of his character, are revealed as by a lightning’s flash.
To do! Not to think, to stand, to carry yourself, but to do; and this
doing is so universal among the English,—its necessity is so
completely recognized,—that no one dreams of asking whether you
are doing, or what you are doing, but all demand, “How do you do?”
It has been well observed by the learned German writer, J. D.
Michaelis, that “some virtues are more sedulously cultivated by
moralists, when the language has fit names for indicating them;
whereas they are but superficially treated of, or rather neglected, in
nations where such virtues have not so much as a name. Languages
may obviously do injury to morals and religion by their equivocation;
by false accessories, inseparable from the principal idea; and by their
poverty.” It is a striking fact, noted by an English traveller, that the
native language of Van Dieman’s Land has four words to express the
idea of taking life, not one of which indicates the deep-lying
distinction between to kill and to murder; while any word for love is
wanting to it altogether. One of the most formidable obstacles which
Christian missionaries have encountered in teaching the doctrines
and precepts of the Gospel to the heathen, has been the absence
from their languages of a spiritual and ethical nomenclature. It is in
vain that the religious teachers of a people present to them a
doctrinal or ethical system inculcating virtues and addressed to
faculties, whose very existence their language, and consequently the
conscious self-knowledge of the people, do not recognize. Equally
vain is it to reprehend vices which have no name by which they can
be described and denounced, as things to be loathed and shunned.
Hence, in translating the Bible into the languages of savage nations,
the translators have been compelled to employ merely provisional
phrases, until they could develop a dialect fitted to convey moral as
well as intellectual truth. It is said that the Ethiopians, having but
one word for “person” and “nature,” could not apprehend the
doctrine of the union of Christ’s two natures in one single person.
There are languages of considerable cultivation in which it is not easy
to find a term for the Supreme Being. Seneca wrote a treatise on
“Providence,” which had not even a name at Rome in the time of
Cicero. It is a curious fact that the English language, rich as it is in
words to express the most complex religious ideas, as well as in
terms characterizing vices and crimes, had until about two centuries
ago no word for “selfishness,” the root of all vices, nor any single
word for “suicide.” The Greeks and Romans had a clear conception of
a moral ideal, but the Christian idea of “sin” was utterly unknown to
the Pagan mind. Vice they regarded as simply a relaxed energy of
the will, by which it yielded to the allurements of sensual pleasure;
and virtue, literally “manliness,” was the determined spirit, the
courage and vigor with which it resisted such temptations. But the
idea of “holiness” and the antithetic idea of sin were such utter
strangers to the Pagan mind that it would have been impossible to
express them in either of the classical tongues of antiquity. As De
Maistre has strikingly observed, man knew well that he could
“irritate” God or “a god,” but not that he could “offend” him. The
words “crime” and “criminal” belong to all languages: those of “sin”
and “sinner” belong only to the Christian tongue. For a similar
reason, man could always call God “Father,” which expresses only a
relation of creation and of power; but no man, of his own strength,
could say “my Father”! for this is a relation of love, foreign even to
Mount Sinai, and which belongs only to Calvary.
Again, the Greek language, as we have already seen, had no term
for the Christian virtue of “humility”; and when the apostle Paul
coined one for it, he had to employ a root conveying the idea, not of
self-abasement before a just and holy God, but of positive
debasement and meanness of spirit. On the other hand, there is a
word in our own tongue which, as De Quincey observes, cannot be
rendered adequately either by German or Greek, the two richest of
human languages, and without which we should all be disarmed for
one great case, continually recurrent, of social enormity. It is the
word “humbug.” “A vast mass of villany, that cannot otherwise be
reached by legal penalties, or brought within the rhetoric of scorn,
would go at large with absolute impunity, were it not through the
stern Rhadamanthian aid of this virtuous and inexorable word.”
There is no way in which men so often become the victims of error
as by an imperfect understanding of certain words which are artfully
used by their superiors. Cynicism is seldom shallower than when it
sneers at what it contemptuously calls the power of words over the
popular imagination. If men are agreed about things, what, it is
asked, can be more foolish than to dispute about names? But while it
is true that in the physical world things dominate over names, and
are not at the mercy of a shifting vocabulary, yet in the world of
ideas,—of history, philosophy, ethics and poetry,—words triumph
over things, are even equivalent to things, and are as truly the living
organism of thought as the eyes, lips, and entire physiognomy of a
man, are the media of the soul’s expression. Hence words are the
only certain test of thought; so much so that we often stop in the
midst of an assertion, an exclamation, or a request, startled by the
form it assumes in words. Thus, in Shakespeare, King John says to
Hubert, who pleaded his sovereign’s order for putting the young
prince to death, that if, instead of receiving the order in signs,
“Thou
Hadst bid me tell my tale in express words,
Deep shame had struck me dumb.”
Words are often not only the vehicle of thought, but the very mirror
in which we see our ideas, and behold the beauty or ugliness of our
inner selves.
A volume might be written on the mutual influence of language
and opinion, showing that as
“Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,
And these reciprocally those again,”
How often have thoughtless words set empires ablaze, and kindled
furious wars among nations! It was one of the virtues of George
Washington that he knew how to be silent. John Adams said he had
the most remarkable mouth he had ever seen; for he had the art of
controlling his lips. One of the rules of conduct to which David Hume
inflexibly adhered, was never to reply to any attack made upon him
or his writings. It was creditable to him that he had no anxiety to
have “the last word,”—that which in family circles has been
pronounced to be “the most dangerous of infernal machines.”
It is not, however, in the realm of literature and morals only that
the power of words is seen. Who is ignorant of their sway in the
world of politics? Is not fluency of speech, in many communities,
more than statesmanship? Are not brains, with a little tongue, often
far less potent than “tongue with a garnish of brains”? Need any one
be told that a talent for speech-making has stood in place of all other
acquirements; that it is this which has made judges without law, and
diplomatists without French; which has sent to the army brigadiers
who knew not a cannon from a mortar, and to the legislature men
who could not tell a bank note from a bill of exchange; which,
according to Macaulay, made a Foreign Minister of Mr. Pitt, who
never opened Vattel, and which was near making a Chancellor of the
Exchequer of Mr. Sheridan, who could not work a sum in long
division? “To be a man of the world,” says Corporal Bunting, a
character in one of Bulwer’s novels, “you must know all the ins and
outs of speechifying. It’s words that make another man’s mare go
your road. Augh! that must have been a clever man as invented
language. It is a marvel to think how much a man does in the way of
cheating, if he only has the gift of the gab; wants a missus,—talks
her over; wants your horse,—talks you out of it; wants a place,—
talks himself into it.... Words make even them ’ere authors, poor
creatures, in every man’s mouth. Augh! sir, take note of the words,
and the things will take care of themselves.”
It is true that “lying words” are not always responsible for the
mischief they do; that they often rebel and growl audibly against the
service into which they are pressed, and testify against their
taskmasters. The latent nature of a man struggles often through his
own words, so that even truth itself comes blasted from his lips, and
vulgarity, malignity, and littleness of soul, however anxiously cloaked,
are betrayed by the very phrases and images of their opposites. “A
satanic drop in the blood,” it has been said, “makes a clergyman
preach diabolism from scriptural texts, and a philanthropist thunder
hate from the rostrum of reform.”[9] But though the truth often leaks
out through the most hypocritical words, it is yet true that they are
successfully employed, as decoy ducks, to deceive, and the dupes
who are cheated by them are legion. There are men fond of
abstractions, whom words seem to enter and take possession of, as
their lords and owners. Blind to every shape but a shadow, deaf to
every sound but an echo, they invert the legitimate order, and regard
things as the symbols of words, not words as the symbols of things.
There is, in short, “a besotting intoxication which this verbal magic, if
I may so call it, brings upon the mind of man.... Words are able to
persuade men out of what they find and feel, to reverse the very
impressions of sense, and to amuse men with fancies and paradoxes,
even in spite of nature and experience.”[10]
All who are familiar with Dickens will recollect the reply of the
shrewd Samuel Weller, when asked the meaning of the word
monomania: “When a poor fellow takes a piece of goods from a
shop, it is called theft; but if a wealthy lady does the same thing, it is
called monomania.” There is biting satire as well as naïveté and dry
humor in the reply, and it strikingly shows the moral power of
language; how the same act may be made to appear in wholly
different lights, according to the phraseology used to describe it. The
same character may be made to look as spotless as an angel, or as
black as “the sooty spirits that troop under Acheron’s flag,” through
the lubricity of language. “Timidus,” says Seneca, “se cantum vocat;
sordidus parcum.” Thousands who would shrink back with disgust or
horror from a vice which has an ugly name, are led “first to endure,
then pity, then embrace,” when men have thrown over it the mantle
of an honorable appellation. A singular but most instructive dictionary
might be compiled by taking one after another the honorable and the
sacred words of a language, and showing for what infamies,
basenesses, crimes, or follies, each has been made a pretext. Is
there no meaning in the fact that, among the ancient Romans, the
same word was employed to designate a crime and a great action,
and that a softened expression for “a thief” was “a man of three
letters” (f. u. r.)? Does it make no difference in our estimate of the
gambler and his profession, whether we call him by the plain,
unvarnished Saxon “blackleg,” or by the French epithet, “industrious
chevalier”? Can any one doubt that in Italy, when poisoning was
rifest, the crime was fearfully increased by the fact that, in place of
this term, not to be breathed in ears polite, the death of some one
was said to be “assisted”? Or can any one doubt the moral effect of a
similar perversion of words in France, when a subtle poison, by
which impatient heirs delivered themselves from persons who stood
between them and the inheritance they coveted, was called
“succession powder”?
Juvenal indignantly denounces the polished Romans for relieving
the consciences of rich criminals by softening the names of their
crimes; and Thucydides, in a well known passage of his history, tells
how the morals of the Greeks of his day were sapped, and how they
concealed the national deterioration, by perversions of the customary
meanings of words. Unreasoning rashness, he says, passed as
“manliness” and esprit de corps, and prudent caution for specious
cowardice; sobermindedness was a mere “cloak for effeminacy,” and
general prudence was “inefficient inertness.” The Athenians, at one
time, were adepts in the art of coining agreeable names for
disagreeable things. “Taxes” they called “subscriptions,” or
“contributions”; the prison was “the house”; the executioner a “public
servant”; and a general abolition of debt was “a disburdening
ordinance.” Devices like these are common to all countries; and in
our own, especially, one is startled to see what an amount of
ingenuity has been expended in perfecting this “devil’s vocabulary,”
and how successful the press has been in its efforts to transmute
acts of wickedness into mere peccadilloes, and to empty words
employed in the condemnation of evil, of the depth and earnestness
of the moral reprobation they convey.
The use of classical names for vices has done no little harm to the
public morals. We may say of these names, what Burke said with
doubtful correctness of vices themselves, that “they lose half their
deformity by losing all their grossness.” If any person is in doubt
about the moral quality of an act, let him characterize it in plain
Saxon, and he will see it in its true colors.
Some time ago a Wisconsin clergyman, being detected in stealing
books from a bookstore, confessed the truth, and added that he left
his former home in New Jersey under disgrace for a similar theft.
This fact a New York paper noted under the head of “A Peculiar
Misfortune.” About the same time a clerk in Richmond, Va., being
sent to deposit several hundreds of dollars in a bank, ran away with
the money to the North. Having been pursued, overtaken, and
compelled to return the money, he was spoken of by “the chivalry” as
the young man “who had lately met with an accident.” Is it not an
alarming sign of the times, when, in the legislature of one of our
largest eastern States, a member declares that he has been asked by
another member for his vote, and told that he would get “five
hundred reasons for giving it”; thus making the highest word in our
language, that which signifies divinely given power of discrimination
and choice, the synonym of bribery?
Perhaps no honorable term in the language has been more
debased than “gentleman.” Originally the word meant a man born of
a noble family, or gens, as the Romans called it; but as such persons
were usually possessed of wealth and leisure, they were generally
distinguished by greater refinement of manners than the working
classes, and a more tasteful dress. As in the course of ages their
riches and legal privileges diminished, and the gulf which separated
them from the citizens of the trading towns was bridged by the
increasing wealth and power of the latter, the term “gentleman”
came at last to denote indiscriminately all persons who kept up the
state and observed the social forms which had once characterized
men of rank. To-day the term has sunk so low that the acutest
lexicographer would be puzzled to tell its meaning. Not only does
every person of decent exterior and deportment assume to be a
gentleman, but the term is applied to the vilest criminals and the
most contemptible miscreants, as well as to the poorest and most
illiterate persons in the community.
In aristocratic England the artificial distinctions of society have so
far disappeared that even the porter who lounges in his big chair,
and condescends to show you out, is the “gentleman in the hall”;
Jeames is the “gentleman in uniform”; while the valet is the
“gentleman’s gentleman.” Even a half a century ago, George IV, who
was so ignorant that he could hardly spell, and who in heart and soul
was a thorough snob, was pronounced, upon the ground of his grand
and suave manners, “the first gentleman of Europe.” But in the
United States the term has been so emptied of its original meaning,
—especially in some of the southern states, where society has hardly
emerged from a feudal state, and where men who shoot each other
in a street fray still babble of being “born gentlemen,” and of “dying
like gentlemen,”—that most persons will think it is quite time for the
abolition of that heartless conventionality, that pretentious cheat and
barbarian, the gentleman. Cowper declared, a hundred years ago, in
regard to duelling:
“A gentleman
Will not insult me, and no other can.”
G R A N D W O R D S.
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