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 Bioethics
Principles, Issues, and Cases
Fourth Edition

Lewis Vaughn

New York Oxford

OX F OR D U N I V E R SI T Y PR E S S

vau03268_fm_i-xii.indd i 05/15/19 12:27 PM

viii Contents

“Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of

of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con,” Enhancement of Human Beings,” Julian
Dan W. Brock 551 Savulescu 627
“Germ-Line Gene Therapy,” LeRoy Walters and
Julie Gage Palmer 636
Chapter 9
“What Does ‘Respect for Embryos’ Mean
genetic choices 562 in the Context of Stem Cell Research?”
Genes and Genomes 562 Bonnie Steinbock 643
Genetic Testing 563 Declaration on the Production and the Scientific
In Depth: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests 566 and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic
Gene Therapy 570 Stem Cells, Pontifical Academy for Life 646
Fact File: Available Genetic Tests for
Cancer Risk 571 Chapter 10
Fact File: Recent Research Breakthroughs
in Gene Therapy 574 euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide 648
Stem Cells 575
Applying Major Theories 577 Deciding Life and Death 649
Classic Case File: The Kingsburys 578 Legal Brief: Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide:
Major Developments 651
Key Terms 579
In Depth: Assisted Suicide: What Do Doctors
Summary 579
Think? 652
Cases for Evaluation 579
Autonomy, Mercy, and Harm 653
Further Reading 582
In Depth: Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act 655
Notes 582
In Depth: End-of-Life Decisions in the
Netherlands 657
readings 583
Applying Major Theories 657
“Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the
In Depth: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Public
Human Right to Life,” Leon R. Kass 583
Opinion 658
“Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having
Classic Case File: Nancy Cruzan 659
Children Be Immoral?” Laura M. Purdy 587
Key Terms 660
“The Morality of Screening for Disability,”
Summary 660
Jeff McMahan 594
Cases for Evaluation 661
“Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an
Further Reading 664
Open Future,” Dena S. Davis 598
Notes 665
“Disowning Knowledge: Issues in Genetic
Testing,” Robert Wachbroit 608 readings 666
“The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic “Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps,” Decision Making,”
Dan W. Brock 612 Timothy E. Quill 666
“Is Gene Therapy a Form of Eugenics?” “Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Dan W. Brock 670
John Harris 616 “When Self-Determination Runs Amok,”
“Genetic Enhancement,” Walter Glannon 622 Daniel Callahan 682

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 Contents ix

“Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View,” The Ethics of Rationing 754

John D. Arras 687 Classic Case File: Christine deMeurers 756
“Active and Passive Euthanasia,” James Key Terms 758
Rachels 702 Summary 758
“Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on Cases for Evaluation 759
(Un)Assisted Suicide,” John Hardwig 706 Further Reading 761
“The Philosophers’ Brief,” Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Notes 762
Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson 717 readings 763
“Legalizing Assisted Dying Is Dangerous “Is There a Right to Health Care and, if So, What
for Disabled People,” Liz Carr 725 Does It Encompass?,” Norman Daniels 763
“  ‘For Now Have I My Death’: The ‘Duty to Die’ “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health
Versus the Duty to Help the Ill Stay Alive,” Care,” Allen E. Buchanan 770
Felicia Ackerman 727 “Rights to Health Care, Social Justice, and Fairness
Vacco v. Quill, United States Supreme Court 738 in Health Care Allocations: Frustrations in the
Face of Finitude,” H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 776
Part 4. ​Justice and Health Care “Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison
Reflects Flaws and Opportunities for Better
Chapter 11 U.S. Health Care,” Eric C. Schneider, Dana O.
dividing up health care Sarnak, David Squires, et al. 784
resources 743 “Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain,”
Health Care in Trouble 743 James F. Childress et al. 788
In Depth: Unequal Health Care for “Human Rights Approach to Public Health
Minorities 746 Policy,” D. Tarantola and S. Gruskin 799
Fact File: U.S. Health Care 747
Appendix 811
Theories of Justice 748
Glossary 813
In Depth: Comparing Health Care Systems:
United States, Canada, and Index 815
Germany 749
Fact File: Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA
(“Obamacare”) 751
A Right to Health Care 752
In Depth: Public Health and Bioethics 753

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 P R E FAC E

This fourth edition of Bioethics embodies all the features filling out the discussions with background on the
that have made it a best-selling textbook and includes all latest medical, legal, and social developments. The
the most important changes and improvements that main issues include paternalism and patient auton-
dozens of teachers have asked for recently and over the omy, truth-telling, confidentiality, informed consent,
years. The book is, therefore, better than ever. And if it research ethics, clinical trials, abortion, assisted re-
isn’t, let even more good teachers say so and let the cor- production, surrogacy, cloning, genetic testing, gene
rections and enhancements continue. And may the book therapy, stem cells, euthanasia, physician-assisted
remain, as so many teachers have said, exactly suitable to suicide, and the just allocation of health care.
their teaching approach. Every issues chapter contains five to twelve read-
Bioethics provides in-depth discussions of the ings, with each selection prefaced by a brief s­ ummary.
philosophical, medical, scientific, social, and legal The a­ rticles—old standards as well as new ones—
aspects of controversial bioethical issues and reflect the major arguments and latest thinking in
combines this material with a varied collection of each debate. They present a diversity of perspectives
thought-provoking readings. But on this foundation on each topic, with pro and con positions well rep-
are laid elements that other texts sometimes forgo: resented. In most cases, the relevant court rulings
are also included.
1. An extensive introduction to ethics, bioethics,
moral principles, critical thinking, and moral
reasoning special features
2. Full coverage of influential moral theories, A two-chapter introduction to bioethics, moral
including criteria and guidelines for evaluat- reasoning, moral theories, and critical thinking.
ing them (the focus is on utilitarianism, These chapters are designed not only to introduce
­Kantian ethics, natural law theory, Rawls’ the subject matter of bioethics but also to add co-
contract theory, virtue ethics, the ethics of herence to subsequent chapter material and to
care, and feminist ethics) provide the student with a framework for thinking
3. Detailed examinations of the classic cases critically about issues and cases. Chapter 1 is an in­
that have helped shape debate in major issues troduction to basic ethical concepts, the field of
4. Collections of current, news-making cases for bioethics, moral principles and judgments, moral
evaluation reasoning and arguments, the challenges of rela-
5. Many pedagogical features to engage students tivism, and the relationship between ethics and
and reinforce lessons in the main text both religion and the law. Chapter 2 explores moral
6. Writing that strives hard for clarity and conci- theory, shows how theories relate to moral princi-
sion to convey both the excitement and com- ples and judgments, examines influential theories
plexity of issues without sacrificing accuracy (including virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and
feminist ethics), and demonstrates how they can be
topics and readings applied to moral problems. It also explains how to
Nine chapters cover many of the most controversial evaluate moral theories using plausible criteria of
issues in bioethics, detailing the main arguments and adequacy.

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 Preface xi

Helpful chapter elements. Each issues chapter • Annette C. Baier, “The Need for More Than
contains: Justice”
• Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Linda L. Emanuel,
1. Analyses of the most important arguments
“Four Models of the Physician-Patient
offered by the various parties to the debate.
Relationship”
They reinforce and illustrate the lessons on
• Dax Cowart and Robert Burt, “Confronting
moral reasoning in Chapter 1.
Death: Who Chooses, Who Controls? A Di-
2. A section called “Applying Major Theories”
alogue Between Dax Cowart and Robert
showing how the moral theories can be ­applied
Burt”
to the issues. It ties the discussions of moral
• Harriet Hall, “Paternalism Revisited”
theories in Chapter 2 to the moral problems and
• Angus Chen, “Is It Time to Stop Using Race
illustrates the theories’ relevance.
in Medical Research?”
3. A section labeled “Classic Case File” that
• Liz Carr, “Legalizing Assisted Dying Is
­examines in detail a famous bioethics case. The
Dangerous for Disabled People”
stories covered in these sections include those
• Felicia Ackerman, “‘For Now I Have My
of Elizabeth Bouvia, Jerry Canterbury, Nancy
Death’: The ‘Duty to Die’ Versus the Duty to
Klein, Baby M, Nancy Cruzan, the Kingsburys,
Help the Ill Stay Alive”
Christine deMeurers, and the UCLA Schizo-
• Eric C. Schneider, Dana O. Sarnak, David
phrenia Study. These are in ­addition to many
Squires, et al., “Mirror, Mirror 2017: Interna-
other controversial cases covered elsewhere in
tional Comparison Reflects Flaws and Op-
the book—for example, the Terri Schiavo con-
portunities for Better U.S. Health Care”
troversy, the Tuskegee tragedy, the Willow-
Clarifications and Further Discussions
brook experiments, and the U.S. government’s
• Principlism and prima facie principles
human radiation studies.
• Feminist ethics
4. A bank of “Cases for Evaluation” at the end
• Abortion and Judaism
of each chapter. These are recent news stories
• Research on euthanasia in Oregon and the
followed by discussion questions. They give stu-
Netherlands
dents the chance to test their moral ­reasoning
• End-of-life decisions in the Netherlands
on challenging new scenarios that range across
(statistics)
a broad spectrum of current topics.
• Advance directives
A diverse package of pedagogical aids. Each Updates
issues chapter contains a chapter summary, sugges- • Important informed consent cases
tions for further reading, and a variety of text boxes. • U.S. abortion (statistics)
The boxes are mainly of three types: • Abortion and public opinion (survey)
• Recent breakthroughs in gene therapy
1. “In Depth”—additional information, illustra-
• Euthanasia and assisted suicide: major
tions, or analyses of matters touched on in
developments
the main text.
• Assisted suicide: What do doctors think?
2. “Fact File”—statistics on the social, medical,
(survey)
and scientific aspects of the chapter’s topic.
• Public opinion: physician-assisted suicide
3. “Legal Brief”—summaries of important court rul-
(survey)
ings or updates on the status of legislation.
• Health care: the uninsured, per capita
spending, U.S. health care quality
new to this edition
• Comparing health care systems: U.S.,
Ten New Readings Canada, Germany
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books I and II • Public opinion: views on the ACA
• Nel Noddings, “Caring” (“Obamacare”)

vau03268_fm_i-xii.indd xi 05/16/19 02:47 PM

xii Preface

ancillaries Leslie P. Francis, University of Utah

The Oxford University Press Ancillary Resource Center Devin Frank, University of Missouri–Columbia
(ARC) at www.oup-arc.com/vaughn-bioethics-4e Kathryn M. Ganske, Shenandoah University
houses an Instructor’s Manual with Test Bank and Martin Gunderson, Macalester College
PowerPoint Lecture Outlines for instructor use. Stu- Helen Habermann, University of Arizona
dent resources are available on the companion website Stephen Hanson, University of Louisville
at www.oup.com/us/vaughn and include self-quizzes, Karey Harwood, North Carolina State
flashcards, and helpful web links. University
Sheila R. Hollander, University of Memphis
Scott James, University of North Carolina,
acknowledgments
Wilmington
This edition of the text is measurably better than
James Joiner, Northern Arizona University
the first thanks to the good people at Oxford Uni-
William P. Kabasenche, Washington State
versity Press—especially my editor Robert Miller
University
and assistant editor Alyssa Palazzo—and many
Susan Levin, Smith College
reviewers:
Margaret Levvis, Central Connecticut State
Keith Abney, Polytechnic State University University
at San Luis Obispo Burden S. Lundgren, Old Dominion University
Kim Amer, DePaul University Joan McGregor, Arizona State University
Jami L. Anderson, University of Michigan Tristram McPherson, Virginia Tech
Carol Isaacson Barash, Boston University Jonathan K. Miles, Bowling Green State
Deb Bennett-Woods, Regis University University
Don Berkich, Texas A&M University James Lindemann Nelson, Michigan State
Stephan Blatti, University of Memphis University
William Bondeson, University of Missouri, Thomas Nenon, University of Memphis
Columbia Laura Newhart, Eastern Kentucky University
Lori Brown, Eastern Michigan University Steve Odmark, Century College
David W. Concepción, Ball State University Assya Pascalev, Howard University
Catherine Coverston, Brigham Young Viorel Pâslaru, University of Dayton
University David J. Paul, Western Michigan University
Russell DiSilvestro, Assistant Professor, Anthony Preus, Binghamton University
­California State University, Sacramento Susan M. Purviance, University of Toledo
John Doris, Washington University in St. Louis Sara Schuman, Washtenaw Community College
Denise Dudzinski, University of Washington David Schwan, Bowling Green State University
School of Medicine Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University
Craig Duncan, Ithaca College M. Josephine Snider, University of Florida
Anne Edwards, Austin Peay State University Joseph Wellbank, Northeastern University
John Elia, University of Georgia Gladys B. White, Georgetown University
Christy Flanagan-Feddon, Regis University David Yount, Mesa Community College
Jacqueline Fox, University of South Carolina
School of Law

vau03268_fm_i-xii.indd xii 05/15/19 12:27 PM

 Principles and Theories
1

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vau03268_ch01_001-033.indd 2 05/02/19 07:36 PM
 CHAP TER 1

Moral Reasoning in Bioethics

Any serious and rewarding exploration of bio- Second, it would be difficult to imagine moral
ethics is bound to be a challenging journey. issues more important—​more closely gathered
What makes the trip worthwhile? As you might around the line between life and death, health
expect, this entire text is a long answer to that and illness, pain and relief, hope and despair—​
question. You therefore may not fully appreciate than those addressed by bioethics. Whatever
the trek until you have already hiked far along our view of these questions, there is little doubt
the trail. The short answer comes in three parts. that they matter immensely. Whatever answers
First, bioethics—​like ethics, its parent disci- we give will surely have weight, however they fall.
pline—​is about morality, and morality is about Third, as a systematic study of such ques-
life. Morality is part of the unavoidable, bitter- tions, bioethics holds out the possibility of an-
sweet drama of being persons who think and feel swers. The answers may or may not be to our
and choose. Morality concerns beliefs regarding liking; they may confirm or confute our precon-
morally right and wrong actions and morally ceived notions; they may take us far or not far
good and bad persons or character. Whether we enough. But, as the following pages will show,
like it or not, we seem confronted continually the trail has more light than shadow—​ and
with the necessity to deliberate about right and thinking critically and carefully about the prob-
wrong, to judge someone morally good or bad, lems can help us see our way forward.
to agree or disagree with the moral pronounce-
ments of others, to accept or reject the moral ethics and bioethics
outlook of our culture or community, and
even to doubt or affirm the existence or nature Morality is about people’s moral judgments,
of moral concepts themselves. Moral issues are principles, rules, standards, and theories—​a ll of
thus inescapable—​including (or especially) those which help direct conduct, mark out moral prac­
that are the focus of bioethics. In the twenty-first tices, and provide the yardsticks for measuring
century, few can remain entirely untouched by moral worth. We use morality to refer gener-
the pressing moral questions of fair distribution ally to these aspects of our lives (as in “Morality
of health care resources, abortion and infanti- is essential”) or more specifically to the beliefs
cide, euthanasia and assisted suicide, exploitative or practices of particular groups or persons (as
research on children and populations in devel- in “American morality” or “Kant’s morality”).
oping countries, human cloning and genetic en- Moral, of course, pertains to morality as just
gineering, assisted reproduction and surrogate ­defined, though it is also sometimes employed
parenting, prevention and treatment of HIV/ as a synonym for right or good, just as immoral
AIDS, the confidentiality and consent of patients, is often meant to be equivalent to wrong or bad.
the refusal of medical treatment on religious Ethics, as used in this text, is not synonymous with
grounds, experimentation on human embryos morality. Ethics is the study of morality using the
and fetuses, and the just allocation of scarce life- tools and methods of philosophy. Philosophy is
saving organs. a discipline that systematically examines life’s

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4 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S

big questions through critical reasoning, logical some or all of these as proper guides for our ac-
argument, and careful reflection. Thus ethics—​ tions and judgments. In normative ethics, we
also known as moral philosophy—​is a reasoned ask questions like these: What moral principles,
way of delving into the meaning and import of if any, should inform our moral judgments?
moral concepts and issues and of evaluating the What role should virtues play in our lives? Is the
merits of moral judgments and standards. (As principle of autonomy justified? Are there any
with morality and moral, we may use ethics to exceptions to the moral principle of “do not
say such things as “Kant’s ethics” or may use kill”? How should we resolve conflicts between
ethical or unethical to mean right or wrong, moral norms? Is contractarianism a good moral
good or bad.) Ethics seeks to know whether an theory? Is utilitarianism a better theory?
action is right or wrong, what moral standards A branch that deals with much deeper ethical
should guide our conduct, whether moral prin- issues is metaethics. Metaethics is the study of
ciples can be justified, what moral virtues are the meaning and justification of basic moral be-
worth cultivating and why, what ultimate ends liefs. In normative ethics we might ask whether
people should pursue in life, whether there are an action is right or whether a person is good,
good reasons for accepting a particular moral but in metaethics we would more likely ask what
theory, and what the meaning is of such notions it means for an action to be right or for a person
as right, wrong, good, and bad. Whenever we try to be good. For example, does right mean has the
to reason carefully about such things, we enter best consequences, or produces the most happi-
the realm of ethics: We do ethics. ness, or commanded by God? It is the business of
Science offers another way to study morality, metaethics to explore these and other equally
and we must carefully distinguish this approach fundamental questions: What, if anything, is
from that of moral philosophy. Descriptive the difference between moral and nonmoral be-
ethics is the study of morality using the meth- liefs? Are there such things as moral facts? If so,
odology of science. Its purpose is to investigate what sort of things are they, and how can they
the empirical facts of morality—​the actual be- be known? Can moral statements be true or
liefs, behaviors, and practices that constitute false—​or are they just expressions of emotions
people’s moral experience. Those who carry out or attitudes without any truth value? Can moral
these inquiries (usually anthropologists, sociol- norms be justified or proven?
ogists, historians, and psychologists) want to The third main branch is applied ethics, the
know, among other things, what moral beliefs a use of moral norms and concepts to resolve
person or group has, what caused the subjects to practical moral issues. Here, the usual challenge
have them, and how the beliefs influence behav- is to employ moral principles, theories, argu-
ior or social interaction. Very generally, the dif- ments, or analyses to try to answer moral ques-
ference between ethics and descriptive ethics is tions that confront people every day. Many such
this: In ethics we ask, as Socrates did, How ought questions relate to a particular professional field
we to live? In descriptive ethics we ask, How do such as law, business, or journalism, so we have
we in fact live? specialized subfields of applied ethics like legal
Ethics is a big subject, so we should not be ethics, business ethics, and journalistic ethics.
surprised that it has three main branches, each Probably the largest and most energetic subfield
dealing with more or less separate but related is bioethics.
sets of ethical questions. Normative ethics is the Bioethics is applied ethics focused on health
search for, and justification of, moral standards, care, medical science, and medical technology.
or norms. Most often the standards are moral (Biomedical ethics is often used as a synonym,
principles, rules, virtues, and theories, and the and medical ethics is a related but narrower term
lofty aim of this branch is to establish rationally used most often to refer to ethical problems in

vau03268_ch01_001-033.indd 4 05/02/19 07:36 PM

 Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 5

medical practice.) Ranging far and wide, bio- about art; norms of etiquette about polite social
ethics seeks answers to a vast array of tough behavior; grammatical norms about correct use
ethical questions: Is abortion ever morally per- of language; prudential norms about what is in
missible? Is a woman justified in having an abor- one’s interests; and legal norms about lawful and
tion if prenatal genetic testing reveals that her unlawful acts. But moral norms differ from these
fetus has a developmental defect? Should people nonmoral kinds. Some of the features they are
be allowed to select embryos by the embryos’ sex thought to possess include the following.
or other genetic characteristics? Should human
embryos be used in medical research? Should Normative Dominance. In our moral practice,
human cloning be prohibited? Should physicians, moral norms are presumed to dominate other
nurses, physicians’ assistants, and other health kinds of norms, to take precedence over them.
care professionals always be truthful with patients Philosophers call this characteristic of moral
whatever the consequences? Should severely im- norms overridingness because moral consider-
paired newborns be given life-prolonging treat- ations so often seem to override other factors.
ment or be allowed to die? Should people in A maxim of prudence, for example, may suggest
persistent vegetative states be removed from life that you should steal if you can avoid getting
support? Should physicians help terminally ill caught, but a moral prohibition against stealing
­patients commit suicide? Is it morally right to con­ would overrule such a principle. An aesthetic (or
duct medical research on patients without their pragmatic) norm implying that homeless people
consent if the research would save lives? Should should be thrown in jail for blocking the view of
human stem-cell research be banned? How a beautiful public mural would have to yield to
should we decide who gets life-saving organ trans­ moral principles demanding more humane treat-
plants when usable organs are scarce and many ment of the homeless. A law mandating brutal
patients who do not get transplants will die? actions against a minority group would conflict
Should animals be used in biomedical research? with moral principles of justice and would there-
The ethical and technical scope of bioethics is fore be deemed illegitimate. We usually think
wide. Bioethical questions and deliberations that immoral laws are defective, that they need to
now fall to nonexpert and expert alike—​to pa- be changed, or that, in rare cases, they should be
tients, families, and others as well as to philoso- defied through acts of civil disobedience.
phers, health care professionals, lawyers, judges,
scientists, clergy, and public policy specialists. Universality. Moral norms (but not exclusively
Though the heart of bioethics is moral philoso- moral norms) have universality: Moral princi-
phy, fully informed bioethics cannot be done ples or judgments apply in all relevantly similar
without a good understanding of the relevant situations. If it is wrong for you to tell a lie in
nonmoral facts and issues, especially the medi- a particular circumstance, then it is wrong for
cal, scientific, technological, and legal ones. everyone in relevantly similar circumstances to
tell a lie. Logic demands this sort of consistency.
It makes no sense to say that Maria’s doing
ethics and the moral life
action A in circumstances C is morally wrong,
Morality then is a normative, or evaluative, enter- but John’s doing A in circumstances relevantly
prise. It concerns moral norms or standards that similar to C is morally right. Universality, how-
help us decide the rightness of actions, judge the ever, is not unique to moral norms; it’s a charac-
goodness of persons or character, and prescribe the teristic of all normative spheres.
form of moral conduct. There are, of course, other
sorts of norms we apply in life—​nonmoral norms. Impartiality. Implicit in moral norms is the
Aesthetic norms help us make value judg­ments notion of impartiality—​the idea that everyone

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6 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S

should be considered equal, that everyone’s inter- the moral life—​is to do moral reasoning. If our
ests should count the same. From the perspective moral judgments are to have any weight at all, if
of morality, no person is any better than any they are to be anything more than mere per-
other. Everyone should be treated the same unless sonal taste or knee-jerk emotional response,
there is a morally relevant difference between they must be backed by the best of reasons. They
persons. We probably would be completely baf- must be the result of careful reflection in which
fled if someone seriously said something like we arrive at good reasons for accepting them,
“murder is wrong . . . except when committed by reasons that could be acknowledged as such by
myself,” when there was no morally relevant dif- any other reasoning persons.
ference between that person and the rest of the Both logic and our commonsense moral ex-
world. If we took such a statement seriously at all, perience demand that the thorough sifting of
we would likely not only reject it but also would reasons constitutes the main work of our moral
not even consider it a bona fide moral statement. deliberations—​regardless of our particular moral
The requirement of moral impartiality pro- outlook or theory. We would think it odd, per-
hibits discrimination against people merely be- haps even perverse, if someone asserted that
cause they are different—​different in ways that physician-assisted suicide is always morally
are not morally relevant. Two people can be dif- wrong—​and then said she has no reasons at all for
ferent in many ways: skin color, weight, gender, believing such a judgment but just does. What-
income, age, occupation, and so forth. But these ever our views on physician-assisted suicide, we
are not differences relevant to the way they would be justified in ignoring her judgment, for
should be treated as persons. On the other hand, we would have no way to distinguish it from
if there are morally relevant differences between personal whim or wishful thinking. Likewise she
people, then we may have good reasons to treat herself (if she genuinely had no good reasons for
them differently, and this treatment would not her assertion) would be in the same boat, adrift
be a violation of impartiality. This is how phi- with a firm opinion moored to nothing solid.
losopher James Rachels explains the point: Our feelings, of course, are also part of our
moral experience. When we ponder a moral
The requirement of impartiality, then, is at issue we care about (abortion, for example), we
bottom nothing more than a proscription against may feel anger, sadness, disgust, fear, irritation,
arbitrariness in dealing with people. It is a rule or sympathy. Such strong emotions are normal
that forbids us from treating one person differ- and often useful, helping us empathize with
ently from another when there is no good reason others, deepening our understanding of human
to do so. But if this explains what is wrong with suffering, and sharpening our insight into the
racism, it also explains why, in some special consequences of our moral decisions. But our
kinds of cases, it is not racist to treat people dif- feelings can mislead us by reflecting not moral
ferently. Suppose a film director was making a truth but our own psychological needs, our own
movie about the life of Martin Luther King, Jr. personal or cultural biases, or our concern for
He would have a perfectly good reason for ruling personal advantage. Throughout history, some
out Tom Cruise for the starring role. Obviously, people’s feelings led them to conclude that
such casting would make no sense. Because there women should be burned for witchcraft, that
would be a good reason for it, the director’s “dis- whole races should be exterminated, that black
crimination” would not be arbitrary and so men should be lynched, and that adherents of a
would not be open to criticism.1 different religion were evil. Critical reasoning
can help restrain such terrible impulses. It can
Reasonableness. To participate in morality—​to help us put our feelings in proper perspective
engage in the essential, unavoidable practices of and achieve a measure of impartiality. Most of

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 Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 7

or economic. Thus murder and embezzlement are

I N D E P TH both immoral and illegal, backed by social disapproval
and severe sanctions imposed by law. Controversy
MORALITY AND THE LAW
often arises when an action is not obviously or seri-
ously harmful but is considered immoral by some who
want the practice prohibited by law. The conten-
Some people confuse morality with the law, or iden-
tious notion at work is that something may be made
tify the one with the other, but the two are distinct
illegal solely on the grounds that it is immoral, re-
though they may often coincide. Laws are norms
gardless of any physical or economic harm involved.
enacted or enforced by the state to protect or pro-
This view of the law is known as legal moralism, and
mote the public good. They specify which actions
it sometimes underlies debates about the legalization
are legally right or wrong. But these same actions
of abortion, euthanasia, reproductive technology,
can also be judged morally right or wrong, and these
con­traception, and other practices.
two kinds of judgments will not necessarily agree.
Many issues in bioethics have both a moral and
Lying to a friend about a personal matter, deliberately
legal dimension, and it is important not to confuse
trying to destroy yourself through reckless living, or
the two. Sometimes the question at hand is a moral
failing to save a drowning child (when you easily
one (whether, for example, euthanasia is ever morally
could have) may be immoral—​but not illegal. Racial
permissible); whether a practice should be legal or
bias, discrimination based on gender or sexual orien-
illegal then is beside the point. Sometimes the ques-
tation, slavery, spousal rape, and unequal treatment
tion is about legality. And sometimes the discussion
of minority groups are immoral—​but, depending on
concerns both. A person may consider physician-
the society, they may not be illegal.
assisted suicide morally acceptable but argue that it
Much of the time, however, morality and the law
should nevertheless be illegal because allowing the
overlap. Often what is immoral also turns out to be
practice to become widespread would harm both
illegal. This is usually the case when immoral actions
patients and the medical profession.
cause substantial harm to others, whether physical

all, it can guide us to moral judgments that are purports to explain right actions, or make judg-
trustworthy because they are supported by the ments about right or wrong actions.
best of reasons. Moral values, on the other hand, generally
The moral life, then, is about grappling with a concern those things that we judge to be morally
distinctive class of norms marked by normative good, bad, praiseworthy, or blameworthy. Nor-
dominance, universality, impartiality, and rea- mally we use such words to describe persons (as
sonableness. As we saw earlier, these norms can in “He is a good person” or “She is to blame for
include moral principles, rules, theories, and hurting them”), their character (“He is virtu-
judgments. We should notice that we commonly ous”; “She is honest”), or their motives (“She did
apply these norms to two distinct spheres of our wrong but did not mean to”). Note that we also
moral experience—​ to both moral obligations attribute nonmoral value to things. If we say that
and moral values. a book or bicycle or vacation is good, we mean
Moral obligations concern our duty, what we good in a nonmoral sense. Such things in them-
are obligated to do. That is, obligations are about selves cannot have moral value.
conduct, how we ought or ought not to behave. Strictly speaking, only actions are morally
In this sphere, we talk primarily about actions. right or wrong, but persons are morally good or
We may look to moral principles or rules to bad (or some degree of goodness or badness).
guide our actions, or study a moral theory that With this distinction we can acknowledge a

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8 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S

simple fact of the moral life: A good person can We can see appeals to moral principles in
do something wrong, and a bad person can do countless cases. Confronted by a pain-racked,
something right. A Gandhi can tell a lie, and a terminally ill patient who demands to have his
Hitler can save a drowning man. life ended, his physician refuses to comply, rely-
In addition, we may judge an action right or ing on the principle that “it is wrong to inten-
wrong depending on the motive behind it. If tionally take a life.” Another physician makes a
John knocks a stranger down in the street to pre- different choice in similar circumstances, insist-
vent her from being hit by a car, we would deem ing that the relevant principle is “ending the suf-
his action right (and might judge him a good fering of a hopelessly ill patient is morally
person). But if he knocks her down because he permissible.” An infant is born anencephalic
dislikes the color of her skin, we would believe (without a brain); it will never have a conscious
his action wrong (and likely think him evil). life and will die in a few days. The parents decide
The general meaning of right and wrong seems to donate the infant’s organs to other children
clear to just about everyone. But we should be so they might live, which involves taking the
careful to differentiate degrees of meaning in organs right away before they deteriorate. A
these moral terms. Right can mean either “obliga- critic of the parents’ decision argues that “it is
tory” or “permissible.” An obligatory action is one unethical to kill in order to save.” But someone
that would be wrong not to perform. We are obli- else appeals to the principle “save as many chil-
gated or required to do it. A permissible action is dren as possible.”2 In such ways moral principles
one that is permitted. It is not wrong to perform it. help guide our actions and inform our judg-
Wrong means “prohibited.” A prohibited action is ments about right and wrong, good and evil.
one that would be wrong to perform. We are obli- As discussed in Chapter 2, moral principles
gated or required not to do it. A supererogatory are often drawn from a moral theory, which is a
action is one that is “above and beyond” our duty. moral standard on the most general level. The
It is praiseworthy—​a good thing to do—​but not principles are derived from or supported by the
required. Giving all your possessions to the poor theory. Many times we simply appeal directly to
is generally considered a supererogatory act. a plausible moral principle without thinking
much about its theoretical underpinnings.
Philosophers make a distinction between ab-
moral principles in bioethics
solute and prima facie principles (or duties). An
As noted earlier, the main work of bioethics is absolute principle applies without exceptions.
trying to solve bioethical problems using the An absolute principle that we should not lie de-
potent resources and methods of moral phi- mands that we never lie regardless of the cir-
losophy, which include, at a minimum, critical cumstances or the consequences. In contrast, a
­reasoning, logical argument, and conceptual prima facie principle applies in all cases unless
analysis. Many, perhaps most, moral philoso- an exception is warranted. Exceptions are justi-
phers would be quick to point out that beyond fied when the principle conflicts with other
these tools of reason we also have the consider- principles and is thereby overridden. W. D. Ross
able help of moral principles. (The same could be is given credit for drawing this distinction in his
said about moral theories, which we explore in 1930 book The Right and the Good.3 It is essen-
the next chapter.) Certainly to be useful, moral tial to his account of ethics, which has a core of
principles must be interpreted, often filled out several moral principles or duties, any of which
with specifics, and balanced with other moral might come into conflict.
concerns. But both in everyday life and in bio- Physicians have a prima facie duty to be truth­
ethics, moral principles are widely thought to be ful to their patients as well as a prima facie duty
indispensable to moral decision-making. to promote their welfare. But if these duties come

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 Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 9

in conflict—​if, for example, telling a patient the their consent, treating competent patients against
truth about his condition would somehow result their will, physically restraining or confining pa-
in his death—​a physician might decide that the tients for no medical reason—​such practices con-
duty of truthfulness should yield to the weight- stitute obvious violations of personal autonomy.
ier duty to do good for the patient. Not all restrictions on autonomy, however,
Moral principles are many and varied, but in are of the physical kind. Autonomy involves the
bioethics the following have traditionally been capacity to make personal choices, but choices
extremely influential and particularly relevant cannot be considered entirely autonomous unless
to the kinds of moral issues that arise in health they are fully informed. When we make decisions
care, medical research, and biotechnology. In in ignorance—​without relevant information or
fact, many—​perhaps most—​of the thorniest issues blinded by misinformation—​our autonomy is
in bioethics arise from conflicts among these diminished just as surely as if someone physi-
basic principles. In one formulation or another, cally manipulated us. If this is correct, then we
each one has been integral to major moral have a plausible explanation of why lying is
theories, providing evidence that the principles generally prohibited: Lying is wrong because it
capture something essential in our moral expe- undermines personal autonomy. Enshrined in
rience. The principles are (1) autonomy, (2) non­ bioethics and in the law, then, is the precept of
maleficence, (3) beneficence, (4) utility, and informed consent, which demands that patients
(5) justice.4 be allowed to freely consent to or decline treat-
ments and that they receive the information they
Autonomy need to make informed judgments about them.
Autonomy refers to a person’s rational capacity In many ways, autonomy is a delicate thing,
for self-governance or self-determination—​ the easily compromised and readily thwarted. Often
ability to direct one’s own life and choose for a person’s autonomy is severely undermined not
­oneself. The principle of autonomy insists on full by other people but by nature, nurture, or his or
­respect for autonomy. One way to express the prin- her own actions. Some drug addicts and alcohol-
ciple is: Autonomous persons should be allowed ics, people with serious psychiatric illness, and
to exercise their capacity for self-determination. those with severe mental impairment are thought
According to one major ethical tradition, autono- to have drastically diminished autonomy (or to
mous persons have intrinsic worth precisely be essentially nonautonomous). Bioethical ques-
because they have the power to make rational tions then arise about what is permissible to do
decisions and moral choices. They therefore must to them and who will represent their interests or
be treated with respect, which means not violating make decisions regarding their care. Infants and
their autonomy by ignoring or thwarting their children are also not fully autonomous, and the
ability to choose their own paths and make their same sorts of questions are forced on parents,
own judgments. guardians, and health care workers.
The principle of respect for autonomy places Like all the other major principles discussed
severe restraints on what can be done to an here, respect for autonomy is thought to be
autonomous person. There are exceptions, but in prima facie. It can sometimes be overridden by
general we are not permitted to violate people’s considerations that seem more important or
autonomy just because we disagree with their compelling—​ considerations that philosophers
decisions, or because society might benefit, or and other thinkers have formulated as princi-
because the violation is for their own good. We ples of autonomy restriction. The principles are
cannot legitimately impair someone’s autonomy articulated in various ways, are applied widely
without strong justification for doing so. Con- to all sorts of social and moral issues, and are
ducting medical experiments on patients without themselves the subject of debate. Chief among

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10 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S

these is the harm principle: a person’s autonomy A health care professional violates this prin-
may be curtailed to prevent harm to others. To ciple if he or she deliberately performs an action
prevent people from being victimized by thieves that harms or injures a patient. If a physician
and murderers, we have a justice system that intentionally administers a drug that she knows
prosecutes and imprisons the perpetrators. To will induce a heart attack in a patient, she obvi-
discourage hospitals and health care workers ously violates the principle—she clearly does
from hurting patients through carelessness or something that is morally (and legally) wrong.
fraud, laws and regulations limit what they can But she also violates it if she injures a patient
do to people in their care. To stop someone from through recklessness, negligence, or inexcusable
spreading a deadly, contagious disease, health ignorance. She may not intend to hurt anyone,
officials may quarantine him against his will. but she is guilty of the violation just the same.
Another principle of autonomy restriction is Implicit in the principle of nonmaleficence is
paternalism. Paternalism is the overriding of a the notion that health professionals must exer-
person’s actions or decision-making for her own cise “due care.” The possibility of causing some
good. Some cases of paternalism (sometimes pain, suffering, or injury is inherent in the care
called weak paternalism) seem permissible to and treatment of patients, so we cannot realisti-
many people—​when, for example, seriously de- cally expect health professionals never to harm
pressed or psychotic patients are temporarily anyone. But we do expect them to use due care—
restrained to prevent them from injuring or kill- to act reasonably and responsibly to minimize
ing themselves. Other cases are more controver- the harm or the chances of causing harm. If a
sial. Researchers hoping to develop a life-saving physician must cause patients some harm to
treatment give an experimental drug to some- effect a cure, we expect her to try to produce the
one without his knowledge or consent. Or a least amount of harm possible to achieve the re-
physician tries to spare the feelings of a compe- sults. And even if her treatments cause no actual
tent, terminally ill patient by telling her that she pain or injury in a particular instance, we expect
will eventually get better, even though she in- her not to use treatments that have a higher
sists on being told the truth. The paternalism in chance of causing harm than necessary. By the
such scenarios (known as strong paternalism) is lights of the nonmaleficence principle, subjecting
usually thought to be morally objectionable. patients to unnecessary risks is wrong even if no
Many controversies in bioethics center on the damage is done.
morality of strong paternalism.
Beneficence
Nonmaleficence The principle of beneficence has seemed to many
The principle of nonmaleficence asks us not to to constitute the very soul of morality—​or very
intentionally or unintentionally inflict harm on close to it. In its most general form, it says that
others. In bioethics, nonmaleficence is the most we should do good to others. (Benevolence is dif-
widely recognized moral principle. Its aphoris- ferent, referring more to an attitude of goodwill
tic expression has been embraced by practitio- toward others than to a principle of right action.)
ners of medicine for centuries: “Above all, do no Beneficence enjoins us to advance the welfare of
harm.” A more precise formulation of the prin- others and prevent or remove harm to them.
ciple is: We should not cause unnecessary injury Beneficence demands that we do more than
or harm to those in our care. In whatever form, just avoid inflicting pain and suffering. It says
nonmaleficence is the bedrock precept of count- that we should actively promote the well-being of
less codes of professional conduct, institutional others and prevent or remove harm to them. In
regulations, and governmental rules and laws bioethics, there is little doubt that physicians,
designed to protect the welfare of patients. nurses, researchers, and other professionals have

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 Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 11

such a duty. After all, helping others, promoting possible benefits of the treatment outweigh its
their good, is a large part of what these profes- risks by an acceptable margin. Suppose a man’s
sionals are obliged to do. clogged artery can be successfully treated with
But not everyone thinks that we all have a open-heart surgery, a procedure that carries a
duty of active beneficence. Some argue that considerable risk of injury and death. But imag-
though there is a general (applicable to all) duty ine that the artery can also be successfully
not to harm others, there is no general duty to opened with a regimen of cholesterol-lowering
help others. They say we are not obligated to aid drugs and a low-fat diet, both of which have a
the poor, feed the hungry, or tend to the sick. much lower chance of serious complications.
Such acts are not required, but are supererogatory, The principle of utility seems to suggest that the
beyond the call of duty. Others contend that latter course is best and that the former is mor-
though we do not have a general duty of active ally impermissible.
beneficence, we are at least sometimes obligated The principle also plays a major role in the
to look to the welfare of people we care about creation and evaluation of the health policies of
most—​such as our parents, children, spouses, institutions and society. In these large arenas,
and friends. In any case, it is clear that in cer- most people aspire to fulfill the requirements of
tain professions—​particularly medicine, law, and beneficence and maleficence, but they recognize
nursing—​benefiting others is often not just that perfect beneficence or maleficence is im-
supererogatory but obligatory and basic. possible: Trade-offs and compromises must be
made, scarce resources must be allotted, help and
Utility harm must be balanced, life and death must be
The principle of utility says that we should pro- weighed—​tasks almost always informed by the
duce the most favorable balance of good over bad principle of utility.
(or benefit over harm) for all concerned. The prin- Suppose, for example, we want to mandate
ciple acknowledges that in the real world, we the immunization of all schoolchildren to pre-
cannot always just benefit others or just avoid vent the spread of deadly communicable dis-
harming them. Often we cannot do good for eases. The cost in time and money will be great,
people without also bringing them some harm, but such a program could save many lives.
or we cannot help everyone who needs to be There is a down side, however: A small number
helped, or we cannot help some without also of children—​perhaps as many as 2 for every
hurting or neglecting others. In such situations, 400,000 immunizations—​w ill die because of a
the principle says, we should do what yields the rare allergic reaction to the vaccine. It is impos-
best overall outcome—​the maximum good and sible to predict who will have such a reaction
minimum evil, everyone considered. The utility (and impossible to prevent it), but it is almost
principle, then, is a supplement to, not a substi- certain to occur in a few cases. If our goal is social
tute for, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, beneficence, what should we do? Children are
and justice. likely to die whether we institute the program
In ethics this maxim comes into play in sev- or not. Guided by the principle of utility (as well
eral ways. Most famously it is the defining pre- as other principles), we may decide to proceed
cept of the moral theory known as utilitarianism with the program since many more lives would
(discussed in Chapter 2). But it is also a stand- likely be saved by it than lost because of its
alone moral principle applied everywhere in implementation.
bio­ethics to help resolve the kind of dilemmas Again, suppose governmental health agencies
just mentioned. A physician, for example, must have enough knowledge and resources to de-
decide whether a treatment is right for a patient, velop fully a cure for only one disease—​either a
and that decision often hinges on whether the rare heart disorder or a common form of skin

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12 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S

cancer. Trying to split resources between these justify the properties, or traits, of just distribu-
two is sure to prevent development of any cure tions. A basic precept of most of these theories is
at all. The heart disorder kills 200 adults each what may plausibly be regarded as the core of
year; the cancer occurs in thousands of people, the principle of justice: Equals should be treated
causing them great pain and distress, but is equally. (Recall that this is one of the defining
rarely fatal. How best to maximize the good? On elements of ethics itself, impartiality.) The idea
which disease should the government spend its is that people should be treated the same unless
time and treasure? Answering this question there is a morally relevant reason for treating
(and others like it) requires trying to apply the them differently. We would think it unjust for
utility principle—​a job often involving complex a physician or nurse to treat his white diabetic
calculations of costs and benefits and frequently patients more carefully than he does his black
generating controversy. diabetic patients—​and to do so without a sound
medical reason. We would think it unfair to
Justice award the only available kidney to the trans-
In its broadest sense, justice refers to people get- plant candidate who belongs to the “right” po-
ting what is fair or what is their due. In practice, litical party or has the best personal relationship
most of us seem to have a rough idea of what with hospital administrators.
justice entails in many situations, even if we The principle of justice has been at the heart
cannot articulate exactly what it is. We know, of debates about just distribution of benefits and
for example, that it is unjust for a bus driver to burdens (including health care) for society as a
make a woman sit in the back of the bus because whole. The disagreements have generally not been
of her religious beliefs, or for a judicial system to about the legitimacy of the principle, but about
arbitrarily treat one group of citizens more how it should be interpreted. Different theories
harshly than others, or for a doctor to care for of justice try to explain in what respects equals
some patients but refuse to treat others just be- should be treated equally.
cause he dislikes them. Libertarian theories emphasize personal free-
Questions of justice arise in different spheres doms and the right to pursue one’s own social
of human endeavor. Retributive justice, for ex- and economic well-being in a free market with-
ample, concerns the fair meting out of punish- out interference from others. Ideally the role
ment for wrongdoing. On this matter, some of government is limited to night-watchman
argue that justice is served only when people are functions—​ the protection of society and free
punished for past wrongs, when they get their economic systems from coercion and fraud. All
just deserts. Others insist that justice demands other social or economic benefits are the respon-
that people be punished not because they de- sibility of individuals. Government should not
serve punishment, but because the punishment be in the business of helping the socially or eco-
will deter further unacceptable behavior. Dis- nomically disadvantaged, for that would require
tributive justice concerns the fair distribution violating people’s liberty by taking resources
of society’s advantages and disadvantages—​for from the haves to give to the have-nots. So uni-
example, jobs, income, welfare aid, health care, versal health care is out of the question. For the
rights, taxes, and public service. Distributive jus- libertarian, then, people have equal intrinsic
tice is a major issue in bioethics, where many of worth, but this does not entitle them to an equal
the most intensely debated questions are about distribution of economic advantages. Individu-
who gets health care, what or how much they als are entitled only to what they can acquire
should get, and who should pay for it. through their own hard work and ingenuity.
Distributive justice is a vast topic, and many Egalitarian theories maintain that a just dis-
theories have been proposed to identify and tribution is an equal distribution. Ideally, social

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 Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 13

benefits—​whether jobs, food, health care, or But moral objectivism is directly challenged
some­thing else—​should be allotted so that every- by a doctrine that some find extremely appeal-
one has an equal share. Treating people equally ing and that, if true, would undermine ethics
means making sure everyone has equal access to itself: ethical relativism. According to this view,
certain minimal goods and services. To achieve moral standards are not objective but are rela-
this level of equality, individual liberties will tive to what individuals or cultures believe.
have to be restricted, measures that libertari- There simply are no objective moral truths, only
ans would never countenance. In a pure egali- relative ones. An action is morally right if en-
tarian society, universal health care would be dorsed by a person or culture and morally wrong
guaranteed. if condemned by a person or culture. So eutha-
Between strict libertarian and egalitarian views nasia is right for person A if he approves of it but
of justice lie some theories that try to achieve a wrong for person B if she disapproves of it, and
plausible fusion of both perspectives. With a the same would go for cultures with similarly
nod toward libertarianism, these theories may diverging views on the subject. In this way, moral
exhibit a healthy respect for individual liberty norms are not discovered but made; the indi-
and limit governmental interference in econo­ vidual or culture makes right and wrong. Ethi-
mic enterprises. But leaning toward egalitarian- cal relativism pertaining to individuals is known
ism, they may also mandate that the basic needs as subjective relativism, more precisely stated as
of the least well-off citizens be met. the view that right actions are those sanctioned
In bioethics, the principle of justice and the by a person. Ethical relativism regarding cultures
theories used to explain it are constantly being is called cultural relativism, the view that right
marshaled to support or reject health care poli- actions are those sanctioned by one’s culture.
cies of all kinds. They are frequently used—​along In some ways, subjective relativism is a com-
with other moral principles—​to evaluate, design, forting position. It relieves individuals of the
and challenge a wide range of health care pro- burden of serious critical reasoning about mo-
grams and strategies. They are, in other words, rality. After all, determining right and wrong is
far from being merely academic. a matter of inventorying one’s beliefs, and any
sincerely held beliefs will do. Morality is essen-
tially a matter of personal taste, which is an ex-
ethical relativism
tremely easy thing to establish. Determining
The commonsense view of morality and moral what one’s moral views are may indeed involve
standards is this: There are moral norms or deliberation and analysis—but neither of these
principles that are valid or true for everyone. is a necessary requirement for the job. Subjective
This claim is known as moral objectivism, the relativism also helps people short-circuit the un-
idea that at least some moral standards are ob- pleasantness of moral debate. The subjective
jective. Moral objectivism, however, is distinct relativist’s familiar refrain—“That may be your
from moral absolutism, the belief that objective truth, but it’s not my truth”—has a way of stop-
moral principles allow no exceptions or must be ping conversations and putting an end to rea-
applied the same way in all cases and cultures. A soned arguments.
moral objectivist can be absolutist about moral The doctrine, however, is difficult to maintain
principles, or she can avoid absolutism by ac- consistently. On issues that the relativist cares
cepting that moral principles are prima facie. In little about (the moral rightness of gambling,
any case, most people probably assume some say), she may be content to point out that moral
form of moral objectivism and would not take norms are relative to each individual and that
seriously any claim implying that valid moral “to each his own.” But on more momentous
norms can be whatever we want them to be. topics (such as genocide in Africa or the Middle

vau03268_ch01_001-033.indd 13 05/02/19 07:36 PM

 Another Random Document on
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refused to be its patron and protector. She said that by complaining,
as he did, that he was claimed by the religious party, he caused
much embarrassment to its members. She therefore begged him to
cease attacking them and turning them to ridicule on every occasion,
as he was in the habit of doing. "Ah, Madame!" he replied, "you wish
then that I should leave the public in error, and thus deprive myself
of my only consolation, and my only chance of revenge." She was
furious. The one thing which annoys M. Royer-Collard, (and it
annoys him very much) is Guizot and all his works. This annoyance
is perhaps not altogether unfounded. He has no love for M. de
Broglie whose lofty virtue did not seem to him adequate to the
circumstances which recently arose, and as for Madame de Broglie
he likes her even less, because her piety does not preserve her from
any of the agitations of public life, and is even compatible with
political intrigue. The contrast involved in this is displeasing to him.
Valençay November 7, 1834.—Here is an anecdote which is quite
authentic, having been told me by an eye witness, and which struck
me very much. M. Casimir-Périer, as is well known, died of cholera.
Besides this he was completely out of his mind during the last ten
days of his life; a tendency to insanity had already revealed itself in
several members of his family. Well, several hours before his death
two of his colleagues in the Ministry, with two of his brothers, were
talking in a corner of the room of the embarrassment which the
arrival of Madame la Duchesse de Berry was causing in la Vendée, of
the resulting difficulties for the Government, of what ought to be
done, and of the responsibility involved in doing it, and of the fear
and reluctance every one had in assuming this responsibility. This
conversation was suddenly interrupted by the sick man who sat up
in bed and exclaimed: "Oh if only the President of the Council were
not mad!" Then he fell back on the pillow and was silent. He died
shortly afterwards. Is not this striking, and does it not make one
shudder as one does at King Lear?
Valençay, November 9, 1834.—I went to Châteauvieux yesterday to
see M. Royer-Collard. He had received letters from several of the
Ministers who have resigned. From these he understands that no
sooner were the five resignations sent in than they were politely
accepted. The King sent for M. Molé, and entrusted him with the
Presidency of the Council, and the task of recomposing the whole
Cabinet. M. Molé asked for twenty-four hours to consider matters,
and to see whom he could persuade to act with him. However, as
everybody declined to share the task, he was himself compelled to
withdraw, and so the whole situation has again become vague, and
perhaps impossible.
Almost all the papers have again broken out against M. de
Talleyrand. Some say he is dead, some that he is ill in mind and
body, others insult him grossly and foully. M. Royer-Collard explains
this new access of savagery to the fear that the Presidency of the
Council will be offered to M. de Talleyrand and accepted by him. It
seems that many people, struck by the absence of good men, wish
the King to look to us, and that the terror which this inspires in
certain others envenoms all that they do, or say, or write. It is a
melancholy privilege to be the last resort of some people and the
object of the detestation of others, and that at an age when the
need of rest should be the ruling consideration, and the one aim in
all things should be to make a good end.
Valençay, November 10, 1834.—Here is an extract from a letter from
M. Royer-Collard received yesterday: "I will say in all seriousness to
M. de Talleyrand that, after four years absence, I am not surprised
that he attaches more importance to newspaper articles than they
now possess. He does not know how much the prestige of the press,
like all other kinds of prestige, is worn out. Any one who replied to a
newspaper after the lapse of a day or two, would not be understood;
the occasion would be forgotten. Violent language can no longer
either exalt or abase any one. Amid torrents of praise or abuse one
remains exactly where one was before. It is the characteristic of this
evil age.
"No, nothing is settled at Paris, because nothing that will pass
muster is possible. Here are seen the natural consequences of the
last revolution. M. de Talleyrand was clever enough and fortunate
enough to turn it to his glory, but he could not repeat the miracle.
His last piece of ingenuity must be to choose the right moment for
the end, I had almost said for breaking both with England and
France, as this year has made them. I often come back to the idea
that last year was the time he should have gone and put himself in a
position of safety. It was natural to make the mistake; I made it
myself. You, Madame la Duchesse, alone were right. From this very
arm-chair from which I am writing to you to-day, I was blind enough
to combat you, knowing nothing about it. You alone were in a
position to know and to judge. I was wrong; this is yet another piece
of homage which I am anxious to pay you."
Valençay, November 11, 1834.—Mr. Damer writes from Paris as
follows: "Have you heard a horrible story relating to Madame and
Mlle. de Morell, the sister and the niece of M. Charles de Mornay, of
something which happened at the Military School at Saumur. A
young man of that town called M. de la Roncière, not a particularly
high-minded person, fell in love with Madame de Morell, who may,
or may not, have given him some encouragement. I don't know
exactly whether she did or not, but finally she dismissed him. On this
he vowed vengeance, and transferred his attentions to the daughter,
a young girl of seventeen. He wrote her frequent threatening letters,
saying he would kill her father and mother if she did not listen to
him, and one night she was found in a condition which amounted to
insanity. On hearing of her condition, the young man fled from the
school, but has since been arrested. He then produced letters,
whether genuine or not, which he says were written to him by the
mother and daughter, and which are exceedingly compromising.
They say Charles de Mornay has come to Paris about this affair."[43]
Valençay, November 12, 1834.—A letter written the day before
yesterday from Paris, while the King was signing, in the next room,
the order creating the new Ministry, which was too late to appear in
the morning papers yesterday, arrived in the evening. The names
are unexpected and almost new. If this were the case with all of
them, it might not perhaps much matter, but one name is that of the
Duc de Bassano, who grew grey in the splendours of the Empire,
and who has been blamed for its fall. Another is that of M. Bresson,
who will probably create a sensation and who, in the article of
improbability, would have deserved the celebrated letter on the
marriage of M. de Lauzun. I need not set down what we Londoners
thought who witnessed the birth, ruin, and resuscitation of this
person, all of which took place in such bewilderingly rapid
succession. It is also needless to say that this arrangement of the
Ministry puts an end to all M. de Talleyrand's irresolution, and will
give wings to his resignation of the London Embassy.
Valençay, November 13, 1834.—Here is the impression produced on
M. Royer-Collard by the new phase of the Ministry. "But this is a
Polignac Cabinet! I expected anything rather than this adventure. I
am much surprised that M. Passy, who is a man of parts with a
future before him, should have enrolled himself in that troupe. The
former Cabinet is now thrown into opposition, but whether it attacks
or treacherously supports the new one, it is making a path for itself
back to power. It seems inevitable to me that it will return."
"Adventure" is indeed the right word!
Valençay, November 16, 1834.—We learned by last night's post that
the fancy Ministry had literally lived "ce que vivent les roses, l'espace
d'un matin." The comparison is not outrageous. On the evening of
the 13th, MM. Teste and Passy handed the King their resignations,
which they explained by a reference to the pecuniary position of the
Duc de Bassano. It was inevitable that these resignations should be
followed by others, and, as a matter of fact, M. Charles Dupin came
and offered his the following morning. On this, M. de Bassano
recognised that it was all up.
On the day before yesterday, the 14th, at four in the afternoon,
nothing was arranged, or planned, or hoped. What a cruel and
deplorable situation for the King! If one wanted to put this Ministerial
crisis into a play, it would not be possible to apply the twenty-four
hours rule!
I think the conduct of MM. Teste and Passy was unpardonable. It
appears that it was they who had insisted at first that the Duc de
Bassano should have the Presidency of the Council and the Ministry
of the Interior, and certainly they did not then learn for the first time
of M. de Bassano's financial position, which for two years has been
well known to every one.
Valençay, November 18, 1834.—Here is the most important passage
of a letter written yesterday by M. de Talleyrand to Madame
Adélaïde. "What a relief! I cordially thank Marshal Mortier for having
accepted the Presidency of the Council! I would fain follow his
example and mount the breach once more, but for me England is
out of the question. I should like Vienna doubtless in many ways,
and, besides, it would suit Madame de Dino who, with all her
devotion to me, is very sorry to leave London, where she was so
much appreciated. But at my age one no longer seeks business so
far afield. If it was only a question of a special mission to a
congress, such as those of Verona or Aix-la-Chapelle, I should be
delighted. And if such a case arises, as is by no means improbable,
and the King thinks me still capable of representing France, let him
issue his orders and I will leave instantly, only too happy to devote
my last days to his service. A permanent mission, however, is now
no longer possible for me, and especially not at Vienna where
twenty years ago I represented the Restoration. Has Your Royal
Highness thought of that circumstance, especially with reference to
Charles X. and Madame la Dauphine, who often comes to Vienna,
and who there receives all the honours due to her rank, her
misfortunes and her near relationship to the Imperial family? In
England, the Bourbons of the elder branch are merely private
persons. In Austria they are Princes and almost pretenders. For the
King's ambassador this makes an enormous difference which this or
that person might not perhaps feel, but which is decisive for me,
across whose career 1814 is written in large characters. No,
Madame, there is now no other life for me but that of frank and
complete retirement in privacy and simplicity. Perfidy alone can
accuse me of any arrière pensée; at my age one occupies one's self
only with memories.[44]..."
The Journal des Débats announces M. de Talleyrand's resignation,[45]
and for its own purposes tries to connect it with the Bassano
Ministry. Assuredly, of all explanations this might have been the most
plausible, but it has nothing to do with any of the people whose
names have occupied the attention of the public during the last
fortnight. The event might have been recorded in a more sincere
and dignified way, but party spirit distorts everything for its own
ends. Never mind, we need bother our heads about it no longer!
It is stated that, during the Ministerial crisis, M. de Rigny behaved
with great propriety, firmness and dignity. This was not so with
everybody, and here is a detail the authenticity of which is certain.
At the celebrated Council of ten days ago, when every one threw off
the mask and M. Guizot tried to impose M. de Broglie on the King as
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the King raised his hand and said, "this
hand will never sign a decree recalling M. de Broglie to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs." Then M. Guizot called upon the King to state why
he refused. "Because he nearly embroiled me with all Europe," was
the reply, "and if any attempt is made to force my hand I will speak
out." "And we, Sire," returned M. Guizot, "will write." Has the like
ever been heard of? And after this is it possible that the same
people can again assemble round the same green table to regulate
the destinies of Europe?
Valençay, November 19, 1834.—We heard last night by letter from
London of the great event of the change of Ministry in England and
the return of the Tories to power.[46] This morning did not pass
without a despatch rider from the King, who brought a letter in His
Majesty's own hand and one from Mademoiselle. These letters are
full of caresses, prayers and supplications. My name even, which is
frequently repeated, is invoked. Every kind of pressure is brought to
bear on M. de Talleyrand, to resume his Embassy. The Prince Royal
writes to me in this sense in the most pressing manner, and all the
other letters we received by this post are in this key. Mrs. Dawson
Damer writes that she hopes that the change of Ministry in England
will induce M. de Talleyrand to withdraw his resignation, and that the
Queen of England will never forgive me if it is otherwise. Lady
Clanricarde says that she is all the more afraid that the Tories may
fail in their task, as the result would be that England would again fall
into the clutches of Lord Durham, and that she sees only one
agreeable feature in the situation, which is the practical certainty of
my return to London. This is very gracious but not convincing.
M. de Rigny writes excusing himself for his long silence. He seems to
me much disgusted by the events of the last fortnight, and not very
hopeful about the future of the French Ministry, though M. Humann
has accepted office, and the process of patching-up is complete. He
adds the regulation passage about the impossibility of our not
returning to London, and the King's positive wishes in the matter.
M. Raullin, from his little corner, also thinks it necessary to swell the
chorus. He says that Madame de Broglie's doctrinaires are of the
same opinion, but all this coterie, like the Bourse and the
Boulevards, are very much agitated by the news from England. He
tells me some amusing things about the Duc de Bassano and M.
Humann. The courier sent after the latter found him at Bar, and he
said he would not answer till he got to Strasbourg. I like this Alsatian
phlegm.
It is also said that Admiral Duperré is very coy about accepting the
Ministry of Marine. Till yesterday morning there were ministers only
in petto. M. de Bassano was imperturbably signing things and
working with great ardour at the Ministry of the Interior.
M. de Talleyrand has also received a great many letters. M. Pasquier,
in reply to a letter of excuses for not being able to be present at the
case,[47] insinuates a phrase about the immense services he is still
called upon to render. Madame de Jaucourt writes a few lines, at the
dictation of M. de Rigny saying, "Come, we can't do without you,
and save us." Finally M. de Montrond, who has said nothing for a
long time, writes that the news from England has fallen on every
one like a flood of boiling-water. Every one is distracted, and Lord
Granville takes the change in his country much amiss. He also says
he is commanded by the King to make us understand the necessity
of our return to England, and that MM. Thiers and de Rigny look
upon it as their one hope of salvation.
Valençay, November 24, 1834.—M. de Talleyrand fortunately refuses
to withdraw his resignation, but such is the singular prestige which
he enjoys that stocks go up and down at Paris according to the
greater or less probability of his departure for London. Letters from
all parts call on him to come to the rescue, and any number of
people whom we do not even know by name, write to beg him not
to abandon France. The reason is twofold. The French public will
never regard the Duke of Wellington as anything else but an ogre, or
M. de Talleyrand as anything but a person whom the Devil will carry
off some day, but who in the meantime, owing to an unholy bargain
with the Prince of Darkness, has the power of bewitching the
Universe. How idiotic it all is! The public is so credulous in its beliefs,
so cruel in its revenge and its injustice!
Valençay, November 27, 1834.—A letter from the King came
yesterday, in reply to that in which M. de Talleyrand persisted in his
resignation, and among other things contained the following: "My
dear Prince, I have never seen anything more perfect, more
honourable, or better expressed than the letter which I have just
received from you. It has deeply touched me. No doubt it costs me
much to recognise the justice of most of the reasons which make
you refuse to return to London, but I am too sincere, and too much
the friend of my friends not to say that you are right."[48]
This exordium is followed by a new invitation to come to Paris with
all speed to talk over everything. M. Bresson writes to M. de
Talleyrand a very witty and clever letter, in which he begs him to be
so kind as to write him all the witticisms with which his sudden
apotheosis will no doubt have inspired him. He is anxious not to miss
a single one.
M. de Montrond writes that the King says there can be nothing finer
than M. de Talleyrand's letter, and that his reasoning is conclusive.
For the rest, they are in great embarrassment, and look back to
Marshal Soult with regret, and are even seeking to get him back. A
new ignominy for our little Ministers! It appears that the Army is in a
state of disorganisation.
The Poles who came here for the funeral of the Princess Tyszkiewicz
are saying kind things about us, it appears, in Paris. Valençay is
approved of only by the Prince Royal, being opposed by the Flahaut
influence. M. de Montrond is furious at the kind things which are
being said about Valençay, which he has always treated with ridicule.
Valençay, December 1, 1834.—When I was passing through Paris
three months ago I saw M. Daure who, in very bad company, was
writing in the Constitutionnel, and seemed to me to be in very poor
circumstances. I offered him my interest with M. Guizot to get him
employment in the researches into the ancient manuscripts and
charters of the South, with which the Ministry of Public Instruction is
occupied. I went so far as to make an application on his behalf,
which was well received. I left for Valençay and heard no more of M.
Daure, nor of his application, till a fortnight ago, when I heard from
M. Guizot that Daure had been nominated to the place for which I
had applied. I at once wrote to Daure, forwarding the Minister's
letter, but, not knowing his address, made inquiries at Paris which
remained without result, and my letter was awaiting some light on
the whereabouts of the poor man, when yesterday evening I
received two letters with the Montauban postmark; one in Daure's
handwriting, the other in a handwriting unknown to me, which I
opened first. It was from an abbé, a friend of Daure, who in
accordance with his last wishes, informs me of his death—and what
a death! He has committed suicide! Daure's own letter, written
shortly before his mad act, touched me deeply, and I will even say,
made me very proud. He refers to the people whom he liked in
London. I blame myself very much for not asking him to come here
this year; it would probably have turned him aside from this dreadful
end.
It recurred to my mind last night that last autumn, at Rochecotte,
while walking alone with him on the way to visit my schools I spoke
to him of his future, and lectured him about his carelessness and
extravagance. He replied with much gratitude, and begging me not
to be at all anxious about him as he had a resource in reserve of
which he could not speak to any one, which he had prepared long
since, and which he would have if everything else failed. He was not,
he said, so improvident as he seemed, and was as free as possible
from anxiety about the future. I thought he meant that he had saved
a little money—fool that I was! He killed himself at the very moment
that we were burying poor Princess Tyszkiewicz here. What a sad
November it has been!
Here is a little piece of politics taken from one of yesterday's letters.
"The position of the French Ministers will be decided in a week. They
intend to seize the first opportunity (which will not be long in
coming) to speak frankly of all they have done and all that has
happened, so as to make their position tolerable, or else to go out.
They have had their fill of degradation and do not wish to remain in
power any longer on the present conditions. They must see what the
Chamber means to do and what its attitude will be. There was some
talk of a speech from the Throne but they decided that this would
not do, and I think they were right."
Valençay, December 2, 1834.—I am on the eve of a new trouble—
the probable death of the Duke of Gloucester, which will be a real
sorrow. How should I not mourn one whose esteem, confidence and
friendship were so sincere and so thoroughly tried?
I hear from Paris that the new Ambassador in London will not be
appointed till Sir Robert Peel has constituted his Government. Sir
Robert, it is thought, was to pass through Paris yesterday. Another
reason for not making the appointment for a week or ten days is
that no one would dream of accepting it till there is some light on
the fate of the French Ministry which is most uncertain. The
slackness of Deputies in attending the Chamber is attracting
attention as a symptom of their disinclination to interest themselves
in the quarrels of the Ministers. These quarrels are subterranean but
very real. There is always the same revolt against the arrogant
pedantry of some and the tangled intrigues of others; it is only their
fear of the Chamber which keeps them together at all.
They say the King is much depressed, and perhaps his Cabinet owe
their remaining in office to the fact that he is as much afraid of the
Chamber as they are. I hear that there is much ridicule of a letter
from M. Bresson in reply to a remark of the Quotidienne. "M.
Bresson," writes a friend, "has been giving us his genealogy and has
been telling us that he has been an important person from the day
when he handed the despatches to 'the unfortunate and too much
misunderstood Bolivar,' to that on which he nearly became Minister
of Foreign Affairs! We are very fortunate to be represented at Berlin
by so considerable a personage! Can you understand this mania for
writing to the newspapers? And can you wonder that the importance
of the press is so great?"
M. de Talleyrand is quite furious because diplomatic communications
are being bandied about at the Bourse and the Opera. This as well
as many other things makes it impossible to serve some people.
Paris, December 7, 1834.—Here we are back in Paris, whose
exhausting and unquiet life is so bad both for M. de Talleyrand and
for me. Yesterday we were already overwhelmed with visits and
social duties.
At twelve I received M. Royer-Collard who, on his way to the
Chamber, called to ask for me. He only came in and went out again,
and the real object of his visit was, I think, to discharge a
commission for M. Molé. The latter asked him to tell me that he
wished to come to our house again, but on the first occasion to
come to see only me and to see me alone. This meeting is fixed for
tomorrow, Monday, between four and five.
M. Royer-Collard gone, M. le Duc d'Orléans arrived, and hardly had
he sat down when he began to discuss a piece of Madame de
Flahaut's gossip. It all passed off with great good temper and good
manners, but I don't think I surrendered any of my advantages. I
was quiet and restrained, without the slightest trace of animosity.
This was my chief position: "Madame de Flahaut's remarks about me
do not affect me. I pay no attention to them. It is impossible that
two people whose circles, habits and positions are so different as
ours, could ever come to quarrelling, or that I could be offended by
her. What offends me is the harm she is doing you,
Monseigneur."—"But my principal reason for liking her is that nobody
else does."—"Oh, if you reckon it proportionately on that principle
your Royal Highness must simply adore her!" We burst out laughing
and the matter rested there.
He spoke of another subject, namely, how wrong it was of him not
to write to us for so long after his visit to Valençay. I replied,
"Monseigneur, in view of the great age of M. de Talleyrand it was not
very good manners on your part, but you have a frank and graceful
way of doing things which makes one charmed to forgive you."
He then came to general questions. He is much embarrassed and
troubled by his present situation, annoyed with his dear friend Dupin
for the curious way in which he treated the Monarchy last night, and
astonished at Lord Brougham, of whom he tells the following story.
On the day of Lord Brougham's arrival in Paris, M. le Duc d'Orléans
met him at Lord Granville's. Unsuitable as the place was, in my
opinion, for such a topic, the conversation turned on the Amnesty of
which the ex-Chancellor declared himself a violent partisan. The Duc
d'Orléans disputed this view but without apparently convincing him.
The following day at the Tuileries Lord Brougham drew a paper from
his pocket and, showing a corner of it to the Prince Royal, said,
"Here are my reflections on the Amnesty which I am going to show
to the King." This of course was another piece of ill-breeding on the
part of a foreigner, but he did in fact hand the paper to His Majesty.
It was found to be a violent argument against the Amnesty! When
mobility reaches a certain point it is, I think, an evident symptom of
insanity!
M. le Duc d'Orléans concluded his visit by trying to make me feel
that M. de Talleyrand was under an imperative obligation to attach
himself in a public manner to the Government. I replied by a
reference to the state of his legs. We parted on the best of terms.
When I came down again I found the Entresol crowded. There was
Frederick Lamb, Pozzo, Mollien, Bertin de Veaux, and General
Baudrand. In spite of the great variety of opinions represented they
talked as freely of everything as if they had been in the street. The
most animated was Pozzo, who poured scorn inconceivable on the
French Ministry, pitying the King and speaking very well of him,
bemoaning the embarrassment of his Ambassadors in foreign
countries which is caused by what is going on here, and much
annoyed by certain passages in a speech delivered last night by M.
Thiers.
Later on we dined with Count Mollien, where there were M. Pasquier,
Baron Louis, Bertin de Veaux and M. de Rigny, who came late and
brought news of the vote of the Chamber, which is favourable if you
like, but which will cost the Ministry dear, and from which, as M. de
Rigny at least has the sense to see, nothing can be predicted as to
the course of the Session.
It appears that after a speech by M. Sauzet, which is said to have
been admirable, the House wavered and the Ministry gave
themselves up for lost. M. Thiers feared to put it to the touch, but
finally did so almost in despair. He spoke, it is said, miraculously, and
sent everybody on the other tack. His speech the night before had
been a fiasco, and the English were furious with him on account of
his strange, and, indeed, inexcusable phrase about England.
Yesterday, however, he seems to have triumphed completely.
Here is a curious fact of which I am quite certain. M. Dupin had
promised the King three days ago to support the order of the day.
The day before yesterday he voted against it; yesterday again he
spoke against it but voted for it. Why? Because after M. Sauzet's
speech the Ministers thought they were lost, and said to M. Dupin:
"M. le Président, prepare yourself to go to the King and have your
Cabinet ready, for, in an hour from now, we shall have resigned." M.
Dupin, much upset, said: "but I didn't think that all this would be so
serious; I have no wish to see you fall, for I do not at all desire that
the burden should again fall on my shoulders." With these words he
tried to escape and leave the Vice-President in his place, when
Thiers taking him by the arm said: "No, M. le Président, you shall not
go till the question is settled; if it goes against us you will go
nowhere else but to the King where you will be condemned to be
Minister."
This, no doubt, is very interesting, but what an atmosphere! What
people!
Paris, December 8, 1834.—Yesterday, when I got back at four, I was
astonished to see the Duc d'Orléans, whom I supposed to be already
on his way to Brussels. He was not to leave, however, for another
hour, and he came to tell me that Sir Robert Peel had passed
through Paris, and had sent his brother to him (the Duc d'Orléans)
as an intimate friend, to beg him to make his excuses to the King for
not requesting the honour of an audience. His Majesty would,
however, easily understand that in the circumstances hours were
centuries. We drew two conclusions from this: first, that Sir Robert
Peel had decided to accept the Premiership, for an ordinary private
individual would not have considered himself of sufficient importance
to send such a message; secondly, that the courtesy of his language
proved a feeling rather friendly to France than the reverse.
Speaking of Sir Robert Peel, I had a letter from him yesterday,
written from Rome, about the Bassano Ministry, very civil and kind in
its terms, in which he says that what alarms him most in this
combination is that it may prevent M. de Talleyrand from returning
to London.
Paris, December 9, 1834.—Frederick Lamb, who came to see me
yesterday morning, told me several curious things. He gave me a
worse idea than ever of Lord Palmerston; incredible details, for
instance, on his conduct with regard to the Eastern Question, and
many other matters of which in London we could only form a
superficial opinion. He told me that at the time of the quarrel
between England and Russia about Sir Stratford Canning, Madame
de Lieven had wanted the matter to be arranged so that Frederick
Lamb should go to St. Petersburg and Sir Stratford Canning to
Vienna. This was proposed to Prince Metternich, who replied: "This
arrangement will arrange nothing, for the one ambassador whom we
will never agree to accept is Sir Stratford Canning."
He told me also that M. de Metternich said of Lord Palmerston: "He
is a tyrant, and the age of tyrants is over."
Frederick Lamb detests Lord Granville, but he does not believe that
the Tory Cabinet will succeed, though he does not think that the
Radicals will necessarily be their successors. He thinks Lord Grey will
come back, and is looking for means to extrude Lord Palmerston and
Lord Holland. Like Pozzo and M. Molé, he says extraordinary things
of M. de Broglie. If we may believe them, no one ever made such
blunders.
When I got back yesterday, at four, I received M. Molé. It all passed
off as if we had parted only yesterday. He spoke to me, as he used
to do, of himself, his affections, friends, attitude of mind—all with
the charm which is peculiar to him. He told me that I was much
more amiable even than I was four years ago, and he stayed nearly
an hour. I have always thought that nobody's conversation is so
good, so rapid, or so agreeable as his. He is in very good taste in an
age in which good taste is unknown. Perhaps he is not high-souled
enough to rule, but he is high-minded enough to refuse to be
degraded, and that is already much.
Many names, many facts and deeds, were passed in review during
that hour, and I was much pleased with the natural manner in which
he approached every topic. He told me that my mind was so just
that even those who feared my enmity were reassured; and, in fact,
all went off excellently. I am not sure that this will be so between M.
de Talleyrand and him. I have undertaken to arrange a meeting, and
both parties have begged me to be present at this first interview,
which is rather amusing.
M. Molé told me that he yesterday refused an invitation to dine with
M. Dupin on the ground that the latter had given a distorted version
in the tribune of the purely unofficial relations between them a
fortnight ago. M. Molé added that he had no thoughts of the English
Embassy—as some people were saying—for he did not wish to
accept anything from the present Ministry.
He never sees the Duc de Broglie at all now. He thinks Rayneval is
the only possible Ambassador for London just now, and intends to
speak about it to the King, with whom he says he is on very good
terms. He is scarcely on bowing terms with Guizot, and his relations
with Thiers are very cold.
Paris, December 10, 1834.—Yesterday evening M. de Talleyrand was
overwhelmed with a procession of visitors. A great many things were
said, of which the following seemed to me the best.
They come from Frederick Lamb, who came first, and with whom we
were for some time alone. He talked a great deal of M. de
Metternich and of his remark made four months ago about King
Louis-Philippe: "I thought he was an intriguer, but now I see quite
well he is a King." He also told us that on the day of the fall of the
last English Ministry Lord Palmerston sent the news to the British
chargé d'affaires at Vienna, and asked him to acquaint M. de
Metternich, adding: "You will never be in a position to make to M. de
Metternich a communication which will give him more pleasure." The
chargé d'affaires took the despatch to the Prince, and for some
unknown reason read the whole of it to him, including even this last
phrase. M. de Metternich made the following reply, which, I think, is
in very good taste: "Here is another proof of Lord Palmerston's
ignorance of men and things. I cannot be pleased at an event the
consequences of which I cannot yet measure. Tell him that I receive
the news not with joy but with hope."
Paris, December 12, 1834.—I dined yesterday at the Tuileries;
besides M. de Talleyrand, there were the Molliens, the Valençays,
and Baron de Montmorency. I sat between the King and the Duc de
Nemours; the last-named has conquered his shyness a little, but he
is still very timid. He is as white and blonde and pink and slim and
transparent as a young girl, and not pretty in my opinion.
No conversation could be more interesting than the King's, especially
when, deserting politics, he plunges into the innumerable memories
of his extraordinary life. I was struck by two anecdotes which he told
extremely well, and though I fear I may spoil them in the repetition,
I will put them down. There was in the room a portrait of M. de
Biron, Duc de Lauzun, which the King has just had copied from one
lent him by M. de Talleyrand. This naturally led the talk to the
original of the portrait, and the King told how, when he came back
to Paris in 1814, he saw at his first reception an old man, who
approached him and asked for a few minutes private conversation
away from the crowd. The King placed himself in the embrasure of a
window, and then the unknown drew from his pocket a ring
mounted with the portrait of the Duc d'Orléans, the King's father,
and said: "When the Duc de Lauzun was condemned to death I was
at the Revolutionary Tribunal, and as he was going out M. de Biron,
whom I had met several times, stopped before me, and said:
'Monsieur, take this ring and promise me that if ever occasion offers
you will give it to the children of M. le Duc d'Orléans, assuring them
that I die a faithful friend of their father and a devoted servant of
their House.'" The King was naturally touched by the scrupulous
fidelity with which after so many years the commission had been
discharged, and asked the unknown his name. The latter refused,
however, saying: "My name will not interest you, and might even
awake painful memories. I have carried out the promise I made to a
man about to die. You will never see or hear of me again;" and, in
fact, he never reappeared.
This is the second anecdote. When the present King was still in
England with Louis XVIII. and the Comte d'Artois, the last-named
insisted absolutely on his cousin wearing the uniform of the French
emigrés, and especially the white cockade. This the Duc d'Orléans
persistently refused, and said he would never do. He appeared
always in civil dress, which gave rise to many bitter discussions. In
1814, the Duc d'Orléans, following the whole of France, adopted the
white cockade, and the Comte d'Artois took the uniform of Colonel-
General of the National Guard. The first day on which the Duc
d'Orléans appeared at the Comte d'Artois', the latter said to him,
"Give me your hat." He took it, turned it over, and, playing with the
white cockade, said: "Ah, ah! my dear cousin, what is this cockade?
I thought you were never going to wear it?" "I thought so too,
Monsieur; and I thought also that you were never destined to wear
the coat I see you in to-day. I am very sorry you have not adopted
the cockade, which suits it best." "My dear fellow," replied Monsieur,
"do not deceive yourself. A coat matters nothing. You may take it or
leave it; it is all the same. But a cockade is a different thing; it is a
party symbol, a rallying point; and the symbol which you adopt must
never be withdrawn." What I liked in the King, as he was pleased to
recount this scene, was that he hastened to add: "Well, Madame,
Charles X. was right, and what he said was cleverer than might have
been expected." "What the King says is true," I replied. "Charles X.'s
explanation was that of a man of honour and a gentleman, and it is
certain that in him there was much of both." "Assuredly there was,"
added the King; "and besides that he has a very good heart." I was
very much pleased to see justice done to him in that quarter.
At nine I went with Madame Mollien to the Comtesse de Boigne's.
She had been to see me first, and had caused me to be told at
Madame Mollien's that she would be much flattered if I would come
and see her sometimes in the evening. Hers is the leading salon at
present; the one good house which belongs, I will not say to the
Court, but to the Ministry, as that of Madame de Flahaut belongs to
the Duc d'Orléans, and that of Madame de Massa to the Court
proper. There is no fourth. At Madame de Boigne's there is a
reception every evening; politics is the leading subject, and they talk
of nothing else. The conversation seemed to me strained and rather
embarrassing owing to the direct questions which the speakers
rather indiscreetly hurled at each other. "Will the Duke of Wellington
be able to go on?"—"Do you think that Mr. Stanley will join Sir
Robert Peel?"—"Do you believe that a reconciliation between Lord
Grey and Lord Brougham is possible?" These are specimens of the
interrogations with which I was naïvely assailed. I escaped by
pleading absolute ignorance, concluding with a laugh by saying that
I did not expect to have to solve questions of conscience on a festive
occasion. The matter ended there, but I got a disagreeable
impression in spite of the excessive graciousness of our hostess, and
I was glad to get away.
Paris, December 14, 1834.—Lady Clanricarde came to breakfast
yesterday, and at half-past eleven we left for the Académie
française. M. Thiers, who was being received, had secured the best
places for us, which I was grateful to observe were far from those
occupied by his family, who were with the Duchesse de Massa in an
elevated gallery. In our neighbourhood there were only Madame de
Boigne, M. and Madame de Rambuteau, Marshal Gérard, M. Molé, M.
de Celles, and Madame de Castellane. The last-named has got
stouter, heavier, and thicker, but she retains her pleasant face, the
mobility of whose lower parts is so attractive. She seemed so
delighted, so moved, and so touched on seeing me (I used to be
intimate with her and knew all about her affairs, so much that the
imprudence of her subsequent quarrel with me was incredible) that I
was quite touched too, and we shook hands. She said, "May I come
and see you again?" and I answered, "Yes, with all my heart."
Here is the story. When the Tuileries were against me under the
Restoration, Madame de Castellane turned against me, and, without
thinking of the injury it was in my power to inflict on her, she broke
with me. I was deeply hurt, because I was very fond of her; but to
revenge myself would have been mean, and, in spite of all my faults,
I am incapable of doing anything so low as that would have been. I
think that at the bottom of her heart she was grateful to me for
having spared her.
M. de Talleyrand, as a member of the Institute, came into the hall
leaning on the arm of M. de Valençay. The effect of his entry was
unbelievable. Every one rose with one accord in the galleries, as well
as on the floor of the house, and this, no doubt, with a certain
stirring of curiosity, but also with an impulse of respect, of which he
was deeply sensible. I know that in spite of the crowd which
obstructed the approaches every one made way for him.
The sitting began at one. M. Thiers is so small that he entered
without being seen, being surrounded by Villemain, Cousin, and
some others. No one noticed him till he stood up alone to begin his
speech. He spoke with the best possible accent, and pronounced
everything distinctly. His voice was sustained, and his gestures rare.
He was not over voluble, and for the first few moments he was as
pale as death and trembling from head to foot. This made a much
better impression than if he had displayed the insolence with which
he is often reproached. In spite of the disagreeable tone of his voice,
he never offended the ear; he was neither monotonous nor shrill;
and, in fact, Lady Clanricarde went so far as to think him splendid!
M. de Talleyrand and M. Royer-Collard were opposite to him, and he
seemed to speak only for them. His discourse was brilliant. I do not
know whether it was precisely academic, though it was full of wit, of
good taste, and fine language in certain places, but there is no
doubt that it was political, and he spoke it much more as if it was an
improvisation than as if it was a lecture. Certain of his movements,
too, recalled the tribune, and on the audience the effect produced
was much more parliamentary than literary, but always favourable
and sometimes even enthusiastic. M. de Talleyrand was quite
moved, and M. Royer-Collard moved his wig up and down in a way
that signified the most lively approbation! The passage on calumny
was spoken with a conviction and an intimacy which was contagious,
and was received with a salvo of applause.
The discourse is in the highest degree anti-revolutionary. He is
orthodox in his literary principles, he is—and this is what I like in him
above all—he is penetrated through and through with a sentiment of
honesty which greatly pleased me, and which should be useful to M.
Thiers throughout the remainder of his career. This fine speech did
not require the tedious reply of M. Viennet to bring out its
excellence; no one listened to him, and he only succeeded in
drawing attention to the fact that the hour was very late and that it
was dreadfully hot.
It is said that during M. Thiers' speech M. de Broglie was making
merry jests. M. Guizot was cross, and not very well satisfied, I think,
to see his rival make a double success—political and literary—in the
same week.
Paris, December 16, 1834.—Yesterday I paid several calls, and found
Madame de Castellane in. She had missed me when she came to see
me. She insisted on my hearing her history during the past twelve
years; and she tells it so well that I thought she must have had
some practice in pouring it into the ears of others than myself in
these cooing tones. She has lost all her youth, and is a large, short,
squat person. Except for her smile, she is no longer the same person
that I once knew—physically, that is. Morally, I thought she had
made up her mind to be grave, rather than that she had become
serious. She is witty and caressing as ever, and she talked a great
deal; I very little. My heart was full of many old memories; and
though she was kind I could not recover my old confidence in her.
However, I received all she said well, and I am not sorry to be on
good terms with her again.
Paris, December 17, 1834.—Yesterday I allowed myself to be
persuaded to go with her to the Court of Peers. We sat, not in a
conspicuous box, but in that of the Duchesse Decazes, which is in a
retired position, and from which one can see and hear without being
seen. I had never been there, the sittings not having been public till
1830. The proceedings of yesterday had been very much advertised
and excited general curiosity, so the House was full.
Whenever one comes to Paris one is always sure of finding some
scandalous drama in progress for the amusement of the public.
Yesterday it was the case against Armand Carrel of the National.
M. Carrel did not at all correspond to my expectations. No doubt he
was impertinent, but not with that kind of bold and energetic
insolence, that verve and talent which impress you even while you
are offended with the man himself. The effect of the speech he had
written was very feeble, and he made an impression which was
positively painful when he tried to speak extempore. It was General
Exelmans who vociferated about the assassination of Marshal Ney,
and scandalised every one. His manner was that of a drunken man,
and was all the more ridiculous as no one could help remembering
the platitudes he used to utter during the Restoration; which, I
understand, were very cruelly cast up against him last night at the
Minister of Marine's party. In the morning in the House of Peers he
was supported only by M. de Flahaut, who was in a great state of
excitement, and whose behaviour was most improper.
He disgusted everybody by his cries of "Go on! Go on!" addressed to
Carrel when the President wished to bring him to an end. It was this
encouragement which made Carrel resist M. Pasquier and argue that
he had no right to stop him when a member of the Chamber and, in
fact, one of his judges, pressed him to continue.
On this occasion I learned from every one that M. de Flahaut was
universally detested for his arrogance, ill-temper, acrimony, and
ignorance. He will soon become as unpopular as his wife.
M. Pasquier presided with firmness, moderation, dignity, and
coolness. I confess, however, that I agree with those who would
have preferred him to stop M. Carrel when he spoke of "the young
men who had fought gloriously in the troubles of last April," and not
when he referred to the case of Marshal Ney. The first question dealt
with—material interests—would have found more sympathy both
inside and outside the House.
We had a dinner yesterday—a dozen people, my daughter Pauline
being the twelfth. It is not a bad thing that she should learn to listen
to serious conversation without being bored. She has a good manner
in society, where her open countenance and kindly manners seem to
please. After dinner people came to pay visits just as if we were
Ministers. The fact is that it was Thursday, the reception day at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Marine, and I suppose
that people took us on the way going or coming.
Paris, December 19, 1834.—M. le Duc d'Orléans is returned from
Brussels; he came to see me yesterday, and invited me to a ball he
is giving on the 29th. He stayed only a moment, when he was sent
for by the King; the reason for which I learned later.
M. Guizot was the next visitor. He seemed less at his ease than
usual, and tried to compose himself by prosing about England,
France, and all sorts of things, but he must have found me a very
unworthy listener. As a matter of fact, I listened without enthusiasm,
for he was extremely tedious, and soon departed.
Madame de Castellane then came, quite out of breath, from M.
Molé, in order that I might warn M. de Talleyrand of what was going
on. M. le Duc d'Orléans, carried away by the deplorable Flahaut
influence, proposed at the opening of the sitting of the House of
Peers to-day and the reading of the minutes of last meeting, to
protest along with his group against the assassination of Marshal
Ney, and to demand the revision of the case. Fortunately, M.
Decazes was warned, and went and told M. Pasquier. He rushed to
M. Molé, who is one of the twenty-three survivors of the peers who
tried the Marshal. There was a great and well-justified tumult in the
camp. They went to Thiers, who hastened to the King, who knew
nothing of the affair, and was very angry. He sent after his son
everywhere, and after a very lively scene he forbade him to do
anything. His great argument was as follows: "If you demand that
Marshal Ney's case shall be re-opened, what will you say to any
Carlist peer who comes (as some one very well may) and asks that
the verdict against Louis XVI.—which was assassination if you like!—
shall be reversed?" I heard the last part of the affair from M. Thiers,
who came to see M. de Talleyrand quite at the end of the morning.
Bertin de Veaux, who had got wind of the thing, also arrived quite
out of breath.
Finally, the King's good sense prevailed and put a stop to this nice
business. But that it should ever have entered any one's head to
propose such a thing is one of the extraordinary features of this age!
Paris, December 20, 1834.—Yesterday I got a letter from London,
dated the 18th, and took it at once to M. de Talleyrand. I read him a
passage about the terror caused by the suggestion that M. de
Broglie might be sent as Ambassador to England, and the necessity
of nominating M. de Talleyrand's successor. He quite saw the point,
and at once wrote that he wished to see the King. At this very
moment M. de Rigny arrived, bringing him another private letter to
see. M. de Talleyrand has been urging the choice of Rayneval, which,
I think, has not pleased M. de Rigny, if I may judge by what he said
to me at dinner: "There is a very strong reason for not sending M.
de Rayneval to London, but that is the secret of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs; if it was the Admiral's secret I would tell you." I did
not insist.
I know that at five o'clock it was arranged with the King that Rigny
should write a letter, confidential but producible, to London, in which
he should say that the King would choose Molé, Sainte-Aulaire, or
Rayneval, and that they would be glad to know which of the three
would be most agreeable to the Duke of Wellington. I went so far as
to say to M. de Talleyrand that this seemed to me a very maladroit
proceeding, as if the Duke chooses Rayneval it will be very difficult
not to appoint him, and if he wants Molé, Molé will refuse, and they
will, in fact, have to take Sainte-Aulaire, who is not wanted either by
the King or by the Council, or by the Duke. How badly everything is
directed and managed here! There is no common sense or simplicity,
or elevation of mind anywhere, and yet they pretend to govern not
only thirty-two millions of subjects, but also all Europe!
Paris, December 21, 1834.—I heard the following facts on excellent
authority: (1) They don't want to send Rayneval to London as
ambassador; (2) it is Broglie's doctrinaire group who are opposing it;
(3) London was yesterday offered formally and officially to Molé,
who formally and officially declined it; (4) this morning they had got
to Sébastiani but nothing was settled.
Paris, December 24, 1834.—Sébastiani was being talked of yesterday
as if his appointment would be in the Moniteur of to-morrow, but the
more public his name is made the greater clamour it excites. M. de
Rigny is dying to resign his Ministry and ask for the London Embassy,
but they are afraid that the machine might go to pieces under the
difficulties caused by the resignation of an important member of the
Cabinet. It seems that it is the condition of Rayneval's financial
affairs which prevents his being appointed. He is said to be over
head and ears in debt and almost bankrupt.
Paris, December 28, 1834.—I heard through M. Molé that M. de
Broglie had an astonishing influence on the present Ministry, which
was unsuspected by the King, that M. Decazes used to go every
morning and tell him all that went on; that M. de Rigny and M.
Guizot allowed themselves to be much influenced by him, and that
no choice was made without being previously submitted to him.
Will it be believed that in the Journal des Débats they translate all Sir
Robert Peel's speech and leave out—what? The complimentary
passage about the Duke of Wellington which certainly contained
nothing offensive to France. And this when the Duke is Foreign
Secretary, and is extremely well disposed to France, and when the
Débats is reputed the semi-official organ of the Government. Truly
people here are extraordinarily maladroit in spite of the French wit!
Paris, December 29, 1834.—Poor little Madame de Chalais died last
night. She was such a happy person; with that good and regular
happiness which it is given only to some women to experience. Life
forsakes those who are weary of their pilgrimage all too slowly; it
always goes too quickly from those who are enjoying the journey. In
whatever way one importunes Providence, whether one fatigues
one's self with prayers or allows one's wishes to be divined in
discreet silence, the answer is almost always no, and the sentence
usually irrevocable.
What grief at Saint-Aignan! There she was the darling of all the
inhabitants. I seem to hear the cries of all these old servants whom I
know and for whom she represented the third generation they had
served. The poor, the sick, the well-to-do—all idolised her. She was
so helpful, so kindly, and so gracious! It is more than a death; it is
the destruction of a young happiness and of an ancient and
illustrious race. I am profoundly shaken by it.
Paris, December 31, 1834.—Yesterday morning I had a good long
visit from M. Royer-Collard. He told me the whole history of his
professorship, and gave me a glimpse of his system of philosophy;
then he talked a great deal about Port Royal. The hours he gives me
are really precious, but too rare and too short for all that there is to
learn from a mind like his.
Madame de Castellane came afterwards; if I were to allow it for an
instant she would constitute herself my sick nurse! She told me that
M. Molé was writing his Memoirs, and that there were already five
volumes.
Then came M. le Duc d'Orléans; he told me a great deal about his
Ball of the night before, of which the following, among the rest,
remains with me. The greatest elegance was blended with the
utmost originality. The company was brilliant, the supper superb;
there were flowers, artistically grouped statues, lights enough to
blind you, white and gold everywhere, new liveries, grooms-of-the-
chambers in full dress with swords by their sides, clad in velvet and
powdered. The women were covered with diamonds; the Queen was
charmed and Madame Adélaïde jealous, saying, "This is pure Louis
Quinze." All the men were in uniform, but in boots and trousers,
while M. le Duc de Nemours, who wore the coat of a general officer
covered with gold lace, and came in short breeches, stockings, and
shoes, was voted by every one extremely distinguished and good-
looking. M. le Duc d'Orléans asked me whether I did not prefer
boots and trousers for a soldier, and I replied, "The Emperor
Napoleon, who gained a few battles, when he dined alone with the
Empress wore silk stockings and buckled shoes every
evening."—"Really?"—"Yes, Monseigneur."—"Ah, that is different."
Here is the reverse of the medal. The Deputies invited (invited I
mean as Deputies only, for there were others who were asked as
Ministers and Generals), of whom there were only: MM. Odillon
Barrot, Bignon, and Etienne, came in ordinary evening dress in order
to be more conspicuous.
The Prince Royal is full of singular contrasts. There are, for instance,
his aristocratic tastes and pretensions, and his detestable politics.
Yesterday we had a crow to pluck for the first time on the subject of
the Duke of Wellington. "How like the King you are," said the Prince.
"My father knows you are always talking to me on his side, and so
he likes you very much."—"Monseigneur, I never talk except on my
own side and on the side of your interests: but all the same I am
very proud of the approbation of the King." It all ended very kindly,
for he asked leave to add his portrait to those which I have collected
at Rochecotte.
Here, then, I end this year 1834, memorable in my life because it
closes the English period. The four years which I have just passed in
that country have placed me in a new frame, given me a new point
of departure, and directed me towards a new series of ideas. They
have modified the view taken of me by the world. What I owe to
England will, I hope, never leave me, and will remain with me till the
end of my life. Now let us lay up a provision of strength for the evil
days, which probably will not fail to come, and for which it is well to
be prepared.
 CHAPTER V
1835

Paris, January 3, 1835.—I yesterday received the Duc de Noailles,

who had written me a charming letter to ask leave to call. He came
to talk to me about his wife's niece, Madame de Chalais, whom he
loved as his own child and whom he knew I deeply regretted. We
mourned together; then he spoke a little of politics with good sense
and good taste, a little of society, and much of Maintenon. He stayed
a long time and seemed at his ease and very happy. He expressed
the desire to see me often and to become a little intimate with us.
He is one of the men whom M. Royer-Collard esteems, is very ugly,
and older in appearance than in reality. He is studious, and his
manners are excellent and very distinguished. I saw a great deal of
his wife when she was Mlle. Alicia de Mortemart, and was living with
her sister the Duchesse de Beauvilliers, with whom she went to
Saint-Aignan. We are, moreover, nearly related to the Mortemarts.
The old Princesse de Chalais, who brought up M. de Talleyrand, was
a Mortemart, and the daughter of M. de Vivonne, the brother of
Madame de Montespan.
Yesterday I was at the great evening reception at the Tuileries, the
Queen having sent word to me by Madame Mollien that I might
come and go by the private apartments, and so not have to wait for
my carriage. It was the last Court of the season, and I took my
daughter-in-law, Madame de Valençay. The palace, when lit up, is
really superb, and many things look very well—in contrast to many
others. This applies to the black coats scattered here and there
among the uniforms, the elaborate dresses of some women, and the
bourgeois caps of others. There was nothing like disorder, but there
was no distinction of rooms or places. There is no procession; the
Court makes its entry when all the company is assembled and makes
a tour of the ladies, after which the men present file past by
themselves. A little man in uniform precedes their Majesties and asks
each lady her name, a proceeding which in the case of three
quarters of them seems absolutely necessary.
They were very gracious to me, and I think they were pleased that I
went on the day of one of the great receptions which may well be
called "public." They feared that I would restrict myself to special
audiences. That, I think, would have been bad taste. I might
perhaps prefer not to go at all, but when one is pleased to see
people in private it does not do to hide one's self and repudiate
them in public. Whenever she saw me, the Queen herself told me I
might go; they opened the little door and I escaped delighted to be
relieved of the burden.
Paris, January 7, 1835.—M. Molé came to see me and said many
curious things—among others, that he "had a mission to purge the
Government of doctrinaire influences." He has a terrible hatred of
doctrinaires, and he is a good hater. He quite startled me on this
subject, and I asked myself if he was equally good at loving. The
answer to this embarrassed me and I went no further.
Paris, January 8, 1835.—Madame Adélaïde having asked me to bring
Pauline to see her, I did so yesterday. The King told me to wait for
him at his sister's which kept me for three hours. The King had just
heard of the strange scene among the Mont Saint-Michel people who
were amnestied. On the very day of their liberation the Republicans
among them (the Carlists said their prayers and went quietly back to
La Vendée) sang the most horrible songs and ended by swearing on
their table knives to compass the death of the King. His Majesty had
the police reports before him and gave us all the details.
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