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MODELLING COMMAND AND CONTROL
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Modelling Command and Control
Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork
NEVILLE A. STANTON
CHRIS BABER
DON HARRIS
Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre
© Neville A. Stanton, Chris Baber and Don Harris 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Neville A. Stanton, Chris Baber and Don Harris have asserted their moral right under the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work.
Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
Gower House Suite 420
Croft Road 101 Cherry Street
Aldershot Burlington, VT 05401-4405
Hampshire GU11 3HR USA
England
UB212.S72 2008
355.3’3041011--dc22
2007030959
ISBN 978-07546-7027-8
Contents
Chapter 1 Overview 1
Chapter 2 Modelling Command and Control 1
Chapter 3 Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork 2
Chapter 4 Case Study at HMS Dryad 3
Chapter 5 Case Study in RAF Boeing E3D Sentry 4
Chapter 6 Case Study in Battle-Group HQ 4
Chapter 7 Development of a Generic Process Model of
Command and Control 5
Bibliography 239
Index 245
List of Figures
Readers of this book might be interested to know something of the genesis of ideas
and projects that led to its conception. The basic idea to develop a new approach to
the analysis and representation of command and control began early in 2002, when
we decided to form a consortium to bid for the Ministry of Defence research contract
for a Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre (HFI DTC). At that
time there was a paradigm shift in defence research spending, with the desire to set
up consortia based on collaboration between academia and industry. We formed a
consortium led by Aerosystems International, with Birmingham, Brunel and Cranfield
Universities together with Lockheed Martin, MBDA and SEA. In the competitive
tendering process, we had to develop a set of research ideas that would define the
work of the consortium for three years, from 2003 to 2006. One of the strands of
work focused on Command and Control. Part of this work was to be focused on the
analysis of military Command and Control using a new approach (which was to be
developed). Because part of the remit of the HFI DTC was to examine spin-in to the
defence domain from the civil sector (and vice versa), we looked at Command and
Control in the emergency services and other civil applications. However, this book
focuses almost exclusively on research in the military domain.
As history testifies, we were successful in winning the initial HFI DTC contract
and have also won a follow on contract, which takes our programme of research
from April 2003 to March 2009. From those humble beginnings in 2002, we have
developed a new approach to the description and analysis of Command and Control
called Event Analysis of Systemic Team-work (EAST) as well as a sister method
called Workload, Error, Situation awareness, Time and Team-work (WESTT).
This book presents the EAST method and applications of the method in the Navy,
Air Force and Army Command and Control. EAST brings together a collection of
Human Factors methods in an integrated manner, rather than developing completely
new methods from scratch. The novelty of the approach is in the way in which the
various methods have been integrated and the network models that the application
of the methods produce as outputs. These models enable the analyst to consider
the Command and Control system under scrutiny in terms of the task, social and
knowledge networks, as well as the inter-relations between these networks.
At the time of writing the HFI DTC comprises:
xvi Modelling Command and Control
Neville A. Stanton
Chris Baber
Don Harris
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Acknowledgements
Professor Stanton holds a Chair in Human-Centred Design and has published over
75 international academic journal papers and 10 books on human-centred design.
He was a Visiting Fellow of the Department of Design and Environmental Analysis
at Cornell University in 1998. In 1998 he was awarded the Institution of Electrical
Engineers Divisional Premium Award for a co-authored paper on Engineering
Psychology and System Safety. The Ergonomics Society awarded him the prestigious
Otto Edholm medal in 2001 for his contribution to basic and applied ergonomics
research. Professor Stanton is on the editorial boards of Ergonomics, Theoretical
Issues in Ergonomics Science and the International Journal of Human Computer
Interaction. Professor Stanton is a Chartered Occupational Psychologist registered
with The British Psychological Society, a Fellow of The Ergonomics Society. He
has a BSc in Occupational Psychology from Hull University, an MPhil in Applied
Psychology from Aston University, and a PhD in Human Factors, also from Aston.
Dr Chris Baber
HFI DTC, Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
The University of Birmingham, Birmingham
B15 2TT
UK
c.baber@bham.ac.uk
http://www.eee.bham.ac.uk/baberc
Dr Don Harris
HFI DTC, Department of Human Factors
School of Engineering, Cranfield University
Cranfield, Bedford
MK43 0AL
UK
d.harris@cranfield.ac.uk
http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/soe/hf/biog_d_harris.htm
Don Harris is a Reader and Course Director for the MSc in Human Factors in Health
and Safety at Work and MSc Ergonomics and Safety at Work. He is Director of
Flight Deck Design and Aviation Safety Group and of the Defence Human Factors
Group. His principal teaching and research interests lie in the design and evaluation
of flight deck control and display systems, accident investigation and analysis, system
safety and flight simulation and training. Don is a Fellow of both the Ergonomics
Society and the Higher Education Academy. He is also a chartered Psychologist. He
is Chairman of the International Conference series on Engineering Psychology and
Cognitive Ergonomics. He sits on the editorial boards of the International Journal
of Applied Aviation Studies and Cognition, Technology and Work and is Co-Editor in
Chief of the Journal Human Factors and Aerospace Safety (published by Ashgate).
In 2006 Don was a member of a team that received the Royal Aeronautical Society
Bronze Award for advances in Aerospace and was invited to address the Chinese
Academy of Sciences in Beijing.
Contributing Authors
Alison Kay
HFI DTC, Department of Human Factors
School of Engineering, Cranfield University
Cranfield, Bedford, MK43 0AL UK
Linda Wells
HFI DTC, Aerosystems International Ltd
Alvington, Yeovil, Somerset, BA22 8UZ UK
Roy Dymott
HFI DTC, MBDA Missile Systems
Golf Course Lane, Filton, Bristol, BS34 7QW UK
Overview
The Defence Technology Centre for Human Factors Integration (DTC HFI) is a
research consortium comprised of academic institutions and defence companies, part
funded by the Human Sciences Domain of the UK Ministry of Defence Scientific
Research Programme. Human Factors Integration is about:
… providing a balanced development of both the technical and human aspects of equipment
provision. It provides a process that ensures the application of scientific knowledge about
human characteristics through the specification, design and evaluation of systems.’ (MoD,
2000, p.6)
The aim of the book is to show the application of the HFI-DTC’s Event Analysis
for Systemic Teamwork (EAST) methodology to military Command and Control
applications. The chapters in the book report on a series of investigations from a
Human Factors perspective. The book begins with an overview of Command and
Control models. Then the EAST methodology is explained. This is followed by three
case studies in different domains: Sea, Air and Land. The final chapter draws the
material from the case studies, and other research, to present a generic activities
model of Command and Control.
With contributions from Rob Houghton, Paul S. Salmon and Guy H. Walker
Since its inception, just after the Second World War, Human Factors research has
paid special attention to the issues surrounding human control of systems. Command
and Control environments continue to represent a challenging domain for Human
Factors research. We take a broad view of Command and Control research, to
include C2 (Command and Control), C3 (Command, Control and Communication),
and C4 (Command, Control, Communication and Computers) as well as Human
Supervisory Control paradigms. This book will present case studies in diverse
military applications (for example, land, sea and air) of command and control. While
the domains of application are highly diverse, many of the challenges they face share
interesting similarities.
2 Modelling Command and Control
Chapter 3 Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork
With contributions from Dan Jenkins, Paul S. Salmon and Guy H. Walker
The EAST methodology is relatively simple to use. The method requires an initial
understanding of HF and experience in the application of HF methods. However,
from analyst reports it can be concluded that the EAST methodology is relatively
simple to apply. The method’s ease of use is heightened when compared to the
exhaustive output that is generated from an EAST analysis. The EAST methodology
is generic and can be applied in any domain in which collaborative activity takes
place. As an overall conclusion, it is felt by the authors that the EAST methodology
has been successful in its applications thus far and the methodology is perfectly
suited to the analysis of Command and Control activity. Each EAST application
has produced valid and useful results that are currently forming the basis for the
development of a Command and Control model.
Overview 3
Chapter 4 Case Study at HMS Dryad
With contributions from Roy Dymott, Rob Houghton, Geoff Hoyle, Mark Linsell,
Richard McMaster, Paul S. Salmon, Rebecca Stewart, Guy H. Walker and Mark
Young
This study was conducted in order to analyse C4i in the Royal Navy domain.
Researchers were given access to one of the Navy’s training establishments – the
Maritime Warfare School – HMS Dryad in Southwick, Hampshire. Observations
were made during Command Team Training (CTT). This programme involved
training the Command Team of a warship in the skills that would be necessary for
them to defend their ship in a multi-threat environment.
The aim of this study was to apply the EAST methods to assess the communication
and command on board the Type 23 frigate. The study uses the methodology to
explore a complex communication system between sixteen team members where
effective communication, decision making and coordination are essential to task
success, for this highly distributed communication network. Three scenarios (air
threat, subsurface threat and surface threat) were observed and analysed. The
scenarios were different, and due to the complexity of the task only individual crew
members could only be observed at any time as opposed to the scenario being viewed
as a whole. However an overall idea of communications could be ascertained from
these individual observations.
Data are presented in the form of Social Network Analysis, Coordination Demand
Analysis and Propositional Network Analysis. Shared situation awareness is also
considered in this case study using the propositional networks. Knowledge objects
are identified for the whole of the mission as well as for the phases of the mission.
This gives an indication of where there is sharing of information. The networks
also suggest where knowledge is built on as the phases of the mission progress. The
sharing of information could be as a result of direct communications between agents
or through the use of the radio networks.
The individual scenarios show that the social networks are not particularly well
distributed. However when the scenarios are amalgamated into one scenario, as may
happen in a real life threat, it becomes a much denser network with better levels of
participation. The network then becomes a split communications network with the
Anti-Air Warfare Officer (AAWO) and Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) being the
central nodes. Overall the analyses indicate that the Type 23 crew use a distributed
network. Each crew member is connected (communication links) to other crew
members and hence there are several channels with which communication can travel
or information be shared.
4 Modelling Command and Control
Chapter 5 Case Study in RAF Boeing E3D Sentry
With contributions from Alison Kay, Mel Lowe, Paul S. Salmon, Rebecca Stewart,
Kerry Tatlock and Linda Wells
This study was conducted on board a Boeing ED3 AWACS (Airborne Warning
and Control System) aircraft in the Royal Air Force. The crew’s role is as airborne
surveillance, command and control, and weapons control and operations. They are
essentially an aerial patrol that is able to provide information on enemy movement
as well as providing control and the direction of friendly defensive and offensive
airborne operations. The study used the EAST methodology to explore a complex
communication system between eighteen team members and external agencies,
where effective communication, decision making and coordination are essential to
task success for this highly distributed communication network.
Five different missions were flown and observed. The missions were different,
and due to the complexity of the task only individual crew members could be
observed as opposed to the scenario being viewed as a whole. However an overall
idea of communications could be ascertained from these individual observations.
Data are presented in the form of Social Network Analysis, Coordination Demand
Analysis and Propositional Network Analysis. Shared situation awareness is also
considered in this case study using the propositional networks. Knowledge objects
are identified for the whole of the mission as well as for the phases of the mission.
This gives an indication of where there is sharing of information. The networks
also suggest where knowledge is built on as the phases of the mission progress.
The sharing of information could be as a result of direct communications between
agents or through the use of the radio networks or radar screens. Overall the analyses
indicate that the E3 crew use a fairly distributed network. Each crew member is
connected (communication links) to other crew members and hence there are several
channels within which communication can travel or information can be shared.
With contributions from Dan Jenkins, Richard McMaster, Rebecca Stewart, Guy H.
Walker and Linda Wells
These studies were conducted at the Command And Staff Training centre in
Warminster. Military command and control relies heavily on tasks that require
interaction with other team members, and where this is manifest, team working is
principally concerned with the communication of information and development of
Situation Awareness (SA). A relatively simple, yet robust, technological infrastructure
underpins team tasks. It is heavily reliant on a combination of verbal communications
and/or the translation of various planning ‘products’ into an integrated, collective,
4D spatial and temporal ‘image’ of the battle-space. It appears to be in this domain,
based on the Communications Usage Diagram (CUD) method, that Network
Enabled Capability (NEC) technology has much to offer. The assumption is that if
Overview 5
the state of SA can be more rapidly and accurately acquired (and there seems little
doubt that new technology offers this potential), then decision superiority can be
achieved more quickly. If SA can also be shared in optimal ways throughout the
system (which again, new technology appears to provide for), then unity of effort
can also be achieved.
The Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) specifies how the configuration of people
and technology changes in a task and context dependant manner. Three activity
stereotypes are defined: semi-autonomous working, briefing and reviewing. The
social network configures (and re-configures) itself numerous times during the
enactment of military command and control (and the Combat Estimate specifically).
As the network is re-configured, its constraints in terms of communications, density
and centrality change. The design of NEC paradigms, therefore, is revealed to
be more than just a consideration of technology in isolation. The specification of
technology may be appropriate for one configuration, but inappropriate for another.
The combination of HTA and SNA appears to provide one route into addressing this
issue.
The knowledge base that underpins effective SA at the systems level changes in
response to task phase, but also arises as a property of the constraining features of
the configuration of people and technology. Systems level SA, at this summary level
of analysis, appears to support, and be congruent with, task goals (as specified by
the HTA).
In summary, the emergent properties associated with military (and indeed any)
command and control scenario relate to the interplay between task, social and
propositional networks.
With contributions from Rob Houghton, Dan Jenkins, Richard McMaster, Paul S.
Salmon, Rebecca Stewart, Guy H. Walker and Mark Young
Despite the differences in the domains, the command and control applications share
many common features. First, they are typified by the presence of a central, remote,
control room. Data from the field are sent to displays and/or paper records about the
events as they unfold over time. Second, there is (currently) considerable reliance on
the transmission of verbal messages between the field and the central control room.
These messages are used to transmit report and command instructions. Third, a good
deal of the planning activities occurs in the central control room, and these are then
transmitted to the field. There are collaborative discussions between the central
control room and agents in the field on changes to the plan in light of particular
circumstances found in-situ. Finally, the activities tend to be a mixture of proactive
command instructions and reactive control measures. It is hypothesised that one of
the determinants of the success or failure of a command and control system will be
the degree to which both the remote control centre and agents in-the field can achieve
shared situational understanding about factors such as: reports of events in the field,
6 Modelling Command and Control
command intent, plans, risks, resource capability, and instructions. This places a
heavy reliance on the effectiveness of the communications and media between the
various parties in the command and control system.
Analysis of the task analyses from these three domains led to the development
of a taxonomy of command and control activities. The resultant data from the
observational studies and task analyses were subject to content analysis, in order
to pick out clusters of activities. These clusters were subjected to thematic analysis
consistent with a ‘grounded theory’ approach to data-driven research. It was possible
to allocate most of the tasks in the task analysis to one of these categories. To this
extent, the building of a generic model of command and control was driven by the
data from the observations and task analyses.
From development of a series of taxonomies (called receive, planning, rehearsal,
communicate, request, monitor and review), and an analysis of the previous command
and control models, it was possible to develop a generic process model. Construction
of the model was driven by the data collected through observation from the different
domains, and the subsequent thematic analysis and taxonomic development. In the
tradition of ‘grounded theory’ the generic command and control model was as a
result of our observations, rather than an attempt to impose any preconceived ideas
of command and control. This may account for many of the differences between the
current model developed in the course of the current research and those models that
have come before it.
It is proposed that the command and control activities are triggered by events,
such as the receipt of orders of information, which provide a mission and a description
of the current situation of events in the field. The gap between the mission and the
current situation lead the command system to determine the effects that will narrow
that gap. This in turn requires the analysis of resources and constraints in the given
situations. From these activities, plans are developed, evaluated and selected. The
chosen plans are then rehearsed before being communicated to agents in the field.
As the plan is enacted, feedback from the field is sought to check that events are
unfolding as expected. Changes to the mission or the events in the field may require
the plan to be updated or revised. When the mission has achieved the required effects,
the current set of command and control activities may come to an end.
The model distinguishes between ‘command’ activities and ‘control’ activities.
Command comprises proactive, mission-driven, planning and co-ordination
activities. Control comprises reactive, event-driven, monitoring and communication
activities. The former implies the transfer of mission intent whereas the latter implies
reaction to specific situations.
Chapter 2
In order to situate the generic process model within its wider research context a review
of the command and control literature has been conducted. Of particular concern to this
review are the questions of what would define a useful ‘model’ of command and control.
The literature provided several approaches to the challenge of modelling command
and control, and the review addressed a number of broad questions, including:
These concerns cover the wider aim of extracting broad modelling trends from the
prevailing literature, examples of paradigms and approaches, and the derivation of
typologies and categories of outcome measure. The aim of the review, therefore, is
not to provide an exhaustive account of every permutation of C4i related models
but to illustrate the range and scope of relevant approaches and paradigms. Prior to
presenting this review, the chapter will address generic issues associated with the
problem of creating and using models.
Models
As Pew and Mavor (1998), in their report on the activity of the US National Research
Council’s Panel on Modeling Human Behavior and Command Decision Making:
Representations for Military Simulations, the word ‘model’ can cover a host of
definitions, from physical mock-ups to analytical descriptions. In Pew and Mavor
8 Modelling Command and Control
(1998) the term ‘model’ was taken to imply that ‘...human or organizational behavior
can be represented by computational formulas, programs or simulations’ (p.11). In
this book, the notion of ‘model’ is much lighter, that is, our concern is to develop a
useful description that can be applied, as a framework, to understand the operation of
command and control systems. Thus, the intention is not to generate algorithms that
can predict how a command and control system should operate, so much as to develop
a framework in which to describe how such systems do operate. There are numerous
modelling challenges underlying command and control. The difficulty contained by
these challenges can perhaps be summarised by the fact that the ‘real world is made
from open, interacting systems, behaving chaotically’ (Hitchins, 2000), and in the
case of human actors, non-linearly. Complex systems like command and control
also possess various real-time properties that cannot be considered ‘designed’ as
such, they sometimes merely ‘happen’ (Hitchens, 2000). Therefore the notion of a
commander representing something akin to the conductor of an orchestra is in some
cases entirely false (Hitchens, 2000). Also, unlike neat linear systems the possibility
exists (increasingly so with NEC) for there to be no clear boundaries between certain
system elements, as well as no beginning and no end, given that goals are more or
less externally adaptive. For the purposes of this book, a descriptive model serves
four primary purposes: abstracting reality, simplifying complexity, considering
constraint and synthesising results.
Abstracting reality
Simplifying complexity
the world being modelled has an inviolable nature; it cannot be exhaustively described.
We can model the world but we can always go back to find new perspectives for
describing what we are modelling, usually involving new perspectives on what constitutes
information (data), new languages for modelling, and new perspectives on the purpose for
constructing models. (Clancey, 1993, p.41)
Considering constraint
A crucial aspect of any modelling enterprise is the quality of the constraints and
assumptions within the model. For a model to have scientific viability it must feature
some variety of formal constraint. In simple terms, constraints are the limits on what
a model can and cannot do and should (for the most part) correspond with the real
world. For example, if we were modelling some aspects of human manual labour,
this would naturally dictate a constraint that within the model any one individual
has at maximum two arms and two legs. A model may be otherwise impressive in
any other aspect but if its constraints are incorrect or inappropriate then the rest of
the model is invalid. A model may even appear to give the ‘right’ answer if treated
as a ‘black box’ model where we concern ourselves only with the input and the
output, but if it requires the representation of impossibilities (for example, three
armed radio operators, speed of light reaction times and so on) to generate those
results it is questionable whether the model is of genuine theoretical value: a good
model ‘plays by the rules’ so to speak. Whilst it might be obvious how many limbs to
ascribe to an individual, less concrete variables are more difficult to accurately and
uncontroversially constrain; things like attentional capacity, situation awareness and
teamwork. Whilst these are essential constructs in the conceptualisation of command
and control, they have long suffered from problems in their precise characterisation
(and in some cases possibly always will given that mental qualities like attention
and awareness are possibly products of reification). Furthermore, where models are
themselves particularly complex or abstract by nature of their operating principles
(for example, a statistical Hidden Markov-Chain Model) there can be additional
challenges in translating realistic constraints into parameters (for the author) but also
assessing the constraints (for the reader); not all models are so transparent that one
might easily relate, say, a set of arrows on a graph or a set of numbers in a vast matrix
with an inappropriate ‘take’ on the real world.
10 Modelling Command and Control
Synthesising results
Specification
In this book, we follow NATO (1988) in separating the concept of ‘command’ from
that of ‘control’. For NATO (1988), ‘command’ is ‘…the authority vested in an
individual…for the direction, coordination and control of military forces’. This
implies that an individual will be given the role of Commander, that this individual
will (through this role) be imbued with sufficient authority to exercise command,
and (by implication) this command will involve defining the goal (intent, effect) that
Forces under the individual’s command will achieve.
Builder, Bankes and Nordin (1999) follow NATO (1988) in their definition of
command and control:
Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
[individual] over assigned [resources] in the accomplishment of a [common goal].
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a
[designated individual] in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling [resources]
in the accomplishment of the [common goal]. (p.11)
Combining command (authority) with control (the means to assert this authority)
leads to ‘unity of effort in the accomplishment of a [common goal]’ (Jones, 1993,
p.2). Despite the militaristic undertones, the notion of command and control is
itself generic. The separation of activity associated with command from that of
control has a number of useful benefits. For example, in military parlance, ‘Mission
Command’ involves passing a Commander’s Intent down a chain of command in
such a way as to allow lower levels to elaborate and develop the command in the
light of contextual demands. Thus, a Commander might have an Intent to ‘secure
a route from town A to town B’. This might be interpreted by Officers in the field
as (a) patrol the road between the towns; (b) secure a bridge along the route; (c)
repel any attacks on the bridge; and (d) disrupt any attempts to damage the road.
Each of these activities could be passed to specific Units, under the command of an
Officer who will then define these activities according to contextual demands, for
example, activity (a) could be performed according to different time-intervals, using
Modelling Command and Control 11
different resources, with greater or lesser shows of strength etc. In a similar manner,
the notion of Sectorisation in the Fire Service requires Officers to divide activities in
major incidents between different teams, for example, managing water supply, using
breathing apparatus. Each ‘Sector’ exercises different skills under the leadership of
different Officers. Taken together, these examples point to the exercise of Command
as the broad definition of a goal and the provision of appropriate resources to achieve
that goal, whereas Control is more concerned with the management of these resources
in the ongoing pursuit of that goal in the light of changing contextual demands.
Given the definitions above the (relatively) invariant properties of command and
control scenarios can be distilled down to the following three features:
Figure 2.1 shows how these three Independent Variables can be mapped onto a cube.
It is possible to place different forms of command and control structure in this cube.
Thus, for example, a ‘traditional’ hierarchical command structure could be located in
the bottom left-hand corner, whereas a ‘power to the edge’ structure could be located
in the top right-hand corner. Other forms of command and control structures could
be located throughout the cube.
12 Modelling Command and Control
Distribution of Edge
information organisation
Fully distributed
Patterns
of
interaction
Fully hierarchial
Allocation
Classic C2
of
decision rights
C4i is variously defined as a form of ‘management infrastructure […] for any […] large
or complex dynamic resource system’ (Harris and White, 1987). It is immediately
apparent based on this review that the dominant modelling perspective, the so-called
‘cybernetic paradigm’ (Builder et al., 1999) accords the structural aspect of command
and control particular prominence. Dockery and Woodcock (1993) are unequivocal
in stating that, ‘Since [command and control] […] concerns itself with providing
structure to combat, its description should be in terms of structure’ (p.64).
Under this structural/cybernetic paradigm a command and control scenario is
divided into linked functional parts that exchange and modify signals that can be
specified according to mathematical formulae (Builder et al., 1999). Or as similarly
expressed from a systems dynamics point of view, ‘the mathematical modelling of
an assemblage of components so as to arrive at a set of equations which represent the
dynamic behaviour of the system and which can be solved to determine the response
to various sorts of stimuli’ (Doebelin, 1972, p.4). An example of these ‘equations’,
and their relation to the dynamic behaviour and structure of command and control
‘systems’ are reproduced in Table 2.1 from Dockery and Woodcock (1993) merely
as an illustration of the outcome measures that can be derived.
14 Modelling Command and Control
Table 2.1 Sample of mathematical metrics for key constructs in command
and control (from Dockery and Woodcock, 1993, p.66)
Sense COMMAND
CENTRE
ENVIRONMENT
Process
Own Forces
Compare Desired State
Decide
Act
One of the most commonly used structural models of Command and Control
is referred to as the OODA Loop. This provides a tactical-level perspective on
Command and Control as a process involving Observation (of events in the field),
Orientation (of resources to deal with those events), Decision (of how best to manage
those resources in order to deal with those events, under some set of constraints), and
Action (the use of resources to deal with the events). Figure 2.3 shows an example
of the OODA Loop, together with some of the factors that could have a bearing on
performance.
Implicit Implicit
Guidance Cultural Guidance
& Control Traditions & Control
Outside
Information
Genetic Unfolding
Heritage Analyses/ Decision Interaction
Unfolding Action
Observations Synthesis (Hypothesis) with
Circumstances (Test)
Environment
New
Information
Unfolding Previous
Environmental Experience
Interaction
Feedback
Feedback
Random
Disturbances
Commands
Figure 2.4 Example of closed loop feedback control system (from Choisser
and Shaw, 1993)
The Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework (NCO CF) comprises four
main elements. Information sources, which could be sensors, people, or any other
originator of intelligence; value-added services, which could involve the integration
of information from several sources; the Command and Control function; and
Effectors, which are the means by which actions are performed. Figure 2.5 shows
a schematic of the NCO CF process model. Notice how the intention is to contrast
the activity relating to Individuals (on the left-hand side) with that of Groups (on the
right-hand side), with a central role for ‘Quality of Interactions’. This figure can be
read as an elaboration of the previous structural models, in that its focus is on higher-
level ‘quality’ issues and their interactions.
The models that arise from this dominant perspective all tend to approximate in
varying degrees towards control theory models and as Builder et al. (1999) put it,
could just as easily apply to a thermostat as it could to a C4i system. Although
practitioners of the cybernetic paradigm would argue that much of the complexity
lies ‘behind’ such simple systems (within the mathematical metrics expressed in
Table 2.1, for example), the fact, at bottom, still remains. Overall, the specific
outcome metrics from these models are relatively hard to divine, but examples
include ‘catastrophe manifolds’, ‘butterfly landscapes’ (a form of five dimensional
graph), ‘control coefficients’, ‘time dependant behaviour’, etc. These mathematical
metrics provide measures related to overarching ‘mission based’ constructs such as
survivability and effectiveness. Changes in these overarching constructs are based
18 Modelling Command and Control
In summary, the issue of model constraints appears to be felt particularly acutely and
while cybernetic models might provide a robust basis for understanding control, they
appear to be restricted in their ability to model command. This is simply because
the models tend to rely on the assumption that the role of C2 is to react to changing
events in the world. Thus, the models are ‘event-driven’ and reactive rather than
proactive or anticipatory.
Network Models
Introduction
This notion of roles and links is related to a simplistic descriptive model of military
command and control presented by Hitchens (2000) in Figure 2.6.
In Hitchens’ N-squared (N2) chart, information intersects pairs of roles (shown
in capitals on the diagonal). The example given is militaristic, where the content
of information flow downwards from the commander is represented in the upper
quadrant and information flowing upwards to the commander in the lower quadrant.
The commander, therefore, interchanges ‘decision’ information to the operations
20 Modelling Command and Control
Figure 2.6 The N-squared (N2) chart from Hitchens (2000): A simplistic
generic model of command and control
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