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 Chapter 6 Repetition

Section 6.1 Do Loops

1. What is wrong with the following Do loop?

Dim index As Integer = 1
Do While index <> 9
lstBox.Items.Add("Hello")
index += 1
Loop
(A) The test variable should not be changed inside a Do loop.
(B) The test condition will never be true.
(C) This is an infinite loop.
(D) Nothing
D

2. What numbers will be displayed in the list box when the button is clicked?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim num as Double = 10
Do While num > 1
lstBox.Items.Add(num)
num = num - 3
Loop
End Sub

(A) 10, 7, and 4

(B) 10, 7, 4, and 1
(C) 10, 7, 4, 1, and -2
(D) No output
A

3. Which While statement is equivalent to Until num < 100?

(A) While num <= 100
(B) While num > 100
(C) While num >= 100
(D) There is no equivalent While statement.
C
4. What is wrong with the following Do loop?
Dim index As Integer = 1
Do While index <> 10
lstBox.Items.Add("Hello")
index += 2
Loop
(A) It should have been written as a Do Until loop.
(B) It is an infinite loop.
(C) The test variable should not be changed within the loop itself.
(D) Nothing
B

5. In analyzing the solution to a program, you conclude that you want to construct a loop so
that the loop terminates either when (a < 12) or when (b = 16). Using a Do loop, the test
condition should be
(A) Do While (a > 12) Or (b <> 16)
(B) Do While (a >= 12) Or (b <> 16)
(C) Do While (a < 12) Or (b <> 16)
(D) Do While (a >= 12) And (b <> 16)
(E) Do While (a < 12) And (b = 16)
D

6. When Visual Basic executes a Do While loop it first checks the truth value of the
_________.
(A) pass
(B) loop
(C) condition
(D) statement
C

7. If the loop is to be executed at least once, the condition should be checked at the
__________.
(A) top of the loop
(B) middle of the loop
(C) bottom of the loop
(D) Nothing should be checked.
C

8. A Do While loop checks the While condition before executing the statements in the loop.
(T/F)
T

9. If the While condition in a Do While loop is false the first time it is encountered, the
statements in the loop are still executed once. (T/F)
F
10. The following statement is valid. (T/F)
Do While x <> 0
T

11. The following two sets of code produce the same output. (T/F)
Dim num As Integer = 1 Dim num As Integer = 1
Do While num <=5 Do
lstBox.Items.Add("Hello") lstBox.Items.Add("Hello")
num += 1 num += 1
Loop Loop Until (num > 5)
T

12. A loop written using the structure Do While...Loop can usually be rewritten using the
structure Do...Loop Until. (T/F)
T

13. A variable declared inside a Do loop cannot be referred to outside of the loop. (T/F)
T

14. Assume that i and last are Integer variables. Describe precisely the output produced by the
following segment for the inputs 4 and –2.
Dim last, i As Integer
last = CInt(InputBox("Enter terminating value:"))
i = 0
Do While (i <= last)
lstBox.Items.Add(i)
i += 1
Loop
(Input 4): 0 1 2 3 4
(Input –2): No output

15. The following is an infinite loop. Rearrange the statements so that the loop will terminate as
intended.
x = 0
Do
lstBox.Items.Add(x)
Loop Until x > 13
x += 2
Move the last statement one line up, before the Loop Until statement
16. What is wrong with the following simple password program where today's password is
"intrepid"?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim password As String
password = InputBox("Enter today's password:")
Do
lstBox.Items.Add("Incorrect")
password = InputBox("Enter today's password:")
Loop Until password = "intrepid"
lstBox.Items.Add("Password Correct. You may continue.")
End Sub
(A) There is no way to re-enter a failed password.
(B) The Loop Until condition should be passWord <> "intrepid".
(C) It will display "Incorrect." even if the first response is "intrepid".
(D) Nothing
C

17. How many times will HI be displayed when the following lines are executed?
Dim c As Integer = 12
Do
lstBox.Items.Add("HI")
c += 3
Loop Until (c >= 30)
(A) 5
(B) 9
(C) 6
(D) 4
(E) 10
C

18. In the following code segment, what type of variable is counter?

Dim temp, counter, check As Integer
Do
temp = CInt(InputBox("Enter a number."))
counter += temp
If counter = 10 Then
check = 0
End If
Loop Until (check = 0)
(A) counter
(B) accumulator
(C) sentinel
(D) loop control variable
B
19. What numbers will be displayed in the list box by the following code when the button is
clicked?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim num As Integer = 7
Do
num += 1
lstBox.Items.Add(num)
Loop Until (num > 6)
lstBox.Items.Add(num)
End Sub
(A) 7
(B) 8
(C) 7 and 8
(D) 8 and 8
D

20. __________ calculate the number of elements in lists.

(A) Sentinels
(B) Counter variables
(C) Accumulators
(D) Nested loops
B

21. _________ calculate the sums of numerical values in lists.

(A) Sentinels
(B) Counter variables
(C) Accumulator variables
(D) Nested loops
C

22. The following are equivalent While and Until statements. (T/F)
While (num > 2) And (num < 5)
Until (num <= 2) Or (num >= 5)
T

23. A Do…Loop Until block is always executed at least once. (T/F)

T

24. A counter variable is normally incremented or decremented by 1. (T/F)

T
25. The following program uses a counter variable to force the loop to end. (T/F)
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim r As Double = 1
Dim t As Double = 0
Do While (t < 5000)
t = 2 * t + r
r += 1
lstBox.Items.Add(t)
Loop
End Sub
F

Section 6.2 For…Next Loops

1. When the number of repetitions needed for a set of instructions is known before they are
executed in a program, the best repetition structure to use is a(n)
(A) Do While...Loop structure.
(B) Do...Loop Until structure.
(C) For...Next loop.
(D) If blocks.
C

2. What is one drawback in using non-integer Step sizes?

(A) Round-off errors may cause unpredictable results.
(B) Decimal Step sizes are invalid in Visual Basic.
(C) A decimal Step size is never needed.
(D) Decimal Step sizes usually produce infinite loops.
A

3. When the odd numbers are added successively, any finite sum will be a perfect square (e.g.,
1 + 3 + 5 = 9 and 9 = 3^2). What change must be made in the following program to correctly
demonstrate this fact for the first few odd numbers?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim oddNumber As Integer
Dim sum As Integer = 0
For i As Integer = 1 To 9 Step 2 'Generate first few odd numbers
oddNumber = i
For j As Integer = 1 To oddNumber Step 2 'Add odd numbers
sum += j
Next
lstBox.Items.Add(sum & " is a perfect square.")
Next
End Sub
(A) Change the Step size to 1 in the first For statement.
(B) Move oddNumber = i inside the second For loop.
(C) Reset sum to zero immediately before the second Next statement.
(D) Reset sum to zero immediately before the first Next statement.
C
4. What does the following program do with a person's name?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim name, test As String
Dim n As String = ""
name = InputBox("Enter your first name:")
For i As Integer = 0 To (name.Length - 1) Step 2
test = name.Substring(i, 1)
n = test & n
Next
txtBox.Text = n
End Sub
It displays the name
(A) in reverse order.
(B) in reverse order and skips every other letter.
(C) as it was entered.
(D) as it was entered, but skips every other letter.
B

5. Suppose the days of the year are numbered from 1 to 365 and January 1 falls on a Tuesday
as it did in 2013. What is the correct For statement to use if you want only the numbers for
the Fridays in 2013?
(A) For i As Integer = 3 to 365 Step 7
(B) For i As Integer = 1 to 365 Step 3
(C) For i As Integer = 365 To 1 Step -7
(D) For i As Integer = 3 To 365 Step 6
A

6. Given the following partial program, how many times will the statement
lstBox.Items.Add(j + k + m) be executed?
For j As Integer = 1 To 4
For k As Integer = 1 To 3
For m As Integer = 2 To 10 Step 3
lstBox.Items.Add(j + k + m)
Next
Next
Next
(A) 24
(B) 60
(C) 36
(D) 10
(E) None of the above
C
7. Which of the following program segments will sum the eight numbers input by the user?

(A)For k As Integer = 1 To 8
s = CDbl(InputBox("Enter a number.")
s += k
Next
(B) For k As Integer = 1 To 8
a = CDbl(InputBox("Enter a number.")
s += 1
Next
(C) For k As Integer = 1 To 8
a = CDbl(InputBox("Enter a number.")
a += s
Next
(D) For k As Integer = 1 To 8
a = CDbl(InputBox("Enter a number.")
s += a
Next
D

8. What will be displayed by the following program when the button is clicked?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim a As String, n, c As Integer
a = "HIGHBACK"
n = CInt(Int(a.Length / 2))
c = 0
For k As Integer = 0 To n – 1
If a.Substring(k, 1) > a.Substring(7 – k, 1) Then
c += 1
End If
Next
txtBox.Text = CStr(c)
End Sub

(A) 1
(B) 2
(C) 3
(D) 4
(E) 5
C

9. In a For statement of the form shown below, what is the default step value when the "Step c"
clause is omitted?
For i As Integer = a To b Step c
(A) the same as a
(B) the same as b
(C) 0
(D) 1
D
10. What will be displayed when the following lines are executed?
txtBox.Clear()
For k As Integer = 1 To 3
txtBox.Text &= "ABCD".Substring(4 – k, 1)
Next

(A) ABC
(B) CBA
(C) DBA
(D) DCBA
(E) DCB
E

11. Which loop computes the sum of 1/2 + 2/3 + 3/4 + 4/5 + … + 99/100?
(A) For n As Integer = 1 To 99
s += n / (1 + n)
Next
(B) For q As Integer = 100 To 1
s += (q + 1) /q
Next
(C) For d As Integer = 2 To 99
s = 1 / d + d / (d + 1)
Next
(D) For x As Integer = 1 To 100
s += 1 / (x + 1)
Next
A

12. How many times will PETE be displayed when the following lines are executed?
For c As Integer = 15 to -4 Step -6
lstBox.Items.Add("PETE")
Next
(A) 1
(B) 2
(C) 3
(D) 4
D
13. What will be displayed by the following program when the button is clicked?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim s As Double
s = 0
For k As Integer = 1 To 5
If k / 2 = Int(k / 2) Then
s += k
End If
Next
txtBox.Text = CStr(s)
End Sub

(A) 12
(B) 9
(C) 15
(D) 6
D

14. How many lines of output are produced by the following program segment?
For i As Integer = 1 To 3
For j As Integer = 1 To 3
For k As Integer = i to j
lstBox.Items.Add("Programming is fun.")
Next
Next
Next
(A) 8
(B) 9
(C) 10
(D) 11
C

15. Assuming the following statement, what is the For...Next loop's counter variable?
For yr As Integer = 1 To 5
(A) 1
(B) 5
(C) To
(D) yr
D
16. What is the value of j after the end of the following code segment?
For j As Integer = 1 to 23
lstBox.Items.Add("The counter value is " & j)
Next

(A) 22
(B) 23
(C) 24
(D) j no longer exists
D

17. A For...Next loop with a positive step value continues to execute until what condition is
met?
(A) The counter variable is greater than the terminating value.
(B) The counter variable is equal to or greater than the terminating value.
(C) The counter variable is less than the terminating value.
(D) The counter variable is less than or equal to the terminating value.
A

18. Which of the following loops will always be executed at least once when it is encountered?
(A) a For...Next loop
(B) a Do loop having posttest form
(C) a Do loop having pretest form
(D) none of the above.
B

19. Which of the following are valid for an initial or terminating value of a Fir...Next loop?
(A) a numeric literal
(B) info.Length, where info is a string variable
(C) a numeric expression
(D) All of the above
D

20. What is the data type of the variable num if Option Infer is set to On and the statement
Dim num = 7.0 is executed?
(A) Integer
(B) Boolean
(C) Double
(D) String
C

21. The value of the counter variable should not be altered within the body of a For…Next loop.
(T/F)
T
22. The body of a For...Next loop in Visual Basic will always be executed once no matter what
the initial and terminating values are. (T/F)
F

23. If the terminating value of a For...Next loop is less than the initial value, then the body of the
loop is never executed. (T/F)
F

24. If one For...Next loop begins inside another For...Next loop, it must also end within this
loop. (T/F)
T

25. The value of the counter variable in a For...Next loop need not be a whole number. (T/F)
T

26. One must always have a Next statement paired with a For statement. (T/F)
T

27. If the initial value is greater than the terminating value in a For...Next loop, the statements
within are still executed one time. (T/F)
F

28. When one For...Next loop is contained within another, the name of the counter variable for
each For...Next loop may be the same. (T/F)
F

29. A For...Next loop cannot be nested inside a Do loop. (T/F)

F

30. The following code segment is valid. (T/F)

If (firstLetter > "A") Then
For x As Integer = 1 to 100
lstBox.Items.Add(x)
Next
End If
T

31. In a For...Next loop, the initial value should be greater than the terminating value if a
negative step is used and the body of the loop is to be executed at least once. (T/F)
T

32. If the counter variable of a For...Next loop will assume values that are not whole numbers,
then the variable should not be of type Integer. (T/F)
T

33. The step value of a For...Next loop can be given by a numeric literal, variable, or expression.
(T/F)
T
34. The variable index declared with the statement For index As Integer = 0 To 5 cannot
be referred to outside of the For…Next loop. (T/F)
T

35. When Option Infer is set to On, a statement of the form Dim num = 7 is valid. (T/F)
T

36. What is displayed in the text box when the button is clicked?
Private Sub btnDisplay_Click(...) Handles btnDisplay.Click
Dim word As String = "Alphabet"
Dim abbreviation As String = ""
For i As Integer = 0 To word.Length - 1
If word.Substring(i, 1).ToUpper <> "A" Then
abbreviation &= word.Substring(i, 1)
End If
Next
txtBox.Text = abbreviation
End Sub
lphbet

Section 6.3 List Boxes and Loops

1. Which of the following expressions refers to the contents of the last row of the list box?
(A) lstBox.Items(lstBox.Items.Count)
(B) lstBox.Items(lstBox.Items.Count - 1)
(C) lstBox.Items(Count)
(D) lstBox.Items.Count
B

2. Which of the following expressions refers to the contents of the first row of the list box?
(A) lstBox.Items(0)
(B) lstBox.Items(1)
(C) lstBox.Items.First
(D) lstBox.Items(First)
A

3. Each item in a list box is identified by an index number; the first item in the list is assigned
which of the following values as an index?
(A) a randomly assigned value
(B) 1.
(C) a value initially designated by the programmer
(D) 0
D
4. The following lines of code display all the items of lstBox. (T/F)
For n As Integer = 1 to lstBox.Items.Count
lstBox2.Items.Add(lstBox.Items(n))
Next
F

5. The number of items in ListBox1 is ListBox1.Items.Count. (T/F)

T

6. If no item in a list box is selected, the value of lstBox.SelectedIndex is 0. (T/F)

F

7. Which of the statements will unhighlight any highlighted item in lstBox?

(A) lstBox.SelectedItem = Nothing
(B) lstBox.SelectedItem = ""
(C) lstBox.SelectedIndex = 0
(D) lstBox.SelectedIndex = -1
D

8. A list box named lstBox has its Sorted property set to True and contains the three items Cat,
Dog, and Gnu in its Items collection. If the word Elephant is added to the Items collection at
run time, what will be its index value?
(A) 2
(B) 1
(C) 3
(D) 0
A

9. A list box named lstBox has its Sorted property set to False and contains the three items Cat,
Dog, and Gnu in its list. If the word Elephant is added to the list at run time, what will be its
index value?
(A) 2
(B) 1
(C) 3
(D) 0
C

10. If a program contains procedures for both the Click and DoubleClick events on a list box and the user
double-clicks on the list box, only the Click event will be raised. (T/F)
T

11. If a list box has its sorted property set to True and the list box contains all numbers, then the values in
the list box will always be in increasing numerical order. (T/F)
F
12. If a list box contains all numbers, then which of the following values can be calculated
without using a loop?
(A) average value of the numbers
(B) largest number
(C) smallest number
(D) number of numbers
D

13. Which of the following is not a main type of event that can be raised by user selections of
items in a list box?
(A) Click event
(B) SelectedIndexChanged event
(C) FillDown event
(D) DoubleClick event
C

14. The value of lstBox.Items(n) is the nth item in the list box. (T/F)
F

15. The sorted property can only be set to True at design time. (T/F)
F

16. The _____________ data type is most suited to a flag.

(A) Boolean
(B) Integer
(C) String
(D) Double
A

17. A variable that keeps track of whether a certain situation has occurred is called
(A) a counter.
(B) an accumulator.
(C) a switch.
(D) a flag.
D
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
the ardent and influential support of the owners of suburban land,
who would rejoice in the increase of their rents, brought about by
the expenditure of public money in creating railway facilities on
uncommercial terms. These are not fanciful dangers. They are the
results which we may feel sure would inevitably follow the
nationalization of our railways, and the advantages to be gained
from State management would need to be very great to compensate
for these burdens.
Another aspect of the question which requires the gravest
consideration is that which concerns the position of the State as an
employer of labor. There are upwards of 620,000 railway officers and
servants. The State would become the direct employer of that huge
army, and would have to settle all questions relating to hours,
wages, and other conditions of service. If a railway company is
unable to settle differences with its men the ultimate resort of the
men is the withdrawal of their labor, whilst the company are free to
employ other men who are willing to accept their conditions of
employment. Any railway strike on a large scale is a dire calamity to
trade and to the public, but if one were compelled to consider the
possibility of a general strike on a national railway system, even the
deplorable results which accompany strikes on privately-owned
railways would seem comparatively insignificant. Probably a railway
department of Government would not urge the adoption of
compulsory arbitration, if they were themselves concerned, with as
much equanimity as they do in the case of strikes on private
railways. It is true that in this matter the advocates of State railways
can point to the comparative absence of labor conflicts in connection
with the services now under Government control, but municipal
undertakings have not been so successful in avoiding labor disputes,
and in many cases have secured even the degree of immunity from
such conflicts which they enjoy by the concession of terms of
employment which constitute heavy burdens on the ratepayers. It
seems to me that the danger of serious labor disputes cannot be put
aside, and I confess that I am unable to see any safe way of
meeting the objection to State ownership on the ground that the
State ought to limit, as far as possible, its liability to become directly
concerned in such disputes.
In conclusion, I would say that I have felt unable to take up a
partisan attitude on the question. For many years past both my
studies on railway subjects and my practical experience have led me
to a convinced belief in the advantages of well-regulated monopoly,
and I am unable wholly to disapprove of a scheme which would
secure for the country the advantages of a system of well-regulated
monopoly in which I believe, even although it should come in the
guise of State ownership.
Competition, in my judgment, creates more evils than it cures,
especially the half-hearted and imperfect competition which exists in
England so far as railways are concerned, which cannot be regarded
as free competition on a commercial basis.
I recognize that it is impracticable to secure unification or any very
extensive or far-reaching combinations of railways under our system
of private ownership. The public would not tolerate uncontrolled
railways under private management, and I doubt whether any form
of control which has yet been devised, or is likely to be devised,
combined with partial competition, can give entirely satisfactory
results. That there are grave dangers and risks in the public
ownership of railways I fully admit; indeed, so grave are they, that I
think he would be a very bold minister who would venture to bring
forward, under Government sanction, a proposal for the
nationalization of our railways. The existence of such a huge amount
of Government patronage would open the door to political
corruption. The existence of such an enormous body of Government
servants possessing the franchise—and I confess it seems to me
impracticable to hope that any measure could be carried subject to
disfranchisement of Government servants—would imperil the
financial stability of the railway system, and introduce new and very
serious sources of weakness and danger into the body politic.
The risk of loss from the charging of unduly low rates under
pressure from the influential body of traders seeking to enrich
themselves at the expense of the general community seems to me a
risk which no thoughtful man can ignore. No expedients for checking
and restraining political influence so that it could not reach or sway
the decision of the officers of State responsible for railway
management seem to me practicable under our democratic
constitution.
If the nation owns the railways, the nation must take all the risks
of State ownership, and we could only trust that the existing purity
of our politics and the common sense, honorable character, and long
experience in self-government of the English people would suffice to
protect the commonwealth from these perils resulting in serious
harm. But whatever may be the issue of the consideration of the
question of State purchase of railways, I am prepared to believe that
English railways will continue, whether under State management or
under private management, to deserve the praise which Mr. W. M.
Acworth expressed in his recent address as President of the
Economic Section of the British Association in Dublin, by saying that
in his judgment—after, I may remind you, a fuller study of railway
conditions in all countries of the world than has been given to the
subject of many men in England—that "English railways are, on the
whole, among the best, if not actually the best, in the world."
 CONCERNING ADVANCES IN RAILWAY
RATES
February 8, 1909.—Ordered to be printed.
Mr. Elkins, from the Committee on Interstate Commerce, submitted
the following

ADVERSE REPORT.
[To accompany S. 423.]
The Committee on Interstate Commerce, to which was referred
Senate bill 423 "To amend section 6 of an act entitled 'An act to
regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred
and eighty-seven, and acts amendatory thereof," respectfully reports
said bill adversely, and recommends its indefinite postponement.
The amendment proposed to section 6 will be found on page 4,
commencing on line 10, and ending on page 5, on line 8, of the bill,
as follows:
Provided further, That at any time prior to the expiration of the notice
herein required to be given of a proposed increase of rates, fares, or
charges, or of joint rates, fares, or charges, any shipper or any number of
shippers, jointly or severally, may file with the commission a protest, in
writing, against the proposed increase in whole or in part, stating
succinctly the grounds of his or their objections to the proposed change.
The filing of such protest shall operate to continue in force the then
existing rate or rates, fare or fares, charge or charges, proposed to be
changed and protested against as aforesaid, until the reasonableness of
the rate or rates, fare or fares, charge or charges, proposed to be
substituted shall have been determined by the commission. Upon the
filing of such protest, a copy thereof shall be mailed by the Secretary of
the commission to the carrier or carriers proposing the change and
thereafter the commission shall proceed to hear and determine the matter
in all respects as it is required to do by sections thirteen and fifteen of this
 act, in case of a complaint made because of anything done or omitted to
be done by any common carrier, as provided in said section thirteen; but
throughout the proceeding, the burden of proof shall be on the carrier
proposing the change to show that the rate, fare or charge proposed to be
substituted is just and reasonable.
An amendment was offered in the committee which would modify
the original proposition of the amendment, by leaving it to the
discretion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon the filing of
a protest against the proposed increase of rates, to determine
whether the schedule filed should go into effect at the end of thirty
days or should be suspended by order of the commission until after
final hearing, upon the question as to whether the advance was
reasonable.
This proposed amendment to the amendment of the 6th section,
although somewhat modifying its effect, did not alter the principle
upon which the original amendment rested, or remove the
objections that influenced the committee in reporting the bill
adversely. The reasons which control the action of the committee
may be briefly stated as follows:

REVIEW OF QUESTION BEFORE COMMITTEE.

1. From 1887 Congress, by the act then passed "to regulate
commerce" through all of its amendments to that act, including the
act of June 29, 1906 (which was passed after the most elaborate
investigation of the entire subject and the fullest debate), has
adhered to a fixed policy in its legislation upon this subject. It has
declared its constitutional right to regulate the transportation of
persons and property in interstate and foreign commerce, while, at
the same time, it has recognized the right of the owners of the
instrumentalities of commerce to control and manage their
properties subject to the supervision and limitation imposed by the
regulating statute, that the charges, fares and rates must be fair,
just, and reasonable; that neither discrimination as to person or
place must be found in the schedules; and that no device of any
character should result in unlawful preference between shippers.
 It has in all these acts recognized the right of the responsible
managers of the transportation interests of the country to fix the
rates for transportation, as upon its revenue must rest the efficiency
of its service to the public and the value of its property to its
holders, subject only to those wise limitations which prohibit the
exercise of these property rights to the injury of the public. Congress
has appreciated the magnitude of the vast interest affected by such
legislation. With 230,000 miles of track, with millions of rates
published in accordance with the statute, with changes of rates
numbering between 600 and 700 a day, and reaching the enormous
sum of 225,000 a year, it has, with the practical experience of
twenty-two years, refused to take the initiation of rates from the
carrier and impose it upon its administrative tribunal. Congress and
the Supreme Court have adopted the construction of the act to
regulate commerce, announced by Judge Jackson (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep., 37, and
affirmed, 145 U. S., 263):
Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be
unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate, so
as to give undue preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly
circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers as
they were at the common law, free to make special contracts looking to
the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust and
apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, same
principles, which are regarded as sound, and adopted in other trades and
pursuits.

This policy, we believe, has been approved by the country during

that period. Pending the elaborate investigation of this subject prior
to the passage of the act of June 29, 1906, no crystallized sentiment
was manifested, either in the press or during the hearings, that
indicated a public sentiment that this policy should be departed
from. Since this bill has been before your committee no such public
sentiment has been shown to exist by those who appeared before it.
The conferring upon the commission the power to suspend a rate
advanced, either upon the filing of a protest by a shipper or in the
discretion of the commission, taken in connection with the provision
of the statute which gives to the commission the power to fix a rate
and to designate the time, not longer than two years, that it should
remain in force, would ultimately turn over to that administrative
body the function of initiating the rates of the entire country. It
would offer a premium to every shipper to enter a protest to the
advance of rates, whether they were reasonable or unreasonable,
even if discretion was vested in the commission. The protest,
prepared by skilled attorneys, presenting a prima facie case of
unreasonable advance of the rate, with no opportunity for an
investigation before it must be acted upon, an official body, on which
was imposed the responsibility to act would be constrained to
suspend the rate until a final determination of the complaint.
The existing law permits any shipper to protest any rate that has
gone into effect, the hearing on the protest is made without formal
pleadings, and the commission is authorized then to determine the
question whether the rate put in effect by the carrier was a
reasonable rate or not, and, if not, to make the rate reasonable. So
far, in the practical operation of the act of June 29, 1906, this
provision of law has worked satisfactorily, and but comparatively few
of the decisions of the commission have been contested by the
carriers. Under existing law both parties are protected. If the
decision is that the rate is unreasonable a judgment may be
rendered in favor of the protestant for the difference between what
the commissioners determine is a reasonable rate and the rate fixed
by the carrier, with 6 per cent interest from the date of the
overcharge. If, on the other hand, this amendment should receive
the approval of Congress and the rate filed by the carrier should be
protested and then suspended by the commission (in the multiplicity
of duties imposed upon that tribunal), considerable time would
elapse before a final determination of the question could be reached.
During that period the carrier would be receiving only the old rate,
and if the commission finally decided that the advance was
reasonable no reparation in any way could be awarded.
It was alleged before the committee that this last result would not
be very injurious to the carrier, for the reason that it would be
receiving the rate which it had fixed as a fair compensation for the
service performed prior to the change. The answer to this seems
reasonable, which was, that conditions had so changed that it
required an advance of the rate to meet those new conditions.
Otherwise the advanced rate would have no justification. That traffic
officials fully appreciate the fact that, with the watchful eyes of every
shipper affected by an advanced rate and the authority of the
commission to determine and fix a just and reasonable rate (as a
general rule), rates would not be advanced by such officials without
a belief upon their part that there were sufficient reasons to sustain
them, if protested.
The attention of the committee has been called to the attitude of
the commission in its rulings upon the advance of rates, even where
the facts have shown that the rates have been lowered with a view
of developing a particular industry. In the case of the New Albany
Furniture Company against Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Railroad
Company, etc., decided June 2, 1908, the commission held:
"The rates were low before the increase, but having been established,
after prolonged negotiations, especially for the purpose of permitting
complainant to reach a particular market, and in preference to making a
readjustment in some other direction or territory, and complainant having
adjusted its business thereto, defendants may not by an arbitrary advance
in those rates destroy complainant's business, there being no evidence
that the rates advanced were less than the cost of service."
A similar decision was rendered on the 1st of June in the case of
Western Oregon Lumber Manufacturers' Association against the
Southern Pacific Company.
Knowledge of the views held by the commission by the traffic
officials and shippers will serve as the most effective check upon the
part of the carrier in advancing rates over those which have been in
existence for any considerable period of time, unless they can
support the advance by the most satisfactory reasons.

WOULD THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION?
 2. An objection urged to the approval of this amendment, even
though modified as suggested in committee, was that it conflicted
with the fifth amendment in depriving the carrier of its property
without due process of law.
The existing law authorizes carriers to make reasonable rates.
Congress recognizing the right of control by the carrier has provided
reasonable regulations to safeguard the interests of the public in the
exercise of that right. It authorizes a protest after the rate had gone
into effect; it provides for a full hearing after notice by the
commission; it has further extended the time when the rate shall be
made effective to thirty days from the filing of the schedule with the
commission. These were held to be reasonable regulations, but it is
claimed that under the amendment proposed to the sixth section,
that if the rate is suspended from going into effect at the end of the
thirty days by a protest, there is no limitation in the act fixing the
time when the commission shall determine the question of the
reasonableness of the advance; that the period is therefore
indefinite, depending upon numerous considerations which might
extend the time when the rate would be effective, if it was finally
held to be reasonable, to six months or a year.
That the act of suspension either by the operation of the statute
or by the commission is without notice or hearing to the carrier; that
Congress has no greater right to authorize an administrative tribunal
to suspend indefinitely the taking effect of a reasonable rate without
notice or hearing than it has the right to provide that an
administrative tribunal may authorize a rate which would yield less
than the cost of the service.
It was decided in the case of Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. against
Minnesota, 134 U. S., 418, that the right to make a reasonable rate
was a property right. In the case of Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 209 U. S., 118, the
Supreme Court said:
"It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of their
owners; that while from the public character of the work in which they are
 engaged the public has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful
and efficient service and equality between shippers and communities, yet
in no proper sense is the public a general manager."
Justice Brewer, in the above case, page 108, speaking for the
court said:
"It must also be remembered that there is no presumption of wrong
arising from a change of rate by a carrier. The presumption of honest
intent and right conduct attends the action of carriers as well as it does
the action of other corporations or individuals in their transactions in life.
Undoubtedly when rates are changed the carrier making the change must,
when properly called upon, be able to give a good reason therefor, but the
mere fact that a rate has been raised carries with it no presumption that it
was not rightfully done. Those presumptions of good faith and integrity
which have been recognized for ages as attending human action have not
been overthrown by any legislation in respect to common carriers."
It is claimed that the indefinite suspension of the rate until final
hearing is to deprive the carrier, if the rate advanced is reasonable,
of its right of property during the period of suspension, without
having given it any opportunity to be heard prior to the act of
suspension. Due process of law must precede, and should not
follow, the suspension. To set aside the carrier's act in fixing the rate
pending the investigation required by due process of law is to
deprive the carrier, pro tanto, of its property right to charge a
reasonable rate. The fact that the statute requires an investigation
after the suspension of the rate does not avoid the constitutional
inhibition, as that provision can only be satisfied when the
investigation precedes any disturbance of property rights. The carrier
is entitled to the investigation before it is restrained in the exercise
of its property rights; the theory of the amendment suggested is
that the shipper is entitled to an investigation before the carrier can
exercise its property rights.
Those contending for this objection to the amendment assumed
that the indefinite suspension without hearing of the act of the
carrier which deprived it, beyond a reasonable time, of the benefit of
the advanced rate, was in effect the same as that which was
condemned by the Supreme Court in the case of the Chicago, M. &
St. P. R. R. Co. against Minnesota. Under the statute of that State, a
carrier had the right to initiate the rate, and to put it in effect, and,
under the law, the commission was authorized to make such
changes as it deemed proper in the schedule so filed, and to direct
the carrier to modify or change the schedule in accordance with the
decision of the tribunal. In the one case the going into effect of the
rate is suspended indefinitely without notice or hearing; in the other,
the rate is changed or modified without hearing. On page 418 the
court condemns this in the following language:
"No hearing is provided for, no summons or notice to the company
before the commission has found what it is to find and declared what it is
to declare, no opportunity provided for the company to introduce
witnesses before the commission, in fact, nothing which has the
semblance of the process of law."

On page 458 the court said:

"If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates
for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence
of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of
its property, and thus, in substance and effect of the property itself
without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."
This view of the law as announced in 134 U. S. was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the case of Louisville and Nashville Co. against
Kentucky, 183 U. S., 510.
It was further suggested that if this amendment was incorporated
in the sixth section, that it was so fundamental in its character, that
if the court should hold that it was an unconstitutional exercise of
power by Congress, that it might have the effect of destroying the
entire value of this remedial legislation, as it would be impossible to
separate the clause from those provisions of the law directly
controlling the subject of rates.
The committee, without expressing any opinion upon the
constitutional questions suggested, feels that it is of sufficient
importance and gravity to cause it to hesitate to incorporate such
amendment into the sixth section, especially in view of the other
objections to such legislation.

COULD THE COMMISSION, UNDER THE AMENDMENT, FIX A REASONABLE

RATE, IF IT HELD THE PROPOSED ADVANCE RATE UNREASONABLE?

3. One of the most serious objections to this measure, if the

contentions of those who oppose it are well founded, is the assertion
that the adoption of this amendment would, in reference to
advanced rates that were protested, deprive the commission of the
power conferred upon it by the fifteenth section of the act of June
29, 1906, empowering it, if on protest and hearing it found a rate to
be unreasonable, to fix a reasonable rate.
The authority to the commission proposed in the amendment "to
hear and determine the matter in all respects as it was required to
do by sections 13 and 15 of this act," can only be construed to refer
to the procedure as provided in the thirteenth and fifteenth sections
of the interstate commerce law. There is no attempt to amend the
provisions of section 15, which confers upon the commission the
right to declare a rate unreasonable, and when so declared to fix a
reasonable rate. There are no provisions found in the amendment
suggested to the sixth section conferring upon the commission the
power, when it finds a rate proposed to be advanced unreasonable,
that it may then proceed to fix a reasonable rate.
An examination of section 15 in reference to the power of the
commission to fix a rate depends upon a condition precedent that is
clearly set forth in said section. It is, that before the commission has
the authority to fix a rate it must first reach the opinion that—
"The rates, or charges whatsoever, demanded, charged, or collected by
any common carrier or carriers, * * * or that any regulation or practice
whatsoever of such carrier or carriers affecting such rates, are
unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or are unduly preferential or
prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of the provisions of this act."

When this conclusion has been reached as to existing rates the

section then authorizes the commission—
 "to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable rate or
rates, charge or charges, to be thereafter observed in such cases as the
maximum to be charged; and what regulations or practice in respect to
such transportation is just, fair and reasonable to be thereafter followed."
To leave no doubt of the true construction of this section, an
examination of the order required to be entered by the commission
is conclusive of the meaning and intention of Congress in the
enactment of this portion of the fifteenth section. It provides:
"And to make an order that the carrier shall cease and desist from such
violation to the extent to which the commission finds the same to exist,
and shall not thereafter publish, demand, or collect any rate or charge for
such transportation in excess of the maximum rate or charge so
prescribed."
An analysis of this order of the commission which requires it to
provide "that the carrier shall cease and desist from such violation,
to the extent to which the commission finds the same to exist,"
recognizes the fact that the rate is an existing rate, is an effective
rate, is a rate in full operation, and cannot, therefore, be applied
under the provisions of the amendment suggested to the sixth
section, as no rate has gone into effect and become operative.
The subject we are considering as affected by the proposed
amendment and the provisions of the fifteenth section, do not rest
upon any principle of the common law, but are purely statutory
enactments to carry out a policy in reference to interstate commerce
deemed wise by Congress. The construction, therefore, of the
statute in this respect cannot be aided by any principles of the
common law, and the conclusion as to its meaning must rest entirely
upon the intention of the legislature as expressed by the language of
the act.
If this view of the fifteenth section is correct, the adoption of the
amendment to the sixth section would change one of the most
effective provisions of the act of June 29, 1906, and which was
contended for with such earnestness in its passage through
Congress.
 Under the amendment to the sixth section, if adopted, and a
protest was made to the advanced rate, or the commission under a
protest was authorized in its discretion to suspend the advanced
rate, until hearing as to its reasonableness, the only decision that
could be made under that amendment would be, that the rate
proposed to be advanced was either reasonable or unreasonable,
but there would exist no power in the commission, if they found the
rate unreasonable, to fix what in its judgment would be a reasonable
rate. The committee does not believe that it is the desire of
Congress, in view of the sentiment of the country as expressed in
the press and before it, to pass additional legislation which would
invite and suggest such confusion and legal difficulties in the
construction of an act which has not yet been put in full operation by
the tribunal charged with that duty.

COULD THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION, CONDEMNING AN ADVANCE

OF RATES, BE REVIEWED BY THE COURTS?

4. It was suggested to the committee that the incorporation of

this amendment to the sixth section of the act of June 29, 1906,
would deprive the carrier of the right to review by a bill in equity a
decision of the commission which denied to the carrier the right to
advance a rate. This contention is based upon the ruling of the
courts, that the making of a future rate is a legislative act, and not a
question for judicial review, and that until the rate is fixed and
becomes effective it is purely one within the legislative function, and
presents no subject cognizable by the court.
Under the amendment proposed a carrier would file a schedule of
advanced rates; a shipper enters a protest to the rate taking effect;
either by operation of the statute or the exercise of discretion by the
commission, the rate is suspended until final hearing; subsequently
there is a notice of the hearing and a decision rendered adverse to
the contention of the carrier seeking an advance of the rate. Under
these circumstances there is no remedy of review of that act of the
commission provided for by existing law or under the principles of
equity.
 Existing law, providing for a review of a decision of the
commission, does not by its terms enlarge the subject of equitable
jurisdiction. The provision of the statute confers upon the court the
right to take jurisdiction of a case against the commission and to
review its decision when based upon an existing rate. There is no
provision of the statute that contemplates the exercise of a
jurisdiction by the courts in a case arising under a provision of law
similar to the amendment sought to the sixth section of the act of
June 29, 1906. In the decision rendered by the commission denying
the right to advance the rate, the question of the reasonableness of
the former rate or of any existing rate is not involved in the order to
be entered by the commission. Under this proposed amendment the
carrier submits a proposition to advance the rate, which has never
become effective. The order of the commission would simply
approve the proposition or deny the advance of the rate. This, under
the proposed amendment, would be the extent of the authority and
act of the commission.
In the case of McChord v. L. & N. R. R. Co. (183 U. S., 483),
followed by the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Ky. (183 U. S., 503), the
court sustains the doctrine announced, and held that before a court
of equity can intervene, the administrative body must do some act
that advances beyond the legislative function. (Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S., 362; Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Railway Co., 167 U. S., 479.)
It is contended that the decision of the commission prohibiting the
advance is a legislative act, and that under the decisions of the
courts the order simply prohibiting the taking effect of a proposed
advance could not be the subject of equitable cognizance. If this
view is not correct, it is contended that the courts by overruling the
order of the commission would in effect be putting in force a future
rate. Under existing law, however, if the rate has taken effect its
reasonableness is a matter of judicial review, and should the
commission after protest and hearing declare it to be an
unreasonable rate and set the same aside in its order, that decision
is reviewable by the courts, as it presents a judicial question. The
statute conferring upon the commission the power to determine
whether an existing rate is reasonable or unreasonable has fixed the
standard which must determine the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal, and the courts have a right to review the act of the
commission, with a view of ascertaining whether it has acted within
the limitations of the power conferred upon it.
In the case of the State Corporation Commission of Virginia
against Railways, decided by Mr. Justice Holmes November 30, 1908,
speaking of the power of the commission to fix a rate and the appeal
from its decision to the court of appeals of Virginia, the court said:
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.
That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the
future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied
thereafter to all or some parts of those subject to its power. The
establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and
therefore is an act legislative, not judicial, in kind. * * *
"Proceedings legislative in nature are not proceedings in a court within
the meaning of the Revised Statutes, section 720, no matter what may be
the general or dominant character of the body in which they may take
place. * * * That question depends not upon the character of the body,
but upon the character of the proceedings. (Ex parte Va., 100; U. S., 339-
348.) They are not a suit in which a writ of error would lie under Revised
Statutes, section 709, and act of February 18, 1875. (C. 80 Stat., 318.) * *
* Litigation can not arise until the moment of legislation is passed. * * *
We may add that when the rate is fixed a bill against the commission to
restrain the members from enforcing it will not be bad as an attempt to
enjoin legislation or as a suit against a State, and will be the proper form
of remedy."
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Public
Service Commission v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, in which
the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Peckham, in deciding what
is known as the Eighty-Cent Gas Case from the southern district of
New York, is instructive upon the question discussed in this
objection.
In that case, the parties had gone to issue upon the question as to
whether the rate of 80 cents enjoined by the court from taking effect
was confiscatory. After deciding the case upon the merits in favor of
the commission, the court was unwilling, upon the supposed effect
of a rate which had never been in operation, to bar the parties of
their right when the same became effective from asking the
protection of the court against its practical results. The
memorandum announcing the position of the court upon that
question is as follows:
"As it may possibly be that a practical experience of the effect of the
acts by actual operation under them might prevent the complainant from
obtaining a fair and just return upon its property used in its business of
supplying gas, the complainant, in that event, ought to have the
opportunity of again presenting its case to the court. Therefore, the
decree is reversed, with direction to dismiss the bill without prejudice."

This case simply illustrates the fact that the court was unwilling to
decide the question finally until the rate contested had become
effective. This was a suit involving a schedule of rates, and the
question made by the record was that these rates would result in the
confiscation of the property of the complainant in violation of the
Federal Constitution. Where that question can be properly made, the
courts have intervened upon clear proof and sustained their
jurisdiction to prevent such a violation of the constitutional
protection. In this case, although the court held that the evidence
developed the fact that this allegation of the bill was not sustained,
it was so reluctant to give effect to testimony as to what might be
the effect of the rates before they were made operative that it
preserved the rights of the parties by authorizing a new suit after
the rate should become effective. Under the act to regulate
commerce, such a constitutional question could hardly be practically
raised, and the rights of the court to intervene must depend upon
the limit placed upon the power of the commission by Congress in
the enactment of the law, in fixing the standard which should guide
the commission in its action.

BURDEN IMPOSED ON THE COMMISSION.—CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION.—

HOW RATES ARE MADE.
 5. Your committee has deemed it proper that it should report to
the Senate the legal objections to the incorporation of this
amendment in the sixth section of the act of the 29th of June, 1906,
but although giving due weight to these objections, the committee
has been more strongly influenced in its adverse report upon this bill
because of the strong and forcible practical objections which have
been urged to the adoption of this amendment as a part of the
interstate commerce law.
Should this amendment become a part of the law, it would be in
the power of any shipper, whether interested or not in the result, to
file a protest against the advance of the rate which under the
proposed amendment would at once suspend its going into effect,
and under the amendment offered in committee would place it in the
power of the commission to order its suspension, if a prima facie
case was presented in the protest. The shipper in filing a protest
assumes no responsibility, either as to the effect of his action upon
the carrier or liability in any way for cost accruing during the
proceeding. Considering the thousands of articles transported by the
carriers of the country, the hundreds of thousands of rates published
for the transportation of these articles, and the thousands of
shippers interested in their movement, some idea of the number of
protests that probably would be filed on the advance of rates can be
imagined. The burden that would be thrown upon the commission in
its effort to meet this responsibility would, as Judge Cooley well
remarked, require "superhuman" efforts on its part. He said:
"Moreover, an adjudication upon a petition for relief would in many
cases be far from concluding the labors of the commission in respect to
the equities involved, for questions of rates assume new forms, and may
require to be met differently from day to day; and in those sections of the
country in which the reasons or supposed reasons for exceptional rates
are most prevalent the commission would, in effect, be required to act as
rate makers for all the roads and compelled to adjust the tariffs so as to
meet the exigencies of business while at the same time endeavoring to
protect relative rights and equities of rival carriers and rival localities. This
in any considerable State would be an enormous task. In a country so
large as ours, and with so vast a mileage of roads, it would be
superhuman. A construction of the statute which should require its
 performance would render the due administration of the law altogether
impracticable, and that fact tends strongly to show that such a
construction could not have been intended."
If the advance of rates was ultimately decided to be reasonable,
the carrier would have been deprived during the period of
suspension of the additional earnings to which it was entitled, and
under such a provision of law would be required to maintain, at
enormous expense, a large force of attorneys to answer and defend
these protests. It would confer upon the commission the powers
now exercised by the courts, and the jurisdictions over the same
subject by both the courts and the commission would necessarily
produce conflict and confusion.
The Supreme Court in the case of Texas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co. (204 U. S., 426), construing the ninth and twenty-
second sections on the right of a shipper to apply to the courts for
pecuniary redress for an alleged unreasonable rate held that, until
the protested rate was condemned by the commission, there was no
relief in the courts. This decision avoided a conflict of jurisdiction
between the courts and the commission. It would lessen very greatly
the value of the amendment of the act of June 29, 1906, which
requires thirty days' notice in a change of rate, which was adopted,
with a view of investing rate conditions with a greater degree of
stability than formerly. Under existing law, the shipper is assured of
that degree of stability, and can predicate his sales and purchases
accordingly. Under the amendment, shippers would never know
whether or not a rate is to become effective on schedule time, or at
any future time. The effect of the amendment would, therefore, be
to a considerable degree to nullify the permanency which this
amendment to the act to regulate commerce sought to impress upon
the law.
We must remember in considering this question that the majority
of advances have resulted from the practice of the roads in the
reduction of rates to meet certain commercial and economic
conditions at the time, which have usually been the result of appeals
from shippers and suggestions from commercial organizations.
 We desire to direct attention to the statement filed before the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce upon a similar bill
to this by the chairman of the committee of the Southwestern Traffic
Association, which is as follows:
"A very small percentage of the changes in freight rates, either
reductions or advances, is evolved by railroad officials. Practically every
change in rates is the result of suggestion from one or more shippers,
who find that by some modification in the existing schedules their
business in a certain territory can be increased by enabling them to meet
competition which they encounter from other sources of supply, which are
in most cases served by rival railroads. Their representation is that by the
proposed change their profit or business will be increased, and
consequently the railroad serving them will share in an augmented traffic
which, at the time of the suggestion, is being handled by the rival shipper
and carrier.
"Ninety or more per cent. of these suggestions are for reductions in
rates or for changes in rules and regulations beneficial to shippers and
classed as reductions. The railroad company is anxious at all times to
increase its traffic and gives a keen ear to such pleas of the shipper. The
railroad official to whom such requests are made carefully investigates the
conditions recited by the shipper and, by correspondence with such
railroad's representatives at the points of origin and destination, confirms,
if possible, the views of the shipper and the effect of the proposed change
on the tonnage and revenue of the company. The traffic official of the
railroad thus being daily engaged in investigations of this kind becomes
very proficient in his knowledge of the factors surrounding the movement
of the principal articles of commerce and becomes, after experience, a
ready judge of the merit of such propositions. When thus convinced, he
becomes the agent of the shipper in securing the proposed adjustment.
This may take the form of suggesting to a rival railroad that the advantage
which its shippers have enjoyed is unjust and that he should be permitted,
without any corresponding reduction on the part of such rival railroad, to
reduce his rate that the complaining shipper may profitably secure an
increased share of the competitive traffic in question. Being unable to thus
persuade the competing railroad of the merits of such a contention he is
forced to proceed by reducing his own rate without regard to the possible
change which may follow on the part of other railroads as a consequence
of his reduction.
"It will, therefore, naturally be seen that the railroad official and the
shipper are constantly planning to increase the business in which they are
jointly interested, to the disadvantage of the rival railroad and shipper.
 Sometimes these efforts result in serious rate wars until the point in
controversy has been adjusted and the competitive rates placed on a basis
which is more nearly equitable to all concerned. In many instances these
disputes result in arbitration either by the Interstate Commerce
Commission or by individuals who may be agreed upon by the contending
interests.
"Bearing in mind, therefore, that practically all rate reductions are the
result of the effort of the railroad company to serve the shipper, it can
easily be seen what the result will be if no advances in rates can be made
without practically the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Where it is difficult to restore rates to normal figures, the carrier will be
loath to reduce them in order that the shipper dependent upon such
carrier may increase, for the time being, his share in the competitive
traffic in which he is interested."

ADJUSTMENT OF RATES.—INTERRELATION OF RATES.—PRACTICAL

OPERATION OF AMENDMENT.
6. The subject of rate adjustment, even upon a single system of
transportation, is one involving great difficulty and perplexity. When
this adjustment is considered in its relation to the entire country, to
the diversified commercial conditions, as affected by commercial
competition, and as controlled by the interrelation of rates, it stands
forth as one of the most difficult of all the problems which must be
mastered that the transportation agencies may not be injuriously
crippled in the performance of their quasi public functions, or the
prosperity and development of the commercial interests be retarded
by the failure to enact proper, reasonable, and just governmental
regulations.
Rates which can be considered alone are comparatively few in
number. In the large majority of cases they are interrelated with
other rates, and frequently this interrelation exists as between areas
widely separated. The rates upon iron and steel from mills within 50
to 100 miles of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, whose
relations to each other are established by long custom and usage,
are based primarily upon the necessity of preserving a fair
comparative charge between the different shipping points and
destinations. Rates upon coal from central Pennsylvania to tide water
have close relations with the rates upon coal from West Virginia to
tide water, competing as such coal does, in the same markets. The
rates upon lumber from the Michigan markets must bear some
relation to the rates on lumber from Louisiana and Georgia to the
same market of distribution, although separated by hundreds of
miles.
The rates upon grain from western farms to eastern points bear a
relation to the other, and upon export grain the rates to the Atlantic
seaboard bear a close relation to the rates to the Gulf. The rates
upon fruit and vegetable traffic from the various shipping districts, as
California on the West and Florida on the South, must be considered
in the making of rates. The structure of rates between the territory
east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio River, and the territory
east of Pittsburg and Buffalo, including New England, is closely
interrelated; as an example, the rates between Chicago and New
York take a percentage of the Chicago rate from all points west of
Pittsburg and Buffalo. The principle of the interrelation of rates has
frequently been recognized in the decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
In the interest of the manufacturer there is a very important
relationship between rates upon different products entering into the
manufacture of a given article. In the great steel-producing districts
of the Shenango and Mahoning valleys and Pittsburg for many years
the rates upon raw material to the furnaces for the production of pig
iron have been adjusted upon a basis, so far as possible, of making
the freight cost of assembling the raw materials that enter into this
product the same to each furnace. In the one case the rate upon
coke may be higher and the rate upon ore or limestone lower; in
other cases the reverse. The adjustment of rates upon these
different raw materials is so made that when assembled at the
different furnaces the aggregate cost is relatively the same. This
illustrates the contention that such rates cannot be considered
separately, but must be taken as a whole.
 Bearing these facts in mind it is manifest that if an advance in
rates is made and the protest of one shipper shall operate as a stay
to the advance of a particular rate in which he may be interested the
result would be to burden thousands of other shippers who have
made no objection. The protesting shipper would thus secure an
advantage, enjoying for a time, at least, a rate relatively lower than
that to which he was entitled. It might be urged that it would be
open to all other shippers to file similar protests, but under the
provisions of the bill, or of the amendments suggested in committee,
the protesting shipper might wait until the last day of the thirty-day
period, thus giving no opportunity to other shippers, who would be
ignorant of his purpose, to file their protest. It would be possible if
this amendment became a law that many individual shippers would
take advantage of their competitors by making contracts upon the
basis of a lower rate and at the last moment file the protest,
suspend the advance rate, and deliver their product under such
contracts within the period of the suspension of the advanced rates
and thus profit at the expense of their competitors.
The effect of this amendment becomes more serious where the
relation of rates is between wide areas, and these relative rate
adjustments cannot be made simultaneously. The rates upon grain
for export, from the West to the Gulf, as compared with the Atlantic
seaboard, will illustrate this statement. The protest of one shipper
between two specific points would not only result in throwing out of
relation the rates from all points in that section, but would also
affect the competitive rates from other sections. Such a result would
necessarily render the rate situation in reference to the grain rates
"confusion worse confounded."
Rates in a country like the United States, which is comparatively
young, and the development of which attracts the attention of the
world, must, necessarily, be elastic, not only in the interest of the
carrier, but of the shipping public. The principle is sound and has
received the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that
rates must be fixed with regard to their relations one with the other,
and not entirely upon the cost of service. This relation is because of
the competition between shippers, between sections of shippers,
and between localities, and as (because of the rapid development of
our country in the production of new sources of supply, in the
opening up of new grain fields, flour mills, mines, and factories, etc.)
this competition is constantly changing. It is manifest that rates
must constantly fluctuate, so as to be adjusted to the new condition;
it is essential in the development of the country, even in the older
sections, that rates must be elastic, which means constant
reductions and advances.
This is in the interest of communities and the individual shipper.
There must be elasticity for other reasons, in the interest of
communities as of the railroads; in meeting changes in commercial
conditions that necessitates reductions in rates for shorter or longer
periods, as an illustration, to enable our grain and other products of
the farm to reach foreign markets, which would be impossible in one
period unless rates were lowered, whereas in other periods higher
rates could be charged without injurious results. Understanding the
conditions that surround this complex subject, it is manifest that if a
single shipper, or even the Interstate Commerce Commission, is to
have the power to prevent at any time that elasticity which involves
an advance in rates, the natural result will be that reductions will not
be made by the carrier, and the elasticity will be lost. The fear would
be ever presented to the mind of the traffic official that the rate once
reduced could not—at least, until after exhaustive and long-drawn-
out hearings before the commission—be advanced.
The necessary fluctuation in rates to meet the changing conditions
of commerce, when examined in the light of the reports of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, is startling to one not familiar
with the rapid change of commercial conditions in this country.
There were 225,982 tariff publications filed with the commission in
one year, all containing changes of rates, either reductions or
increases, and rules governing transportation. These publications—
many of them—contained a great number of different tariffs. The
Pennsylvania lines, east of Pittsburg, issued 2,200 tariffs and 3,600
supplements. About 33-1/3 per cent of these covered advances, and
66-2/3 per cent were reductions. As the law exists today, there was
no special inducement to the shipper to file protests against the
advances. Suppose, however, that this amendment had been a part
of the act to regulate commerce, how many protests would have
been filed, and what length of time would it have taken the
commission to have disposed of them? What uncertainty would have
resulted to the commercial interests while waiting for the
adjudication of these questions?

OPPORTUNITY FOR FRAUD AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE AMENDMENT.

7. One of the most serious objections urged to the passage of

this amendment is the opportunity which such a law would present
for the perpetration of frauds under it, and in the case of even
honest protest to the advance of rates, where rates rest on a
differential basis, in producing thousands of instances of unfair
discrimination.
An example under the first proposition may be stated briefly, as
follows: There are two men engaged in the same line of trade; they
are both called upon to bid on a contract involving a large amount of
a given commodity in which both deal. The carrier has given notice
of an advance in rate, effective thirty days from the filing and
publication of the schedule; the commodity is not to move for some
days; one of the bidders files his bid, based upon the advanced rate,
assuming that the notice of the carrier will be made effective; the
other shipper and bidder waits until two or three days before the
date the rate is to be made effective, files a protest, confident that it
will take three or four months to have the matter adjudicated, files
his bid against his competitor, based on the current rate, and being
the lowest, secures the contract. An example under the second
proposition would be in case of a rate published from St. Louis to be
followed differentially from Chicago by a number of competing
roads. A shipper on one of the lines, just prior to the taking effect of
the rate, would file his protest as to the rate east of Chicago. The
differential adjustment that has been made by all these roads will at
once be destroyed, and the shipper on the road against which the
protest was filed would have the advantage over all of his
competitors on the other lines in shipping east.
These discriminations between shippers would be the direct result
of the power placed by Congress in the hands of shippers and would
have received the sanction of legislative approval, and, therefore, be
lawful. The statute has taken it out of the power of the carrier to
meet such a condition and to prevent the discrimination. It cannot
change its rate under thirty days without a special order of the
commission, and that order, it must be assumed, cannot be granted
without a reasonable hearing. Congress since 1887 has sought by
the most stringent measures of legislation to prevent discrimination
and preserve equality among shippers. The original act was
demanded more to accomplish that purpose than for any other. The
Elkins Act was confined almost entirely to the subject, and the act of
June 29, 1906, increased the penalties for the violation of these
provisions. Should this policy, which has been followed for more than
twenty years, be modified and an act passed, the tendency of which
is to tempt the cupidity of the shipper to accomplish results which it
has earnestly and vigorously fought to stamp out?

WOULD PREVENT REDUCTIONS, AS WELL AS ADVANCES, IN RATES, AND

DESTROY THEIR FLEXIBILITY.
8. On the face of this amendment, it seems only to give to the
commission the authority to prevent an increase in rates, but the
practical result of such a law would be far more reaching. Such a law
would mean a rigid freight tariff in place of the present flexible and
elastic system of rates which exists alone in this country. Stability of
freight rates is important, but not to the extent that the carrier shall
not feel warranted in promptly applying remedies for the relief or
assistance of shippers who find themselves no longer able to
compete, due to advantages which other shippers have secured, or
changes which have occurred in the conditions surrounding the
marketing of their products.
A law which tends to minimize the commercial or competitive
conditions existing at the present time will necessarily result to the