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Thomas Mailund

Functional Programming in R 4
Advanced Statistical Programming for Data Science,
Analysis, and Finance
2nd ed.
Thomas Mailund
Aarhus N, Denmark

ISBN 978-1-4842-9486-4 e-ISBN 978-1-4842-9487-1

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-9487-1

© Thomas Mailund 2017, 2023

Apress Standard

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks,

service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the
absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the
relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general
use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the
advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate
at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material
contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Apress imprint is published by the registered company APress

Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY
10004, U.S.A.
Any source code or other supplementary material referenced by the
author in this book is available to readers on GitHub
(https://github.com/Apress). For more detailed information, please
visit http://www.apress.com/source-code.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Duncan Murdoch and the people on the R-help
mailing list for helping me work out a kink in lazy evaluation in the
trampoline example.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1:​Introduction
Chapter 2:​Functions in R
Writing Functions in R
Named Parameters and Default Parameters
The “Gobble Up Everything Else” Parameter:​“.​.​.​”
Lazy Evaluation
Functions Don’t Have Names
Vectorized Functions
Infix Operators
Replacement Functions
Chapter 3:​Pure Functional Programming
Writing Pure Functions
Recursion As Loops
The Structure of a Recursive Function
Tail-Recursion
Runtime Considerations
Chapter 4:​Scope and Closures
Environments and Functions
Environment Chains, Scope, and Function Calls
Scopes, Lazy Evaluation, and Default Parameters
Nested Functions and Scopes
Closures
Reaching Outside Your Innermost Scope
Lexical and Dynamic Scope
Chapter 5:​Higher-Order Functions
 Currying
A Parameter Binding Function
Continuation-Passing Style
Thunks and Trampolines
Chapter 6:​Filter, Map, and Reduce
The General Sequence Object in R Is a List
Filtering Sequences
Mapping over Sequences
Reducing Sequences
Bringing the Functions Together
The Apply Family of Functions
sapply, vapply, and lapply
The apply Function
The tapply Function
Functional Programming in purrr
Filter-like Functions
Map-like Functions
Reduce-like Functions
Chapter 7:​Point-Free Programming
Function Composition
Pipelines
Chapter 8:​Conclusions
Index
About the Author
Thomas Mailund
is Senior Software Architect at Kvantify, a
quantum computing company from
Denmark. He has a background in math
and computer science. He now works on
developing algorithms for computational
problems applicable for quantum
computing. He previously worked at the
Bioinformatics Research Centre, Aarhus
University, on genetics and evolutionary
studies, particularly comparative
genomics, speciation, and gene flow
between emerging species. He has
published Beginning Data Science in R
with Apress, as well as other books out
there.
About the Technical Reviewer
Megan J. Hirni
is currently pursuing her PhD at the
University of Missouri-Columbia with a
focus on applied statistics research. In
addition to her love for R coding, Megan
loves meeting new people and learning
new topics in multifaceted fields.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to APress Media, LLC, part of Springer
Nature 2023
T. Mailund, Functional Programming in R 4
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-9487-1_1

1. Introduction
Thomas Mailund1
(1) Aarhus N, Denmark

Welcome to Functional Programming in R 4. I wrote this book to have

teaching material beyond the typical introductory level most textbooks
on R have, where functions are simple constructions for wrapping up
some reusable instructions that you can then call when you need those
instructions run. In languages such as R, functions are more than this.
They are objects in their own right that you can also treat as data,
create and manipulate and pass around like other objects, and learning
how to do this will make you a far more effective R programmer.
The R language is a multiparadigm language with elements from
procedural programming, object-oriented programming, and functional
programming. Procedural programming focuses on the instructions you
want the computer to execute—add these numbers, put the result in
this variable, loop through this list, etc. Object-oriented programming,
on the other hand, focuses on what kind of data you manipulate, which
operations you can perform on them, and how they change when you
manipulate them. If you are interested in these aspects of the R
language, I have written another book, Advanced Object-Oriented
Programming in R, also by Apress, that you might be interested in.
Functional programming is the third style of programming, where
the focus is on transformations. Functions transform data from input to
output, and by composing transformations, you construct programs
from simpler functions to more involved pipelines for your data. In
functional programming, functions themselves are considered data, and
just as with other data, you can write transformations that take
functions as input and produce (other) functions as output. You can
thus write simple functions, then adapt them (using other functions to
modify them), and combine them in various ways to construct complete
programs.
The R programming language supports procedural programming,
object-oriented programming, and functional programming, but it is
mainly a functional language. It is not a “pure” functional language.
Pure functional languages will not allow you to modify the state of the
program by changing values parameters hold and will not allow
functions to have side effects (and need various tricks to deal with
program input and output because of it).
R is somewhat close to “pure” functional languages. In general, data
is immutable, so changes to data inside a function do ordinarily not
alter the state of data outside that function. But R does allow side
effects, such as printing data or making plots, and, of course, allows
variables to change values.
Pure functions have no side effects, so a function called with the
same input will always return the same output. Pure functions are
easier to debug and to reason about because of this. They can be
reasoned about in isolation and will not depend on the context in which
they are called. The R language does not guarantee that the functions
you write are pure, but you can write most of your programs using only
pure functions. By keeping your code mostly purely functional, you will
write more robust code and code that is easier to modify when the need
arises.
You will want to move the impure functions to a small subset of
your program. These functions are typically those that need to sample
random data or that produce output (either text or plots). If you know
where your impure functions are, you know when to be extra careful
with modifying code.
The next chapter contains a short introduction to functions in R.
Some parts you might already know, and so feel free to skip ahead, but I
give a detailed description of how functions are defined and used to
ensure that we are all on the same page. The following chapters then
move on to more complex issues.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to APress Media, LLC, part of Springer
Nature 2023
T. Mailund, Functional Programming in R 4
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-9487-1_2

2. Functions in R
Thomas Mailund1
(1) Aarhus N, Denmark

In this chapter, we cover how to write functions in R. If you already

know much of what is covered, feel free to skip ahead. We will discuss
the way parameters are passed to functions as “promises,” a way of
passing parameters known as lazy evaluation. If you are not familiar
with that but know how to write functions, you can jump forward to
that section. We will also cover how to write infix operators and
replacement functions, so if you do not know what those are, and how
to write them, you can skip ahead to those sections. If you are new to R
functions, continue reading from here.

Writing Functions in R
You create an R function using the function keyword or, since R 4.1,
the \() syntax. For example, we can write a function that squares
numbers like this:

square <- function(x) x**2

or like this:

square <- \(x) x**2

and then use it like this:

square(1:5)

## [1] 1 4 9 16 25
The shorter syntax, \(x) x**2, is intended for so-called “lambda
expressions,” and the backslash notation is supposed to look like the
Greek letter lambda, λ. Lambda expressions are useful when we need to
provide short functions as arguments to other functions, which is
something we return to in later chapters. Usually, we use the
function() syntax when defining reusable functions, and I will stick
to this notation in every case where we define and name a function the
way we did for square earlier.
The function we have written takes one argument, x, and returns
the result x**2. The return value of a function is always the last
expression evaluated in it. If you write a function with a single
expression, you can write it as earlier, but for more complex functions,
you will typically need several statements in it. If you do, you can put
the function’s body in curly brackets like this:

square <- function(x) {

x**2
}

The following function needs the curly brackets since it needs three
separate statements to compute its return value, one for computing the
mean of its input, one for getting the standard deviation, and a final
expression that returns the input scaled to be centered on the mean
and having one standard deviation.

rescale <- function(x) {

m <- mean(x)
s <- sd(x)
(x - m) / s
}

The first two statements are just there to define some variables we
can use in the final expression. This is typical for writing short
functions.
 Variables you assign to inside a function will only be visible from
inside the function. When the function completes its execution, the
variables cease to exist. From inside a function, you can see the so-
called local variables—the function arguments and the variables you
assign to in the function body—and you can see the so-called global
variables—those assigned to outside of the function. Outside of the
function, however, you can only see the global variables. At least that is
a good way to think about which variables you can see at any point in a
program until we get to the gritty details in Chapter 4. For now, think in
terms of global variables and local variables, where anything you write
outside a function is in the first category and can be seen by anyone,
and where function parameters and variables assigned to inside
functions are in the second category; see Figure 2-1. If you have the
same name for both a global and a local variable, as in the figure where
we have a global variable x and a function parameter x, then the name
always refers to the local variable.

Figure 2-1 Local and global variables

Assignments are really also expressions. They return an object, the

value that is being assigned; they just do so quietly. R considers some
expressions “invisible,” and while they do evaluate to some value or
other—all expressions do—R does not print the result. Assignments
are invisible in this way; they do return to the value on the right-hand
side of the assignment, but R makes the result invisible. You can remove
this invisibility by putting an assignment in parentheses. The
parentheses make R remove the invisibility of the expression result, so
you see the actual value:

(x <- 1:5)

## [1] 1 2 3 4 5
You can also go the other way and make a value invisible. When you
evaluate an expression, R will print it:

x**2

## [1] 1 4 9 16 25

but if you put the expression in a call to invisible, R will not

print the result:

invisible(x**2)

We usually use assignments for their side effect, assigning a name to

a value, so you might not think of them as expressions, but everything
you do in R is actually an expression. That includes control structures
like if-statements and for-loops. They return values. They are
actually functions themselves, and they return values. If you evaluate an
if-statement, you get the value of the last expression in the branch it
takes:

if (2 + 2 == 4) "Brave New World" else "1984"

## [1] "Brave New World"

If you evaluate a loop, you get the value NULL (and not the last
expression in its body):

x <- for (i in 1:10) i

x

## NULL
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
“I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans,
each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is
my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I
ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility, and I
am not afraid to do so.” (2324-PS; 3252-PS.)

Soon after he became Prussian Minister President, Goering began

to develop the Gestapo, or Secret State Police. To quote from his
own book:

“The most important thing for me was first, to get the

instrument of power of the protective police and political
police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook the first sweeping
changes of personnel. Of the 32 available colonels of the
protective police, I dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and
thousands of sergeants followed them in the course of the
next months. New forces were procured, and everywhere,
these forces were taken out of the large reserve pool of the
SA and the SS.
“For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation, and
finally I created alone and from my own conviction and own
thought the ‘Secret State Police Office’. That instrument,
feared so much by the enemies of the state, which above all
has contributed so much, that today a Communist or Marxist
danger in Germany or Prussia is hardly worth talking about
anymore.” (3251-PS)

In a public address delivered on 11 December 1934, Goering

boasted:

“We were firmly determined after assumption of power to hit

the Communists so that in Germany they would never recover
from our blow. For that we do not require a Reichstag fire.
That has been one of the most important points on our
program. In the former Weimar Constitution the destruction
of Communism was unthinkable. For the execution of these
measures we needed the instrument of a through and
through reliable, and of the highest degree powerful, police
force. I have created this instrument through the
reorganization of the field police (Landespolizei) and the
formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations will
constitute a means for implanting fear in all enemies of the
State, which a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for
always”. (3440-PS)

On 26 April 1933 Goering signed the first law officially

establishing the Secret State Police in Prussia (2104-PS). On 30
November 1933, Goering signed a law naming himself, as Prime
Minister, Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police (2105-PS). He
continued in this position until sometime in 1936, when Himmler
secured control of all police in the Reich.
Men and women taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown,
without judicial or other form of trial, into concentration camps,
which had been established in Prussia as early as the spring of 1933.
(3252-PS; L-83.)
As explained by Goering in his own book:

“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed

ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment of our
rise to power, according to the official election figures of
March 1933, six million people still confess their sympathy for
Marxism. * * * Therefore the concentration camps have been
created, where we have first confined thousands of
Communists and Social Democrat functionaries. * * *” (2344-
PS)

On 10 February 1936, Goering, as Prussian Minister President,

signed a further basic law on the Prussian Secret State Police. Article
7 of this law provided:

“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject

to the review of the administrative courts”. (2107-PS)
Thus it was made quite clear by Goering’s own law that those
imprisoned in concentration camps without trial of any kind were to
have no recourse to any court. On the same day Goering signed a
decree for the execution of the foregoing law, which further
acknowledged his responsibility for Prussian concentration camps.
Its provisions included the following:

“Art. 2 * * * (4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers

the state concentration camps.” (2108-PS)

The range of police terrorism under Goering’s leadership was

almost limitless. A glance at a few of his police directives in these
early days will indicate the extent and thoroughness with which
every dissident voice was silenced:

Directive of 22 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die

Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731): Ordered all
officials to watch the statements of employees of the Prussian
civil service and to denounce to Goering those who made
critical remarks (“Miesmacher”); failure to do so regarded as
proof of hostile attitude.
Directive of 23 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749): Suppressed all
activities of the Social Democratic Party, including meetings
and press, and ordered confiscation of its property.
Directive of 30 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793): Ordered the
Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees on
political attitudes of workers, particularly in cases of criticism
of the regime.
Directive of 15 January 1934 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 137): Ordered the
Gestapo and frontier police to keep track of and to watch
emigres, particularly political emigres and Jews, residing in
neighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and put
into concentration camps if they returned to Germany.

After the elimination of the forces of the opposition, the Nazis felt
it necessary to dispose of nonconformists within their own ranks.
During the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934, many people were
murdered who had nothing to do with the internal SA revolt but
were just “not liked very well” (2950-PS). Goering’s role in this
bloody affair was related less than two weeks later by Hitler in a
speech to the Reichstag:

“Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously

received my instructions that in case of a purge, he was to
take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia.
With an iron fist he beat down the attack on the National
Socialist State before it could develop.” (3442-PS)

(c) The Reich, 1933-39. Meanwhile, in the central Reich

government, Goering occupied a series of the highest and most
influential positions. The broad powers which devolved upon him
made him, under Hitler, the Chief Executive of the Nazi State.
With the accession to power, Goering retained the somewhat
empty title of Reichstag President but was also appointed Minister
Without Portfolio and became a cabinet member. When in an early
meeting (15 March 1933) the cabinet discussed the pending
Enabling Act (which gave the Cabinet plenary powers of legislation)
he offered the suggestion that the required two-thirds majority
might be obtained simply by refusing admittance to the Social
Democratic delegates (2962-PS). He became Reich Air Minister in
May 1933 (2089-PS). In his capacity as Air Minister and Supreme
Commander of the Luftwaffe, he sat as a member of and the
Fuehrer’s deputy on the Reich Defense Council, which was
established by the secret law of 21 May 1933 and continued by the
secret law of 4 September 1938 (2261-PS; 2194-PS). This Council
was a war planning group whose purpose was “to plan preparations
and decrees in case of war which later on were published by the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.” (2986-PS)
In 1936, Goering was made Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan
and acquired plenary legislative and administrative powers over all
German economic life. (1862-PS)
Goering was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council established
in 1938 to act as “an advisory board in the direction of foreign
policy” (2031-PS).
The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, created in
1939, took over, in effect, all the legislative powers of the Cabinet
which had not been reserved to Hitler’s personal control or to
Goering as the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Goering became the
Chairman of this Council. (2018-PS)
Finally, as the invading Nazi armies marched into Poland, Hitler
announced the designation of Goering as successor designate, the
heir apparent of the “New Order.”
(d) Economic Preparation for War, 1933-1939.
In April 1936, Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw
Materials and Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise all
State and Party activities in these fields (2827-PS). In this capacity
he convened the War Minister, the Minister of Economics, the Reich
Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank, and the Prussian
Finance Minister to discuss inter-agency problems connected with
war mobilization. At a meeting of this group on 12 May 1936, when
the question of the prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material
substitutes arose, Goering said:

“If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by

substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is
the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites
for that in peace.” (1301-PS)

At a subsequent meeting of the same men on 27 May 1936, Goering

suggested a program of plant construction for the production of
synthetic substitutes but warned against the financial strain involved
in excessive overexpansion. He opposed any limitations dictated by
orthodox financial policy and stated:

“All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an

assured waging of war.
“Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in

On the Nurnberg Party Day in the fall of 1936, Hitler proclaimed

the establishment of the Four-Year Plan, a comprehensive program
of national self-sufficiency, and announced the appointment of
Goering as “Plenipotentiary” in charge. In October, a decree was
promulgated which implemented this announcement and provided
for the execution of the plan. (1862-PS)
It is clear from Goering’s own statements in an interrogation on
25 June 1945 that the purpose of the Plan was to place Germany on
a war footing economically:

“Goering: ‘My job was to organize the German economy and

my energy was put to work to get things started and carried
through * * *. My main task was to secure the food supply
for Germany for many years ahead and to make Germany
self-sufficient. The most important items were iron, petroleum
and rubber. * * * The industry only wanted to have very high
grade Swedish iron for business reasons. There was danger
that during the war Germany would not be able to get iron
from Sweden and there would be no iron.’
Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936
you’re speaking of.’
Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in
case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’ ”

When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost importance in
1942, Goering explained that his preoccupation with the Air Force
did not allow him the necessary concentration on the affairs of the
Four-Year Plan, and stated:
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished.
This task was to get Germany ready.”

These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that

his chief task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was “to put
the whole economy on a war footing within four years.” (EC-408) As
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Goering was virtually the
economic dictator for Germany with control over all other interested
Reich agencies. He was the “boss of the economy,” and all important
decisions had to be referred to him.
Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired
and directed the preparation of the German economy for aggressive
war. On 8 July 1938 he addressed a number of leading German
aircraft manufacturers, explained the political situation, and laid the
groundwork for a vast increase in aircraft production. After stating
that war with Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the
German air force was already superior in quality and quantity to the
English, he continued:

“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in
the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be
a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only
thing that matters is increased output regarding quantity and
quality. Even if the manufacturers know that their present
policies may mean their bankruptcy within three years, they
will have to do it all the same * * * I want you to be perfectly
resolved, today already, how you will run your business when
war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make their
preparations for mobilization today, the less danger there will
be of work being held up. It must be determined for every
worker whether he is essential for production upon outbreak
of war, and measures must be taken to secure his deferment
in case of mobilization. (3441-PS). An executive will be put in
charge to work on nothing but the complete preparation of
each plant for mobilization day.” (R-140)
A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938,
another conference was held in Goering’s office. He began with the
statement that Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic
armament program which would make insignificant all previous
achievements. He indicated that he had been ordered to build as
rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to increase the
speed of Army and Navy armament, and to concentrate on offensive
weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then
proposed a specific program designed to accomplish these ends.
(1301-PS)
(e) Military Mobilization for War. In his dual role as Reich Air
Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, it was
Goering’s function to develop the Luftwaffe to practical war strength.
As early as March 1935 Goering frankly announced to the world that
he was in the process of building a true military air force:

“After the German government expressed willingness to help,

it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within
German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will
be able to be made available? This situation brought about
the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in
future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future
remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary
to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members
of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law
and their leaders became officers.” (2292-PS)

Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers, Goering

spoke in a still bolder vein:

“I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour

should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of
revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of being lost already
before even having fought. * * *”
 In the same year, he signed his name to the Conscription Law
which provided for compulsory military service and constituted an
act of defiance on the part of Nazi Germany in violation of the
Versailles Treaty. (1654-PS)
Goering’s statements during this period left no doubt in the
minds of Allied diplomats that Germany was engaged in full
mobilization of air power for an impending war.

“Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that

the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the
weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant
position and the weapon which could be developed the most
rapidly and in the shortest time . . . High ranking Nazis with
whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such
as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others,
repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character
of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would
observe her international undertakings only so long as it
suited Germany’s interests to do so.” (2385-PS)

(2) The Launching of Aggressive War. Goering was the central

figure in the preparation of Germany for military aggression. In
German economic development and military growth he held the key
positions throughout the prewar period. Although he held no official
position in the field of foreign affairs, Goering also figured
prominently in all of the major phases of Nazi international
aggression between 1937 and 1941. As “No. 2 Nazi” he was a
leading participant in every major plan of territorial aggrandizement
or offensive military strategy.
Goering was the prompter and director of the diplomatic tragi-
comedy leading to the Austrian Anschluss. In the middle of
November 1937, Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France,
reported the following conversation with Goering:
“I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely
determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this
was an absolute determination of the German Government.
The German Government at the present time was not
pressing this matter because of certain momentary political
considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but
Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question
other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.
He then added a statement which went further than any I
have heard on this subject: He said, ‘There are schemes
being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the
head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to
us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be
an immediate casus belli’.” (L-151)

When the time came, on 11 March 1938, Goering was in complete

command. Throughout the afternoon and evening of that day he
directed by telephone the activities of Seyss-Inquart, also of Keppler,
Ullrich, and the other Nazi operatives in Vienna. (2949-PS); (the
pertinent portions of these telephone conversations have already
been referred to in Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against
Austria.)
In the late afternoon Goering gave the following order to Seyss-
Inquart:

“Now, remember the following: You go immediately together

with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the
conditions which are known to you are not accepted
immediately, the troops who are already stationed in and
advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the
whole line, and Austria will cease to exist.” (2949-PS)

Early the same evening he dictated to Seyss-Inquart the telegram

which the latter was to send to Berlin requesting the Nazi
Government to send German troops to “prevent bloodshed”. Two
days later he was able to call Ribbentrop in London and say:

“Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely over-

shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to
me last night. You must remember it was the first time that
he saw his homeland again. Now, I merely want to talk about
political things. Well, this story we have given an ultimatum,
that is just foolish gossip.” (2949-PS)

Goering played a similarly important role in the attack on

Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with
Austria, he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian
Minister in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way
have a detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, and had emphasized the continued earnest
endeavor on the part of Germany to improve these mutual relations.
In this connection, Goering used the expression: “Ich gebe Ihnen
mein Ehrenwort. (I give you my word of honor)” (TC-27). On the
other hand, in his address to German airplane manufacturers on 8
July 1938, he made his private views on this subject clear:

“Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed

Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil
wells, etc. Moreover, since there are democratic countries on
the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is
enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how
and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one
among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it
may also take some years. At present, the situation is this
that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to
meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no
more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action
on their part would probably suit our policy best, since in this
case we could put the entire responsibility on England
because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.”
(R-140)

On 14 October 1938, shortly after the Munich agreement, Goering

gave his views on the Czechoslovakian question at a conference in
the Air Ministry:

“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means.

General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete
industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia
would become German dominions. Everything possible must
be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up.
Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia,
notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS)

Meanwhile, he was deceiving the representatives of the puppet

Slovakian government to the same end:

“The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak negotiations

toward independence are to be supported in a suitable
manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our
mercy.” (2801-PS)

In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia complete

Goering frankly stated what Germany’s purpose had been
throughout the whole affair:

“In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that

the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German
economy had taken place, among other reasons to increase
the German War potential by exploitation of the industry
there.” (R-133)

Goering was also a moving force in the later crimes against the
peace. As the successor designate to Hitler, as Chief of the Air
Forces, and as economic czar of Greater Germany, he was a party to
all the planning for military operations of the Nazi forces in the East
and the West. In the Polish affair, for example, it was Goering who in
1935 gave assurances to the Polish government that “there should
be not the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it (the
German-Polish alliance) would not be continued in the future.” Yet,
four years later, Goering helped formulate plans for the invasion of
Polish territory.
With regard to the attack upon the Soviet Union, plans for the
ruthless exploitation of Russian territory were made months in
advance of the opening of hostilities. Goering was placed in charge
of this army of spoliation, whose mission was that of “seizing raw
materials and taking over all important concerns.” (1317-PS; 1157-
PS.)
These specific instances cover only a small part of Goering’s
activities in the field of aggressive war. There follows a partial list of
additional documents which demonstrate Goering’s knowledge of
and continued participation in the Nazi war program. They deal
either with conferences on the highest war-planning levels which he
attended, or with secret orders communicated to him outlining in
advance the official plans for the execution of the successive acts of
aggression.
Meetings and Conferences Attended:
Conference in Reichskanzlei, 5 November 1937, to outline the
necessity for expanding German foreign policy; plans discussed for
the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia. (386-PS)
Entry in Jodl diary, 10 March 1938, referring to meeting attended
by Goering and others at which the preparation of “Case Otto” and
the mobilization of the army and the air force were ordered. (1780-
PS)
Top secret conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939, the subject of
which was indoctrination on the political situation and foreign aims.
(L-79)
Meeting with Hitler, 22 August 1939, attended by commanders of
the armed forces at which immediate plans for Polish invasion were
discussed. (L-3; 798-PS; 1014-PS)
Hitler’s speech to all military commanders on 23 November 1939,
regarding the invasion of the low countries. (789-PS)
 Meetings of 8 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, at which Hitler
outlined the prospective operations against Yugoslavia and Greece.
(1746-PS)
Orders and Other Directives Received:
Directive of Blomberg to the armed forces containing plans for
military operations in the event that sanctions were applied against
German withdrawal from League of Nations. (C-140)
Top secret directive of Blomberg of 2 May 1935, with plans for
operation “Schulung” (the reoccupation of the Rhineland). (C-139)
Top secret letter from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935, enclosing
copy of secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and decision of
Reich Cabinet of the same date. (2261-PS)
Order of Blomberg of 2 March 1936, giving the operational basis
for the Rhineland occupation. (C-159)
Directives from Hitler and Keitel April to August 1939 on
preparation and invasion of Poland. (C-120)
Operational file, “Fall Weiss,” the code name for the Polish
operation. (C-126)
Directive from GAF, dated 25 August 1938, regarding the
acquisition of bases in the low countries. (375-PS)
Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war, dated 9 October 1939,
signed by Hitler, and orders of Keitel, dated 15 November 1939, on
the plans for “Fall Gelb”, (operation in the West). (C-62)
Orders of the Supreme Command from 7 November 1939 to 9
May 1940, regarding the opening of the invasion in the West. (C-72)
Order of Hitler No. 8, 20 November 1939, for the execution of
“Fall Gelb”. (440-PS)
Operational plans signed by Keitel on 28 November 1939, on
action near the French-Belgium borders. (C-10)
Entries in Jodl diaries from 1 February to 26 May 1940 confirming
plans for invasion of the West. (1809-PS)
OKW orders, 27 January 1940, signed by Keitel on preparation
for “Fall Weseruebung” (Invasion of Norway and Denmark). (C-63)
Fuehrer order of 1 March 1940 for the execution of “Fall
Weseruebung.” (C-174)
 Most secret order from Hitler’s headquarters, dated 19 February
1941, on plans for the invasion of Greece. (C-59)
Top secret operational order on “Case Barbarossa” (invasion of
the Soviet Union), dated 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel. (447-PS)
Time table for “Case Barbarossa,” signed by Keitel. (C-39)
Top secret memorandum of 29 October 1940, signed by
Falkenstein, Luftwaffe liaison officer with OKW, discussing need for
the seizure of air bases in the event of future war with the United
States. (376-PS)
Basic order No. 24, dated 5 March 1941, signed by Keitel,
regarding German collaboration with Japan. (C-75)

B. WAR CRIMES.
(1) Forced Labor, Deportation, and Enslavement of Residents of
Occupied Territories.
The slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators had two
criminal purposes. The first was to satisfy the labor requirements of
the Nazi war machine by forcing residents of occupied countries to
work in Germany, often directly in the German armament industry,
and the second was to destroy or weaken the peoples of the
occupied territories. Millions of foreign workers were taken to
Germany, for the most part under pressure and generally by physical
force. These workers were forced to labor under conditions of
undescribable brutality and degredation, and often they were used
in factories and industries devoted exclusively to the production of
munitions of war. (See Chapter X on The Slave Labor Program.)
Goering was at all times implicated in the slave labor program.
Recruitment and allocation of manpower and determination of
working conditions were included in his jurisdiction as
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and from its beginning a part
of the Four-Year Plan Office was devoted to such work. (1862-PS;
2827-PS.)
The defendant Goering was present at a meeting in Hitler’s study
on 23 May 1939 at which Hitler, after declaring his intention to
attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity, said:
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. * * * The
population of non-German areas will perform no military
service and will be available as a source of labor.” (L-79)

Soon after the fall of Poland, Goering as Plenipotentiary for the

Four-Year Plan, began the enslavement of large numbers of Poles.
On 25 January 1940, the defendant Frank, then Governor General of
Poland, reported to Goering as follows:

“For the execution of the task of systematically placing the

economic strength of the Generalgouvernement, within the
framework of the Four-Year Plan, in the service of the German
defense industry, I give the following
DIRECTIVES
“1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the
defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to
carry on a long-term economic policy in the
Generalgouvernement. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the
economy of the Generalgouvernement that it will, in the
shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the
maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of
the Generalgouvernement for immediate strengthening of our
capacity for defense. * * *
“2. (g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male
and female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—
among them at least 7500 000 [sic] agricultural workers of
which at least 50% must be women—in order to guarantee
agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement for
industrial workers lacking in the Reich. * * *” (1375-PS)

That orders for this enormous number of workers originated with

the defendant Goering is clear from the following statement in
Frank’s Diary for 10 May 1940:
“Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the
Compulsory Labor Service of the Poles. Upon the demands
from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may
be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was
not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich.
This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and
female Poles. Because of these measures a certain
disquietude had developed which, according to individual
reports, was spreading very much, and which might produce
difficulties everywhere. General Fieldmarshal Goering some
time ago pointed out in his long speech the necessity to
deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far was
160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome.
Therefore it would be advisable to consult the district and
town chiefs in the execution of the compulsion, so that one
could be sure from the start that this action would be
reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles when
leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an
increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he
had no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet
often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets.
The best method for this, however, would be the organization
of a raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole
in the street and to question him what he was doing, where
he was working, etc.” (2233-A-PS)

Goering was also responsible for the harsh treatment given these
workers when they reached Germany. On 8 March 1940, as
Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan and as Chairman of the Cabinet
Counsel for the Defense of the Reich, he issued a directive to the
Supreme Reich authorities, entitled: “Treatment of male and female
civilian workers of Polish Nationality in the Reich.” In this directive
Goering provided in part:

“The mass employment of male and female civilian workers of

Polish nationality in the Reich necessitates a comprehensive
ruling on treatment of these workers.
“The following orders are to be executed at once:
* * * * * *
“4. The blameless conduct of the Poles is to be assured by
special regulations. The legal and administrative regulations,
necessary for this, will be issued by the Reichsfuehrer-SS and
Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the
Interior.
“6. Attention is drawn to the explanations enclosed as
appendix.” (R-148)

Attached to this directive, and also dated 8 March 1940, were a

series of regulations issued by Himmler, as Reichfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police. These regulations provided for stringent
measures and discrimination against Polish workers in the Reich. In
a covering Express Letter addressed to all State Police district-offices
and State Police offices, also dated 8 March 1940, Himmler made
clear what was intended in order to secure “blameless conduct”. He
stated:

“The steps to be taken to combat insubordination and

noncompliance with the duty to work, must be decided
according to the severity of the case and to the spirit of
resistance of the offender. It is of most importance that they
be taken immediately after the offense is committed so that
they have a decisive effect. In accordance with my
instructions in the appended decrees, especially severe
measures must be taken during the first eight weeks, in order
to bring home to the workers of Polish nationality from the
outset the consequences of noncompliance with the orders
issued. * * *
“In general, in all cases where a warning, by the State Police
or a short imprisonment is not sufficient to induce the worker
to fulfill his duties, application is to be made for his transfer to
a labor training camp, and an opinion given on what
treatment he should receive there. The treatment in the labor
training camps will have to be in accordance with, the
severity of the offense. It is suitable, e.g., to make obstinate
shirkers work in the stone-quarries of the Mauthausen camp.
By a special decree, to the heads of SS-Deathshead Units and
concentration camps, I have ordered that the treatment of
these persons under protective custody be undertaken in a
concentration camp.
“Extraordinarily serious cases have to be reported to the Chief
of the Security Police and the SD who, after examination,
make the decision on a special treatment of the workers of
Polish nationality in question.” (R-148)

On 29 January 1942 the Division for the Employment of Labor in

the Four-Year Plan Office issued a circular, signed by Dr. Mansfeld,
the General Delegate for Labor Employment in the Four-Year Plan
Office, and addressed to various civilian and military authorities in
the occupied territories, explaining the various means to be used to
force workers to go to Germany. The circular provides in part:

“Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the

German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations
for mobilization by force.
“On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered
more acute by the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other
hand, the increased scope of the armament problem in the
German Reich, render it necessary that manpower for service
in the Reich be recruited from the occupied territories to a
much greater extent than heretofore, in order to relieve the
shortage of labor. Therefore, any and all methods must be
adopted which make possible the transportation, without
exception and delay, for employment in the German Reich, of
manpower in the occupied territories which is unemployed or
which can be released for use in Germany after most careful
screening.
“This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried
out on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort
for employment in the German Reich must be strengthened
considerably. But if satisfactory results are to be obtained, the
German authorities, who are functioning in the occupied
territories, must be able to exert any pressure necessary to
support the voluntary recruiting of labor for employment in
Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be necessary,
the regulations in force in the occupied territories in regard to
shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal
to work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations
concerning shift in employment must above all insure that
older personnel who are freed must be exchanged for
younger personnel to make up for it, so that the latter may be
made available for the Reich. A far-reaching decrease in the
amount of relief granted by Public Welfare must also be
effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in
the Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the
amount in comparison with the average wages in the Reich
and the possibilities there for sending remittances home may
serve as an inducement to accept employment in the Reich.
When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, the
compensation must be reduced to an amount barely enough
for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this connection,
partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to
particularly heavy obligatory labor may be considered.
“However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity
of supplying the deficit in manpower caused by excessive
draft calls into the Armed Forces, in order to avoid detriment
to the armament industry. For this purpose the forcible
mobilization of workers from the occupied territories cannot
be disregarded, in case the voluntary recruiting is
unsuccessful. The mere possibility of mobilization by force
will, in many cases, make recruiting easier.
“Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in
your district which will promote the employment of workers in
the German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request
you to prepare for publication regulations applying to forced
mobilization of laborers from your territory for Germany, so
that they may be decreed at once, in case recruiting on a
voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that is relief
of the manpower shortage in the Reich. I request you to
inform me of the measures taken by you.” (1183-PS)

On 21 March 1942, Hitler promulgated a decree appointing

Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Man Power. This decree provided
in part:

“In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war

industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is
necessary that the utilization of all available manpower,
including that of workers recruited [erwerben] abroad and of
prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control,
directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war
industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized
manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the
Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the
occupied territories, should be mobilized.
“Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out
this task within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, as
plenipotentiary general, for the employment of manpower. In
that capacity he will be directly responsible to the
Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan.” (1666-PS)

On 27 March 1942, Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year

Plan, issued a decree in pursuance of the Fuehrer’s decree of 21
March 1942. This decree provided:

“In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942

(RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:
“1. My manpower sections (Geschaeftsgruppen
Arbeitseinsatz) are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct
1936/ St M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and
allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions
(Arbeitsbedingungen)) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary
General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
“2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be
responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage
policy) employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the
requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
“3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of
the Four-Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required,
or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit
appropriate proposals to me.
“4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at
his disposal for the performance of his task the right
delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the
higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices,
and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector,
the General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of
the civil administrations. In the case of ordinances and
instructions of fundamental importance a report is to be
submitted to me in advance.” (1666-PS)

Since Sauckel was an authority of the Four-Year Plan, it is clear

that Goering remains responsible for the war crimes committed by
Sauckel as Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower. (See Chapter X on
The Slave Labor Program.)
(2) Employment of Prisoners of War in War Industry. The Nazi
conspirators ordered prisoners of war to work under dangerous
conditions, and in the manufacturing and transportation of arms or
munitions, in violation of the Laws of War and of Articles 31 and 32
of the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 on Prisoners of War. (See
Chapter X on The Illegal Use of Prisoners of War.)
 Goering had a part in these crimes. At a conference on 7
November 1941, the subject of which was the employment of
Russians, including Russian prisoners of war, it appears from a
memorandum signed by Koerner, State Secretary to the defendant
Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, that Goering gave
the following directives for use of Russians as laborers:

“I. The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are
also decisive for the war.
“The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity
during the development of the huge Russian industry.
Therefore it must be made available to the Reich from now
on. Objections against this order of the Fuehrer are of the
secondary nature. The disadvantages which can be created
by the Arbeitseinsatz have to be reduced to a minimum: the
task especially of counter-intelligence and security police.
“II. The Russian in the zone of operations.
“He is to be employed particularly in building roads and
railroads, in clearing work, clearing of mines and in building
airports. The German construction battalions have to be
dissolved to a great extent (Example: Air Forces!); the
German skilled workers belong to the war industry; it is not
their task to shovel and to break stones, the Russian is there
for that.”
* * * * * *
“IV. The Russian in the Reich territory including the
Protectorate.
“The number of the employed depends on the requirement.
By determining the requirement, it is to be considered that
workers of other states who produce little and eat much are
to be shipped out of the Reich and that in the future the
German woman should come less into the foreground in the
labor process. Beside the Russian prisoners of war, free
Russian workers should also be used.
“A. The Russian Prisoner of War.
“1. The selection has to take place already in the collecting
camps, beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical
condition are decisive. At the same time screening as to
nationality and according to the requirements of the security
police and counter-intelligence must take place.
“2. The transportation has to be organized just as the
selection and not improvised. The prisoners are to be
forwarded rapidly. Their feeding should be orderly and their
guarding unconditionally secured.
“3. Officers are to be excluded from the work as much as
possible, commissars as a matter of principle.
“4. The Russian belongs in first line to the following work
places (in order of priorities):

Mining.
Railroad maintenance (including repair shops and
construction of vehicles).
War industry (tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts).
Agriculture.
Building industry.
Large scale workshops (shoe shops!)
Special units for urgent, occasional and emergency work.

* * * * * *
“B. The Free Russian Worker.
Employment and treatment, will not be handled in practice
differently than for Russian prisoners of war. In both
categories, particularly good production can be acknowledged
by a limited distribution of luxury items. Sufficient, adequate
nourishment is also the main thing for the free workers.”
(1193-PS)
 In a set of top secret notes on what was apparently the same
conference, the following appears:

“NOTES
On outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting
of 7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)
“SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.
“The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of
war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5
million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.
“Directives for employment:
“Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into
armament industry (Rue-wirtschaft)
“Serbs: Preferably agriculture.
“Poles: If feasible no individual employment
achievement of Russian armament industry
surpasses the German one. Assembly linework,
a great many mechanical devices with
relatively few skilled workers.
“Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is
strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners
of war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large
numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of
the factories. * * *
“Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz
“Rather employ PW’s than unsuitable foreign workers. Seize
Poles, Dutchmen, etc. if necessary as PW’s and employ them
as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained.
Strong action.” (1206-PS)

In a secret letter from the Reichsminister of Labor to the

Presidents of the Regional Labor Exchange Offices, the following
appears:
“Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are
to be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in
the armament industry, and are to be assigned to the
armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower
supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet PW’s. The
transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be
accomplished by 1 October.” (3005-PS)

(3) Looting and Destruction of Works of Art. The Nazi

conspirators planned and organized the cultural impoverishment of
every country in Europe: the plunder of works of art by the
Government General in occupied Poland and the activities of the
Einsatzstab Rosenberg are outstanding examples. (See Chapter XIV
on the Plunder of Art Treasures.)
Goering was continuously connected with these activities. In
October 1939 he requested a Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann to undertake
immediately the “securing” of all Polish art treasures. In an affidavit,
Dr. Muehlmann states:

“I was the special deputy of the Governor General of Poland,

Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the
General Government, October 1939 to September 1943.
“Goering, in his function as chairman of the Reich Defense
Council, had commissioned me with this duty.
“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor
General, Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art
treasures, which belonged to Polish public institutions, private
collections and the Church. I confirm, that the art treasures,
mentioned, were actually confiscated, and it is clear to me,
that they would not have remained in Poland in case of a
German victory, but that they would have been used to
complement German artistic property.” (3042-PS)

Indicative of the continued interest taken by Goering in these

operations, it appears from Dr. Muehlmann’s report that at one time
31 valuable sketches by the artist Albrecht Durer were taken from a
Polish collection and personally handed to the defendant Goering,
who took them to the Fuehrer’s headquarters. (1709-PS)
The part played by Goering in looting of art by the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg has been shown in Chapter XIV. On 5 November 1940
Goering issued an order under his own signature directed to the
Chief of the Military Administration Paris, and to the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg, as follows:

“In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing
of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military
Administration Paris and the special service staff Rosenberg
(the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 2 f
28.14. W.Z.Nr 3812/40 g), the art objects brought to the
Louvre will be disposed of in the following way:
“1. Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved
for himself the decision as to their use.
“2. Those art objects which serve to the completion of the
Reich Marshal’s collection.
“3. Those art objects and library stocks the use of which
seem useful to the establishing of the higher institutes of
learning and which come within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg.
“4. Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German
museums, of all these art objects a systematic inventory will
be made by the special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will
then be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance
of the Luftwaffe.” (141-PS)

In view of the high priority afforded by the foregoing order to the

completion of Goering’s own collection, it is not surprising to find
that he continued to aid the operations of the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg. Thus, on 1 May 1941, Goering issued an order to all
Party, State, and Wehrmacht Services, under his own signature,
requesting them—