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Varun Gor

Creating Responsive Websites Using

HTML5 and CSS3
A Perfect Reference for Web Designers
Varun Gor
Bengaluru, India

ISBN 978-1-4842-9782-7 e-ISBN 978-1-4842-9783-4

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-9783-4

© Varun Gor 2023

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively
licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in
any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks,

service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the
absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the
relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general
use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the
advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate
at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Apress imprint is published by the registered company APress

Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY
10004, U.S.A.
This book is dedicated to all the hustlers who have started from ground
zero, putting in effort day after day to progress and achieve their goals.
#KeepItUp #Hustlers #Achievers
Any source code or other supplementary material referenced by the
author in this book is available to readers on GitHub
(https://github.com/Apress). For more detailed information, please
visit https://www.apress.com/gp/services/source-code.
Acknowledgments
First I would like to acknowledge my mother, wife, and brother who
supported me in this venture and believed that I could do something I
never thought was possible for me. I also acknowledge the guidance of
my mentors who have shaped my career in the field of IT.
I would also like to acknowledge the Apress team, particularly Divya
Modi and Shonmirin P.A., who went through the trouble of chasing
down every minute detail and helping me shape this book. This was a
tough time for them, and this book would have not been possible
without them.
A special acknowledgment goes to my two furry friends, Coco and
Arlo. The way they light up the surroundings has made it easy for me
(actually everyone) to complete this book.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1:​Introduction to Web Development
Need for Web Development
Technologies Used in Web Development
How HTML Works in a Web Browser
HTML Elements
HTML Page Structure
How CSS Works
The Problem CSS Solves
CSS Selectors
Summary
Chapter 2:​HTML5 and Responsive Web Design
What HTML5 Features Are Supported by Browsers?​
How to Write HTML5 Pages
Writing HTML5 Code Is Easy
Semantic Elements in HTML5
New Semantic Elements
Text-Level Semantics in HTML5
Why Are Text-Level Semantics Important?​
How to Use Text-Level Semantics
Audio and Video Capabilities of HTML5
Summary
Chapter 3:​Cascading Style Sheets and Layouts
CSS and Responsive Design
Using Floats
Building a Float Layout
 Box-Sizing or Border-Box
Introduction to Flexboxes
Flexbox Overview
Arranging the Flex Items
Properties of Flex
Building a Flexbox Layout
Introduction to CSS Grid
CSS Grid:​Revolutionizing Web Layout Design
What Is a CSS Grid?​
Defining a Grid
Placing Grid Items
Grid Lines and Areas
Alignment and Spacing
Responsive Design with CSS Grid
Browser Support
Sizing Grid Columns and Rows
Placing and Aligning Grid Items
Building a CSS Grid Layout
Summary
Chapter 4:​Media Queries
What Are Media Queries?​
Common Media Features
Significance of Media Queries
How Does a Media Query Work?​
Building a Simple Media Query Project
Summary
Chapter 5:​CSS Selectors, Color Modes, and More
Exploring the Power of CSS3
Understanding the Building Blocks of Styling
The Power of Vendor Prefixes
Multiple Columns and Responsive Design in CSS3
Beautifying the Column Layout
Word Wrapping
New CSS3 Selectors
The Universal Selector
Attribute Selectors
Negation Selector
Adjacent Sibling Selector
General Sibling Selector
First Child Selector
Last Child Selector
Empty Selector
Nth Child Selector
Root Selector
CSS3 String Manipulation Attribute Selectors
Attribute Selectors Recap
Substring Matching Attribute Selectors
Prefix Match
Suffix Match
Substring Match
Word Match
Practical Examples
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 Custom Web Typography
Web Fonts
Font Stacks
Text Effects and Decorations
Variable Fonts
Animations and Transitions
@font-face Typography in Responsive Design
Font Selection
Font Formats
Media Queries
Fluid Typography
Performance Optimization
CSS3 Color Formats
RGBA and HSLA
HEX with Alpha Channel
CSS Named Colors
Hue Saturation Lightness
RGB with Percentage
Transparent
Summary
Chapter 6:​Animations and Transitions in CSS3
Animating with CSS3
What Are the Animation Properties?​
Animating an Object
CSS3 Transitions
Understanding CSS3 Transitions
 Key Concepts of CSS3 Transitions
Implementing CSS3 Transitions
The Properties of Transition
transition-property
transition-duration
transition-timing-function
transition-delay
The Transition Shorthand Property
transition
transition-property
transition-duration
transition-timing-function
transition-delay
Understanding Timing Functions
The Basics of Timing Functions
Common Timing Functions
Creating Custom Timing Functions
Experimentation and Fine-Tuning
CSS3 2D Transitions
Understanding CSS3 2D Transformations
Translation
Scaling
Rotation
Skewing
Origin Manipulation
Combining Transformations
 CSS3 3D Transformations
Understanding CSS3 3D Transformations
Key Concepts of CSS3 3D Transformations
Summary
Chapter 7:​Background and Shadows in CSS
Text Shadows with CSS3
Allowed Color Values
How to Prevent a Text Shadow
An Embossed Text Shadow Effect
Multiple Text Shadows
Box Shadows
Understanding the box-shadow Property
Basic Box Shadows
Multiple Shadows for Complex Effects
Inset Shadows:​Creating Sunken Elements
Creating Text Shadows
Background Gradients
Repeating Gradients
Multiple Background Images
Sizable Icons for Responsive Design
Best Practices for Using Scalable Icons in Responsive Design
Summary
Chapter 8:​Forms with HTML
HTML5 Forms
Decoding the HTML5 Form Elements
Input Type
required
placeholder
autofocus
Points to Consider
autocomplete
Usage of autocomplete Attribute
dropdown and Its Associated Values
The <datalist> Element
The <input> Element with the list Attribute
HTML5 Input Types
Text Input
Password Input
Number Input
Email Input
URL Input
Tel Input
Date Input
Time Input
Datetime Input
Month Input
Week Input
Color Input
Checkbox Input
Radio Input
File Input
Search Input
 Range Input
Submit Input
Reset Input
Button Input
Polyfill Nonsupportive Browsers
Summary
Chapter 9:​Cross-Browser Challenges and How to Resolve Them
Cross-Browser Challenges
Progressive Enhancement:​Building from the Ground Up
Graceful Degradation:​Starting at the Pinnacle
Balancing Act:​Which Approach to Choose?​
Progressive Enhancement vs.​Graceful Degradation
When to Choose Progressive Enhancement
When to Choose Graceful Degradation
Making the Choice:​Balancing Priorities
Accommodating Older Versions of Internet Explorer
Modernizr and How It Is Used in Responsive Design
What Is Modernizr?​
Why Is Modernizr Important for Responsive Design?​
Using Modernizr in Responsive Design
Modernizr and Its Support for HTML5
Understanding Modernizr:​A Brief Overview
HTML5:​The Evolution of Web Standards
Modernizr and HTML5 Feature Detection
Adding Media Query Capabilities for Internet Explorer 6, 7, and
8
 Understanding the Problem:​Limited Media Query Support
Introducing Modernizr’s Feature Detection
Using Modernizr for Min/​Max Media Queries
Conditional Loading with Modernizr
Understanding Conditional Loading
The Role of Modernizr
Advantages of Conditional Loading with Modernizr
Implementing Conditional Loading with Modernizr
Summary
Index
About the Author
Varun Gor
has more than 14 years of experience
creating websites using Java, HTML, CSS,
and JavaScript technologies and has
worked with major IT companies with
global clienteles. Varun graduated with a
degree in computer science from
Visvesvaraya Technological University in
2007 and has been part of the corporate
world ever since. Alongside his innate
nature to explore technology, Varun is
interested in outdoor activities; he has
been part of club cricket and played
division 3 league matches, been on a
night trek near Bengaluru, and explored
the city (less city more food) on his bike. In addition, he enjoys binge-
watching good movies and TV shows (recently on web series), and at
times he disconnects himself from the world around him using a device
named headphones. Recently he has been trying his hand at cooking
(God save his family).
About the Technical Reviewer
Sourabh Mishra
is an entrepreneur, developer, speaker,
author, corporate trainer, and animator.
He is a Microsoft guy; he is passionate
about Microsoft technologies and a true
.NET warrior. Sourabh has loved
computers from childhood and started
his career when he was just 15 years old.
His programming experience includes
C/C++, ASP.NET, C#, VB.NET, WCF, SQL
Server, Entity Framework, MVC, Web API,
Azure, jQuery, Highcharts, and Angular.
He is also an expert in computer
graphics. Sourabh is the author of Practical Highcharts with Angular,
published by Apress. Sourabh has been awarded a Most Valuable
Professional (MVP) status. He has the zeal to learn new technologies,
sharing his knowledge on several online community forums.
He is a founder of IECE Digital and Sourabh Mishra Notes, an online
knowledge-sharing platform where one can learn new technologies
easily and comfortably.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to APress Media, LLC, part of Springer
Nature 2023
V. Gor, Creating Responsive Websites Using HTML5 and CSS3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-9783-4_1

1. Introduction to Web Development

Varun Gor1
(1) Bengaluru, India

This chapter will cover why web development is needed in today’s

digital world, how web development is done, and which technologies
are capable of creating world-class and high-performing websites. Web
developers need to know how HTML and CSS work, which will be
covered in depth. I will briefly explain HTML elements and page
structure so you can understand how HTML and CSS work in
conjunction to create websites. I will also explain the problem that CSS
solves and how to write CSS code.

Need for Web Development

Web development has become an increasingly vital aspect of modern
life. The Internet has become an essential part of our daily routine, from
shopping and entertainment to social media and education. With the
constant expansion of the digital world, the demand for web
development has grown exponentially.
Web development refers to the creation and maintenance of
websites, web applications, and other online platforms. It involves a
wide range of skills, including programming languages, database
management, and graphic design. Web developers work together to
create websites that are user-friendly, visually appealing, and accessible
to a broad audience.
One of the most significant reasons why web development is so
essential is the rise of e-commerce. With an increasing number of
people who shop online, businesses are realizing the importance of
having an online presence. Websites are now more than just a way to
provide information about a company; they are a critical tool for
generating revenue. A well-designed website can attract more
customers, increase brand awareness, and ultimately boost sales.
Web development is also crucial for the education sector. With the
growth of e-learning, schools and universities need to have online
platforms that provide easy access to course materials, discussions, and
online assessments. This allows for a more flexible learning experience,
making education more accessible to students who may not be able to
attend traditional classrooms.
Moreover, web development has become essential in the healthcare
industry. With the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare providers have had
to shift to telemedicine and virtual consultations. The development of
online platforms has been crucial in providing care to patients, enabling
doctors to diagnose and treat patients remotely. There are many such
examples where technology has served a better and convenient means
of accomplishing our daily tasks.
In addition to the practical uses, web development has become an
essential tool for communication and entertainment. Social media
platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, have become a significant part
of our daily lives. These platforms rely heavily on web development to
provide users with an engaging and user-friendly experience.
In conclusion, web development is crucial for our modern-day
world. It has become an essential tool for businesses, education,
healthcare, and communication. As the Internet continues to evolve, the
demand for web development will only increase. With the right skills
and tools, web developers can help create websites and online
platforms that are both functional and visually appealing, making the
Internet a better place for everyone. The next section explains which
technologies you can use.

Technologies Used in Web Development

The technologies used in web development have evolved significantly
over the years, with new frameworks, tools, and languages emerging to
improve the performance, functionality, and user experience of
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Other documents randomly have
different content
 “It was a question,” writes von Tirpitz, “of our keeping our nerve,
continuing to arm on a grand scale, avoiding all provocation, and
waiting without anxiety until our sea power was established[4] and
forced the English to let us breathe in peace.” Only to breathe in
peace! What fearful apparatus was required to secure this simple act
of respiration!
Early in October Mr. Asquith invited me to stay with him in
Scotland. The day after I had arrived there, on our way home from
the links, he asked me quite abruptly whether I would like to go to
the Admiralty. He had put the same question to me when he first
became Prime Minister. This time I had no doubt what to answer. All
my mind was full of the dangers of war. I accepted with alacrity. I
said, “Indeed I would.” He said that Mr. Haldane was coming to see
him the next day and we would talk it over together. But I saw that
his mind was made up. The fading light of evening disclosed in the
far distance the silhouettes of two battleships steaming slowly out of
the Firth of Forth. They seemed invested with a new significance to
me.
That night when I went to bed, I saw a large Bible lying on a table
in my bedroom. My mind was dominated by the news I had received
of the complete change in my station and of the task entrusted to me.
I thought of the peril of Britain, peace-loving, unthinking, little
prepared, of her power and virtue, and of her mission of good sense
and fair play. I thought of mighty Germany, towering up in the
splendour of her imperial state and delving down in her profound,
cold, patient, ruthless calculations. I thought of the army corps I had
watched tramp past, wave after wave of valiant manhood, at the
Breslau manœuvres in 1907; of the thousands of strong horses
dragging cannon and great howitzers up the ridges and along the
roads around Wurzburg in 1910. I thought of German education and
thoroughness and all that their triumphs in science and philosophy
implied. I thought of the sudden and successful wars by which her
power had been set up. I opened the Book at random, and in the 9th
Chapter of Deuteronomy I read—

Hear, O Israel; Thou art to pass over Jordan this day, to go in to

possess nations greater and mightier than thyself, cities great and
fenced up to heaven.
 2. A people great and tall, the children of the Anakims, whom thou
knowest, and of whom thou hast heard say, Who can stand before the
children of Anak!
3. Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he which
goeth over before thee; as a consuming fire he shall destroy them, and
he shall bring them down before thy face: so shalt thou drive them out,
and destroy them quickly, as the Lord hath said unto thee.
4. Speak not thou in thine heart, after that the Lord thy God hath cast
them out from before thee, saying, for my righteousness the Lord hath
brought me in to possess this land: but for the wickedness of these
nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee.
5. Not for thy righteousness or for the uprightness of thine heart,
dost thou go to possess their land; but for the wickedness of these
nations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee, and
that he may perform the word which the Lord sware unto thy fathers,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

It seemed a message full of reassurance.

 CHAPTER IV
ADMIRALS ALL

“Concerning brave Captains

Our age hath made known.”
Rudyard Kipling.

At the Admiralty—The State of Business—Immediate Measures—The Two

Leading Sailors—Lord Fisher of Kilverstone—His Great Reforms—His
Violent Methods—The Schism in the Fleet—Difficulties of His Task—The
Bacon Letters—Our Conference at Reigate Priory—A Fateful Decision—Lord
Fisher’s Correspondence—Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord—Deadlock
Concerning the War Staff Policy—Formation of a New Board of Admiralty—
The Command of the Home Fleets—Sir Arthur Wilson’s Retirement—A
Digression Forward—Captain Pakenham’s Sea-going Record—Rear-Admiral
Beatty—The Naval Secretary—Prince Louis of Battenberg Becomes Second
Sea Lord—The War Staff—Military Education and Staff Training—Captains
of Ships and Captains of War—Fifteen Years and Only Thirty Months.

M r. McKenna and I changed guard with strict punctilio. In the

morning he came over to the Home Office and I introduced
him to the officials there. In the afternoon I went over to the
Admiralty; he presented his Board and principal officers and
departmental heads to me, and then took his leave. I knew he felt
greatly his change of office, but no one would have divined it from
his manner. As soon as he had gone I convened a formal meeting of
the Board, at which the Secretary read the new Letters Patent
constituting me its head, and I thereupon in the words of the Order-
in-Council became “responsible to Crown and Parliament for all the
business of the Admiralty.” I was to endeavour to discharge this
responsibility for the four most memorable years of my life.
 The state of Admiralty business was as follows:—The Estimates
and plans for the financial year 1912–13 were far advanced: the
programme had been settled and the designs of the vessels only
awaited final approval. We were to lay down three battleships, one
battle-cruiser, two light cruisers (“Dartmouths”), one smaller light
cruiser (a “Blonde”), the usual flotilla of twenty destroyers and a
number of submarines and ancillary craft. The Estimates embodying
this policy had to be passed by the Cabinet at the latest by the end of
February, and presented to the House of Commons in the utmost
detail in March.
But a great uncertainty hung over all these plans. A continued
succession of rumours and reports from many sources, and of hints
and allusions in the German Press, foreshadowed a further German
naval increase. This, following upon all that had gone before and
coming at a moment when relations were so tense, must certainly
aggravate the situation. It would inevitably compel us to take
important additional counter-measures. What these counter-
measures would have to be, could not be decided till the text of the
new German Navy Law was known to us. It was clear, however, from
the information received, that it was not only to be an increase in
new construction but in the number of squadrons or vessels
maintained in a state of instant and constant readiness.
In addition to these complications were a number of naval
questions of prime importance which I conceived required new
treatment. First, the War Plans of the Fleet, which up to that
moment had been based upon the principle of close blockade.
Second, the organisation of the fleets with a view to increasing their
instantly ready strength. Third, measures to guard against all aspects
of surprise in the event of a sudden attack. Fourth, the formation of a
Naval War Staff. Fifth, the concerting of the War Plans of the Navy
and the Army by close co-operation of the two departments. Sixth,
further developments in design to increase the gun power of our new
ships in all classes. Seventh, changes in the high commands of the
Fleet and in the composition of the Board of Admiralty.
To all these matters I addressed myself in constant secret
consultations with the principal persons concerned in each. For the
present, however, I arrived at no important decisions, but laboured
continually to check and correct the opinions with which I had
arrived at the Admiralty by the expert information which on every
subject was now at my disposal.
With the agreement of the Sea Lords I gave certain directions on
minor points immediately. The flotilla of destroyers sanctioned in
the 1911–12 Estimates would not have been let out to contract till the
very end of the financial year. We now accelerated these twenty boats
(the “L’s”) by four months, and thus, though we could not possibly
foresee it, they were almost all fully commissioned just in time for
the great review and mobilization of the Fleet which preceded the
outbreak of war. I gave, moreover, certain personal directions to
enable me “to sleep quietly in my bed.” The naval magazines were to
be effectively guarded under the direct charge of the Admiralty. The
continuous attendance of naval officers, additional to that of the
resident clerks, was provided at the Admiralty, so that at any hour of
the day or night, weekdays, Sundays, or holidays, there would never
be a moment lost in giving the alarm; and one of the Sea Lords was
always to be on duty in or near the Admiralty building to receive it.
Upon the wall behind my chair I had an open case fitted, within
whose folding doors spread a large chart of the North Sea. On this
chart every day a Staff Officer marked with flags the position of the
German Fleet. Never once was this ceremony omitted until the War
broke out, and the great maps, covering the whole of one side of the
War Room, began to function. I made a rule to look at my chart once
every day when I first entered my room. I did this less to keep myself
informed, for there were many other channels of information, than
in order to inculcate in myself and those working with me a sense of
ever-present danger. In this spirit we all worked.
I must now introduce the reader to the two great Admirals-of-the-
Fleet, Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, whose outstanding
qualities and life’s work, afloat and at the Admiralty, added to and
reacted upon by the energies and patriotism of Lord Charles
Beresford, had largely made the Royal Navy what it was at this time.
The names of both Fisher and Wilson must often recur in these
pages, for they played decisive parts in the tale I have to tell.
I first met Lord Fisher at Biarritz in 1907. We stayed for a fortnight
as the guests of a common friend. He was then First Sea Lord and in
the height of his reign. We talked all day long and far into the nights.
He told me wonderful stories of the Navy and of his plans—all about
Dreadnoughts, all about submarines, all about the new education
scheme for every branch of the Navy, all about big guns, and
splendid Admirals and foolish miserable ones, and Nelson and the
Bible, and finally the island of Borkum. I remembered it all. I
reflected on it often. I even remembered the island of Borkum when
my teacher had ceased to think so much of it. At any rate, when I
returned to my duties at the Colonial Office I could have passed an
examination on the policy of the then Board of Admiralty.
For at least ten years all the most important steps taken to enlarge,
improve or modernise the Navy had been due to Fisher. The water-
tube boiler, the “all big gun ship,” the introduction of the submarine
(“Fisher’s toys,” as Lord Charles Beresford called them), the common
education scheme, the system of nucleus crews for ships in reserve,
and latterly—to meet the German rivalry—the concentration of the
Fleets in Home Waters, the scrapping of great quantities of ships of
little fighting power, the great naval programmes of 1908 and 1909,
the advance from the 12–inch to the 13.5–inch gun—all in the main
were his.
In carrying through these far-reaching changes he had created
violent oppositions to himself in the Navy, and his own methods, in
which he gloried, were of a kind to excite bitter animosities, which he
returned and was eager to repay. He made it known, indeed he
proclaimed, that officers of whatever rank who opposed his policies
would have their professional careers ruined. As for traitors, i. e.,
those who struck at him openly or secretly, “their wives should be
widows, their children fatherless, their homes a dunghill.” This he
repeated again and again. “Ruthless, relentless and remorseless”
were words always on his lips, and many grisly examples of Admirals
and Captains eating out their hearts “on the beach” showed that he
meant what he said. He did not hesitate to express his policy in the
most unfavourable terms, as if to challenge and defy his enemies and
critics. “Favouritism,” he wrote in the log of Dartmouth College, “is
the secret of efficiency.” What he meant by “favouritism” was
selection without regard to seniority by a discerning genius in the
interests of the public; but the word “favouritism” stuck. Officers
were said to be “in the fish-pond”—unlucky for them if they were not.
He poured contempt upon the opinions and arguments of those who
did not agree with his schemes, and abused them roundly at all times
both by word and letter.
In the Royal Navy, however, there were a considerable number of
officers of social influence and independent means, many of whom
became hostile to Fisher. They had access to Parliament and to the
Press. In sympathy with them, though not with all their methods,
was a much larger body of good and proved sea officers. At the head
of the whole opposition stood Lord Charles Beresford, at that time
Commander-in-Chief of the Channel or principal Fleet. A deplorable
schism was introduced into the Royal Navy, which spread to every
squadron and to every ship. There were Fisher’s men and Beresford’s
men. Whatever the First Sea Lord proposed the Commander-in-
Chief opposed, and through the whole of the Service Captains and
Lieutenants were encouraged to take one side or the other. The
argument was conducted with technicalities and with personalities.
Neither side was strong enough to crush the other. The Admiralty
had its backers in the Fleet, and the Fleet had its friends in the
Admiralty: both sides therefore had good information as to what was
passing in the other camp. The lamentable situation thus created
might easily have ruined the discipline of the Navy but for the fact
that a third large body of officers resolutely refused, at whatever cost
to themselves, to participate in the struggle. Silently and steadfastly
they went about their work till the storms of partisanship were past.
To these officers a debt is due.
There is no doubt whatever that Fisher was right in nine-tenths of
what he fought for. His great reforms sustained the power of the
Royal Navy at the most critical period in its history. He gave the
Navy the kind of shock which the British Army received at the time of
the South African War. After a long period of serene and
unchallenged complacency, the mutter of distant thunder could be
heard. It was Fisher who hoisted the storm-signal and beat all hands
to quarters. He forced every department of the Naval Service to
review its position and question its own existence. He shook them
and beat them and cajoled them out of slumber into intense activity.
But the Navy was not a pleasant place while this was going on. The
“Band of Brothers” tradition which Nelson had handed down was for
the time, but only for the time, discarded; and behind the open
hostility of chieftains flourished the venomous intrigues of their
followers.
I have asked myself whether all this could not have been avoided;
whether we could not have had the Fisher reforms without the Fisher
methods? My conviction is that Fisher was maddened by the
difficulties and obstructions which he encountered, and became
violent in the process of fighting so hard at every step. In the
government of a great fighting service there must always be the
combination of the political and professional authorities. A strong
First Sea Lord, to carry out a vigorous policy, needs the assistance of
a Minister, who alone can support him and defend him. The
authority of both is more than doubled by their union. Each can
render the other services of supreme importance when they are both
effective factors. Working in harmony, they multiply each other. By
the resultant concentration of combined power, no room or chance is
given to faction. For good or for ill what they decide together in the
interests of the Service must be loyally accepted. Unhappily, the later
years of Fisher’s efforts were years in which the Admiralty was ruled
by two Ministers, both of whom were desperately and even mortally
ill. Although most able and most upright public men, both Lord
Cawdor and Lord Tweedmouth, First Lords from 1904 to 1908, were
afflicted with extreme ill-health. Moreover, neither was in the House
of Commons and able himself, by exposition in the responsible
Chamber, to proclaim in unquestioned accents the policy which the
Admiralty would follow and which the House of Commons should
ratify. When in 1908 Mr. McKenna became First Lord, there was a
change. Gifted with remarkable clearness of mind and resolute
courage, enjoying in the prime of life the fullest vigour of his
faculties, and having acquired a strong political position in the House
of Commons, he was able to supply an immediate steadying
influence. But it was too late for Fisher. The Furies were upon his
track. The opposition and hatreds had already grown too strong. The
schism in the Navy continued, fierce and open.
The incident which is most commonly associated with the end of
this part of his career is that of the “Bacon letters.” Captain Bacon
was one of the ablest officers in the Navy and a strong Fisherite. In
1906 he had been serving in the Mediterranean under Lord Charles
Beresford. Fisher had asked him to write to him from time to time
and keep him informed of all that passed. This he did in letters in
themselves of much force and value, but open to the reproach of
containing criticisms of his immediate commander. This in itself
might have escaped unnoticed; but the First Sea Lord used to print in
beautiful and carefully considered type, letters, notes and
memoranda on technical subjects for the instruction and
encouragement of the faithful. Delighted at the cogency of the
arguments in the Bacon letters, he had them printed in 1909 and
circulated fairly widely throughout the Admiralty. A copy fell at
length into hostile hands and was swiftly conveyed to a London
evening newspaper. The First Sea Lord was accused of encouraging
subordinates in disloyalty to their immediate commanders, and
Captain Bacon himself was so grievously smitten in the opinion of
the Service that he withdrew into private life and his exceptional
abilities were lost to the Navy, though, as will be seen, only for a
time. The episode was fatal, and at the beginning of 1910 Sir John
Fisher quitted the Admiralty and passed, as every one believed,
finally into retirement and the House of Lords, crowned with
achievements, loaded with honours, but pursued by much obloquy,
amid the triumph of his foes.
As soon as I knew for certain that I was to go to the Admiralty I
sent for Fisher: he was abroad in sunshine. We had not seen each
other since the dispute about the Naval Estimates of 1909. He
conceived himself bound in loyalty to Mr. McKenna, but as soon as
he learned that I had had nothing to do with the decision which had
led to our changing offices, he hastened home. We passed three days
together in the comfort of Reigate Priory.
Although my education had been mainly military, I had followed
closely every detail of the naval controversies of the previous five
years in the Cabinet, in Parliament, and latterly in the Committee of
Imperial Defence; and I had certain main ideas of what I was going
to do and what, indeed, I was sent to the Admiralty to do. I intended
to prepare for an attack by Germany as if it might come next day. I
intended to raise the Fleet to the highest possible strength and secure
that all that strength was immediately ready. I was pledged to create
a War Staff. I was resolved to have all arrangements made at once in
the closest concert with the military to provide for the transportation
of a British Army to France should war come. I had strong support
from the War Office and the Foreign Office: I had the Prime Minister
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer at my back. Moreover, every
one who knew the crisis through which we had passed had been
profoundly alarmed. In these circumstances it only remained to
study the methods, and to choose the men.
I found Fisher a veritable volcano of knowledge and of inspiration;
and as soon as he learnt what my main purpose was, he passed into a
state of vehement eruption. It must indeed have been an agony to
him to wait and idly watch from the calm Lake of Lucerne through
the anxious weeks of the long-drawn Agadir crisis, with his life’s
work, his beloved Navy, liable at any moment to be put to the
supreme test. Once he began, he could hardly stop. I plied him with
questions, and he poured out ideas. It was always a joy to me to talk
to him on these great matters, but most of all was he stimulating in
all that related to the design of ships. He also talked brilliantly about
Admirals, but here one had to make a heavy discount on account of
the feuds. My intention was to hold the balance even, and while
adopting in the main the Fisher policy, to insist upon an absolute
cessation of the vendetta.
Knowing pretty well, all that has been written in the preceding
pages, I began our conversations with no thought of Fisher’s recall.
But by the Sunday night the power of the man was deeply borne in
upon me, and I had almost made up my mind to do what I did three
years later, and place him again at the head of the Naval Service. It
was not the outcry that I feared; that I felt strong enough at this time
to face. But it was the revival and continuance of the feuds; and it
was clear from his temper that this would be inevitable. Then, too, I
was apprehensive of his age. I could not feel complete confidence in
the poise of the mind at 71. All the way up to London the next
morning I was on the brink of saying “Come and help me,” and had
he by a word seemed to wish to return, I would surely have spoken.
But he maintained a proper dignity, and in an hour we were in
London. Other reflections supervened, adverse counsels were not
lacking, and in a few days I had definitely made up my mind to look
elsewhere for a First Sea Lord. I wonder whether I was right or
wrong.
For a man who for so many years filled great official positions and
was charged with so much secret and deadly business, Lord Fisher
appeared amazingly voluminous and reckless in correspondence.
When for the purposes of this work and for the satisfaction of his
biographers I collected all the letters I had received from the Admiral
in his own hand, they amounted when copied to upwards of 300
closely typewritten pages. In the main they repeat again and again
the principal naval conceptions and doctrines with which his life had
been associated. Although it would be easy to show many
inconsistencies and apparent contradictions, the general message is
unchanging. The letters are also presented in an entertaining guise,
interspersed with felicitous and sometimes recondite quotations,
with flashing phrases and images, with mordant jokes and corrosive
personalities. All were dashed off red-hot as they left his mind, his
strong pen galloping along in the wake of the imperious thought. He
would often audaciously fling out on paper thoughts which other
people would hardly admit to their own minds. It is small wonder
that his turbulent passage left so many foes foaming in his wake. The
wonder is that he did not shipwreck himself a score of times. The
buoyancy of his genius alone supported the burden. Indeed, in the
process of years the profuse and imprudent violence of his letters
became, in a sense, its own protection. People came to believe that
this was the breezy style appropriate to our guardians of the deep,
and the old Admiral swept forward on his stormy course.
To me, in this period of preparation, the arrival of his letters was
always a source of lively interest and pleasure. I was regaled with
eight or ten closely-written double pages, fastened together with a
little pearl pin or a scrap of silken ribbon, and containing every kind
of news and counsel, varying from blistering reproach to the highest
forms of inspiration and encouragement. From the very beginning
his letters were couched in an affectionate and paternal style. “My
beloved Winston,” they began, ending usually with a variation of
“Yours to a cinder,” “Yours till Hell freezes,” or “Till charcoal
sprouts,” followed by a P.S. and two or three more pages of pregnant
and brilliant matter. I have found it impossible to re-read these
letters without sentiments of strong regard for him, his fiery soul, his
volcanic energy, his deep creative mind, his fierce outspoken hatreds,
his love of England. Alas, there was a day when Hell froze and
charcoal sprouted and friendship was reduced to cinders; when “My
beloved Winston” had given place to “First Lord: I can no longer be
your colleague.” I am glad to be able to chronicle that this was not
the end of our long and intimate relationship.

Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord, received me with his
customary dignified simplicity. He could not, of course, be wholly
unaware of the main causes which had brought me to the Admiralty.
In conversation with the other Sea Lords when the well-kept secret of
my appointment first reached the Admiralty, he said: “We are to
have new masters: if they wish us to serve them, we will do so, and if
not, they will find others to carry on the work.” I had only met him
hitherto at the conferences of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
and my opinions were divided between an admiration for all I heard
of his character and a total disagreement with what I understood to
be his strategic views. He considered the creation of a War Staff quite
unnecessary: I had come to set one up. He did not approve of the
War Office plans for sending an army to France in the event of war: I
considered it my duty to perfect these arrangements to the smallest
detail. He was, as I believed, still an advocate of a close blockade of
the German ports, which to my lay or military mind the torpedo
seemed already to have rendered impossible.[5] These were large and
vital differences. He on his side probably thought we had got into an
unnecessary panic over the Agadir crisis, and that we did not
properly understand the strength and mobility of the British Fleet
nor the true character of British strategic power. He was due to retire
for age from the Service in three or four months, unless his tenure
had been extended, while I, for my part, came to the Admiralty with
a very clear intention to have an entirely new Board of my own
choosing. In these circumstances our association was bound to be
bleak.
This is, however, the moment for me to give an impression of this
striking naval personality. He was, without any exception, the most
selfless man I have ever met or even read of. He wanted nothing, and
he feared nothing—absolutely nothing. Whether he was commanding
the British Fleet or repairing an old motor-car, he was equally keen,
equally interested, equally content. To step from a great office into
absolute retirement, to return from retirement to the pinnacle of
naval power, were transitions which produced no change in the beat
of that constant heart. Everything was duty. It was not merely that
nothing else mattered. There was nothing else. One did one’s duty as
well as one possibly could, be it great or small, and naturally one
deserved no reward. This had been the spirit in which he had lived
his long life afloat, and which by his example he had spread far and
wide through the ranks of the Navy. It made him seem very
unsympathetic on many occasions, both to officers and men. Orders
were orders, whether they terminated an officer’s professional career
or led him on to fame, whether they involved the most pleasant or
the most disagreeable work; and he would snap his teeth and smile
his wintry smile to all complaints and to sentiment and emotion in
every form. Never once did I see his composure disturbed. He never
opened up, never unbent. Never once, until a very dark day for me,
did I learn that my work had met with favour in his eyes.
All the same, for all his unsympathetic methods, “Tug,” as he was
generally called (because he was always working, i. e., pulling,
hauling, tugging), or alternatively “old ’Ard ’Art,” was greatly loved in
the Fleet. Men would do hard and unpleasant work even when they
doubted its necessity, because he had ordered it and it was “his way.”
He had served as a midshipman in the Crimean War. Every one knew
the story of his V.C., when the square broke at Tamai in the Soudan,
and when he was seen, with the ammunition of his Gatling
exhausted, knocking the Dervish spearmen over one after another
with his fists, using the broken hilt of his sword as a sort of knuckle
duster. Stories were told of his apparent insensibility to weather and
climate. He would wear a thin monkey-jacket in mid-winter in the
North Sea with apparent comfort while every one else was shivering
in great coats. He would stand bareheaded under a tropical sun
without ill effects. He had a strong inventive turn of mind, and
considerable mechanical knowledge. The system of counter-mining
in use for forty years in the Navy, and the masthead semaphore
which continued till displaced by wireless telegraphy, were both
products of his ingenuity. He was an experienced and masterly
commander of a Fleet at sea. In addition to this he expressed himself
with great clearness and thoroughness on paper, many of his
documents being extended arguments of exact detail and widely
comprehensive scope. He impressed me from the first as a man of
the highest quality and stature, but, as I thought, dwelling too much
in the past of naval science, not sufficiently receptive of new ideas
when conditions were changing so rapidly, and, of course, tenacious
and unyielding in the last degree.
After we had had several preliminary talks and I found we were
not likely to reach an agreement, I sent him a minute about the
creation of a Naval War Staff, which raised an unmistakable issue.
He met it by a powerfully reasoned and unqualified refusal, and I
then determined to form a new Board of Admiralty without delay.
The Lords of the Admiralty hold quasi-ministerial appointments, and
it was of course necessary to put my proposals before the Prime
Minister and obtain his assent.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

H.M.S. Enchantress,
Portsmouth.
November 5, 1911.

The enclosed memorandum from Sir A. Wilson is decisive in its opposition, not
only to any particular scheme, but against the whole principle of a War Staff for the
Navy. Ottley’s[6] rejoinder, which I also send you, shows that it would not be
difficult to continue the argument. But I feel that this might easily degenerate into
personal controversy, and would, in any case, be quite unavailing. I like Sir A.
Wilson personally, and should be very sorry to run the risk of embittering relations
which are now pleasant. I therefore propose to take no public action during his
tenure.
If Wilson retires in the ordinary course in March, I shall be left without a First
Sea Lord in the middle of the passage of the Estimates, and his successor will not
be able to take any real responsibility for them. It is necessary, therefore, that the
change should be made in January at the latest.
I could, if it were imperative, propose to you a new Board for submission to the
King at once. The field of selection for the first place is narrow; and since I have,
with a good deal of reluctance, abandoned the idea of bringing Fisher back, no
striking appointment is possible. I may, however, just as well enjoy the advantage
of reserving a final choice for another month. At present, therefore, I will only say
that Prince Louis is certainly the best man to be Second Sea Lord, that I find myself
in cordial agreement with him on nearly every important question of naval policy,
and that he will accept the appointment gladly.... I should thus hope to start in the
New Year with a united and progressive Board, and with the goodwill of both the
factions whose animosities have done so much harm.
Meanwhile I am elaborating the scheme of a War Staff.
 Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.
November 16, 1911.

I have now to put before you my proposals for a new Board of Admiralty, and the
changes consequent thereupon. Having now seen all the principal officers who
might be considered candidates for such a post, I pronounce decidedly in favour of
Sir Francis Bridgeman as First Sea Lord. He is a fine sailor, with the full confidence
of the Service afloat, and with the aptitude for working with and through a staff,
well developed. If, as would no doubt be the case, he should bring Captain de
Bartolomé as his Naval Assistant, I am satisfied that the work of this office would
proceed smoothly and with despatch. I have discussed the principal questions of
strategy, administration and finance with him, and believe that we are in general
agreement on fundamental principles. If you approve, I will write to Sir Francis
and enter more fully into these matters in connection with an assumption by him
of these new duties.
This appointment harmonises, personally and administratively, with that of the
new Second Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, of whom I have already written
to you, and of whose assistance I have the highest expectations. Rear-Admiral
Briggs, the Controller and Third Sea Lord, has, after a year, just begun to acquire a
complete knowledge of his very extensive department, and I do not think it
necessary to transfer him at the present time. He will be the only naval member of
the old Board to remain. Rear-Admiral Madden is, in any case, leaving on January
5, and I am advised from all quarters, including both the proposed First and
Second Sea Lords, that the best man to fill his place is Captain Pakenham. This
officer, who is very highly thought of for his intellectual attainments, has also the
rare distinction of having served throughout the Russo-Japanese War, including
the battle of the Tsushima.
The Home Fleet, which becomes vacant, has not, unhappily, any candidate of
clear and pre-eminent qualifications. Admiral Jellicoe is not yet sufficiently in
command of the confidence of the Sea Service, to justify what would necessarily be
a very startling promotion. I shall, however, be taking the perfectly straightforward
and unexceptionable course in placing Vice-Admiral Sir George Callaghan, the
present Second in Command, who has been in almost daily control of the largest
manœuvres of the Home Fleet, and who has previously been Second in Command
in the Mediterranean, in the place of Sir F. Bridgeman. Sir John Jellicoe will be his
Second in Command, and we shall thus be able to see what fitness he will develop
for the succession.
It appears to me not merely important but necessary that these changes should
operate without delay. The draft Estimates have all arrived for discussion, and a
month of the most severe work, governing the whole future policy of the next two
years, awaits the Board of Admiralty. This task can only be satisfactorily
discharged if it is undertaken by men who come together with consenting minds,
and who will find themselves responsible to the Cabinet and to Parliament for the
immediate consequences of their decisions. I would therefore ask you to authorise
me to approach all parties concerned without delay, and unless some unexpected
hitch occurs I shall hope to submit the list to the King not later than Wednesday
next. The New Board would thus be fully constituted before the end of the present
month.

Afloat the decisive appointment was that of Sir John Jellicoe to be

second in command of the Home Fleet. He thus in effect passed over
the heads of four or five of the most important senior Admirals on
the active list and became virtually designated for the supreme
command in the near future.
The announcement of these changes (November 28) created a
considerable sensation in the House of Commons when, late at night,
they became known. All the Sea Lords, except one, had been replaced
by new men. I was immediately interrogated, “Had they resigned, or
been told to go?” and so on. I gave briefly such explanations as were
necessary. At this time I was very strong, because most of those who
knew the inner history of the Agadir crisis were troubled about the
Fleet, and it was well known that I had been sent to the Admiralty to
make a new and a vehement effort.
Sir Arthur Wilson and I parted on friendly, civil, but at the same
time cool terms. He showed not the least resentment at the short
curtailment of his tenure. He was as good-tempered and as distant as
ever. Only once did he show the slightest sign of vehemence. That
was when I told him that the Prime Minister was willing to submit
his name to the King for a Peerage. He disengaged himself from this
with much vigour. What would he do with such a thing? It would be
ridiculous. However, His Majesty resolved to confer upon him the
Order of Merit, and this he was finally persuaded to accept. On his
last night in office he gave a dinner to the new Sea Lords in the true
“band of brothers” style, and then retired to Norfolk. I could not help
thinking uncomfortably of the famous Tenniel cartoon, “Dropping
the Pilot,” where the inexperienced and impulsive German Emperor
is depicted carelessly watching the venerable figure of Bismarck
descending the ladder. Nevertheless I had acted on high public
grounds and on those alone, and I fortified myself with them.
As will be seen in its proper place, Sir Arthur Wilson came back to
the Admiralty three years later, and worked with Lord Fisher and me
during the six months of our association in the war. When Lord
Fisher resigned in May, 1915, I invited Sir Arthur to take up the
duties of First Sea Lord and he consented to do so. On learning,
however, a few days later that I was to leave the Admiralty, he wrote
to Mr. Asquith refusing to undertake the task under any other First
Lord but me. Here is his letter:—

May 19, 1915.

Dear Mr. Asquith,—

In view of the reports in the papers this morning as to the probable

reconstruction of the Government, I think I ought to tell you that although I agreed
to undertake the office of First Sea Lord under Mr. Churchill because it appeared
to me to be the best means of maintaining continuity of policy under the
unfortunate circumstances that have arisen, I am not prepared to undertake the
duties under any new First Lord, as the strain under such circumstances would be
far beyond my strength.
Believe me,
Yours truly,
A. K. Wilson.

At that time I hardly seemed to have a friend in the official or

Parliamentary world. All the press were throwing the blame of the
Dardanelles entanglement and of many other things upon me, and I
was everywhere represented as a rash, presumptuous person with
whom no Board of Admiralty could work. Sir Arthur had never
previously given me any sign of approval, though, of course, we had
laboured together day after day. I was, therefore, astounded to learn
what he had done. It came as an absolute surprise to me: and I do
not mind saying that I felt as proud as a young officer mentioned for
the first time in dispatches. I thought it my duty, however, to try to
overcome his objections, as I knew the Prime Minister wanted him to
take the post. But it was all in vain. He stuck to his opinion that he
could do it with me and with nobody else. I felt deeply touched.
There was nothing to be touched about, he observed, “You know all
the moves on the board. I should only have to put the brake on from
time to time. I could not possibly manage with anyone else.” And
that was the end of it. He continued working in a subordinate
position at the Admiralty till the end of the war. I hardly ever saw
him afterwards; but I have preserved a memory which is very
precious to me.
The new Fourth Sea Lord was an officer of singular firmness of
character. He possessed a unique experience of naval war. Since
Nelson himself, no British naval officer had been so long at sea in
time of war on a ship of war without setting foot on land. Captain
Pakenham had been fourteen months afloat in the battleship Asahi
during the war between Russia and Japan. Although this vessel was
frequently in harbour, he would not leave it for fear she might sail
without him; and there alone, the sole European in a great ship’s
company of valiant, reticent, inscrutable Japanese, he had gone
through the long vigil outside Port Arthur, with its repeated episodes
of minefields and bombardments, till the final battle in the Sea of
Japan. Always faultlessly attired, with stiff white collar and an
immovable eye-glass, he matched the Japanese with a punctilio and
reserve the equal of their own, and finally captivated their martial
spirit and won their unstinted and outspoken admiration. Admiral
Togo has related how the English officer, as the Asahi was going into
action at the last great battle, when the heavy shells had already
begun to strike the ship, remained impassive alone on the open after-
bridge making his notes and taking his observations of the
developing action for the reports which he was to send to his
Government; and acclaiming him, with Japanese chivalry,
recommended him to the Emperor for the highest honour this
warlike and knightly people could bestow.
The unique sea-going record in time of war on a ship of war which
Captain Pakenham brought to the Admiralty has been maintained by
him to this day, and to fourteen months of sea-going service with the
Japanese Fleet, he may now add fifty-two months constant service
with the Battle-Cruisers, during which time it is credibly reported
that he never on any occasion at sea lay down to rest otherwise than
fully dressed, collared and booted, ready at any moment of the night
or day.
A few weeks after my arrival at the Admiralty I was told that
among several officers of Flag rank who wished to see me was Rear-
Admiral Beatty. I had never met him before, but I had the following
impressions about him. First, that he was the youngest Flag Officer
in the Fleet. Second, that he had commanded the white gunboat
which had come up the Nile as close as possible to support the 21st
Lancers when we made the charge at Omdurman. Third, that he had
seen a lot of fighting on land with the army, and that consequently he
had military as well as naval experience. Fourth, that he came of a
hard-riding stock; his father had been in my own regiment, the 4th
Hussars, and I had often heard him talked of when I first joined. The
Admiral, I knew, was a very fine horseman, with what is called “an
eye for country.” Fifth, that there was much talk in naval circles of his
having been pushed on too fast. Such were the impressions aroused
in my mind by the name of this officer, and I record them with
minuteness because the decisions which I had the honour of taking
in regard to him were most serviceable to the Royal Navy and to the
British arms.
I was, however, advised about him at the Admiralty in a decisively
adverse sense. He had got on too fast, he had many interests ashore.
His heart it was said was not wholly in the Service. He had been
offered an appointment in the Atlantic Fleet suited to his rank as
Rear-Admiral. He had declined this appointment—a very serious
step for a Naval Officer to take when appointments were few in
proportion to candidates—and he should in consequence not be
offered any further employment. It would be contrary to precedent to
make a further offer. He had already been unemployed for eighteen
months, and would probably be retired in the ordinary course at the
expiration of the full three years’ unemployment.
But my first meeting with the Admiral induced me immediately to
disregard this unfortunate advice. He became at once my Naval
Secretary (or Private Secretary, as the appointment was then styled).
Working thus side by side in rooms which communicated, we
perpetually discussed during the next fifteen months the problems of
a naval war with Germany. It became increasingly clear to me that he
viewed questions of naval strategy and tactics in a different light
from the average naval officer: he approached them, as it seemed to
me, much more as a soldier would. His war experiences on land had
illuminated the facts he had acquired in his naval training. He was no
mere instrumentalist. He did not think of matériel as an end in itself
but only as a means. He thought of war problems in their unity by
land, sea and air. His mind had been rendered quick and supple by
the situations of polo and the hunting-field, and enriched by varied
experiences against the enemy on Nile gunboats, and ashore. It was
with equal pleasure and profit that I discussed with him our naval
problem, now from this angle, now from that; and I was increasingly
struck with the shrewd and profound sagacity of his comments
expressed in language singularly free from technical jargon.
I had no doubts whatever when the command of the Battle-Cruiser
Squadron fell vacant in the spring of 1913, in appointing him over the
heads of all to this incomparable command, the nucleus as it proved
to be of the famous Battle-Cruiser Fleet—the strategic cavalry of the
Royal Navy, that supreme combination of speed and power to which
the thoughts of the Admiralty were continuously directed. And when
two years later (February 3, 1915) I visited him on board the Lion,
with the scars of victorious battle fresh upon her from the action of
the Dogger Bank, I heard from his Captains and his Admirals the
expression of their respectful but intense enthusiasm for their leader.
Well do I remember how, as I was leaving the ship, the usually
imperturbable Admiral Pakenham caught me by the sleeve, “First
Lord, I wish to speak to you in private,” and the restrained passion in
his voice as he said, “Nelson has come again.” Those words often
recurred to my mind.
So much of my work in endeavouring to prepare the Fleet for war
was dependent upon the guidance and help I received from Prince
Louis of Battenberg, who, taking it as a whole, was my principal
counsellor, as Second Sea Lord from January, 1912, to March, 1913
(when Sir Francis Bridgeman’s health temporarily failed), and as
First Sea Lord thenceforward to the end of October, 1914, that it is
necessary to give some description of this remarkable Prince and
British sailor. All the more is this necessary since the accident of his
parentage struck him down in the opening months of the Great War
and terminated his long professional career.
Prince Louis was a child of the Royal Navy. From his earliest years
he had been bred to the sea. The deck of a British warship was his
home. All his interest was centred in the British Fleet. So far from his
exalted rank having helped him it had hindered his career: up to a
certain point no doubt it had been of assistance, but after that it had
been a positive drawback. In consequence he had spent an
exceptionally large proportion of his forty years’ service afloat
usually in the less agreeable commands. One had heard at Malta how
he used to bring his Cruiser Squadron into that small, crowded
harbour at speed and then in the nick of time, with scarcely a
hundred yards to spare, by dropping his anchors, checking on his
cables and going full speed astern, bring it safely into station. He had
a far wider knowledge of war by land and sea and of the Continent of
Europe than most of the other Admirals I have known. His brother,
as King of Bulgaria, had shown military aptitudes of a very high
order at the Battle of Slivnitza, and he himself was deeply versed in
every detail, practical and theoretic, of the British Naval Service. It
was not without good reason that he had been appointed under Lord
Fisher to be Head of the British Naval Intelligence Department, that
vital ganglion of our organisation. He was a thoroughly trained and
accomplished Staff Officer, with a gift of clear and lucid statement
and all that thoroughness and patient industry which we have never
underestimated in the German race.
It was recounted of him that on one occasion, when he visited Kiel
with King Edward, a German Admiral in high command had
reproached him with serving in the British Fleet, whereat Prince
Louis, stiffening, had replied “Sir, when I joined the Royal Navy in
the year 1868, the German Empire did not exist.”
The part which he played in the events with which I am dealing
will be recorded as the story unfolds.
Our first labour was the creation of the War Staff. All the details of
this were worked out by Prince Louis and approved by the First Sea
Lord. I also resorted to Sir Douglas Haig, at that time in command at
Aldershot. The general furnished me with a masterly paper setting
forth the military doctrine of Staff organisation and constituting in
many respects a formidable commentary on existing naval methods.
Armed with these various opinions, I presented my conclusions to
the public in January, 1912, in a document of which the first two
paragraphs may be repeated here. They were, as will be seen,
designed so far as possible to disarm the prejudices of the naval
service.

1. In establishing a War Staff for the Navy it is necessary to observe the broad
differences of character and circumstances which distinguish naval from military
problems. War on land varies in every country according to numberless local
conditions, and each new theatre, like each separate battlefield, requires a special
study. A whole series of intricate arrangements must be thought out and got ready
for each particular case; and these are expanded and refined continuously by every
increase in the size of armies, and by every step towards the perfection of military
science. The means by which superior forces can be brought to decisive points in
good condition and at the right time are no whit less vital, and involve far more
elaborate processes than the strategic choice of those points, or the actual conduct
of the fighting. The sea, on the other hand, is all one, and, though ever changing,
always the same. Every ship is self-contained and self-propelled. The problems of
transport and supply, the infinite peculiarities of topography which are the
increasing study of the general staffs of Europe, do not affect the naval service
except in an occasional and limited degree. The main part of the British Fleet in
sufficient strength to seek a general battle is always ready to proceed to sea without
any mobilisation of reserves as soon as steam is raised. Ships or fleets of ships are
capable of free and continuous movement for many days and nights together, and
travel at least as far in an hour as an army can march in a day. Every vessel is in
instant communication with its fleet and with the Admiralty, and all can be
directed from the ports where they are stationed on any sea points chosen for
massing, by a short and simple order. Unit efficiency, that is to say, the individual
fighting power of each vessel and each man, is in the sea service for considerable
periods entirely independent of all external arrangements, and unit efficiency at
sea, far more even than on land, is the prime and final factor, without which the
combinations of strategy and tactics are only the preliminaries of defeat, but with
which even faulty dispositions can be swiftly and decisively retrieved. For these
and other similar reasons a Naval War Staff does not require to be designed on the
same scale or in the same form as the General Staff of the Army.
2. Naval war is at once more simple and more intense than war on land. The
executive action and control of fleet and squadron Commanders is direct and
personal in a far stronger degree than that of Generals in the field, especially under
modern conditions. The art of handling a great fleet on important occasions with
deft and sure judgment is the supreme gift of the Admiral, and practical
seamanship must never be displaced from its position as the first qualification of
every sailor. The formation of a War Staff does not mean the setting up of new
standards of professional merit or the opening of a road of advancement to a
different class of officers. It is to be the means of preparing and training those
officers who arrive, or are likely to arrive, by the excellence of their sea service at
stations of high responsibility, for dealing with the more extended problems which
await them there. It is to be the means of sifting, developing, and applying the
results of actual experience in history and present practice, and of preserving them
as a general stock of reasoned opinion available as an aid and as a guide for all who
are called upon to determine, in peace or war, the naval policy of the country. It is
to be a brain far more comprehensive than that of any single man, however gifted,
and tireless and unceasing in its action, applied continuously to the scientific and
speculative study of naval strategy and preparation. It is to be an instrument
capable of formulating any decision which has been taken, or may be taken, by the
Executive in terms of precise and exhaustive detail.

I never ceased to labour at the formation of a true General Staff for

the Navy. In May, 1914, basing myself on the report of a Committee
which I had set up a year before, I drafted a fairly complete scheme
for the further development of Staff training. I quote a salient
passage:[7]

It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required to secure a

general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers and the definite
processes by which Staff Officers are trained. The first may be called “Military
Education,” and the second “War Staff Training.” They require to be treated
separately and not mixed together as in the report of the Committee. Both must
again be distinguished from all questions of administration, of material, and of
non-military education and training. The application of fighting power can thus be
separated from its development. We are not now concerned with the forging of the
weapon, but only with its use.
‘As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer must be turned
to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His interest must be awakened. He
must be put in touch with the right books and must be made to feel the importance
of the military aspect of his profession....’

But it takes a generation to form a General Staff. No wave of the

wand can create those habits of mind in seniors on which the
efficiency and even the reality of a Staff depends. Young officers can
be trained, but thereafter they have to rise step by step in the passage
of time to positions of authority in the Service. The dead weight of
professional opinion was adverse. They had got on well enough
without it before. They did not want a special class of officer
professing to be more brainy than the rest. Sea-time should be the
main qualification, and next to that technical aptitudes. Thus when I
went to the Admiralty I found that there was no moment in the
career and training of a naval officer, when he was obliged to read a
single book about naval war, or pass even the most rudimentary
examination in naval history. The Royal Navy had made no
important contribution to Naval literature. The standard work on
Sea Power was written by an American Admiral.[8] The best accounts
of British sea fighting and naval strategy were compiled by an
English civilian.[9] ‘The Silent Service’ was not mute because it was
absorbed in thought and study, but because it was weighted down by
its daily routine and by its ever complicating and diversifying
technique. We had competent administrators, brilliant experts of
every description, unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine
sea-officers, brave and devoted hearts: but at the outset of the
conflict we had more captains of ships than captains of war. In this
will be found the explanation of many untoward events. At least
fifteen years of consistent policy were required to give the Royal
Navy that widely extended outlook upon war problems and of war
situations without which seamanship, gunnery, instrumentalisms of
every kind, devotion of the highest order, could not achieve their due
reward.
Fifteen years! And we were only to have thirty months!
 CHAPTER V
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW
1912

‘The young disease, that must subdue at length,

Grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength.’
Pope, Essay on Man.

The Morrow of Agadir—Mission of Sir Ernest Cassel—The New German Navy

Law—The Haldane Visit to Berlin—An Imperial Mare’s Nest—The Opening
of the Reichstag—A Speech at Glasgow—The Luxus Flotte—Mr. Haldane
Returns—Attempt to reach a Settlement—Correspondence with Lord Fisher
—Fisher’s Vision—The Navy Estimates—The Naval Holiday—Efforts at
Goodwill—Consequences of German Naval Power—Von Tirpitz’ Illusions—
Anglo-French Naval Conversations—The Entente strengthened—Von
Tirpitz’ Unwisdom—Organisation of the Navy—The New Structure—With
the Fleet—The Enchantress in Portland Harbour—The Safeguard of
Freedom.

I have shown how forward the Chancellor of the Exchequer was

during the crisis of Agadir in every matter that could add to the
strength of the British attitude. But as soon as the danger was passed
he adopted a different demeanour. He felt that an effort should be
made to heal any smart from which Germany might be suffering, and
to arrive at a common understanding on naval strength. We knew
that a formidable new Navy Law was in preparation and would
shortly be declared. If Germany had definitely made up her mind to
antagonise Great Britain, we must take up the challenge; but it might
be possible by friendly, sincere and intimate conversation to avert
this perilous development. We were no enemies to German Colonial
expansion, and we would even have taken active steps to further her
wishes in this respect. Surely something could be done to break the
chain of blind causation. If aiding Germany in the Colonial sphere
was a means of procuring a stable situation, it was a price we were
well prepared to pay. I was in full accord with this view. Apart from
wider reasons, I felt I should be all the stronger in asking the Cabinet
and the House of Commons for the necessary monies, if I could go
hand in hand with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and testify that
we had tried our best to secure a mitigation of the naval rivalry and
failed. We therefore jointly consulted Sir Edward Grey, and then with
the Prime Minister’s concurrence we invited Sir Ernest Cassel to go
to Berlin and get into direct touch with the Emperor. Sir Ernest was
qualified for this task, as he knew the Emperor well and was at the
same time devoted to British interests. We armed him with a brief
but pregnant memorandum, which cannot be more tersely
summarized than in von Bethmann-Hollweg’s own words[10]:
‘Acceptance of English superiority at sea—no augmentation of the
German naval programme—a reduction as far as possible of that
programme—and on the part of England, no impediment to our
Colonial expansion—discussion and promotion of our Colonial
ambitions—proposals for mutual declarations that the two Powers
would not take part in aggressive plans or combinations against one
another.’ Cassel accepted the charge and started at once. He
remained only two days in Berlin and came at once to me on his
return. He brought with him a cordial letter from the Emperor and a
fairly full statement by von Bethmann-Hollweg of the new German
Navy Law. We devoured this invaluable document all night long in
the Admiralty, and in the morning I wrote as follows to Sir Edward
Grey:—

January 31, 1912.

Cassel returned last night, having travelled continuously from Berlin. At 10 a.m.
on Monday he saw Ballin, who went forthwith to the German Chancellor, and in
the afternoon he saw Ballin, Bethmann-Hollweg and the Emperor together. They
all appeared deeply pleased by the overture. Bethmann-Hollweg, earnest and
cordial, the Emperor ‘enchanted, almost childishly so.’ The Emperor talked a great
deal on naval matters to Cassel, the details of which he was unable to follow. After
much consultation the Emperor wrote out with Bethmann-Hollweg paper, ‘A,’
which Ballin transcribed. The second paper, ‘B,’ is Bethmann-Hollweg’s statement
of the impending naval increases, translated by Cassel. Cassel says they did not
seem to know what they wanted in regard to colonies. They did not seem to be
greatly concerned about expansion. ‘There were ten large companies in Berlin
importing labour into Germany.’ Over-population was not their problem. They
were delighted with Cassel’s rough notes of our ideas. They are most anxious to
hear from us soon....
Such is my report.

Observations.
It seems certain that the new Navy Law will be presented to the Reichstag, and
that it will be agreed to, even the Socialists not resisting. The naval increases are
serious, and will require new and vigorous measures on our part. The spirit may be
good, but the facts are grim. I had been thinking that if the old German programme
had been adhered to, we should have built 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against their six years’
programme of 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2. If their new programme stands, as I fear it must, and
they build 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, we cannot build less than 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4. This maintains
60 per cent. superiority in Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Cruisers over Germany
only. It will also be 2 keels to 1 on their additional 3 ships.
The creation of a third squadron in full commission is also a serious and
formidable provision. At present, owing to the fact that in the six winter months
the first and second squadrons of the High Sea Fleet are congested with recruits,
there is a great relief to us from the strain to which we are put by German naval
power. The addition of the third squadron will make that strain continual
throughout the year. The maintenance in full commission of 25 battleships, which
after the next four or five years will all be Dreadnoughts, exposes us to constant
danger, only to be warded off by vigilance approximating to war conditions. A
further assurance against attack is at present found in the fact that several of the
German Dreadnoughts are very often the wrong side of the Kiel Canal, which they
cannot pass through and must therefore make a long détour. The deepening of the
Canal by 1913 will extinguish this safety signal.[11] The fact that the defenders are
always liable to be attacked while only at their ordinary average strength by an
enemy at his selected moment and consequent maximum strength, means that our
margins would have to be very large. Against 25 battleships we could not keep less
than 40 available within twenty-four hours. This will involve additional expense.
The German increase in personnel must also be met. I had intended to ask
Parliament for 2,000 more men this year and 2,000 next. I expect to have to
double these quotas. On the whole the addition to our estimates consequent upon
German increases will not be less than three millions a year. This is certainly not
dropping the naval challenge.
I agree with you that caution is necessary. In order to meet the new German
squadron, we are contemplating bringing home the Mediterranean battleships.
This means relying on France in the Mediterranean,[12] and certainly no exchange
of system[13] would be possible, even if desired by you.
The only chance I see is roughly this. They will announce their new programme,
and we will make an immediate and effective reply. Then if they care to slow down
the ‘tempo’ so that their Fleet Law is accomplished in twelve and not in six years,
friendly relations would ensue, and we, though I should be reluctant to bargain
about it, could slow down too. All they would have to do, would be to make their
quotas biennial instead of annual. Nothing would be deranged in their plan.
Twelve years of tranquillity would be assured in naval policy. The attempt ought to
be made.

We laid these matters before the Cabinet, who decided that a

British Cabinet Minister should go to Berlin and selected Mr.
Haldane for that purpose. The ex-Emperor in his Memoirs makes a
ridiculous story out of this:—

‘... a keen dispute had arisen among Ministers—especially between Churchill and
Grey—as to who should go to Berlin, in the event of the achievement of the object
of making Germany abandon the further development of her fleet, and affix his
name to this great historical document. Churchill considered himself the right man
for the job, seeing that he was the head of the Navy, but Grey and Asquith would
not allow their colleague to reap the glory. Thus for a time, Grey stood in the
foreground—another proof that some political purpose rather than the number of
ships was the leading factor. After a while, however, it was decided that it was more
fitting to Grey’s personal and official importance that he should appear only at the
termination of the negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and ... “to get
his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part of the festivities and
fireworks,” which, in good German, means to enjoy the “Bengal light illumination.”
As it had been decided that in any event Churchill was not to get this, it was
necessary to choose somebody for the negotiations who was in close accord with
Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their complete confidence, was willing to
conduct the negotiations as far as the beginning of the “fireworks”; one, moreover,
who was already known at Berlin and not a stranger to Germany. Churchill
certainly qualified to this extent, for he had attended the Imperial manœuvres in
Silesia and Wurtemberg on several occasions as a guest of the Emperor.’

On this it may be observed that there never was any question of my

going to Berlin to negotiate about the Navy; nor did I at this time
wish to go. All the British ministers concerned worked together in
the utmost accord. After full discussions we authorized Sir Ernest
Cassel to send the following telegram:—

Sir E. Cassel to Herr Ballin (drafted by Sir E. Cassel, the First Lord, Mr. Haldane,
Sir Edward Grey).
 February 3, 1912.
Spirit in which statements of German Government have been made is most
cordially appreciated here. New German programme would entail serious and
immediate increase of British naval expenditure which was based on assumption
that existing German naval programme would be adhered to.
If the British Government are compelled to make such increase, it would make
negotiations difficult if not impossible.
If, on the other hand, German naval expenditure can be adapted by an alteration
of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious increase unnecessary to meet
German programme, British Government will be prepared at once to pursue
negotiations on the understanding that the point of naval expenditure is open to
discussion and that there is a fair prospect of settling it favourably.
If this understanding is acceptable, the British Government will forthwith
suggest the next step, as they think that the visit of a British Minister to Berlin
should in the first instance be private and unofficial.

All being acceptable, the Secretary of State for War accompanied

by Sir Ernest Cassel, started accordingly on February 6 for Berlin.
I had undertaken some weeks earlier to make a speech in support
of the Home Rule Bill in Belfast. Violent hostility to this project
developed in the inflammable capital of Ulster. Being publicly
committed, I had no choice but to fulfil my engagement, though to
avoid unnecessary provocation the meeting-place was changed from
the Ulster Hall to a large tent which was erected in the outskirts of
the city. Threats of violence and riot were loudly proclaimed on every
side and nearly 10,000 troops were concentrated in the area to keep
the peace. I had planned, if all went well at Belfast, to go on the next
day to Glasgow to inspect some of the shipbuilding works along the
Clyde, and to make a speech on the Naval position, which should
state very plainly our root intentions and be the necessary
counterpart of the Haldane mission. As I was waiting for the train for
Ireland to leave the London railway station, I read in the late edition
of the evening papers the German Emperor’s speech on the opening
of the Reichstag announcing Bills for the increase both of the Army
and the Navy. The new Navy Law was still a secret to the British and
German nations alike, but knowing as I did its scope and character
and viewing it in conjunction with the Army Bill, I sustained a strong
impression at this moment of the approaching danger. One sentence,
full of German self-revelation, stood out vividly. ‘It is my constant
duty and care to maintain and to strengthen on land and water, the
power of defence of the German people, which has no lack of young
men fit to bear arms.’ It was indeed true. One thought of France with
her declining birthrate peering out across her fortresses into the wide
German lands and silently reflecting on these ‘young men fit to bear
arms’ of whom there was indeed ‘no lack.’ My mind, skipping over
the day of Irish turmoil and the worry of the speech that lay before
me, fixed upon Glasgow as the place where some answer to this
threat of continental domination might perhaps be provided. Once
again Europe might find a safeguard against military overlordship in
an island which had never been and never would be ‘lacking in
trained and hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the
service of the sea.’
Accordingly, after the Irish ordeal was over, I said at Glasgow:—

‘The purposes of British naval power are essentially defensive. We have no

thoughts, and we have never had any thoughts of aggression, and we attribute no
such thoughts to other great Powers. There is, however, this difference between the
British naval power and the naval power of the great and friendly Empire—and I
trust it may long remain the great and friendly Empire—of Germany. The British
Navy is to us a necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to
them more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British existence. It
is existence to us; it is expansion to them. We cannot menace the peace of a single
Continental hamlet, no matter how great and supreme our Navy may become. But,
on the other hand, the whole fortunes of our race and Empire, the whole treasure
accumulated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement, would perish
and be swept utterly away if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is the
British Navy which makes Great Britain a great Power. But Germany was a great
Power, respected and honoured all over the world, before she had a single ship....
‘If to-day our position is eminently satisfactory we owe much to the foresight and
resolution of Mr. McKenna.... Whatever is needed for the safety of the country will
be asked for by the Government, and granted by the representatives of the nation
with universal assent. There is no need for anxiety in regard to our shipbuilding
capacity. There is no chance whatever of our being overtaken in naval strength
unless we want to be....
‘But what of the men ? We have to-day 135,000 men in the active service ratings
of the Navy. The great bulk of them are long-service men who have begun as boys
and have been trained as a lifelong profession to the naval service. We have no
difficulty in recruiting for the Navy ... and there is no doubt whatever of our ability
to make any increases which may be necessary, and which I think will be
necessary, in the personnel of the Navy. We have great reserves of seamen in this
country. There are measures which may be taken to make a greater use of our
reserves than has hitherto been found possible, and I have given directions for that
part of the subject to be carefully studied by the naval experts upon whom I rely.
Our reserves, both from the Royal Navy and from the Mercantile Marine, are a
great resource, and this island has never been, and never will be, lacking in
trained and hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the service of the sea.
‘Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whining here, no signals of
distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up. We will face the
future as our ancestors would have faced it, without disquiet, without arrogance,
but in stolid and inflexible determination. We should be the first Power to welcome
any retardation or slackening of naval rivalry. We should meet any such slackening
not by words but by deeds.... If there are to be increases upon the Continent of
Europe, we shall have no difficulty in meeting them to the satisfaction of the
country. As naval competition becomes more acute, we shall have not only to
increase the number of the ships we build, but the ratio which our naval strength
will have to bear to other great naval Powers, so that our margin of superiority
will become larger and not smaller as the strain grows greater. Thus we shall make
it clear that other naval Powers, instead of overtaking us by additional efforts, will
only be more outdistanced in consequence of the measures which we ourselves
shall take.’

This speech created a considerable outcry in Germany, which was

immediately re-echoed by a very large proportion of our own Liberal
press. It appeared that the word “luxury” had a bad significance
when translated into German. The ‘Luxus Flotte’ became an
expression passed angrily from lip to lip in Germany. As I expected,
on my return to London I found my colleagues offended. Their
congratulations upon Belfast were silenced by their reproaches about
Glasgow. Mr. Haldane returned two days later from Berlin, and the
Cabinet was summoned to receive an account of his mission.
Contrary to general expectation, however, the Secretary of State for
War declared that so far from being a hindrance to him in his
negotiations, the Glasgow speech had been the greatest possible
help. He had in fact used almost identical arguments to von
Bethmann-Hollweg the day before. He had told the Chancellor that if
Germany added a third squadron we should have ‘to maintain five or
even six squadrons in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the
Mediterranean to strengthen them’; that if ships were added to the
existing programme we should ‘proceed at once to lay down two
keels to each of the new German additions’; and that for the sake of
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