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Contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................................xv
Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................................ xix
Authors ......................................................................................................................................... xxi
vii
viii Contents
2.1.2
Complex Numbers in Polar Form................................................................34
2.1.2.1 Complex Algebra Using the Polar Form ..................................... 36
2.1.2.2 Integer Powers of Complex Numbers ......................................... 38
2.1.2.3 Roots of Complex Numbers .......................................................... 38
2.1.3 Complex Variables and Complex Functions .............................................. 39
2.2 Differential Equations ................................................................................................ 40
2.2.1 Linear, First-Order Differential Equations ................................................. 40
2.2.2 Second-Order Differential Equations with Constant Coefficients ......... 41
2.2.2.1 Homogeneous Solution .................................................................42
2.2.2.2 Particular Solution .........................................................................42
2.3 Laplace Transformation ............................................................................................. 45
2.3.1 Linearity of Laplace and Inverse Laplace Transforms ............................. 48
2.3.2 Differentiation and Integration of Laplace Transforms ........................... 48
2.3.2.1 Differentiation of Laplace Transforms ........................................ 48
2.3.2.2 Integration of Laplace Transforms ............................................... 49
2.3.3 Special Functions ........................................................................................... 50
2.3.3.1 Unit-Step Function ......................................................................... 50
2.3.3.2 Unit-Ramp Function ...................................................................... 52
2.3.3.3 Unit-Pulse Function ....................................................................... 53
2.3.3.4 Unit-Impulse (Dirac Delta) Function ........................................... 53
2.3.3.5 The Relation between Unit-Impulse and Unit-Step
Functions ..................................................................................... 54
2.3.3.6 Periodic Functions..........................................................................54
2.3.4 Laplace Transforms of Derivatives and Integrals ..................................... 55
2.3.4.1 Laplace Transforms of Derivatives .............................................. 56
2.3.4.2 Laplace Transforms of Integrals ................................................... 56
2.3.5 Inverse Laplace Transformation .................................................................. 57
2.3.5.1 Partial-Fraction Expansion Method............................................. 57
2.3.5.2 Performing Partial-Fraction Expansion in MATLAB ............... 60
2.3.5.3 Convolution Method ...................................................................... 61
2.3.6 Final-Value Theorem and Initial-Value Theorem ......................................64
2.3.6.1 Final-Value Theorem ......................................................................64
2.3.6.2 Initial-Value Theorem ....................................................................65
2.4 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 70
Review Problems ................................................................................................................... 71
3. Matrix Analysis..................................................................................................................... 75
3.1 Vectors and Matrices .................................................................................................. 75
3.1.1 Special Matrices .............................................................................................77
3.1.2 Elementary Row Operations ........................................................................77
3.1.3 Rank of a Matrix ............................................................................................ 78
3.1.4 Determinant of a Matrix ............................................................................... 79
3.1.4.1 Properties of Determinant ............................................................80
3.1.4.2 Rank in Terms of Determinant ....................................................80
3.1.4.3 Block Diagonal and Block Triangular Matrices ......................... 81
3.1.5 Inverse of a Matrix ......................................................................................... 82
3.1.5.1 Adjoint Matrix ................................................................................ 82
Contents ix
4.5.2
Block-Diagram Reduction Techniques...................................................... 139
4.5.2.1 Moving a Branch Point ................................................................ 139
4.5.2.2 Moving a Summing Junction ..................................................... 139
4.5.2.3 Mason’s Rule ................................................................................. 142
4.5.3 Block Diagram Construction from System Model .................................. 144
4.5.3.1 State-Space Block in Simulink ........................................ 146
4.6 Linearization .............................................................................................................. 151
4.6.1 Linearization of a Nonlinear Element ...................................................... 151
4.6.1.1 Functions of Two Variables ......................................................... 153
4.6.2 Linearization of a Nonlinear Model ......................................................... 153
4.6.2.1 Operating Point ............................................................................ 153
4.6.2.2 Linearization Procedure.............................................................. 154
4.6.2.3 Small-Angle Linearization .......................................................... 157
4.6.3 Linearization in Simulink .................................................................... 158
4.7 Summary .................................................................................................................... 162
Review Problems ................................................................................................................. 164
Bibliography................................................................................................................................ 577
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 579
Appendix B: Useful Formulas ................................................................................................. 581
Index ............................................................................................................................................. 583
Preface
As with the earlier editions of this book, the primary goal of this new edition is to provide
the reader with a thorough knowledge of mathematical modeling and analysis of dynamic
systems. MATLAB, Simulink, and Simscape are introduced at the outset and are utilized
throughout the book to perform symbolic, graphical, numerical, and simulation tasks. The
textbook, written at the junior level, meticulously covers techniques for modeling dynamic
systems, methods of response analysis, and an introduction to vibration and control
systems.
This book consists of 10 chapters and 2 appendices. Chapter 1 provides an introduction of
MATLAB, Simulink, and Simscape to the reader. The essential mathematical background
is covered in Chapters 2 and 3. Different forms of system model representation (state-space
form, transfer function, input–output equation, block diagram, etc.) and linearization are
discussed in Chapter 4. Each topic is also handled using MATLAB, and block diagrams are
constructed and analyzed using Simulink.
Chapter 5 discusses translational, rotational, and mixed mechanical systems. Free-body
diagram approach is emphasized in the derivation of the systems’ equations of motion.
Electrical and electromechanical systems are covered in Chapter 6 and operational
amplifiers and impedance methods are also included in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents
pneumatic, liquid-level, and thermal systems. Modeling and analysis of dynamic systems
ranging from mechanical to thermal using Simulink and Simscape are fully integrated in
Chapters 5 through 7.
Time-domain and frequency-domain analyses of dynamic systems are introduced in
Chapter 8. Time-domain analysis entails transient response of first-, second-, and higher-
order systems. The sinusoidal transfer function (frequency response function) is intro-
duced and utilized in obtaining the system’s frequency response as well as Bode diagram.
Analytical solution of the state equation is also included in this chapter. MATLAB and
Simulink play significant roles in determining and simulating system response and are
used throughout the chapter.
Chapter 9 presents an introduction to vibrations and includes free and forced vibrations
of single and multiple degrees-of-freedom systems, vibration suppression including vibra-
tion isolators and absorbers, modal analysis, and vibration testing. Some applications of
vibrations are also included: logarithmic decrement for experimental determination of the
damping ratio, rotating unbalance, and harmonic base excitation.
Chapter 10 gives an introduction to control systems analysis and design in the time
and frequency domains. Basic concepts and terminology are presented first, followed by
stability analysis, system identification, types of control, root-locus analysis, Bode plot,
and full-state feedback. These techniques are subsequently implemented using MATLAB,
Simulink, and Simscape.
xv
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xvi Preface
Appendices
Appendix A includes a summary of systems of units and conversion tables. Appendix B
contains useful formulas such as trigonometric identities and integrals.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter summaries provide concise reviews of the key aspects of each chapter.
3. At least 50% of the examples and exercises throughout the book are either new or
have been dramatically revised. The problem sets also include more challenging
exercises.
Ramin S. Esfandiari
Bei Lu
The authors express their deep gratitude to Jonathan Plant (Senior Editor, Mechanical,
Aerospace, Nuclear & Energy Engineering) at Taylor & Francis/CRC Press for his assis-
tance in various stages of the development of this book.
xix
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thought of his own forlorn condition was in his mind here: yet we
may hope that there was something of disinterested concern too.[173]
This early consideration frequently takes the practical form of
helpfulness. A child loves nothing better than to assist you in little
household occupations; and though love of activity and the pleasure
of imitating no doubt count for much in these cases, we can, I think,
safely set down something to the wish to be of use. This inference
seems justified by the fact that such practical helpfulness is not
always imitative. A little boy of two years and one month happened
to overhear his nurse say to herself: ‘I wish that Anne would
remember to fill the nursery boiler’. “He listened, and presently
trotted off; found the said Anne doing a distant grate, pulled her by
the apron, saying: ‘Nanna, Nanna!’ (come to nurse). She followed,
surprised and puzzled, the child pulling all the way, till, having got
her into the nursery, he pointed to the boiler, and added: ‘Go dare,
go dare,’ so that the girl comprehended and did as he bade her.”
With this practical ‘utilitarian’ sympathy there goes a quite
charming wish to give pleasure in other ways. A little girl when just a
year old was given to offering her toys, flowers, and other pretty
things to everybody. Generosity is as truly an impulse of childhood
as greediness, and it is odd to observe their alternate play. At an
early age, too, a child tries to make himself agreeable by pretty and
dainty courtesies. A little girl, aged three and a quarter, petitioned
her mother this wise: ‘Please, mamma, will you pin this with the
greatest pleasure?’ Regard for another’s feelings was surely never
more charmingly expressed than in the prayer that in rendering this
little service the helper should not only be willing, but glad.
Just as there are these sporadic growths of affectionate concern
and wish to please in relation to the mother and others, so there is
ample evidence of kindness to animals. The charge of cruelty in the
case of little children is, indeed, seen to be a gross libel as soon as
we consider their whole behaviour towards the animal world.
I have touched above on the vague alarms which this animal
world has for tiny children. It is only fair to them to say that these
alarms are for the most part transitory, giving place to interest,
attachment and fellow-feeling. In a sense a child may be said to
belong to the animal community, as Mr. Rudyard Kipling’s charming
account of the Jungle prettily suggests. Has he not, indeed, at first
more in common with the dog and cat, the pet rabbit or dormouse,
than with that grown-up human community which is apt to be so
preoccupied with things beyond his understanding, and in many
cases, at least, to wear so unfriendly a mien? We must remember,
too, that children as a rule know nothing of the prejudices, of the
disgusts, which make grown people put animals so far from them.
The boy C. was nonplussed by his mother’s horror of the caterpillar.
A child has been known quite spontaneously to call a worm
‘beautiful’.
As soon as the first fear of the strangeness is mastered a child will
take to an animal. A little boy of fifteen months quickly overcame his
fright at the barking of his grandfather’s dog, and began to share his
biscuits with him, to give him flowers to smell, and to throw stones
for his amusement. This mastery of fear by attachment takes a
higher form when later on the child will stick to his dumb companion
after suffering from his occasional fits of temper. Ruskin in his
reminiscences gives a striking example of this triumph of attachment
over fear. When five years old, he tells us, he was taken by the
serving-man to see a favourite Newfoundland dog in the stable. The
man rather foolishly humoured the child’s wish to kiss Leo (the dog)
and lowered him so that his face came near the animal’s. Hereupon
the dog, who was dining, resenting the interruption of his meal, bit
out a piece of the boy’s lip. His only fear after this was lest the dog
should be sent away.[174]
Children will further at a quite early age betray the germ of a truly
humane feeling towards animals. The same little boy that bravely
got over his fear of the dog’s barking would, when nineteen months
old, begin to cry on seeing a horse fall in the street. More passionate
outbursts of pity are seen at a later age. A boy five years and nine
months had a kitten of which he was very fond. One day, after two
or three days’ absence from the house, it came back with one foot
much mutilated and the leg swollen, evidently not far from dying.
“When (writes the mother) he saw it he burst into uncontrollable
tears and was more affected than I have ever seen him. The kitten
was taken away and drowned, and ever since (a month) he has
shown great reluctance in speaking of it, and never mentions it to
any one but those who saw the cat at the time. He says it is too sad
to tell any one of it.” The boy C. when only four was moved to
passionate grief at the sight of a dead dog taken from a pond.
The indignation of children at the doings of the butcher, the
hunter and others, shows how deeply pitiful consideration for
animals is rooted in their hearts. This is one of the most striking
manifestations of the better side of child-nature and deserves a
chapter to itself.
It is sometimes asked why children should take animals to their
bosoms in this fashion and lavish so much fellow-feeling on them. It
seems easy to understand how they come to choose animals,
especially young ones, as playmates, and now and again to be
ruthlessly inconsiderate of their comfort in their boisterous gambols;
but why should they be so affected by their sufferings and champion
their rights so sturdily? I think the answer is not hard to find. The
sympathy and love which the child gives to animals grow out of a
sort of blind gregarious instinct, and this again seems to be rooted in
a similarity of position and needs. As M. Compayré well says on this
point: “He (the child) sympathises naturally with creatures which
resemble him on so many sides, in which he finds wants analogous
to his own, the same appetite, the same impulses to movement, the
same desire for caresses. To resemble is already to love.”[175] I think,
however, that a deeper feeling comes in from the first and gathers
strength as the child hears about men’s treatment of animals, I
mean a sense of a common danger and helplessness face to face
with the human ‘giant’. The more passionate attachment of the child
to the animal is the outcome of the wide-spread instinct of helpless
things to band together. A mother once remarked to her boy,
between five and six years old: ‘Why, R., I believe you are kinder to
the animals than to me’. ‘Perhaps I am,’ he replied, ‘you see they are
not so well off as you are.’ May there not be something of this sense
of banding and mutual defence on the animals’ side too? The idea
does not look so absurd when we remember how responsive, how
forbearing, how ready to defend, a dog will often show itself towards
a ‘wee mite’ of a child. This same instinct to stand up for the
helpless inferior shows itself in children’s attitude towards servants
when scolded and especially when dismissed.[176]
The same outpourings of affection are seen in the dealings of
children with their toy babies and animals. Allowing for occasional
outbreaks of temper and acts of violence, the child’s intercourse with
his doll and his toy ‘gee gee’ is a wonderful display of loving
solicitude; a solicitude which is at once tender and corrective and
has the enduring constancy of a maternal instinct. No one can watch
the care given to a doll, the wide-ranging efforts to provide for its
comfort, to make it look pretty, and to get it to behave nicely, and
note the misery when it is missing, without acknowledging that in
this plaything humanised by childish fancy, and brought by daily
habit into the warmest intimacy of daily companionship, we have the
focal meeting-point of the tender impulses of the child.
Lastly, the reader may be reminded that childish kindness and
pitifulness extend to what look to us still less deserving objects in
the inanimate world. The manifestations of pity for the falling leaves
and for the stones condemned to lie always in one place, referred to
above, show how quick childish feeling is to detect what is sad in the
look of things. Children have even been known to apply the
commiserating vocable ‘poor’ to a torn paper figure, and to a bent
pin. It seems fair to suppose that here, too, the more tender heart
of the child saw occasion for pity.
It is worth noting that childish sorrow at the sufferings of things is
sometimes so keen, that even artistic descriptions which contain a
‘cruel’ element are shunned. A little boy under four "is indignant
(writes his mother) at any picture where an animal suffers. He has
even turned against several of his favourite pictures—German
Bilderbogen, because they are ‘cruel,’ as the bear led home with a
corkscrew in his nose." The extreme manifestation of this shrinking
from the representation of animal or human suffering is dislike for
‘sad stories’. The unsophisticated tender heart of the child can find
no pleasure in horrors which appear to be the supreme delight of
many an adult reader.
Here, however, it is evident, we verge on the confines of
sentimental pity. It is to be remarked that highly imaginative children
shed most tears over these fictitious sufferings. Children with more
matter-of-fact minds and a practical turn are not so affected. Thus a
mother writes of her two girls: ‘M. being the most imaginative is and
always has been much affected by sad stories, especially if read to
her with dramatic inflexions of voice. From two years old upwards
these have always affected her to tears, whilst P. who is really the
most tender-hearted and helpful, but has little imagination, never
cries at sad stories, and when four years old explained to me that
she did not mind them because she knew they didn’t really happen.’
It appears to me to be incontestable that in this spontaneous
outgoing of fellow-feeling towards other creatures, human and
animal, the child manifests something of a truly moral quality. C.’s
stout and persistent championship of the London horses against the
oppression of the bearing-rein had in it something of righteous
indignation. The way in which his mind was at this period pre-
occupied with animal suffering suggests that his sympathies with
animals were rousing the first fierce protest against the wicked
injustice of the world. The boy De Quincey got this first sense of the
existence of moral evil in another way through his sympathy with a
sister who, rumour said, had been brutally treated by a servant. He
could not, he tells us, bear to look on the woman. It was not anger.
‘The feeling which fell upon me was a shuddering horror as upon a
first glimpse of the truth that I was in a world of evil and strife.’[177]
Children’s Lies.
We may now turn to the other main charge against children, that
of lying. According to many, children are in general accomplished
little liars, to the manner born and equally adept with the
mendacious savage. Even writers on childhood, by no means
prejudiced against them, lean to the view that untruth is universal
among children, and to some extent at least innate.[178]
Here, surely, there is need of discrimination. A lie connotes, or
should connote, an assertion made with full consciousness of its
untruth, and in order to mislead. It may well be doubted whether
little children have so clear an apprehension of what we understand
by truth and falsity as to be liars in this full sense. Much of what
seems shocking to the adult unable to place himself at the level of
childish intelligence and feeling will probably prove to be something
far less serious. It is satisfactory to note a tendency to take a milder
and more reasonable view of this infantile fibbing; and in what
follows I can but follow up the excellent recent studies of Dr. Stanley
Hall, and M. Compayré.[179]
It is desirable to inspect a little more closely the various forms of
this early mendacity. To begin with those little ruses and
dissimulations which, according to M. Perez, are apt to appear
almost from the cradle in the case of certain children, it is plainly
difficult to bring them into the category of full-fledged lies. When, for
example, a child wishing to keep a thing hides it, and on your asking
for it holds out empty hands, it would be hard to name this action a
lie, even though there is in it a germ of deception. We must
remember that children have an early developed instinct to secrete
things, and the little dissimulation in these actions may be a mere
outcome of this hiding propensity, and the accompanying wish that
you should not get the hidden thing. Refusals to tell secrets, or as C.
called them ‘private secrets’ (a fine distinction), show the same
thing. A child when badgered is most jealous in guarding what he
has been told, or what his fancy has made a secret. The little ruses
or ‘acted lies’ to which I am now referring seem to me at the worst
attempts to put you off the scent in what is regarded as a private
matter, and to have the minimum of intentional deception. As Mrs.
Fry has well shown, this childish passion for keeping things secret
may account for later and more serioua-looking falsehoods.[180]
More distinct marks of mendacity appear when the child comes to
use language and proffers statements which if he reflected he might
know to be false. It may readily be thought that no child who has
the intelligence to make statements at all could make false ones
without some little consciousness of the falsity. But here I suspect
we judge harshly, applying adult tests to cases where they are
inappropriate. Anybody who has observed children’s play and
dramatic talk, and knows how readily and completely they can
imagine the non-existent so as to lose sight of the existent, will be
chary when talking of them of using the word lie. There may be
solemn sticklers for truth who would be shocked to hear the child
when at play saying, ‘I am a coachman,’ ‘Dolly is crying,’ and so
forth. But the discerning see nothing to be alarmed at here. Similarly
when a little girl of two and a half after running on with a pretty long
rigmarole of sounds devoid of all meaning said: “It’s because you
don’t understand me, papa”. Here the love of mystery and secrecy
aided by the dramatic impulse made the nonsense talk real talk. The
wee thing doubtless had a feeling of superiority in talking in a
language which was unintelligible to her all-wise papa.
On much the same level of moral obliquity are those cases where
a child will say the opposite of what he is told, turning authoritative
utterances upside down. A quaint instance is quoted by Compayré
from Guyau. Guyau’s little boy (age not given) was overheard saying
to himself: “Papa parle mal, il a dit sevette, bébé parle bien, il dit
serviette”. Such reversals are a kind of play too: the child not
unnaturally gets tired now and then of being told that he is wrong,
and for the moment imagines himself right and his elders wrong,
immensely enjoying the idea.
A graver-looking case presents itself when an ‘untruth’ is uttered
in answer to a question. C. on being asked by his mother who told
him something, answered, ‘Dolly’. ‘False, and knowingly false,’
somebody will say, especially when he learns that the depraved
youngster instantly proceeded to laugh. But let us look a little closer.
The question had raised in C.’s small mind the idea that somebody
had told him. This is a process of ‘suggestion’ which, as we shall see
presently, sways a child’s mind as it sways that of the hypnotised
adult. And there close by the child was dolly, and the child’s make-
believe includes, as we all know, much important communication
with dolly. What more natural than that the idea should at once seize
his imagination? But the laugh? Well I am ready to admit that there
was a touch of playful defiance here, of young impishness. The
expression on the mother’s face showed him that his bold absurd
fancy had produced its half-startling, half-amusing effect; and there
is nothing your little actor likes more than this after-effect of
startling you. But more, it gave him at the same instant a glimpse of
the outside look of his fancy, of the unreality of the untruth; and the
laugh probably had in it the delight of the little rebel, of the naughty
rogue who loves now and then to set law at defiance.
A quick vivid fancy, a childish passion for acting a part, these
backed by a strong impulse to astonish, and a turn for playful
rebellion, seem to me to account for this and other similar varieties
of early misstatement. Naughty they no doubt are in a measure; but
is it not just that playing at being naughty which has in it nothing
really bad, and is removed toto cœlo from downright honest lying? I
speak the more confidently as to C.’s case as I happen to know that
he was in his serious moods particularly, one might almost say
pedantically, truthful.
A somewhat different case is that where the vivid fancy underlying
the misstatement may be supposed to lead to a measure of self-
deception. When, for example, a child wants to be carried and says,
“My leg hurts me and my foot too just here, I can’t walk, I can’t, I
can’t,”[181] it is possible at least that he soon realises the tiredness he
begins by half feigning. The Worcester collection gives an example.
“I was giving some cough syrup, and E (aged three years two
months) ran to me saying: ‘I am sick too, and I want some
medicine’. She then tried to cough. Every time she would see me
taking the syrup bottle afterwards, she would begin to cough. The
syrup was very sweet.” This looks simply awful. But what if the child
were of so imaginative a turn that the sight of the syrup given to the
sick child produced a more or less complete illusion of being herself
sick, an illusion strong enough to cause the irritation and the cough?
The idea may seem far-fetched, but deserves to be considered
before we brand the child with the name liar.
The vivid fanciful realisation which in this instance was sustained
by the love of sweet things is in many cases inspired by other and
later developed feelings. How much false statement—and that not
only among little children—is of the nature of exaggeration and
directed to producing a strong effect. When, for example, the little
four-year-old draws himself up and shouts exultantly, “See, mamma,
how tall I am, I am growing so fast, I shall soon be a giant,” or
boasts of his strength and tells you the impossible things he is going
to do, the element of braggadocio is on the surface, and imposes on
nobody.
No doubt these propensities, though not amounting in the stage
of development now dealt with to full lying, may if unrestrained
develop into this. An unbridled fancy and strong love of effect will
lead an older child to say what he knows, vaguely at least, at the
moment to be false in order to startle and mystify others. Such
exaggeration of the impulses is distinctly abnormal, as may be seen
by its affinity to what we can observe in the case of the insane. The
same is true of the exaggeration of the vain-glorious or ‘showing off’
impulses, as illustrated for example in the cases mentioned by Dr.
Stanley Hall of children who on going to a new town or school would
assume new characters which were kept up with difficulty by means
of many false pretences.[182]
A fertile source of childish untruth, especially in the case of girls, is
the wish to please. Here we have to do with very dissimilar things.
An emotional child who in a sudden fit of tenderness for mother,
aunt or teacher gushes out, ‘Oh I do love you,’ or ‘What sweet lovely
eyes you have,’ or other pretty flattery, may be sincere for the
moment, the exaggeration being indeed the outcome of a sudden
ebullition of emotion. There is more of acting and artfulness in the
flatteries which take their rise in a calculating wish to say the nice
agreeable thing. Some children are, I believe, adepts at these
amenities. Those in whom the impulse is strong and dominant are
presumably those who in later years make the good society actors.
In all this childish simulation and exaggeration we have to do with
the germs of what may become a great moral evil, insincerity, that is
falsity in respect of what is best and ought to be sacred. Yet this
childish flattery, though undoubtedly a mild mendacity, is a most
amiable mendacity through its charming motive—always supposing
that it is a pure wish to please, and is not complicated with an
arrière pensée, the hope of gaining some favour from the object of
the devotion. Perhaps there is no variety of childish fault more
difficult to deal with; if only for the reason that in checking the
impulse we are robbing ourselves of the sweetest offerings of
childhood.
The other side of this wish to please is the fear to give offence,
and this, I suspect, is a fertile source of childish prevarication. If, for
example, a child is asked whether he does not like or admire
something, his feeling that the questioner expects him to say ‘Yes’
makes it very hard to say ‘No’. Mrs. Burnett gives us a reminiscence
of this early experience. When she was less than three, she writes, a
lady visitor, a friend of her mother, having found out that the baby
newly added to the family was called Edith, remarked to her: ‘That’s
a pretty name. My baby is Eleanor. Isn’t that a pretty name?’ On
being thus questioned she felt in a dreadful difficulty, for she did not
like the sound of ‘Eleanor,’ and yet feared to be rude and say so. She
got out of it by saying she did not like the name as well as ‘Edith’.
These temptations and struggles, which may impress themselves
on memory for the whole of life, illustrate the influence of older
persons’ wishes and expectations on the childish mind. It is possible
that we have here to do with something akin to “suggestion,” that
force which produces such amazing results on the hypnotised
subject, and is known to be a potent influence for good or for evil on
the young mind. A leading question of the form, ‘Isn’t this pretty?’
‘Aren’t you fond of me?’ may easily overpower for a moment the
child’s own conviction super-imposing that of the stronger mind.
Such passive utterance coming from a mind over-ridden by another’s
authority is not to be confounded with conscious falsehood.
This suggestion often combines with other forces. Here is a good
example. A little American girl, sent into the oak shrubbery to get a
leaf, saw a snake, which so frightened her that she ran home
without the leaf. As cruel fate would have it she met her brothers
and told them she had seen a ‘’sauger’. “They knew (writes the lady
who recalls this reminiscence of her childhood) the difference
between snakes and their habits, and, boy-like, wanted to tease me,
and said ‘’Twas no ’sauger—it didn’t have a red ring round its neck,
now, did it?’ My heated imagination saw just such a serpent as soon
as their words were spoken, and I declared it had a ring about ‘its
neck’.” In this way she was led on to say that it had scars and a little
bell on its neck, and was soundly rated by her brothers as a ‘liar’.[183]
Here we have a case of “illusion of memory” induced by suggestion
acting on a mind made preternaturally sensitive by the fear from
which it had not yet recovered. If there was a germ of mendacity in
the case it had its source in the shrinking from the brothers’ ridicule,
the wish not to seem utterly ignorant about these boyish matters,
the snakes. Yet who would say that such swift unseizable
movements of feeling in the dim background of consciousness made
the child’s responses lies in the proper sense of the word?
It seems paradoxical, yet is, I believe, indisputable, that a large
part of childish untruth comes upon the scene in connexion with
moral authority and discipline. We shall see by-and-by that
unregenerate child-nature is very apt to take up the attitude of self-
defence towards those who administer law and inflict punishment.
Very little children brought face to face with restraint and
punishment will ‘try on’ these ruses. Here are one or two illustrations
from the notes on the little girl M. When seventeen and a half
months old she threw down her gloves when wheeled in her mail-
cart by her mother. The latter picked them up and told her not to
throw them away again. She was at first good, then seemed to
deliberate and finally called out: ‘Mamma, Bubbo’ (dog). The mother
turned to look, and the little imp threw her gloves away again,
laughing; there was of course no dog. The fib about the dog formed
part of a piece of childish make-believe, of an infantile comedy. It
was hardly more when about two months later, after she had thrown
down and broken her tea-things, and her mother had come up to
her, she said: ‘Mamma broke tea-things—beat mamma,’ and
proceeded to beat her. In connexion with such little child-comedies
there can be no talk of deception. They are the outcome of the
childish instinct to upset the serious attitude of authority by a bit of
fun.
The little stratagem begins to look more serious when the child
gets artful enough to put the mother off the scent by a false
statement. For example, a mite of three having in a moment of
temper called her mother ‘monkey,’ and being questioned as to what
she had said, replied: “I said I was a monkey”. In some cases the
child does not wait to be questioned. A little girl mentioned by
Compayré, being put out by something the mother had done or said,
cried: ‘Nasty!’ (Vilaine!) then after a significant silence, corrected
herself in this wise, ‘Dolly nasty’ (Poupée vilaine). The skill with
which this transference was effected without any violence to
grammar argues a precocious art.[184]
Our moral discipline may develop untruth in another way. When
the punishment has been inflicted and the governor, relenting from
the brutal harshness, asks: ‘Are you sorry?’ or ‘Aren’t you sorry?’ the
answer is exceedingly likely to be ‘No,’ even though this is in a sense
untrue. More clearly is this lying of obstinacy seen where a child is
shut up and kept without food. Asked: ‘Are you hungry?’ the hardy
little sinner stifles his sensations and pluckily answers ‘No,’ even
though the low and dismal character of the sound shows that the
untruth is but a half-hearted affair.
I have tried to show how a child’s untruths may be more than half
“playing,” how when they are serious assertions they may involve a
measure of self-deception, and how even when consciously false
they may have their origin in excusable circumstances and feelings.
In urging all this I do not wish to deny the statement that children
wall sometimes deliberately invent a lie from a base motive, as when
a girl of three seeing her little brother caressed by her mother for
some minutes and feeling herself neglected fabricated the story that
‘Henri’ had been cruel to the parrot.[185] Yet I am disposed to look on
such mean falsehoods as exceptional if not abnormal.
There is much even yet to be done in clearing up the modus
operandi of children’s lies. How quick, for example, is a child to find
out the simple good-natured people, as the servant-maid, or
gardener, who will listen to his romancing and flatter him by
appearing to accept it all as gospel. More significant is the fact that
intentional deception is apt to show itself towards certain people
only. There is many a school-boy who would think it no dishonour to
say what is untrue to those he dislikes, especially by way of getting
them into hot water, though he would feel it mean and base to lie to
his mother or his father, and bad form to lie to the head-master.
Similar distinctions show themselves in earlier stages, and are
another point of similarity between the child and the savage whose
ideas of truthfulness seem to be truthfulness for my people only.
This is a side of the subject which would repay fuller inquiry.
Another aspect of the subject which has been but little
investigated is the influence of habit in the domain of lying, and the
formation of persistent permanent lies. The impulse to stick to an
untruth when once uttered is very human, and in the case of the
child is enforced by the fear of discovery. This applies not only to
falsehoods foisted on persons in authority, but to those by which
clever boys and girls take pleasure in befooling the inferior wits of
others. In this way there grow up in the nursery and in the
playground traditional myths and legends which are solemnly
believed by the simple-minded. Such invention is in part the
outcome of the “pleasures of the imagination”. Yet it is probable that
these are in all cases reinforced not only by the wish to produce an
effect, but by the love of power which in the child not endowed with
physical prowess is apt to show itself in hood-winking and practical
joking.
Closely connected with the permanence of untruths is the
contagiousness of lying. The propagation of falsehood is apt to be
promoted by a certain tremulous admiration for the hardihood of the
lie and by the impulses of the rebel which never quite slumber even
in the case of fairly obedient children. I suspect, however, that it is in
all cases largely due to the force of suggestion. The falsehood boldly
announced is apt to captivate the mind and hold it under a kind of
spell.
This effect of suggestion in generating falsehood is very marked in
those pathological or semi-pathological cases where children have
been led to give false testimony. It is now known that it is quite
possible to provoke an illusion of memory in certain children
between the ages of six and fifteen by simply affirming something in
their hearing, whether they are in the waking or in the sleeping
state, so that they are ready to state that they actually saw happen
what was asserted.[186]
So much as to the several manners and circumstances of childish
lying. In order to understand still better what it amounts to, how
much of conscious falsehood enters into it, we must glance at
another and closely related phenomenon, the pain which sometimes
attends and follows it.
There is no doubt that a certain number of children experience a
qualm of conscience when uttering a falsehood. This is evidenced in
the well-known devices by which the intelligence of the child thinks
to mitigate the lie; as when on saying what he knows to be false he
adds mentally, ‘I do not mean it,’ ‘in my mind,’ or some similar
palliative.[187] Such subterfuges show a measure of sensibility, for a
hardened liar would despise the shifts, and are curious as
illustrations of the childish conscience and its unlearnt casuistry.
The remorse that sometimes follows lying, especially the first lie,
which catches the conscience at its tenderest, has been remembered
by many in later life. Here is a case. A lady friend remembers that
when a child of four she had to wear a shade over her eyes. One
day on walking out with her mother she was looking, child-wise,
sidewards instead of in front, and nearly struck a lamp-post. Her
mother then scolded her, but presently remembering the eyes, said:
“Poor child, you could not see well”. She knew that this was not the
reason, but she accepted it, and for long afterwards was tormented
with a sense of having told a lie. Miss Wiltshire, who tells the story
of the mythical snake, gives another recollection which illustrates the
keen suffering of a child when he becomes fully conscious of
falsehood. She was as a small child very fond of babies, and had
been permitted by her mother to go when invited by her aunt to
nurse her baby cousin. One day wanting much to go when not
invited, she boldly invented, saying that her aunt was busy and had
asked her to spend an hour with the baby. ‘I went (she adds) not to
the baby, but by a circuitous route to my father’s barn, crept behind
one of the great doors, which I drew as close to me as I could,
vainly wishing that the barn and the hay-stacks would cover me;
then I cried and moaned I do not know how many hours, and when
I went to bed I said my prayers between sobs, refusing to tell my
mother why I wept.’[188]
Such examples of remorse are evidence of a child’s capability of
knowingly stating what is false. This is strikingly shown in Miss
Wiltshire’s two reminiscences; for she distinctly tells us that in the
case of her confident assertion about the imaginary snake with ring
and bell, she felt no remorse as she was not conscious of uttering a
lie.[189] But these sufferings of conscience point to something else, a
sense of awful wickedness, of having done violence to all that is
right and holy. How, it may be asked, does it happen that children
feel thus morally crushed after telling a lie?
Here is a question that can only be answered when we have more
material. We know that among all childish offences lying is the one
which is apt to be specially branded by theological sanctions. The
physical torments with which the ‘lying tongue’ is threatened, may
well beget terror in a timid child’s heart. I think it likely, too, that the
awfulness of lying is thought of by children in its relation to the all-
seeing God who, though he cannot be lied to, knows when we lie.
The inaudible palliative words added to the lie may be an awkward
child-device for putting the speaker straight with the all-hearing God.
Further inquiry is, however, needed here. Do children contract a
horror of a lie when no religious terrors are introduced? Is there
anything in the workings of a child’s own mind which would lead him
to feel after his first lie as if the stable world were tumbling about
his ears? Let parents supply us with facts here.
Meanwhile I will venture to put forth a conjecture, and will gladly
withdraw it as soon as it is disproved.
So far as my inquiries have gone I do not find that children
brought up at home and kept from the contagion of bad example do
uniformly develop a lying propensity. Several mothers assure me that
their children have never seriously propounded an untruth. I can say
the same about two children who have been especially observed for
the purpose.[190]
This being so, I distinctly challenge the assertion that lying is
instinctive in the sense that a child, even when brought up among
habitual truth tellers, shows an unlearned aptitude to say what he
knows to be false. A child’s quick imitativeness will, of course, lead
him to copy grown-up people’s untruths at a very early age.[191]
I will go further and suggest that where a child is brought up
normally, that is, in a habitually truth-speaking community, he tends,
quite apart from moral instruction, to acquire a respect for truth as
what is customary. Consider for a moment how busily a child’s mind
is occupied during the first years of linguistic performance in getting
at the bottom of words, of fitting ideas to words when trying to
understand others, and words to ideas when trying to express his
own thoughts, and you will see that all this must serve to make
truth, that is, the correspondence of statement with fact, to the
child-mind something matter-of-course, something not to be
questioned, a law wrought into the very usages of daily life which he
never thinks of disobeying. We can see that children accustomed to
truth-speaking show all the signs of a moral shock when they are
confronted with assertions which, as they see, do not answer to fact.
The child C. was highly indignant on hearing from his mother that
people said what he considered false things about horses and other
matters of interest: and he was even more indignant at meeting with
any such falsity in one of his books for which he had all a child’s
reverence. The idea of perpetrating a knowing untruth, so far as I
can judge, is simply awful to a child who has been thoroughly
habituated to the practice of truthful statement. May it, then, not
well be that when a preternatural pressure of circumstances pushes
the child over the boundary line of truth, he feels a shock, a horror,
a giddy and aching sense of having violated law—law not wholly
imposed by the mother’s command, but rooted in the very habits of
social life? I think the conjecture is well worth considering.
Our inquiry has led us to recognise, in the case of cruelty and of
lying alike, that children are by no means morally perfect, but have
tendencies which, if not counteracted or held in check by others, will
develop into true cruelty and true lying. On the other hand, our
study has shown us that these impulses are not the only ones. A
child has promptings of kindness, which alternate, often in a
capricious-looking way, with those of inconsiderate teasing and
tormenting; and he has, I hold, side by side with the imaginative
and other tendencies which make for untruthful statement, the
instinctive roots of a respect for truth. These tendencies have not
the same relative strength and frequency of utterance in the case of
all children, some showing, for example, more of the impulse which
makes for truth, others more of the impulse which makes for
untruth. Yet in all children probably both kinds of impulse are to be
observed.
I have confined myself to two of the moral traits of childhood. If
there were time to go into an examination of others, as childish
vanity, something similar would, I think, be found. Children’s vanity,
like that of the savage, has been the theme of more than one
chapter, and it is undoubtedly vast to the point of absurdity. Yet, side
by side with these impulses to deck oneself, to talk boastfully, there
exists a delightful childish candour which, if not exactly what we call
modesty, is possibly something better.
We may then, perhaps, draw the conclusion that child-nature is on
its moral side wanting in consistency and unity. It is a field of half-
formed growths, some of which tend to choke the others. Certain of
these are favourable, others unfavourable to morality. It is for
education to see to it that these isolated propensities be organised
into a system in which those towards the good become supreme and
regulative principles.
165. Darwin notes that all his boys did this kind of thing, whereas
his girls did not (Mind, ii., p. 288). My own observations agree with
this. A small boy has more of savage attack than a small girl.
183. Sara E. Wiltshire, The Christian Union, vol. xl., No. 26.
184. Perez gives a similar story, only that the epithet ‘vilaine’ was
here transferred to ‘l’eau’. L’Education dès le berceau, p. 53.
186. M. Motet was one of the first to call attention to the forces of
childish imagination and the effects of suggestion in the false
testimonies of children. Les Faux Temoignages des Enfants devant la
Justice, 1887. The subject has been further elucidated by Dr.
Bérillon.
189. Cf. what Mrs. Fry says, Uninitiated (‘A Discovery in Morals’).
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