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IT
IO
will get you to the good stuff, fast. Jennifer will explain every
Whether you’re a beginner or bringing your skills up to date, this book gives you a solid footing in
N
step you need, including some very advanced concepts.”
modern web production. I teach each topic visually at a pleasant pace, with frequent exercises
—JEN SIMMONS, MOZILLA AND W3C CSS WORKING GROUP
to let you try out new skills. Reading it feels like sitting in my classroom! —Jennifer Robbins
Learning
Web Design
A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO HTML, CSS,
JAVASCRIPT, AND WEB GRAPHICS
vi Contents
Contents vii
Test Yourself...................................................................................417
CSS Review: Floating and Positioning Properties.............................418
viii Contents
Contents ix
A. Answers......................................................................... 737
x Contents
FOREWORD
BY JEN SIMMONS
If you travel to Silicon Valley and navigate between the global headquarters
of some of the world’s most famous internet companies, you can head to
the Computer History Museum. Wander through the museum, past the
ancient mainframes and the story of the punch card, and you’ll eventually
find yourself at the beginning of the Wide World Web. There’s a copy of the
Mosaic browser on a floppy disk tucked in a book of the same name, a copy
of Netscape Navigator that was sold in a box, and something called “Internet
in a Box,” the #1 best-selling internet solution for Windows. Then there are
the websites. Some of the earliest, most notable, and most important websites
are on permanent display, including something called the “Global Network
Navigator,” from 1993. It was designed by none other than the author of this
book, Jennifer Robbins. Long before most of us had any idea the web existed,
or even before many of you were born, Jen was busy designing the first com-
mercial website. She’s been there from the very beginning, and has watched,
taught, and written about every stage of evolution of the web.
Learning Web Design is now in its 5th edition, with a gazillion new pages and
updates from those early days.
I am constantly asked, “What are the best resources for learning web technol-
ogy?” I learned by reading books. Blog posts are great, but you also need an
in-depth comprehensive look at the subject. In the beginning, all books were
beginner books, teaching HTML, URLs, and how to use a browser. When
CSS came along, the books assumed you’d already been using HTML, and
taught you how to change to the new techniques. Then CSS3 came along,
and all the books taught us how to add new CSS properties to our preexist-
ing understanding of CSS2. Of course there were always books for beginners,
but they were super basic. They never touched on professional techniques for
aspiring professionals. Each new generation of books assumed that you had
prior knowledge. Great for those of us in the industry. Tough for anyone new.
xi
Foreword
But how in the world are you supposed to read about two decades of tech-
niques, discarding what is outdated, and remembering what is still correct?
How are you supposed to build a career from knowledge that’s so basic that
you have no idea what real pros code in their everyday jobs?
You can’t. That’s why today when people ask me for a book recommendation,
I have only one answer. This book.
This book you are reading now doesn’t require any prior knowledge. You
don’t need to have made a web page before, or to have any idea where to get a
code editor. It starts at the very beginning. And yet, unlike all the other books
that start at the beginning, this one will get you to the good stuff, fast. Jen will
explain every step you need, including some very advanced concepts. She’s
packed this book full of cutting edge, insider knowledge from top experts.
I honestly don’t know how she does it. How can someone teach the basics
and the advanced stuff at the same time? Usually you’ll learn those things
years apart, with lots of struggling in the dark in the meantime. Here, Jen
will lift you up from wherever you are in your journey, and take you farther.
Every one of us—myself included, and I’m on the CSS Working Group (the
group of people who invent new CSS)—can learn a lot from this book. I do
every time I pick it up.
Pay attention to the notes in the margins. Read the websites she recommends,
watch the videos. Jen is giving you a shortcut to a professional network.
Follow the people she mentions. Read the links they suggest. These might
be your future colleagues. Dare to dream that you will meet them. They are,
after all, only a tweet away. It is a small world, full of real people, and you can
become part of it all. This book will get you started.
—Jen Simmons
Designer and Developer Advocate at Mozilla
Member of the CSS Working Group
April 2018
xiii
Preface
TYPOGRAPHICAL CONVENTIONS
Italic
Used to indicate filenames and directory names, as well as for emphasis.
Colored italic
Used to indicate URLs and email addresses.
Colored roman text
Used for special terms that are being defined.
Constant width
Used to indicate code examples and keyboard commands.
Colored constant width
Used for emphasis in code examples.
Constant width italic
Used to indicate placeholders for attribute and style sheet property values.
→
Indicates that a line of code was broken in the text but should remain
together on one line in use.
Preface xv
Preface
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Once again, many smart and lovely people had my back on this edition.
I want to say a special thanks to my two amazing tech reviewers. I am quite
indebted to Elika J. Etemad (fantasai), who, as a member of the W3C CSS
Working Group, helped me make this edition more accurate and up-to-date
with standards than ever before. She was tough, but the results are worth it.
Petter Dessne brought his computer science expertise as well as valuable per-
spective as a professor and a reader for whom English is a second language.
His good humor and photos of his home in Sweden were appreciated as well!
I am also grateful for this roster of web design superstars who reviewed
particular chapters and passages in their areas of expertise (in alphabetical
order): Amelia Bellamy-Royds (SVG), Brent Beer (developer tools), Chris
Coyier (SVG), Terence Eden (audio/video), Brad Frost (Responsive Web
Design), Lyza Danger Gardner (developer tools), Jason Grigsby (images), Val
Head (animation), Daniel Hengeveld (developer tools), Mat Marquis (respon-
sive images), Eric Meyer (CSS layout), Jason Pamental (web fonts), Dan Rose
(images), Arsenio Santos (embedded media), Jen Simmons (CSS layout),
Adam Simpson (developer tools), and James Williamson (structured data).
Thanks also to Mat Marquis for his contribution of two lively JavaScript
chapters that I could never have written myself, and to Jen Simmons for writ-
ing the Foreword and for her ongoing support of Learning Web Design.
I want to thank my terrific team of folks at O’Reilly Media: Meg Foley
(Acquisitions Editor), Jeff Bleiel (Developmental Editor), Kristen Brown
(Production Editor), Rachel Monaghan (Copyeditor), Sharon Wilkey
(Proofreader), and Lucie Haskins (Indexer). Special thanks go to InDesign
and book production expert Ron Bilodeau, who turned my design into a tem-
plate and a set of tools that made book production an absolute joy. Special
thanks also go to Edie Freedman for the beautiful cover design and half a
lifetime of friendship and guidance.
Finally, no Acknowledgments would be complete without profound apprecia-
tion for the love and support of my dearest ones, Jeff and Arlo.
HOW TO CONTACT US
Please address comments and questions concerning this book to the
publisher:
O’Reilly Media, Inc.
1005 Gravenstein Highway North
Sebastopol, CA 95472
800-998-9938 (in the United States or Canada)
707-829-0515 (international or local)
707-829-0104 (fax)
We have a web page for this book, where we list errata, examples,
and any additional information. You can access this page at bit.ly/
learningWebDesign_5e.
To comment or ask technical questions about this book, send email to
bookquestions@oreilly.com.
For more information about our books, courses, conferences, and news, see
our website at www.oreilly.com.
Find us on Facebook: facebook.com/oreilly
Follow us on Twitter: twitter.com/oreillymedia
Watch us on YouTube: www.youtube.com/oreillymedia
Preface xvii
I
GETTING STARTED
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
[114] 1 Atk. 508.
[115] 3 Bro. C. C. 416.
[116] Richards v. Richards, 9 Price, 226.
[117] Barton v. Cooke, 5 Ves. 461.
[118] Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. 258.
[119] 2 Ves. Sen. 561.
[120] Wms. Exrs. 994.
[121] 1 Roper, 215.
[122] Sayer v. Sayer, 2 Vern. 688.
[123] 5 Ves. 150.
[124] Duncan v. Alt, 3 Penn. 383.
[125] Wms. Exrs. 759.
[126] Idem. 1035.
[127] Bacon’s Ab. Leg. (E); 2 Vent. 342; Moore v. Smith, 9 Watts,
403.
[128] 11 Wend. 259.
[129] 2 Vern. 673; Van Wyck v. Bloodgood, 1 Bradf. 154.
[130] Collins v. Metcalfe, 1 Vern. 462. To avoid the lapse of a legacy
by the death of the legatee during the lifetime of the testator, the
following States have provided against it, if any issue of the legatee
be living at the death of the testator: Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New
Jersey, Mississippi, Maine, Rhode Island. (4 Kent, 542.)
[131] 1 Roper, 216; 1 Paige, 33; Harris v. Fly, 7 Paige, 429; Sweet v.
Chase, 2 N. Y. 73.
[132] May v. Wood, 3 Bro. 471.
[133] Barlow v. Grant, 1 Vern. 255.
[134] Duke of Chandos v. Talbot, 2 P. Wms. 612; Smith v. Smith, 2
Vern. 92.
[135] 1 Roper, 645.
[136] Bacon’s Ab. Leg. (F.)
[137] 37 Miss. 114.
[138] 2 Meriv. 26.
[139] Moore v. Moore, 47 Barb. 257.
[140] 2 Salk. 570.
[141] Randall v. Payne, 1 Bro. C. C. 55.
[142] A legacy was sometimes given on condition that the legatee
should not marry a Roman Catholic. As late as April, 1869, the Hon.
Araminta Monck Ridley, in London, left a clause in her will that “if
any or either of my said children, either in my lifetime, or at any
time after my decease, shall marry a Roman Catholic, or shall join or
enter any Ritualistic brotherhood or sisterhood, then in any of the
said cases, the several provisions, whether original, substitutive, or
accruing, hereby made for the benefit of such child or children, shall
cease and determine, and become absolutely void.”
[143] Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East. 170.
[144] Scott v. Tyler, 2 Bro. C. C. 488. This is a leading case, and the
arguments of the leading counsel engaged contain much of the law
on the subject. See Amb. 209.
[145] Godolp. Leg. 45.
[146] Godolp. 46.
[147] 2 Redfield, 295.
[148] Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 10 Penn. 350.
[149] L. R. 19 Eq. 631.
[150] 2 J. and H. 356.
[151] In the following instance, a testator is not content only to have
his wife remain a widow—he must have her display the appropriate
insignia of her situation. Mr. James Robbins, whose will was proved
in October, 1864, in London, declares: “That, in the event of my dear
wife not complying with my request, to wear a widow’s cap after my
decease, and in the event of her marrying again, that then, and in
both cases, the annuity which shall be payable to her out of my
estate shall be £20 per annum and not £30.” As there was no
stipulation as to the time the widow’s cap was to be worn, probably
Mrs. Robbins found it easy to comply with the letter of the request in
her husband’s will, and yet indulge her own taste in the matter. In
contradistinction to this was the will of Mr. Edward Concanen, proved
in 1868. He says: “And I do hereby bind my said wife that she do
not, after my decease, offend artistic taste, or blazon the sacred
feelings of her sweet and gentle nature, by the exhibition of a
widow’s cap.”
[152] Wills, Pt. 4, Sec. 12.
[153] 1 Ch. Ca. 22.
[154] Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169.
[155] 2 Ves. 265.
[156] Garret v. Pritty, 2 Vern. 293.
[157] The case of Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige, 333, is a curious
example of an attempt made by a testator to regulate and control
the choice of his children in marriage.
The testator died at the city of Troy, in March, 1839, leaving a widow
and three infant children. By his will, made a few months before his
death, and evidently without the aid or advice of counsel, he placed
the following condition on a legacy to his children:
“I charge upon my children, in every possible case, and under all
circumstances, never to make a matrimonial engagement, or bind
themselves to any individuals by promise of marriage, without full
parental approbation and consent as it regards the favored
individual. And while I consider it unjust as well as unwise for a
parent to coerce, or to attempt forcibly to induce a child to marry an
object it cannot love, so do I also deem it without any possible
excuse on the part of the child to marry without the full consent of
the parents. And in the event of disobedience on the part of my
child, in this respect, my wish, desire, and intention is to cut that
child off from any participation of the benefits arising from any
property I may leave at my decease, of every kind and description
whatever.”
The provisions of the will were in many respects so vague and
indefinite, that Chancellor Walworth remarked: “It is very evident
that this will was drawn by the decedent himself, or by some other
person equally ignorant, not only of legal language, but of legal
principles.” He held that the children took the same shares as if their
father died intestate.
[158] Lord Comyns’ Rep. 728.
[159] Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden. 140.
[160] 10 Ves. 13. This was the time allowed in the civil law, 2 Salk.
415.
[161] 2 Rev. Stat. 90.
[162] Benson v. Maude, 6 Madd. 15.
[163] 2 Vern. 31. Roden v. Smith, Amb. 588.
[164] Cricket v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 13.
[165] Nevil v. Nevil, 2 Vern. 431.
[166] Joe v. Hart’s Executors, 2 J. J. Marsh. 351.
[167] 1 Hawks 241.
[168] Fawkes v. Gray, 18 Ves. 131.
[169] Wms. Exrs. 1221; 2 Bradf. 77.
[170] 8 Ves. 410.
[171] Poph. 104.
[172] Marsh v. Hague, 1 Edw. Ch. 174.
[173] Ves. 10.
[174] Wms. Exrs. 1222.
[175] Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige, 298.
[176] 5 Binney 475.
[177] 1 Vern. 251.
[178] 1 Johns. Ch. 3.
[179] Wms. Exrs. 1206-7.
[180] 2 Rev. St. 450.
[181] Palmer v. Trevor, 1 Vern. 261; Toller 320.
[182] Wms. Exrs. 1213.
[183] 2 Rev. St. 65. So in California: Civil Code 1282.
[184] 1 Seld. 125.
[185] Morris v. Kent, 2 Edw. Ch. 182; Preston on Leg. 281.
[186] The word “children” includes only the immediate legitimate
descendants, and not a step-child: Cromer v. Pinckney, 3 Barb. Ch.
466; Mowatt v. Carrow, 7 Paige, 339. Nor does it include
grandchildren: Radcliff v. Buckley, 10 Ves. 195; 4 Watts, 82.
[187] Sherer v. Bishop, 4 Bro. C. C. 55; 2 Ves. 84.
[188] Doe v. Clark, 2 H. Bl. 399; Balm v. Balm, 3 Sim. 492.
[189] 1 Barb. Ch. 637; Wms. Exrs. 934.
[190] Rawlins v. Rawlins, 2 Cox’s Ca. 425; Marsellis v. Thalheimer, 2
Paige, 35.
[191] Jenkins v. Freyer, 4 Paige, 47.
[192] Collin v. Collin, 1 Barb. Ch. 630.
[193] 2 Paige, 11.
[194] Pratt v. Flamen, 5 Har. & Johns. 10.
[195] Garrett v. Niblock, 1 R. & M. 629; Lady Lincoln v. Pelham, 10
Ves. 106.
[196] Schloss v. Stiebel, 6 Sim. 1.
[197] 1 Jarman, 306.
[198] Vol. II, 96.
[199] Connolly v. Pardon, 1 Paige, 291. In Thomas v. Stevens, 4
Johns. Ch. 607, a legacy to Cornelia Thompson was held a good
bequest to Caroline Thompson, it appearing that she was the person
intended.
[200] Standen v. Standen, 2 Ves. Jr. 589.
[201] See Chap. VIII.
[202] 4 Ves. 680.
[203] 2 Cha. Ca. 51.
[204] 3 Bro. C. C. 311.
[205] 3 Ves. 148.
[206] Vide the case of Shakspeare, Introduction, p. 23.
[207] 2 N. Y. Rev. St. 57; Civil Code Cal. 1275. In Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, there is no Mortmain act.
[208] Charitable Uses (D). The doctrine of Superstitious Uses cannot
be to much extent applicable here, as we have no religion
recognized and established by the State.
[209] Vide Will of Lady Alice West, p. 18.
[210] Ch. Prec. 272. Eyre v. Countess of Salisbury, 2 P. Wms. 119.
[211] Lord Hardwicke, in Jones v. Williams, Amb. 651, defines a
charitable use as “a gift to a general public use, which extends to
the poor as well as the rich.”
[212] It may be thought a singular purpose of charity to provide for
the “marriages of poor maids,” and one that would accomplish but
little in a field where the objects would be so numerous;
nevertheless, the benevolent designs of men have been turned in
that channel, as well as in other various directions mentioned in the
statute.
By the will of Mr. Henry Raine, a wealthy London brewer, a fund was
established for just such a purpose. Among the notable charitable
institutions of London, there is none more novel in inception or more
unique in management than Raine’s Asylum, established by him in
1736, for clothing, educating, and properly training for domestic
service forty young girls, taken from a lower school previously
established by him. On arriving at the age of twenty-two, any girl
who has been educated in the asylum, and who can produce
satisfactory testimonials of her conduct while in service, may
become a candidate for a marriage portion of one hundred pounds,
for which six girls are allowed to draw twice in each year, on the first
of May and the fifth of November. The drawing is in this manner:
The treasurer, in compliance with the explicit directions of Mr. Raine,
takes a half sheet of white paper and writes thereon the words, “one
hundred pounds.” Next, he takes as many blank sheets as, with the
one written on, will correspond with the number of candidates
present. Each of these half sheets is wrapped tightly round a little
roller of wood, tied with a narrow green ribbon, the knot of which is
firmly sealed. The rolls are then formally deposited in a large
canister placed upon a small table in the middle of the room. This
being done, the candidates, one at a time, advance towards the
canister, each drawing therefrom one of the small rolls. When all
have drawn, they proceed to the chairwoman, who cuts the ribbon
which secures each roll, and bids the candidates unfold the various
papers. There is no need to ask which of them has gained the prize
—the sparkling eyes of the fortunate “hundred-pound girl” reveal the
secret more quickly than it could be spoken by the lips. The scene
seems to be one in which Mr. Raine took deep interest, for in his will,
after appointing his nephews to purchase £4,000 stock in order to
make a permanent provision for these marriage portions, he says: “I
doubt not but my nephews would cheerfully purchase the said stock
if they had seen, as I have, six poor innocent maidens come
trembling to draw the prize, and the fortunate maid that got it, burst
out in tears with excess of joy.” The portion drawn in May is given
after a wedding on the fifth of November; the November portion
being given in like manner on May day. The author witnessed one of
these marriage ceremonies in the church of St. George’s-in-the-East.
The number of marriage portions given since the opening of the
asylum is said to exceed three hundred.
[213] This statute has been adopted in Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Kentucky, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and several other States.
2 Kent 285. In Pennsylvania, the will, to make a valid devise to
charitable uses, must be made a month before the testator’s
decease. Price v. Maxwell, 28 Penn. 23.
[214] 8 N. Y. 525.
[215] 33 N. Y. 97, reversing 40 Barb. 585.
[216] The case of the Smithsonian Institute was adduced as an
argument to show that the United States could take by devise. In
that case Mr. Smithson, an Englishman by birth, and a citizen of that
country, bequeathed to the United States all, or nearly all, of his
property, to be applied to the establishment of an institution for the
increase and diffusion of useful knowledge. But Wright, J., said that
this furnished no evidence of capacity, simply as a political
organization, to take and hold property for charitable purposes. That
was an English charity, and the case was determined by the law of
the domicile. It was a charity under the statute of Elizabeth, and
administered as such, and took effect only on a law of Congress
organizing the institution in the District of Columbia.
[217] In New York, as in many if not all the States, the law relating
to trusts as it formerly existed in England in its intricate details, has
been abolished, and only express, active trusts are permitted, where
the trustee has some active duty to perform in the management of
the estate. These express trusts are of four kinds: 1. To sell land for
the benefit of creditors; 2. To sell, mortgage, or lease lands, to pay
legacies or other charges; 3. Where the trustee is authorized to
receive the rents and profits, and apply them to the use of some
person during his life, or for a shorter period; 4. To receive rents and
income to accumulate for the benefit of minors, to cease at majority.
The same trusts only are allowed in California: Civil Code 857. It is
therefore held that all trusts, for any purpose whatever, not coming
under one of these four classes, are void, as it was apparent in the
enumeration of these the legislature intended to exclude all others.
Hence, in the drawing of wills, attention is most particularly needed
to see that no trusts are created other than those above.
[218] 34 N. Y. 584. It is not uncommon for persons to devise
property to the United States Government. The last case in New York
was somewhat singular. It is in the case of United States v. Fox, in
52 N. Y. 530. The testator there devised “to the Government of the
United States at Washington, District of Columbia, for the purpose of
assisting to discharge the debt contracted by the war for the
subjugation of the rebellious Confederate States.” It was held that
the government had no capacity to take. This case is now appealed
to the Federal Courts, but with little prospect of reversal.
[219] Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Beall v. Fox, 4 Ga. 404;
Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96; 7 Vt. 249; Vidal v. Gerard, 2 How.
127. The doctrine was elaborately argued and examined in the
Gerard Will Case, 28 Penn. 54, and it was maintained that it was
founded on the common law.
[220] There are many institutions permitted by statute in New York
to take property by devise or bequest. By Laws 1848, ch. 319,
benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, missionary, or Sabbath-
school societies can take a devise or bequest, the clear annual
income of which shall not exceed $10,000; but, to be valid, the will
must be executed two months before testator’s death. By Laws
1841, ch. 261, colleges and literary incorporated institutions are
allowed to take for certain purposes. And, by Laws 1864, the State
can take a devise for benefit and support of common schools. For
these reasons, it is held the law of charitable uses is not so much
required in New York; and, by special enactment, the legislature will
incorporate societies to take a devise for pious, benevolent, or
charitable purposes.
[221] 4 Ves. 227.
[222] In case the trust exceeds this term, it is void in toto, and not
merely pro tanto; Griffiths v. Vere, 1 Ves. 136, 10 Penn. St. 326.
[223] A direction to accumulate all the testator’s estate for fifteen
years by investment and reinvestment in bonds is valid in Illinois.
Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239.
But in New York an accumulation for three years, and also ten years,
was held invalid: 4 Sandf. 442; 7 Barb. 590.
[224] In New York it is two lives; in California, any lives in being:
Civil Code, 715.
[225] Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328.
[226] The maximum period during which alienation may be
suspended may, in one instance, under the New York statutes, and
those of a great many other States, be suspended for two lives in
being, and twenty-one years and a fraction afterwards, in certain
cases of minority. For example, an estate to A for life, remainder to B
for life, remainder to his children in fee, but in case such children
shall die under the age of twenty-one years, then to D in fee. Here,
it will be observed, the ownership may be legally suspended for the
lives of A and B, and the actual infancy of B’s children; but in no
event can such suspension exceed that length of time before the
remainder becomes vested. If one of the children reach twenty-one,
D’s remainder is cut off. In the example just given, suppose the
children of B die before attaining twenty-one, and that B, at his
death, leaves his wife enceinte, there would then be a suspension of
alienation for a few months more than twenty-one years.
The extent to which variation from the ordinary term of gestation
may take place in women, whether the birth be premature or
protracted, is one of the difficult problems involved in medical
jurisprudence. On this subject the highest medical authorities are at
issue; some adhering closely to the regular period of forty weeks as
the extreme term; while others extend their indulgence even to the
utmost verge of eleven calendar months. See Long v. Blackall, 7
Term R. 104; Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Finn. 372.
[227] Moore v. Moore, 47 Barb. 257.
[228] Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254.
[229] Rose v. Rose, 4 Abb. Ct. App., Dec., 108.
[230] The argument of Prof. Dwight, one of the counsel, in two
volumes, presents a marvelous and most scholarly amount of
research upon the law of charitable uses, from the earliest times.
[231] See page 31.
[232] Swinburne, Part 7, Sec. 14, says: “Concerning the making of a
latter testament, so large and ample is the liberty of making
testaments that a man may, as oft as he will, make a new
testament, even until his last breath; neither is there any cautel
under the sun to prevent this liberty; but no man can die with two
testaments, and therefore the last and newest is of force; so that, if
there were a thousand testaments, the last of all is the best of all,
and makes void the former.”
[233] 4 Co. Rep. 60.
[234] Doe v. Barford, 4 Man. & S. 16.
[235] Johnston v. Johnston, 1 Phillim. 447.
[236] Wellington v. Wellington, 4 Burr. 2165.
[237] 4 Johns. Ch. 506. Of course, this rule was only good where
the issue of the marriage were otherwise unprovided for, or had no
means of maintenance.
[238] The law respecting implied revocations was a fruitful source of
difficult and expensive litigation, and often defeated the intention of
testators, instead of carrying it into effect. Lord Mansfield has said
that some of the decisions on this head had brought “a scandal on
the law”; and, on another occasion, he remarked “that all
revocations not agreeable to the intention of the testator are
founded on artificial and absurd reasoning.” 3 Burr. 491.
[239] Ash v. Ash, 9 Ohio, 383; Stat. Ohio, (1831) p. 243; Stat. Ind.
1821; Stat. Ill. 1829; G. Laws, Conn. p. 370, last edition.
[240] 4 Kent, 525; Cal. Civ. Code, 1306.
[241] 4 Kent, 526.
[242] Sec. 1307.
[243] Gage v. Gage, 9 Foster, 533.
[244] 2 Rev. Stat. 64.
[245] Redfield, I, 298.
[246] Rev. Stat. 1849, Ch. 122.
[247] Civil Code, 1290. So in Rhode Island, Rev. Stat. Ch. 154.
[248] Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 1 Ashm. 224.
[249] Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151.
[250] 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. 64; Civil Code, 1299.
[251] Cotter v. Layer, 2 P. Wms. 623.
[252] In re Fisher, 4 Wis. 254; Simmons v. Simmons, 26 Barb. 68;
Smith v. McChesney, 15 N. J. Ch. 359.
[253] Campbell v. Logan, 2 Bradf. 90.
[254] Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. C. C. 131.
[255] Mod. 203.
[256] 1 Cowp. 87.
[257] Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 162. In some States this is
settled by statute. Thus, in California, an antecedent will is not
revived by the revocation of a subsequent will unless an intention
appear: Civil Code, 1297. The same in New York: 2 Rev. Stat. 66.
[258] Wms. Exrs. 136 and cases cited. The general effect of a
subsequent will in revoking one of an earlier date, by reason of its
inconsistent provisions, is very extensively discussed in the late and
important case of Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357.
[259] Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876.
[260] Howard v. Davis, 2 Binney, 406; Jackson v. Betts, 6 Cow. 483;
Steele v. Price, 5 B. Mon. 58; 8 Met. 486.
[261] 7 B. Mon. 408.
[262] 8 Watts & Serg. 275.
[263] Wharram v. Wharram, 10 Jur. N. S. 499. A will and codicil were
torn to pieces by a testator’s eldest son, after the death of his
father; the pieces were saved, by which, and by oral evidence, the
court arrived at the substance of those instruments, and in effect
pronounced for them. Foster v. Foster, 1 Addams, 462.
[264] Patch v. Graves, 3 Denio, 348; 28 Vt. 274.
[265] 4 Ves. 610.
[266] 3 Sw. & Tr. 478.
[267] 14 Mass. 208; Hine v. Hine, 31 Penn. 246.
[268] Lewis v. Lewis, 2 W. & S. 455.
[269] Price v. Maxwell, 28 Penn. 23.
[270] Howard v. Halliday, 7 Johns. R. 394. If two wills, in duplicate,
were in possession of the testator, and he destroyed one, did this, in
effect, work a revocation? This was in some doubt. The California
Code has set at rest this question for that State, in Sec. 1295, where
it is provided that a destruction of one of the copies shall amount to
a revocation. See Onions v. Tyrer, 2 Vern. 742.
[271] Hobbs v. Knight, 1 Curteis, 289. And the cutting out of the
principal part, as the signature of the testator, or of the witnesses,
will be a revocation of the whole will: 1 Jarman, 161.
[272] Where the word “destroying” is used in the statute, as one
mode of revocation, it is generally held to include all modes of
defacing not specifically enumerated in the statute, and does not
require an absolute and entire destruction. Johnson v. Brailsford, 2
Nott & McCord, 272.
[273] 2 Rev. Stat. 66. It is the same in California: Civil Code, 1292.
[274] Burtenshaw v. Gilbert, 1 Cowp. 49.
[275] Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 490.
[276] Etheringham. v. Etheringham, Aleyn, 2.
[277] 3 B. & Ald. 489.
[278] Bibb v. Thomas, 2 W. Bl. 1043.
[279] Pryor v. Coggin, 17 Ga. 444.
[280] White v. Carter, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 197.
[281] Smiley v. Gambill, 2 Head, 164.
[282] Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62.
[283] 7 Jur. N. S. 52.
[284] 1 Jarman, 133.
[285] Bap. Church v. Roberts, 2 Penn. 110.
[286] 1 Johns. Ch. 530.
[287] Bethell v. Moore, 2 Dev. & Batt. 311.
[288] 1 Jarman, 125.
[289] McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. 92.
[290] 1 B. Mon. 57.
[291] 2 Doug. (Mich.) 515.
[292] 8 Jur. N. S. 897.
[293] Legatees are entitled to be paid in the money of the country in
which the testator is domiciled and the will is made. 2 Atk. 465; 2
Bro. C. C. 39.
[294] Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Peters, 483.
[295] To determine a person’s domicile is sometimes a matter of
some difficulty. It is determined on two principles: the fact of one’s
residence, and the intent of remaining there as at one’s home; or it
depends upon habitation and the animo manendi. Residence and
domicile are not convertible terms, because they are not the same
things. The Roman definition has been admired for its
expressiveness and force. It is there defined: “It is not doubted that
individuals have a home in that place where each one has
established his hearth, and the sum of his possessions and fortunes;
whence he will not depart if nothing calls him away; whence if he
has departed he seems to be a wanderer, and if he returns he
ceases to wander.” (Code, lib. 10, tit. 39.) It must be assumed as a
fact that every person has a domicile, or home, and the domicile of
origin remains until another is obtained, not by merely moving or
changing, but by leaving it with no intention of returning, without
animo revertendi. But an intention to change is not sufficient to alter
a domicile until it is actually changed. Therefore, death en route
does not alter domicile. (State v. Hallet, 8 Ala. 159.) One who goes
abroad, animo revertendi, does not change his domicile, because
only the fact of residence is changed, and not the intent. But if he
remains very long abroad, and in one place, the intent may be
inferred from the fact. The Supreme Court of the United States have
intimated that an exercise of the right of suffrage would be the
highest evidence, and almost conclusive against the party. (Shelton
v. Tiffin, 6 How. 185.)
[296] The doctrine was well settled in a very early case in
Pennsylvania, decided by Judge Tilgham, in 1808: the case of
Desasbats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 336; and this case has ever since
been quoted and approved as a good statement of the law on this
point. There, a will was executed in St. Domingo by a person
domiciled there, and sought to be enforced in Pennsylvania, where
the effects of the deceased were. It appeared not to have been
executed according to the laws of St. Domingo, though it was
conceded that it would have been a good will if executed by a citizen
of Pennsylvania. The alleged will was held to be invalid.
[297] 23 N. Y. 394.
[298] Confl. Laws, Sec. 481; Adams v. Wilbur, 2 Sumner, 266.
[299] Wills, I, 404.
[300] Nat v. Coons, 10 Mo. 543.
[301] 14 How. 400.
[302] Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291. This was accepted as an
indisputable proposition, in Lynes v. Townsend, 33 N. Y. 558.
[303] Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596; 9 Wheat. 565.
[304] Vol. I, 1.
[305] Conf. Laws, Sec. 479.
[306] Evid. 671.
[307] Gold v. Judson, 21 Conn. 616.
[308] 8 Cranch, 66; G. Stat. (Mass.) C. 92; 7 Met. 141; 6 N. H. 47.
[309] Cushing v. Aylwin, 12 Met. 169.
[310] Washburne, Real Prop. I, 166.
[311] Re Maraver, 1 Hagg. 498.
[312] Hoxie v. Hoxie, 7 Paige, 187.
[313] Hone v. Van Schaick, 3 Barb. Ch. 488.
[314] 2 W. Bl. 976.
[315] 1 Salk. 234.
[316] 2 Mau. and Sel. 454.
[317] Roe v. Pattison, 16 East. 221; Wheeler’s Heirs v. Dunlap, 13 B.
Mon. 293.
[318] Youngs v. Youngs, 45 N. Y. 254.
[319] 5 Co. 68 b.
[320] 1 Johns. Ch. 231.
[321] 2 Vern. 624.
[322] Brownfield v. Brownfield, 20 Penn. 55; Johnson v. Johnson, 32
Ala. 637. Where there is no ambiguity on the face of a will, evidence
is inadmissible to explain it: Hill v. Alford, 46 Ga. 247.
[323] Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201.
[324] Walston v. White, 5 Md. 297.
[325] Worman v. Teagarden, 2 Ohio N. S. 380.
[326] Asay v. Hoover, 5 Penn. 21.
[327] 2 Sneed, 618.
[328] Allen v. Allen, 18 How. (U. S.) 385.
[329] Betts v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 187.
[330] Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411.
[331] Civil Code, 1340; Estate of Garraud, 35 Cal. 336.
[332] 4 Vesey, 329; 1 Salk. 238.
[333] Hodgson v. Ambrose, 1 Doug. 341.
[334] Theall v. Theall, 6 La. 220.
[335] 18 Jur. 915.
[336] Dowson v. Gaskoin, 2 Kee. 14. The word “money” used in
making a devise in a will, will be construed to include both personal
and real property, if it appears from the context, and on the face of
the instrument, that such was the intention of the testator. Estate of
Miller, 48 Cal. 165.
[337] Co. Litt. 207.
[338] 1 Johns. Ch. 231.
[339] James v. Smith, 14 Sim. 214.
[340] 5 Vesey, 159.
[341] 2 Eden, 194.
[342] Thus, in a case in California, Norris v. Henley, 27 Cal. 439, a
testator devised his real estate upon a particular street, one-third to
each of three persons by name, “to have and to hold their lifetime,
and then to go to their heirs and assigns, but never to sell.” It was
held to create a fee, and these words, “never to sell,” had no effect.
[343] Cro. Eliz. 9.
[344] Sims v. Doughty, 5 Ves. 243: Parks v. Parks, 9 Paige, 107.
[345] Frazer v. Boone, 1 W. R. Hill, 367.
[346] 3 P. Wms. 259; Cal. Civ. Code, 1317.
[347] Parks v. Parks, 9 Paige, 107; Williams v. Williams, 4 Seld. 525;
Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61.
[348] Chrystie v. Phyfe, 19 N. Y. 344.
[349] 8 Jur. N. S. 825.
[350] Matter of Hallet, 8 Paige, 375.
[351] 33 Maine, 464.
[352] Hughes v. Hughes, 12 B. Mon. 121.
[353] Metham v. Duke of Devon, 1 P. Wms. 529.
[354] Cartwright v. Vawdry, 5 Vesey, 530; Gardner v. Heyer, 2 Paige,
12.
[355] 2 Meriv. 419.
[356] 1 Vent. 231; Moore v. Moore, 12 B. Mon. 655.
[357] Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 522; Pope v. Pope, 14 Beav. 591.
[358] Hopkins v. Jones, 2 Barr, 69; Moore v. Moore, 12 B. Mon. 653.
[359] N. Y. Rev. Stat. Vol. III, p. 12.
[360] 9 Vesey, 319.
[361] 8 Sim. 134.
[362] Legacies, Ch. II, Sec. 10.
[363] Jones v. Sefton, 4 Vesey, 166.
[364] 3 P. Wms. 112.
[365] Timewell v. Perkins, 2 Atk. 103. The word “estate” in a will
carries everything, unless restrained by particular expressions:
Turbett v. Turbett, 3 Yeates, 187.
[366] Delamater’s Estate, 1 Wharton, 362.
[367] 29 Beav. 207.
[368] 5 Allen, 556.
[369] Holder v. Ramsbottom, 9 Jur. N. S. 350; Nichols v. Osborn, 2 P.
Wms. 419.
[370] Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige, 140; 12 Mass. 537; Estate of Wood,
36 Cal. 75.
[371] Wootton v. Redd, 12 Gratt. 196.
[372] 3 Burr, 1634.
[373] 4 Vesey, 406.
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