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 Artificial Intelligence
Programming with Python®
Artificial Intelligence
Programming with
Python®
From Zero to Hero

Perry Xiao
Copyright © 2022 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

ISBN: 978-­1-­119-­82086-­4
ISBN: 978-­1-­119-­82094-­9 (ebk)
ISBN: 978-­1-­119-­82096-­3 (ebk)

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or
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 This book is dedicated to my family. To my wife, May, my son, Zieger, and
my daughter, Jessica, who make my life complete—­without them, life
would be meaningless. To my parents and my brother, who have shared their
life and love with me that ultimately made me who I am today. To my friends
and colleagues, who supported me throughout my career.

I would also like to dedicate this book to Grace Qing Wang, who sadly
passed away during the course of writing this book. Grace Qing Wang was a
young, energetic professional woman who was passionate about innovation
and artificial intelligence in education. She was also a collaborator and a
good friend. Through Grace I have made many professional connections
that were very beneficial to my career.
 About the Author

Dr. Perry Xiao is a professor and course director at the School of Engineering,
London South Bank University in London, United Kingdom. He got his BEng
degree in opto-­electronics, MSc degree in solid-­state physics, and PhD degree
in photophysics. He is a charted engineering (CEng), a Fellow (FIET) from
the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET), and a Senior Fellow
(SFHEA) from the Higher Education Academy (HEA). He has been teaching
electronics, software, computer networks, and telecommunication subjects
at both the undergraduate level and the postgraduate level for nearly two
decades. He also supervises BEng final project students and MSc project
students every year. His main research interest is to develop novel infrared
and electronic sensing technologies for skin bioengineering applications and
industrial nondestructive testing (NDT). To date, he has finished more than
12 PhD student supervisions, obtained two UK patent applications, published
more than 100 scientific papers, been editorial reviewer for nine journals, and
generated nearly £1 million in research grants.
He is also a director and cofounder of Biox Systems Ltd., UK, a university
spin-­o ff company that designs and manufactures state-­o f-­t he-­a rt skin
measurement instruments, AquaFlux and Epsilon, which have been used in
more than 200 organizations worldwide, including leading cosmetic com-
panies, universities, research institutes, and hospitals.

vii
 About the Technical Editors

Dr. Hongmei (Mary) He (FHEA, SIEEE) is an associate professor of cyber-

security in the School of Computer Science and Informatics at De Montfort
University. Previously, she was a lecturer in AI and cyber security at Cranfield
University. She received her PhD in computer science from Loughborough
University in the UK in 2006 and gained sustained experience as a postdoctoral
researcher at various universities. She has worked as an academic in the field
of computer science and engineering for many years and has brief industrial
experience at Motorola Design House in China as a senior embedded system
engineer. Her research can be briefly divided into four themes: AI and data
science, cognitive cybersecurity, cognitive robotics and trustworthy auton-
omous systems, and computing theory and optimization. Dr. He is a senior
member of IEEE in the Computational Intelligence, Cybersecurity, RAS, and
Women in Engineering Societies.

Dr. Weiheng Liao, DPhil (Oxon), is a computer scientist and technology entre-
preneur in AI. He has authored and co-­authored a number of influential papers
in top journals and conferences and is the visiting scholar of several research
universities. His interests include machine learning, AutoML, deep learning,
explainable AI, natural language processing, and their applications in finance
and investment. He cofounded YouShore, one of the world’s first teams to
employ deep NLP to analyze social media data, to extract alternative data, and
to construct alpha signals.
If you want to know more about his recent work, please visit w w w
.madebydata.com.

ix
 Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Wiley Publishing for giving

me this opportunity. I would also like to thank Devon Lewis, Liz Britten, Pete
Gaughan, Dr. Weiheng Liao, and Hongmei He for their support. Without them,
this book would not have been possible.

xi
 Contents at a Glance

Prefacexxiii
Part I Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction to AI 3
Chapter 2 AI Development Tools 23
Part II Machine Learning and Deep Learning
Chapter 3 Machine Learning 53
Chapter 4 Deep Learning 117
Part III AI Applications
Chapter 5 Image Classification 201
Chapter 6 Face Detection and Face Recognition 265
Chapter 7 Object Detections and Image Segmentations 337
Chapter 8 Pose Detection 433
Chapter 9 GAN and Neural-­Style Transfer 465
Chapter 10 Natural Language Processing 491
Chapter 11 Data Analysis 543
Chapter 12 Advanced AI Computing 613
Index659

xiii
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
 The various services which received the order certainly
understood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it
as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed
planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order
to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.
So we come to the military planning and preparation for the
implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13
January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that
part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation
to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed
Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our
numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132.
This document contains a substantial amount of technical
information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and
the manner in which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel,
however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point
that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date,
to read only a small portion of the entry into the record, beginning
on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary
itself. The entry reads:
“30 January 1941.
“7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the Barbarossa
Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.”
I should note that “Ia” is in this case the abbreviation for a
deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy’s
objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for
the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the
Tribunal an idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English
translation:
“II. Objectives of War Against Russia . . . .
“d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1) Lightning-
like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force units against
strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Polar
Sea.”
 The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it
indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried
out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation
actually got under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of
evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the
invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly
premeditated attacks on a neighboring power in the history of the
world. Similarly the Naval War Diary for the month of February
contains at least several references to the planning and preparation
for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained
in Document C-33, which I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit
USA-133.
I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the
entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English
translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
“In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all S-
boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only be considered
after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.”
On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to
assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa.
The conference also discussed the plans for “Sonnenblume,” which
was the code name for the North African operation—“Sunflower.”
Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel;
the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl;
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the
Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others, including
Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant.
A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number
872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134.
During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army
General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared
with their own strength and the general overall operational plans for
the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by
comments from the Führer.
 At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which
is at Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract,
which, although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently
clear to inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out
for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I
quote:
“The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First
Deployment Echelon”—Aufmarschstaffel—“now being transferred,
Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle of
March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but Army
groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West. In
the East there are already considerable reinforcements though still in
the rear area. From now on, ‘Attila’ ”—I might state here
parenthetically that this was the code word for the operation for the
occupation of unoccupied France—“Attila can be carried out only
with difficulty. Economic traffic is hampered by transport
movements. From the beginning of April, Hungary will be
approached about the march-through. Third Deployment Echelon,
from the middle of April. ‘Felix’ is now no longer possible, as the
main part of the artillery has been shipped.”—Felix was the name for
the proposed operation against Gibraltar.—“In industry the full
capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage. Fourth
Deployment Echelon, from 25. IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable
forces from the West (‘Seelöwe’ can no longer be carried
out).”—“Seelöwe” (or Sea Lion) was a code word for the planned
operation against England, and “Marita,” which we shall see a little
later in the quotation, was the code word for the action against
Greece.—“The concentration of troops in the East is clearly apparent.
The full capacity timetable is maintained. The complete picture of
the disposition of forces on the map shows 8 Marita divisions.
“Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to
assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready as
reserves for commander in the West.
“Führer: ‘When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its breath
and make no comment.’ ”
This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions,
which I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army
as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and
were far along with their preparations even as early as February
1941—almost 5 months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was
actually launched. The conference report summarized the
conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa,
as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation,
which is on Page 7 of the German:
“Conclusions:
“1. Barbarossa.
“a. The Führer on the whole is in agreement with the operational
plan. When it is being carried out it must be remembered that the
main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
“b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of the
deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
“c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may not
be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage.
The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing the Moldau.
“d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With the
means available.)
“e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a feint for
Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita.”
On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational
directive to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form
of “Directives for Special Areas.” This detailed operational order is
Number 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-135.
This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of
the attack indicates how complete were the plans on practically
every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed,
“Area of Operations and Executive Power,” and outlines who was to
be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is
in progress in territory through which the Army is advancing, the
Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During
this period, however, the Reichsführer SS is entrusted with “special
tasks.” This assignment is discussed in Paragraph 2b, which appears
on Page 1 of the English translation and reads as follows:
“b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer SS is, on
behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation
of the political administration—tasks which result from the struggle
which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems.
Within the realm of these tasks the Reichsführer SS shall act
independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power
invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in
agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the
responsibility of the Reichsführer SS that through the execution of
his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be
arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsführer SS.”
The order then states that in time political administration will be
set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the
relationship of these officials to the Army. This is contained in
Paragraph 2c and Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:
“c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it
is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear
of the area of operations is to be given its own political
administration. For the present it is to be divided on the basis of
nationality and according to the positions of the Army groups into
North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine).
In these territories the political administration is taken care of by
Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the
Führer.
“3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the
political administration in the rear of the area of operations,
commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
“The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the
Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military
sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial commander and the
rights of a supreme Army commander or a commanding general. In
this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
“a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order
to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of the country
and securing its economic values for use by German industry.”
The directive also outlines the responsibility for the
administration of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will
develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in
Section I, Paragraph 4, which I shall read:
“4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the area of operations and in the
territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal, who has
delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rü Amt’ with the execution of the
task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rü Amt.”
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and
...
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who
these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS at that
time?
MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and
communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.
Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other
countries, and states in part as follows—I am reading from Page 3 of
the English translation:
“III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Finland.
“9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made
by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according to the
wish of the respective high commands. In case it should become
necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights,
applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.”
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is
also on Page 3 of the English Translation:
“IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
“12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops, no
special authority is to be granted to the commander of the German
troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the
immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage and
attacks.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,”—signed—
“Keitel.”
As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number
21, which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that
the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the
meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved
in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa
for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a
document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been
identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official
extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by
naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains
file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.
I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.
Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like
at present to read only an item which appears in the second
paragraph of Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and
which is in the text in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original.
This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:
“Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. All
measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be
stopped according to the Führer’s order.”
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened
out to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June—
more than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is
a top-secret report of a conference with the Chief of the Section
“Landesverteidigung” of the “Wehrmacht Führungsstab” on April 30,
1941. I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137.
I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this
report:
“1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided:
“Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations
the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.
“2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:
“Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the
same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector
South, Russian superiority.”
Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for
the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High
Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the
disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I
offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-138.
This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered
here was the third copy which was given to the High Command of
the Navy; Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as
follows:
“Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Nr. 44842/41
top military secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer’s headquarters; for
chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op. 00845/41; received
6 June; no enclosures.
“The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation
for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If alterations should be
necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces must be informed.
“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”—signed—
“Keitel.”
I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which
indicates where the 21 copies went.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it
necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters at the
head of these documents, “top secret,” “only through officer,” and
then the various reference numbers and file information when you
give identification of a document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text
outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The
outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under
six headings: General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Camouflage.
I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual
material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven
columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date,
Serial number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most
interesting among the items appearing on this chart . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph,
for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The heading “General” on Page 2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
“1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in the
East will be put into operation on the 22d of May.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on
this chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10.
These are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9
it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force—and I
quote:
“Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be
cancelled.”
Under the column headed OKW appears the note that—and again I
quote:
“Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of
attack by code word ‘Dortmund’.”
In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of
main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be reckoned
with.”
The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June,
under Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the
columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as
follows, under the heading:
“Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and
crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours.”
In the Remarks column, it states that:
“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the part
of the Air Force owing to weather.”
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted
and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and
missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports
on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just
8 days before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler’s Adjutant,
Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer
it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-139.
 I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading “Conference
Barbarossa”:
“1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups,
armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank.
“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the
Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
“3. Timetable:
“a) 1100 hours, “Silver Fox”; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army Group
South; c) 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all participants in
conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army Group North, Army
Group Center, in this order.”
It is signed by Schmundt.
There is attached a list of participants and the order in which
they will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a
large number of the members of the Defendant High Command and
General Staff group as of that date. Among those to participate
were, of course, the Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted
from are more than sufficient to establish conclusively the
premeditation and cold-blooded calculation which marked the
military preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting
almost a full year before the commission of the crime, the Nazi
conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their
aggression against the Soviet Union with all of that thoroughness
and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the
German character. Although several of these defendants played
specific parts in this military phase of the planning and preparation
for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading roles were
performed, as we have seen, by the military figures: the Defendants
Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
Next, preparation for plunder—plans for the economic
exploitation and spoliation of the Soviet Union.
 Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a
purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed
planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to
ensure that their aggression would prove economically profitable.
A little later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal
the motives which led these conspirators to attack, without
provocation, a neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the
crime was motivated by both political and economic considerations.
The economic basis, however, may be simply summarized at this
point as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material,
food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which
they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of
their war machine. To these defendants such a need was translated
indubitably as a right, and they early began planning and preparing
with typical care and detail to ensure that every bit of the plunder
which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression
would be exploited to their utmost benefit.
I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early
as August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group Army,
received a hint from the Defendant Göring about a possible attack
on the U.S.S.R. which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet
war economy. I also said at that time that I would later introduce
evidence that in November 1940—8 months before the attack—
Thomas was categorically informed by Göring of the planned
operation in the East and preliminary preparations were commenced
for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the
course of such operation. Göring, of course, played the overall
leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the
Four Year Plan.
Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early
planning at Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS
introduced earlier as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at Pages
10 and 11 of the English translation:
“In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries of
State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General Von Hanneken were
informed by the Reich Marshal of the action planned in the East.
“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the
action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at the end
of 1940.
“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first
of all the following tasks:
“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament industry,
its location, its capacity, and its associate industries.

“2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big armament

centers and their dependency one on the other.
“3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry of
the Soviet Union.
“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude
oil).
“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
industries in the Soviet Union.
“These points were concentrated in one big compilation, ‘War
Economy of the Soviet Union,’ and illustrated with detailed maps.”—I
am still quoting.—“Furthermore a card index was made containing all
the important factories in Soviet Russia and a lexicon of economy in
the German-Russian language for the use of the German war
economy organization.
“For the processing of these problems a task staff, ‘Russia,’ was
created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in
charge of Major General Schubert. The work was carried out
according to the directives from the chief of the office,
respectively”—I suppose—“by the group of departments for foreign
territories”—Ausland—“with the co-operation of all departments,
economy offices, and any other persons possessing information on
Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent
collection of material was made which proved of the utmost value
later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the
territories.”
That ends the quotation.
By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had
proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was
needed, and so General Thomas held a conference with his
subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A
memorandum of this conference, classified top secret and dated 1
March 1941, was captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now
offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this
memorandum reads as follows:
“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted
for the Reich Marshal.
“Essential Points:
“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal.
Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the Four Year
Plan.
“2. The organization must include everything concerning war
economy, excepting only food which is said to be made already a
special mission of State Secretary Backe.
“3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent of the
military or civil administration. Close co-ordination, but instructions
direct from the central office in Berlin.
“4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a) Accompanying
the advancing troops directly behind the front lines in order to avoid
the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important
goods; b) Administration of the occupied industrial districts and
exploitation of economically complementary districts.”
And then, on the bottom of Page 1:
“5. In view of the extended field of activity the term ‘war economy
inspection’ is to be used in preference to armament inspection.
“6. In view of the great field of activity the organization must be
generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly
numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of
seizing raw materials and taking over all important exploitations. For
the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be
interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation
from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their
experience. (For example: lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).
“After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel Luther was
instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within a
week.
“Close co-operation with the individual sections in the building is
essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi and Rü with
whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to
give each section chief and Lieutenant Colonel Luther a copy of the
new plan regarding Russia.
“Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are ordered to
draw up the individual armament inspections are to report to the
office chief at the end of the week.—Signed—Hamann.”
Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending
as a captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably
it fell naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the
conference.
The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was
organizing at the direction of Göring was clearly recognized by Keitel
in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is Number 447-
PS, and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-
135. At that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was
stated that the Führer had entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the areas of operation and political
administration to the Reich Marshal who in turn had delegated his
authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt.
The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the
meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29
April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the
Armed Forces to explain the organizational set-up of the Economic
Staff “Oldenburg.” Oldenburg was the code name given to this
economic counterpart of Plan Barbarossa. A report of this conference
is captured Document Number 1157-PS, and I now offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this memorandum deals
with the general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had
developed by this time, and I should like to read most of that section
into the record. The report begins:
“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours
on Tuesday, 29th April 1941.
“1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the
organizational structure of the economic section of the undertaking
Barbarossa-Oldenburg.
“As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous procedure, has
ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all
economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the
overall direction of the economic administration in the area of
operations and in the areas under political administration.
“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Economic
General Staff working under the director of the Economic Armament
Office (Chief, Wi Rü Amt).
“Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff the
supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the”—and
then a heading—“Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties under
the command of Lieutenant General Schubert. His subordinate
authorities, geographically subdivided, are: 5 economic
inspectorates, 23 economic commands, and 12 district offices which
are distributed among important places within the area of the
economic command.
“These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is that in
the territory of each army group an economic inspectorate is to be
established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area,
and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of
the territory.
“A distinction must be made between the military rear area and the
battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area of the army
on the other hand. In the latter, economic matters are dealt with by
the Group IV Economy”—IV Wi—“of the Army Headquarters
Command, that is, the liaison officer of the Economic Armament
Office within the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces assigned
to the Army Headquarters Command. For the battle area he has
attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery
troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in
particular, tractors and means of production.
“In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle and the
military rear area, Group IV Economy with the various field
commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the
Economic Armament Office for the support of the specialists of the
Army Headquarters Command, who are responsible for supplying the
troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the
subsequent general economic exploitation.
“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,
economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the
locality.
“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command
of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with
military industry but comprises the entire economic field.
Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of
the military industries or armaments but quite generally as economic
inspectorates, economic commands, et cetera.
“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the
individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to
the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into three
large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with troop requirements,
armaments, industrial transport organization; Group L, which
concerns itself with all questions of feeding and agriculture, and
Group W, which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry,
including raw materials and supplies; further, questions of forestry,
finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of
commodities, and manpower allocation.
“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and
Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field
of activities of Group W are dealt with by General Von Hanneken.”
The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions,
personnel and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it
unnecessary to put into the record.
These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method
with which those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot
their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only
planned to stage a wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had
pledged security, but they also intended to strip that neighbor of his
food, his factories, and all his means of livelihood.
As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question
of motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully
aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and
starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed

by the interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this
morning, so I shall try to temper the speed.
Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political
phase of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall
develop more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic
and political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in
invading the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the
planning and preparations for the economic side of the aggression.
Equally elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in by the
conspirators to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their
aggression. It is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that
political aim as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as a powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition
of Lebensraum.
For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators
selected as their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the 2d
of April 1941 Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a
memorandum on the U.S.S.R. This memorandum speculates on the
possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result in
a quick occupation of an important part of that country. This
memorandum then considers what the political goal of such
occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.
The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer it
in evidence now as Exhibit USA-142.
Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject
“U.S.S.R.”;
“A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an extraordinarily
rapid occupation of an important and large section of the U.S.S.R. It
is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be
followed by the military collapse of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of
these areas would then present not so many military as
administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first
question:
“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or economic
needs respectively, or is the laying of political foundations for a
future organization of the area also a factor in determining how far
the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to
fix the political goal which is to be attained, for it will without doubt
also have an effect on military operations.
“If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak
condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military
operations, one may conclude that:
“1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions.
“2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sections of
territory should, in regard to administration as well as economics
and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to
attain.
“3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas such
as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for the
continuation of war against England, the maintenance of production
which this necessitates, and the great directives for the completely
separate areas, should best be dealt with all together in one place.
“It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments
which follow only hold good, of course, once the supplies from the
area to be occupied, which are essential to Greater Germany for the
continuance of the war, have been assured.
“Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia’s population
the following national or geographical units:
“(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White Russia,
with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with Kiev as its center;
(e) The Don area, with Rostov as its capital; (f) The area of the
Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.”
The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or
geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages.
At the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts
and briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into
the record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation
under the heading “Summary”:
“The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the
points briefly outlined here:
“(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied areas of
the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time. Working in
agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would
be the task of this department:
“(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate
administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at the
time and the goal which is to be achieved;
“(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the
occupied areas;
“(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out in
main outline of, the primarily important questions for all areas, as for
instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production
of oil, coal, and food.
“(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the
separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by
reason of political economy for the carrying out of the totally
dissimilar tasks assigned to them.
“As against this, an administrative department regulating matters in
principle and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at
present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate and fail
in its purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to carry out
a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic
considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the
political task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic
lines, might possibly even prevent it.
“The question therefore arises whether the opinions which have
been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken
into consideration from the very beginning when organizing the
administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of
the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise
from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by
Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western
Europe, the whole question of the U.S.S.R. would require different
treatment from that which has been applied in the individual
countries of Western Europe.”
 THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?
MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s
handwriting?
MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he
wrote it?
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by
Rosenberg or under his authority. We captured the whole set of
Rosenberg files, which constitutes really a large library.
It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration
operating on a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum
objects was the Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already
described as having been set up under Göring and General Thomas.
Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political
purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it
apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April
1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of
questions connected with the east European region. This order is
part of the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment,
which has been given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that
this file, all relating to the same subject and consisting of four
letters, all of which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence
as Exhibit USA-143.
The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the
English translation of 865-PS:
“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the
central control of questions connected with the east European
region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with his
orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying
out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The necessary money for
this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a
lump sum.
“Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed, Adolf
Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery, signed, Dr.
Lammers.”
This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter
which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his co-
operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to
work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the
stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:
“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the
20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred
Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control connected
with the east European region. In this capacity Reichsleiter
Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable
emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that Rosenberg shall
be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest co-operation of
the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and
summon the representatives of the highest Reich authorities to
conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the
commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being,
only those of the highest Reich authorities should be informed on
whose co-operation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend.
They are: The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring
—“the Reich Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is Keitel
—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the Führer’s wishes
to place your co-operation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg
in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him. It is recommended
in the interests of secrecy that you name a representative in your
office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and
who, in addition to your usual deputy, should be the only one to
whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.
“I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this
letter.
“Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.”
 In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of
his letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also
writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the
letter to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text:
“Dear Reich Minister:
“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in which
the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the
east European region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl,
head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my permanent
deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to Reichsleiter
Rosenberg.”
And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:
“The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner for
the central control of questions connected with the east European
region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, head of the
Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy, Major General
Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as far as they concern
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far
as your office is concerned, to deal with them only.”
Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg
began building his organization, conferring with the various
ministries, issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed
plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission.
Although Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were
crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the
preparation and its purpose, I believe that the citation of a small
number which are typical should be sufficient for the Tribunal and
the record. All of those I shall now discuss were found in the
Defendant Rosenberg’s files.
Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8
May 1941, entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners
in the Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as
Exhibit USA-144.
In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines
the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third
paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the
German, the following remarks appear:
“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the
German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries to
come. This does not only correspond with German interests but also
with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a position to
accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed,
whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the
German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia
with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a great
Russian empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all
historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and
Leningrad have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation
today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist
movement to correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid
down in his book, that now the military and political threat in the
East shall be eliminated forever.
“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical
and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of which bears
within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commission
Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will have the task to
prepare, by way of development into a Germanized protectorate, a
progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall
become an independent state in alliance with Germany, and
Caucasia with the contiguous northern territories a federal state with
a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in
order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in the
following instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that
there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for
all Reich commissioners.”
 The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the
German, presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated
robbery. It reads:
“The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries,
tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly
all its land and houses were confiscated without indemnification;
hundreds of thousands (in the south on the Volga) starved or were
deported or, as in the Baltic territories, deprived of the fruits of their
cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich must
proclaim the principle that after the occupation of the Eastern
Territories the former German assets are the property of the people
of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former
individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the
right (assuming that it has not already been done during
resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of
compensation and restitution of this national property will be subject
to different treatment by each Reich commission.”
Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a
Reich Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction
which was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or
Kommissars), and is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the
Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in the
course of their aggression. I offer this document in evidence as
Exhibit USA-145. I should like to read into the record the first three
paragraphs. It begins:
“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been in
close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old history
has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living
there in a European direction and has in spite of all Russian threats
added this region to the living space of Greater Germany.
“The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to strive to
achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then transform the
region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially
possible elements, colonizing Germanic races, and banishing
undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic
inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.
“For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a land of
surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to make this
surplus once more available to the German people and, if possible,
to increase it. With regard to the process of germanizing or
resettling, the Estonian people are strongly germanized to the extent
of 50 percent by Danish, German, and Swedish blood, and can be
considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia the section capable of
being assimilated is considerably smaller than in Estonia. In this
country stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with and
banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar
development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here
too the immigration of racial Germans is called for in order to
promote very extensive germanization (on the East Prussian
border).”
Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and
reads as follows:
“The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in Riga will
therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A country which
700 years ago was captured by German Knights, built up by the
Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German
blood together with Swedish elements was a predominantly
germanized land, is to be established as a mighty German
borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available
everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the
right to a later settlement to all those who have distinguished
themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their
lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic
campaign, never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair,
and delivered Baltic civilization from Bolshevism. For the rest the
solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic question but one
which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on these
lines.”
These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to
show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped
would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a
week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of
his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might
almost think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order
to be of assistance to this prosecution.
This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this
report are its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants
who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and
preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which
practically all of the ministries and offices of both state and Party are
shown to have been involved in this operation. The report was found
in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it
is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups, and
organizations, that it must, I believe, be read in full in order that it
may be made part of the record. It is headed, “Report on the
Preparatory Work in Eastern European Territories”:
“Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich
offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference with
the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took
place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the
various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and
presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the
OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too
complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out
best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of
the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued an
appropriate command which established the basis for the coming
requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl
and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which then
commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern territory including
personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it is—“were carried on by the
gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office.
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that
under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way
deal with any representatives of the people of the east European
area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military intelligence
required it and then to name persons to me who could count as
political personalities, over and above the military intelligence, in
order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral
Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political
groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that
he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.
“Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and
Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of
the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a
representative of my office to the Supreme Commander of the Army,
respectively to the Chief Quartermaster, and to the Army groups for
questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW.
In the meantime this has been done.
“Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of
Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant
Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial Director
Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr.
Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the
Economic Operational Staff East. In this connection I had
conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary Körner, State
Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert, and
others.
“Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as
regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems
regarding the general relationship of the proposed Reich ministry
toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will be subject, after
submission, to the decision of the Führer. In principle I declared that