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 Contents vii

Traditional Functions of States 56 CHAPTER 5

Defense 56
Policing 56
Development 97
Taxation 57 Concepts 99
Order, Administration, and “Legibility” 58 Types 99
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Poverty 100
­Expand? 58 Social Outcomes and Human Development 100
Political or Conflict Theories 59 Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic Identities 101
Economic Theories 61 Satisfaction and Happiness 103
Cultural Theories 62 Cultural Development 104
Diffusion Theories 63 Sustainability 104
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Great Britain, the United Causes and Effects:
­ ingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England
K Why Does Development Happen? 105
and Scotland 66 Institutions: The Market–State Debate, Revisited 105
Institutions: Beyond the Market–State Debate 107
CASES IN CONTEXT
Culture and Development 109
Mexico 57
Civil Society, Social Capital, and Trust 109
France 60
Religion 110
United Kingdom 63
Value Systems 111
Nigeria 64
Systems and Structures: Domestic and
International 112
CHAPTER 4
Domestic Economic Structures and Class Interests 112
Political Economy 71 International Economic Structures and Class Interests 112
Geography 114
Concepts 73
Inequality 74 Explaining the Development of
THINKING COMPARATIVELY

Employment and Inflation 76 North and South Korea 116

CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 77
Markets and States in Modern Economies 77 India 100
Markets and Economic Performance 78 Nigeria 102
States and Economic Performance 80 China 107
Economic Functions of Modern States 83 Brazil 113
States and Economic Management 83
Investments in Human Capital: Education and Health 84
Infrastructure and Other Public Goods 86 CHAPTER 6

Welfare State Functions 86 Democracy and Democratization 121

Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 87 Concepts 123
Cultural Changes 88 Democracy and Democratic Regimes 123
Industrial Capitalism 88 Procedural (Minimal) Definitions of Democracy 125
Mobilization and Political Action 90 Substantive Definitions of Democracy 126
International Learning Effects 93 Regime Change and Democratization 126
THINKING COMPARATIVELYWelfare States in the Types 128
Nordic Countries: What Can We Learn and How? 94 Types of Democracy 128
CASES IN CONTEXT Representative Democracy 128
United States 73 Direct Democracy 131
United Kingdom 79 Types of Democratization 131
Japan 85 Democratic Transitions 131
Germany 88 Democratic Consolidation 132
viii Contents

Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 133

Modernization 134
Culture and Democracy 135
The International System 137
Domestic Institutions 138 PART III: Institutions of Government
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and Groups 139
Combining Arguments and Theories: Multiple Causes 141 CHAPTER 8
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Is American Democracy Constitutions and Constitutional
a Model? 143
­Design 174
CASES IN CONTEXT
Concepts 177
Brazil 133 Constitutions 177
China 134 Constitutional Design 178
India 136
United States 142 Types 179
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 180
CHAPTER 7 Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and Parliamentary
Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic ­Sovereignty 181
Federalism and Unitarism 183
Breakdown 147 Federalism 183
Concepts 149 Unitarism 185
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes 149 Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions 186
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 150
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal and
Types 150 Unitary Constitutions? 187
Types of Authoritarianism 150 What Constitutional Designs Support Social Stability? 188
Totalitarian Regimes 150 What Constitutional Designs Support Democratic Rights? 190
Theocracies 151 What Constitutional Designs Support the Economy? 191
Personalistic Dictatorships 152 Judicial Review and Democracy 193
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes 153
THINKING COMPARATIVELYWhat Explains the ­Similarities
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian Regimes 153
Between the Brazilian and South African
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism 154
C
­ onstitutions? 196
Authoritarian Persistence 154
Democratic Breakdown 156 CASES IN CONTEXT

Transition to Hybrid or Semi-authoritarian Regime 159 United Kingdom 184

Iran 188
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to
Nigeria 190
Emerge and Persist? 161
India 192
Historical Institutionalist Theories 161
United States 195
Poverty and Inequality 162
State Weakness and Failure 165
CHAPTER 9
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence 165
Barriers to Collective Action 167 Legislatures and Legislative Elections 201
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding Hybrid and Concepts 203
­Semi-authoritarian Regimes 168 What Legislatures Are 203
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and
THINKING COMPARATIVELY What Legislatures Do 204
Remain Authoritarian? 169 Types 205
CASES IN CONTEXT Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 206
Iran 152 Electoral Systems 208
Russia 156 District Systems 208
Mexico 157 Proportional Representation (PR) 211
Germany 159 Mixed or Hybrid 212
France 160 Executive–Legislative Relations 214
 Contents ix

Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Types 260

R
­ epresentation? 216 Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties 260
Patterns of Representation 216 Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party, and Multiparty
Electoral Systems and Representation 218 ­Systems 261
Legislative Decision Making and Representation 221 Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism 267
Executive–Legislative Relations and Representation 223 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Representation in New Zealand What Effects Do They Have? 269
and Beyond 225 Party Systems and Representation 270
CASES IN CONTEXT
What Factors Shape Party Systems? 270
How Do Party Systems Shape Political Outcomes? 272
United Kingdom 209
Interest Groups and Representation 275
Brazil 212
Japan 213 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Party Systems in
Germany 215 Sub-Saharan Africa 277
United States 220 CASES IN CONTEXT
China 262
CHAPTER 10 Japan 263
Germany 265
Executives 229 Russia 268
Concepts 231 Mexico 269

Types 232
Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliamentary 233
Formal Powers 235
Partisan Powers 238
Coalitions 238
Informal Powers 243
Causes and Effects: What Explains PART IV: Politics, Society, and Culture
Executive S­ tability? 243
Stable and Unstable Regimes: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, CHAPTER 12
and Democracy 244
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of Presidential Rule 246 Revolutions and Contention 280
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of Parliamentary Concepts 282
Rule 248 What Is “Contention”? 282
Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Beyond the American and British
Contention 283
Models 250
CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 283
Social Movements 283
France 234
Revolutions 288
United States 234
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 290
Russia 237
Terrorism 291
China 239
“Everyday Resistance” 293
Nigeria 244
Thinking About Contention: Summary 294

CHAPTER 11
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 294
Relative Deprivation 294
Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Resource Mobilization and Political
Groups 254 Opportunities 295
Rational Choice 297
Concepts 257
Culture or “Framing” Explanations 299
Political Parties 257
Party Systems 257 THINKING COMPARATIVELY The “Arab Spring” of 2011 and Its
Interest Groups 258 Legacy 301
x Contents

CASES IN CONTEXT Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence

Brazil 285
the Political Representation of Women and
France 289
Minority Groups? 340
Social Movement Mobilization 340
Russia 295
Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity 341
China 297
Institutions for Promoting Women’s and Minority Group
Iran 300
­Representation 345
CHAPTER 13 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Measuring Gender
Nationalism and National Identity 308 E­ mpowerment 347
CASES IN CONTEXT
Concepts 310
Identity 310 Iran 337
Nationalism, National Identity, and the Nation 311 Japan 338
Brazil 340
Types 314 Mexico 343
Types of Nationalism 314 India 344
Civic and Ethnic Nationalism 314
Jus Sanguinis and Jus Soli 316 CHAPTER 15
Limits of Typologies in the Study of National Identity 317
Ideology and Religion in Modern
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National
C
­ onflict? 318 ­Politics 351
Primordial Bonds 320 Concepts 353
Cultural Boundaries 321 Modernity and Modernization 353
Material Interests 322 Ideology 354
Rational Calculation 322 Religion 354
Social Psychology 324 Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics 355
Religious Conflict 356
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Ending Ethnic and
National V
­ iolence 325 Types 357
Modern Ideologies 357
CASES IN CONTEXT
Liberalism 357
United Kingdom 311
Fascism 358
Mexico 312
Socialism 359
Japan 313
Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 360
Germany 315
Lay and Religious States 361
Nigeria 320
Denominationalism 363
CHAPTER 14
Causes and Effects: Why Does Ideology Remain Prevalent
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 328 in Modern Politics? 364
Why Didn’t Ideology (and History) End? 365
Concepts 330
Race and Ethnicity 330 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Is Twenty-First-Century Populism
Gender 331 an Ideology? 367
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 332 CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 332 Nigeria 356
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity 332 United Kingdom 358
Discrimination Based on Race and Ethnicity 335 Russia 360
Gender Discrimination 336 France 362
Empowerment of Women and Minority Groups 338 Iran 364
 Contents xi

CASE STUDIES 408

Does the Global Economy Help or Hurt Developing Nations like
Brazil? (Chapter 5) 408
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil (Chapter 6) 409
PART V: The Comparative-International Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil’s Legislature
Nexus (Chapter 9) 410
Brazil’s Landless Movement (Chapter 12) 411
CHAPTER 16 Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where Has Progress
Come From? (Chapter 14) 411
Comparative Politics and International
­Relations 372 China 413
Concepts 375 PROFILE 413
Issues 376 Introduction 413
Globalization and Trade 376 Historical Development 415
International Institutions and Integration 380 Regime and Political Institutions 418
Immigration 382 Political Culture 419
Environment and Sustainability 385 Political Economy 420
Transnational Networks 387 CASE STUDIES 421
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388 How Did China Become an Economic Power? (Chapter 5) 421
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in Is China Destined for Democracy? (Chapter 6) 422
­International Relations? 391 Who Governs China? (Chapter 10) 424
Realism 392 The Chinese Party System (Chapter 11) 425
Liberalism 394 The Chinese Revolution (Chapter 12) 426
Constructivism 395
Marxism 395
France 428
THINKING COMPARATIVELY The EU and Levels PROFILE 428
of ­Analysis 396 Introduction 428
KAZAKHSTAN UZBEKISTAN
GEORGIA Historical Development 430
CASES IN CONTEXT
Regime and Political Institutions 432
AZERBAIJAN
United States 382
ARMENIA Political Culture 433
TURKEY France 384 Caspian Sea
TURKMENISTAN Political Economy 434
Japan 388
Iran 390 Tabriz CASE STUDIES 435
India 391 The State in France (Chapter 3) 435
Now Shahr
Mashhad
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France
Tehran
(Chapter 7) 436
Kermanshah Qom Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do?
AFGHANISTAN

I R A N (Chapter 10) 437

IRAQ Esfahan
Birjand The French Revolution (Chapter 12) 439
Dezful
Yazd
Religion and Secularism in France (Chapter 15) 439
PART VI: Country Profiles and Cases
Ahvaz
Abadan Globalization and Culture in France (Chapter 16) 440
Shiraz Kerman

BrazilKUWAIT
400 Bushehr
Zahedan
Germany 443
SAUDI Asaluyeh
PROFILE
ARABIA
400 Bandar Abbas
PROFILE 443
Introduction 400 Persian
PAKISTAN Introduction 443
Chabahar
Historical Development QATAR
402 Gulf
Historical Development 445
Gulf of Oman
Regime and Political Institutions 405 Regime and Political Institutions 448
U.A.E.
Political Culture 406 Political Culture 449
Political Economy 407 OMAN Political Economy 450
0 110 220 Kilometers

0 110 220 Miles

xii Contents

Political Culture 491

CASE STUDIES 451
Political Economy 491
The German State: Unification and Welfare (Chapter 4) 451
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany (Chapter 7) 452 CASE STUDIES 493
Institutional Design: Germany’s Bundestag and Bundesrat State-Led Development in Japan (Chapter 4) 493
(Chapter 9) 453 The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet
Consensus-Based Politics in Germany (Chapter 11) 454 (Chapter 9) 494
Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? (Chapter 13) 455 How Has Japan’s Dominant Party Won for So Long?
(Chapter 11) 494
India 457 Importing National Identity in Japan? (Chapter 13) 496
Gender Empowerment in Japan? (Chapter 14) 497
PROFILE 457
Resource Management in Japan (Chapter 16) 497
Introduction 457
Historical Development 459 Mexico 499
Regime and Political Institutions 462
Political Culture 463 PROFILE 499
Political Economy 464 Introduction 499
Historical Development 501
CASE STUDIES 465
Regime and Political Institutions 504
What Explains India’s Recent Growth? (Chapter 5) 465
Political Culture 505
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn from a
Political Economy 506
“Deviant Case”? (Chapter 6) 466
Federalism and Differences in Development in India CASE STUDIES 507
(Chapter 8) 466 The Mexican State and Rule of Law (Chapter 3) 507
Ethnicity and Political Parties in India (Chapter 14) 467 Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End (Chapter 7) 508
India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics, Identity, and The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico (Chapter 11) 509
Security (Chapter 16) 468 Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity in Mexico
(Chapter 13) 510
Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) 471 Why Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico?
(Chapter 14) 511
PROFILE 471
Introduction 471
Nigeria 514
Historical Development 473
Regime and Political Institutions 476 PROFILE 514
Political Culture 477 Introduction 514
Political Economy 477 Historical Development 516
Regime and Political Institutions 519
CASE STUDIES 478
Political Culture 519
Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of Iran
(Chapter 7) 478 Political Economy 520
Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran (Chapter 8) 479 CASE STUDIES 521
Iran’s Islamic Revolution and “Green Revolution”? What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed? The Case of Nigeria
(Chapter 12) 481 (Chapter 3) 521
Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics Why Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse? The Nigerian
(Chapter 14) 482 Case (Chapter 5) 522
Religion and Politics in Iran (Chapter 15) 482 Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding Together or Tearing
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chapter 16) 483 Apart? (Chapter 8) 523
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations
Japan 485 (Chapter 10) 525
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism and
PROFILE 485 ­Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-colonial Society
Introduction 485 (Chapter 13) 526
Historical Development 487 Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria: Disentangling
Regime and Political Institutions 490 ­Ethnicity and Religion? (Chapter 15) 527
 Contents xiii

Russia (Russian Federation) 529 United States 558

PROFILE 529 PROFILE 558
Introduction 529 Introduction 558
Historical Development 531 Historical Development 560
Regime and Political Institutions 535 Regime and Political Institutions 563
Political Culture 536 Political Culture 564
Political Economy 536 Political Economy 565
CASE STUDIES 537 CASE STUDIES 566
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich? Will They in the
(Chapter 7) 537 Future? (Chapter 4) 566
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers Is American Democracy in Trouble? (Chapter 6) 567
(Chapter 10) 538 Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem?
Personalism and the Party System in Russia (Chapter 11) 539 (Chapter 8) 568
The Russian Revolution (Chapter 12) 540 The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning by
Communist Ideology in Practice: Russia and the Soviet Union Design? (Chapter 9) 569
(Chapter 15) 541 “The Most Powerful Person in the World”? Checks on American
Presidents (Chapter 10) 571
United Kingdom 543 The United States and the World: A Love–Hate Relationship?
(Chapter 16) 572
PROFILE 543
Introduction 543
Notes 575
Historical Development 545
Glossary 589
Regime and Political Institutions 548
References and Further Reading 601
Political Culture 549
Credits 627
Political Economy 549
Index 629
CASE STUDIES 550
The State in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) 550
Political Economy of Britain (Chapter 4) 551
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality in the
United Kingdom (Chapter 8) 552
The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom and the
­Westminster Model (Chapter 9) 553
National Identity in the United Kingdom (Chapter 13) 554
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom (Chapter 15) 556
 Contents xv

Insights

CHAPTER 3 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States 61

Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History 62
Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe 63
Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors 65
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the
­Nation-State 66
CHAPTER 4 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 80
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation 82
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 90
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 91
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 92

CHAPTER 5 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 108
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
­Development 110
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 111
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 114
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 115

CHAPTER 6 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social Requisites of
­ emocracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy 135
D
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 137
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 139
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 141
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:
The Human Development Sequence 142
CHAPTER 7 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World 163
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 164
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five N
­ ations 166
Timur Kuran, Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 168
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 169
CHAPTER 8 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 189
Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model 189
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism 192
Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management in
­Multi-Tiered Systems 193
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 196

xv
xvi Insights

CHAPTER 9 Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America
216
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 217
Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House 222
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government 224
Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures 225

CHAPTER 10 Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism and The Virtues of Parliamentarism 245
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy:
A Critical ­Appraisal 246
Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy 247
Kenneth Roberts, Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America:
The Peruvian Case 248
Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy 250

CHAPTER 11 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 268
Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties] 271
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 271
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 274
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups and The Rise and
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 276
CHAPTER 12 Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest 287
Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 292
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel 296
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 297
Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma 299

CHAPTER 13 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 312

Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity 313
David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence 323
 onald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 324
D
CHAPTER 14 Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and C
­ ulture 341
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity 342
Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America 343
Mala Htun, Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups 345
Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform W ­ orldwide 347
CHAPTER 15 Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim Integration Fails in
Christian-­Heritage Societies 361
José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 362
Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey 363
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 365
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 366
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities 367

CHAPTER 16 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 387

Moisés Naím, The Five Wars of Globalization 389
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 393
Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 395
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 396
 Preface xvii

Preface

T he field of comparative politics is changing, not only in how it’s studied but
in how it’s taught. We set out to write this textbook because we saw the
need for a new approach—one that is truly comparative, that goes beyond a litany
of facts or abstract ideas. In the process, we had to rethink what a book for this
course should look like. We started with a central aim: to get students to think like
comparativists. Toward that end, we have integrated theories and methods with
a range of country case applications to address the big questions in comparative
politics today.
Many undergraduates take a course in comparative politics because they
are broadly interested in world affairs. They want to understand issues such as
democracy and democratization, economic and social development, transnational
social movements, and the relationship between world religions and conflict
around the globe, just as we did as students (and still do!). This book focuses
squarely on these big issues and offers a framework for understanding through
comparison.
Our job is to teach students how to think critically, how to analyze the world
around them. We want our students to do more than just memorize facts and
theories. Ultimately, we want them to learn how to do comparative politics. This
course is successful if students can use the comparative method to seek out their
own answers. We are successful as educators if we give them the analytical skills
to do so.

What’s New in This Edition?

We have updated this edition of Comparative Politics to reflect feedback we
received from numerous readers, instructors, and students, not to mention our
own ­experiences of teaching with the book. We are truly grateful to those who
have shared their perspectives with us, and we have made the following revisions
throughout the book:
• Amplified and enhanced discussions on the United States, Russia, China,
and North Korea to incorporate the most current developments
• Updated information on international elections and the Trump adminis-
tration in the United States, with further coverage on the growth of populist
and nationalist movements across the globe
• Revisions and updates to the Country Profiles and Thinking Comparatively
features
• New Case Studies and Insights, and revisions, where necessary, to existing ones
• Broad revisions to figure and table data, as well as maps.
xvii
xviii Preface

An Integrative Approach
One of the distinctive features of this book is the way we have integrated theories,
methods, and cases. Rather than focusing on either country information or themes
of comparative politics, we have combined these approaches while emphasizing
application and analysis. By providing students with the tools to begin doing
their own analyses, we hope to show them how exciting this kind of work can
be. These tools include theories (presented in an accessible way), the basics of the
­comparative method, and manageable case materials for practice, all in the context
of the big questions.
We thus take an integrative approach to the relationship between big themes
and country case studies. This text is a hybrid containing sixteen thematic chapters
plus linked materials for twelve countries of significant interest to comparativists.
The country materials following the thematic chapters include both basic country
information and a series of case studies dealing with specific thematic issues.
We link the country cases to the thematic chapters via short “call out” boxes—
“Cases in Context”—at relevant points in the chapters. For example, a “Case
in Context” box (titled “Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn
from a Deviant Case?”) in a discussion of theory in chapter 6, “Democracy and
Democratization,” points students to a full case study on democratization in
India, included at the back of the text.

136 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

CASE IN CONTEXT
Democracy’s Success in India:
What Can We Learn from a Deviant Case? PAGE 466

India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop- 3. Can you think of a way to “save” modernization theory
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco- in the face of the case of India?
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization
theory would predict. India is the world’s second largest society
and its largest democracy—consider, therefore, the share that
Indian citizens hold in the world’s broader democratic popula-
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and makes
the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 466. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country’s democratization?
2. What, if anything, does Indian democratization sug-
gest about the importance of individual actors, leader- Indian Voters, 2017, in Uttar Pradesh state. India is
ship, and institutional design? the world’s largest democracy.

One prominent cultural argument is the “Asian values” argument, as articulated

by certain non-democratic leaders in Asia who argued why Asia is not conducive
466 India Preface xix

CASE STUDY
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn
from a “Deviant Case”? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 136

How does modernization theory account refutes modernization theory, and turn development facilitates democratiza-
for low-income democracies such as India? to some other theory of democratization. tion and democratic consolidation? Why
As discussed in chapter 6, modernization For example, we could turn to institu- would this be different? Because the
theory predicts that economic develop- tional theories of democratization as an theory would now say that it is unlikely
ment will lead to democratization and alternative. Perhaps something about that India could successfully democra-
democratic consolidation. Indeed, this the parliamentary form of government tize without first achieving a higher level
relationship generally holds. More often rather than presidential government of economic development, but not that
than not, increasing economic develop- contributed to India’s rather successful it is impossible. A more flexible theory of
ment increases the probability that any democracy (as is discussed in chapter modernization might be compatible by
given society will have democratic politics. 10); one could consider the Indian case to including insights from other theories. For
India, however, poses a major anomaly for test this hypothesis. For example, has the example, perhaps modernization theory
some versions of modernization theory. parliamentary system with its multiparty could be linked to institutional theories,
Given that India’s population is approxi- coalitions and governments that are ac- like the one on parliamentarism men-
mately one-seventh of the world’s popu- countable to the legislature resulted in tioned previously. Maybe parliamentarism
lation, this anomaly is not easily dismissed. more power-sharing and less “winner- is particularly called for as a form of insti-
Why does India constitute an anom- take-all” politics? Has it resulted in a prime tutional design when the society in ques-
aly or “deviant case” for modernization ministerial “style” that is less centralized tion has a relatively low level of economic
theory? India only recently began to see than in presidential systems? There is evi- development. We are speculating here for
notable economic development; and for dence both for and against the argument the sake of argument and not proposing
most of the twentieth century, the coun- that parliamentarism has been a cause of this theory; India’s history of development
try was profoundly poor. Modernization India’s democratic success. and democracy does not and cannot
would lead us to suspect authoritarian Another alternative, though, would prove this assertion. Rather, it might sug-
governance under these conditions. Yet be to use a deviant case like India’s de- gest this hypothesis, which we could then
after decolonization, India defied pes- mocracy to amend or clarify the nature test through the examination of other
simists and built the world’s largest de- of the original theory. What if modern- well-selected cases. In general, deviant
mocracy, one that has now endured for ization theory is not making the law- cases are useful. We should be pleased
decades. There are several conclusions like generalization that development when we find them, as they help us to criti-
that one could draw from this. We could leads inevitably to democratization, but cally assess existing theories, modifying or
decide that this anomaly disproves or rather a “weaker” claim that economic rejecting them as appropriate.

CASE STUDY
Another “Case in Context” box in chapter 6 (titled “Is China Destined for
Democracy?”) invites Federalism
students to and Differences
consider in Development
whether democratization in Chinain India
is CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192
inevitable. Other boxes in that chapter focus on issues of democracy and democ-
ratization
One of the inmain
Brazil and theofUnited
advantages federal-States.
competition with one another while Brazil can have different policies in differ-
Using
ism these short
is purported “linking”
to be its impact onboxes
eco- has enabled
also ensuringus togovernment
that integrate adecisions
complete entset states,
of each adapted to local needs
case materials
nomic without
and social interrupting
development. As notedtheabout
narrative
taxesflow of the chapters.
and services are “closerThe
to kind
and of
demands. Yet this key advantage
reading we 8,suggest
in chapter with the
federal systems maystructure
allow of this
the textand
people,” is similar
thus moretoresponsive.
following hyper-
of federalism and decentralized govern-
links in online
different statestext—something
to engage in healthy students do easily.
A country like This
India,flexible design
the United States,feature
or alsois also one of its disadvantages:
ment
xx Preface

caters to the diversity of teaching styles in today’s political science. Instructors

can choose to have students follow these links to case studies as they go, using all
or just some of them, or they can choose to teach thematic chapters and country
materials separately.
The text integrates theories, methods, and cases in other ways as well. “Insights”
boxes make connections by briefly summarizing important scholarly works repre-
sentative of the major schools of thought. Concepts 313

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity

INSIGHTS
by Liah Greenfeld

G reenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally cultural

and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to
such groups to serve their interests well. Greenfeld examines
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian?
this hypothesis against a number of cases (including England,
social conditions. To understand nationalism’s emergence and France, Russia, Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status
169

growth, we must understand why the idea spread that human- inconsistency in each case in the key groups that are most cen-
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
ity is divided into distinct “peoples”
INSIGHTS After the Cold War who are “sovereign” and tral in redefining their societies as nations. At the same time,
“equal.” For Greenfeld, the key preconditions
by Steven Levitskyforandthe develop-
Lucan A. Way Greenfeld acknowledges the importance of institutions like the
ment of national identity are problems in stratification systems state prior to national identity’s emergence in helping to shape

L
through which societies
evitsky andhierarchically
of transitions
as the class structure. Elitethat are likely
status
divide
Way are interested themselves, the
in understanding such
to develop out ofcondition
inconsistency—a
sorts the
“competitive this
type to
linkages
firsttheory
that
thedevelops
is ongoing
in any
West, though, given
two main
authoritarianism
also
case.
paths
in the context
note that political
areScholars working with
possible. The
of a strong play
institutions
authoritarian” regimes, a term that they have coined to label This path is most likely, the authors argue, when (a) the state
state. an impor-

present when the stratification system breaks down and elites tant role in spreading and preserving national identity.
regimes that do allow (often problematic) elections alongside is strong at the beginning of the process and (b) the party or
are no longer other
sure non-democratic
of their status—leads
features. Assome groups
they note, to seekau- Liah
competitive other strongest
Greenfeld, organizational
Nationalism: vehicle
Five Roads in the competitive
to Modernity. Cambridge,au-
MA: Harvard
to transform thoritarian
identity, regimes
and national
should notidentity often
be thought seems
of as to University
transitional: thoritarianPress, 1992.
environment (which is the core of the competitive
there is no reason to assume that competitive authoritarian authoritarian regime) has lots of “organizational power.” The
regimes will become democratic or more fully authoritarian. second path is authoritarian persistence with lots of instability
However, certain characteristics do predict the likelihood of and turnover, which is more likely in the context of a weaker

An example of Each chapter after

transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy
a constructivist the introduction chapter
and less stable state.
that(chapter
na- 1) closes with a “Thinking
or full-blown autocracy. First,theory is Liah
lots of linkages Greenfeld’s
to the West pre- argument
tional identitydict
is aan imaginative Comparatively”
response to feature,
contradictory
move toward democratization. If there are not so many
which
public focuses claims on a case
about aor set
After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University
of cases to illustrate how
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
Press, 2010.

group’s status.11 Greenfeld emphasizesstudents can apply

social the theories
psychology, discussed
rather in the chapter.
than economics,
in analyzing the processes through which national identity emerges and thrives
(see Insights box on Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity).
These theories reveal just how different such structuralist and constructivist
approaches can
Why be, Did
but simultaneously
Zimbabwereveal points of
Become andsimilarity. For example, the THINKING
group status inconsistency that Greenfeld emphasizes may often be due to “struc- COMPARATIVELY
Remain Authoritarian?
tural” changes in society such as shifting ways of organizing social and economic

fact that such a

A
uthoritarian regimes come in many varieties, and they come from many
class or innovations
theory
in the
different ways
origins. Wethat
emphasizes
havestates recruit
emphasized
social
their
that
psychology
therestaff.
and
is noIn other
single
symbolic
words,
thing called theKEY METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS
construction
“authoritarianism” that one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes Evidence and
does not meanhavethat it ignores
distinct features structural
and exhibit characteristics of society.
many different types of transitions (and non-
Empirical Critiques
transitions). Scholars have developed a number of explanatory models to account
for these. Some of the main general factors in most cases, though, include (1) One reason that many theories
continue to endure in different areas
historical relationships between contending groups, (2) the strength and form of of comparative politics is that most
existing institutions,
CASE IN CONTEXT(3) a country’s level of economic development, (4) political- of the major theories have some
cultural traditions and tendencies, and (5) the strategic situations and choices of empirical support. This makes it chal-
Importing National Identity in Japan?
key actors. Of course, as we have seen in other chapters, it is not enough to merely lenging to determine which theory PAGE XXX
list such contributing factors; we must figure out how such factors interact and is the most accurate. In reality, most
theories will not be accurate under
which are most important. What do you think? And how could we test your ideas all circumstances, but rather each will
Japan had aempirically?
clear civilizational identity for centuries before For more on Japanese nationalism, see better
explain some outcomes the casethan study in
As we noted
modern nationalism. at the
Indeed, outsetthe
under of the chapter, modern-day
Tokugawa regime, Part Zimbabwe is an authori-
VI, p. XXX. As you read it, Sokeep
others. how doinyoumind the following
avoid simply

the countrytarian
turnedregime thatand
inward is characterized by many
sharply limited of the features
commercial we have discussed. It is making “laundry lists” (as noted earlier)
questions:
a “personalist” regime, the population of which is subject to many of the vagaries and saying, “Everything matters”? In
and cultural contact with the outside world. Yet many schol- 1. What does Japan show preparingus about
to make theargu-
theoretical relationship
of authoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack of secure political ments, it is of course important for any
ars think that it only
rights, developed
seemingly modern
arbitrary rule,national identity
and so on. Eveninafter its recent
between nationalism
transition, and
au- particular other key
question to examine how
aspects of
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
another triumph at home. In truth, the prospect of impending triumph at first almost
defeated the need of a campaign. The enthusiasm during the period of the drive
transcended everything ever seen in this country before. The result reflected it: In an issue
of $6,000,000,000 there was an oversubscription of $933,073,250 and the total number was
the 22,777,680 which will stand as the high mark of Americanism for many generations to
come.

AROUSING THE HALF-HEARTED

It has been set forth here that all appeals were based on arousing the emotions of the
people. This was necessary because, had the offerings gone before the public solely on
their practical value as investments, the results would have been considered abroad as
another demonstration of our sordidness. Had the people of the United States been
sordid, it is certain that they might have obtained better investment values. That they
were not touched by selfish instincts is further proved by the fact that all through the
drives the bonds of the previous issues had been quoted below par, due to the
machinations of a group that never could be lifted above self-interest. The public, in full
realization of this apparent depreciation, fought it out and showed their utter contempt
for the manipulators by subscribing in greater force and for greater amounts to each
subsequent issue.

It has been said before that the feeling of the public toward the war was made clear in
the First Loan. It became the problem of the Second and the succeeding drives to organize
enthusiasm so that through contagion the more resistant types might be affected. This
compelled an organization of psychology. Back of each demonstration there were stage
managers. These managers of psychology worked upon the public through the
newspapers, through advertising, through "stunts," and generated a force of example
which affected the whole community in which they were expressed.

For instance, a parade always has the effect of stirring people; feelings deep-hidden
cannot be well concealed when, in war-time, marching men stride past. Unconsciously
there comes to the mind of people the question: "What will become of these fine boys
when they reach France?" There is the wish to help them, and the means to help them has
been before their eyes for days in the Liberty Loan publicity. That is what is meant by
stage management.

Through all the Loans it was necessary to manipulate the emotions first, to bring to the
consciousness of the people in the news reports the facts and purposes of the loans;
secondly, to carry the "urge" to them through the advertising; and thirdly to work upon
their feelings through spectacles, meetings, aeroplane flights, sham battles, motion
pictures of actual warfare, and like accelerants. It was necessary to infect them in the
mass so that as individuals they might infect others with the fever to buy bonds.

All this work had to be carried through and was carried through with brilliant success
in the four war-time loans. The Army, the Navy, the stage women's committees, police
organizations, Boy Scouts, foreign language groups, all played a part. When the call came
for the Fifth Loan, practically everything that had been done before had to be scrapped. It
was all part of the war equipment and would help little in getting over another loan when
people were striving with every fiber to get away from the thought and the sacrifices of
the war.

"FINISH THE JOB"

We had to deal, then, with a people who were beginning to adjust themselves to peace,
who were consoling themselves with the thought that they had done their part and
should not be called upon again. It looked like a hopeless prospect from the vista
presented at the close of the Fourth campaign to expect the same response for a peace
campaign. The one optimistic fact that stood out was that the people had proved their
patriotism, and such patriotism never dies. The Fifth Loan based its appeal solely upon
patriotism's one expression in peace, duty.

Victory Way at Night

 During the Victory Loan Drive, Park Avenue, just above the
Grand Central Station, was shut off and devoted to
propaganda for the drive. The photograph shows a pyramid
of captured German helmets.

Click for a larger image.

"Finish the Job" was the slogan of the Fifth Loan. The country was told that the war was
not ended until its debts were paid, that we should feel gratitude in the lives spared by its
sudden end. The Liberty Loan workers had to create a new state of mind, to begin a new
education—for this time the issue was in Victory notes instead of bonds—and to arouse
the people to new emotions through spectacles, parades and other features. It may be
mentioned here that the greatest parade of the entire war was held in New York in this
Fifth Loan, when the different branches of the army showed in procession the men and
weapons they had employed to win victory.

The call was for $4,500,000,000 and the answer was subscribed in notes by 12,000,000
persons, who paid in $5,249,908,300.

WAR SAVINGS CAMPAIGN

In between the drives there was a lesser drive constantly carried on among people who
were not able to participate in bond buying. This was the War Savings campaign which
was a part of the Government Loan enterprise. Newsboys, bootblacks, shop-girls, clerks
and others who had been unable to participate in the Loan drives or who wanted to
prove again their devotion to their country answered this appeal. In these savings there
was collected for the country up to the date of the armistice $932,339,000 and the number
of persons hoarding in small sums was far beyond a million.

LIBERTY LOAN FIGURES

Entire Country
Quota Am't Subscribed Allotted No. of
Subscribers
First $2,000,000,000 $3,035,226,850 $2,000,000,000 4,500,000
Loan
Second 3,000,000,000 4,617,532,300 3,808,766,150 9,500,000
Loan
Third 3,000,000,000 4,170,069,650 4,170,069,650 17,000,000
Loan
 Fourth 6,000,000,000 6,993,073,250 6,993,073,250 22,777,680
Loan
Fifth 4,500,000,000 5,249,908,300 4,500,000,000 12,000,000
Loan
—————— —————— —————— —————
Totals 18,500,000,000 $24,065,810,350 $21,471,909,050 65,777,680
Federal Reserve District of New York
First $600,000,000 $1,191,992,100 $617,831,650 978,959
Loan
Second 900,000,000 1,550,453,500 1,164,366,950 2,259,151
Loan
Third 900,000,000 1,115,243,650 1,115,243,650 3,046,929
Loan
Fourth 1,800,000,000 2,044,901,750 2,044,901,750 3,604,101
Loan
Fifth 1,350,000,000 1,762,684,900 1,318,098,450 2,484,532
Loan
—————— —————— —————— —————
Totals $5,550,000,000 $7,665,275,900 $6,260,442,450 12,373,672

BENEFITS DERIVED FROM LOAN CAMPAIGNS

The benefits derived from the Loan campaigns were many. Prominent among them
was the growth of thrift among the American people. The growth of this habit will be an
important factor in the future greatness of this country.

A lasting monument to the war spirit of those who had to stay at home is the fact that
more than a million persons, men, women and children, were engaged actively in the
promotion of the five loans. In other words, one person in every hundred in the United
States was a part of the organization, and each induced twenty other persons in that
hundred to buy bonds. This colossal force did not work in haphazard fashion nor scatter
its energy but acted under a definite plan of campaign in which each had an assigned
part and in which each worked according to a method that would avoid duplication or
extra expense.
 The five campaigns which united such an aggregation of workers and which produced
such remarkable results were carried forward with a minimum of expense. Never before
in the history of finance had such widespread exploitation been accomplished at so low a
cost. Of the million workers all but a small nucleus were volunteers; the resources of the
country were thrown open to the organizers with unexampled prodigality, mediums of
flotation in a veritable flood being contributed without cost to the officers in the Liberty
Loan Army.

A single purpose animated the whole nation. Party lines, race prejudice, creed
distinctions, social barriers, all were wiped out in these loan drives. The whole country
formed itself into an All-American team that rushed onward irresistibly. The closest
approximation to a common brotherhood had been achieved. War, with its terrible losses,
with its impairment of lusty young men, with its heartbreaks and agonies, surely had not
been waged in vain when it brought about such a unity.

The United States in waging the war for democracy had won that democracy for
herself at home.
 VIII—FOOD AND THE WAR
How Scientific Control and Voluntary
Food-Saving Kept Belgium from Starving
and Enabled the Allies to Avert Famine

By VERNON KELLOGG
Member of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium

America was made familiar with a slogan during 1917 and 1918 which declared that
"Food Will Win the War." The European Allies became familiar from the very beginning
of the war with the fact that without much more food than they could count on from their
own resources they could not hope to win the war. And it became equally obvious to
Germany and her associates that if their normal food resources were materially impaired
they also could not hope to win the war.

So there arose almost from the beginning of the great military struggle an equally great
struggle to get food and to keep food from being got. The Allies, devoting their
manpower to fighting and munitions-making, saw their farms doomed to neglect and
their food reduction doomed to lessen. And they began their call on America for food in
such quantities as America had never dreamed of exporting before. In the last years
before the war we had been sending about five million tons of foodstuffs a year to
Europe. In 1918 we sent over fourteen million tons. Also the Allies began trying, by their
blockade, to prevent the Central Empires from adding to their own inevitably lessened
native production by importations from without.

On the other hand, Germany and her associates began to husband carefully their
internal food supplies by instituting a rigid, or would-be rigid, control of internal
marketing and consumption, and to collect from any outside sources still accessible to
them, such as the contiguous neutral lands, whatever food was possible. Also they had
strong hopes of preventing, by their submarine warfare, the provisioning of the Allies
from America and other overseas sources.
 Thus, from the beginning of the war, and all through its long course, food supply and
food control were of the most vital importance. If our epigrammatic slogan, "Food Will
Win the War," was, like most epigrams, not literally true, it was, nevertheless, literally
true that there was always possible to either side the loss of the war through lack of food,
and it is literally true that the food victory of the Allies was a great element in the final
war victory. Germany's military defeat was partly due to food defeat, and if a military
decision had not been reached in the fall of 1918, Germany would have lost the war in the
spring of 1919 anyway from lack of food and raw materials.

ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The great struggle for food supply and food control involved so many and such
complex undertakings that it is hopeless to attempt a detailed account of it in any space
short of a huge volume. Yet the very limitations of the present discussion may have its
advantages in compelling us to concentrate our attention on the most important aspects
of the struggle and to try to sum up the most important results of it. Some of these at least
should not be forgotten, for they have a bearing on the peace-time food problem as well
as the war-time one. Fortunately the war-time food situation has developed in us a
national and an individual food consciousness that will certainly not disappear in this
generation at least.

The first important lesson that has been learned is that it is of great value to a nation to
be able to provide in its own land its own necessary food supply. For although in times of
peace and usual harvests international food exchanges enable a country, such as England
or Belgium, highly industrialized and of large population in proportion to area, to make
up without much difficulty its deficit as between production and consumption, the
moment the great emergency arrives there is the utmost danger for its people. The history
of the "relief of Belgium" during the war will illustrate this.

$600,000,000 WORTH OF FOOD SUPPLIED

This little country, famous through all past history as a battleground and now famous
for all future time for its heroic and pathetic rôle in the World War, found itself at the
very beginning of the war faced with a food problem that seemed at first insoluble, and
which, if not solved, meant starvation for its people. It is a country highly industrialized,
and with an agriculture which, though more highly developed as to method than that of
almost any other country, was yet capable of providing but little more than a third of the
food necessary to its people. It depended for its very life on a steady inflow of food from
outside sources. But with its invasion and occupation by the Germans this inflow was
immediately and completely shut off. Belgium was enclosed in a ring of steel. What food
it possessed inside this ring disappeared rapidly.

The terrible situation was met in a way of which Americans may be proud. For the
Commission for the Relief of Belgium, which was the agency that solved Belgium's great
problem, was an American organization with a staff composed chiefly of young
Americans, most of them from American colleges and universities, headed by an
American, Herbert Hoover, of great organizing and diplomatic genius, and with the large
heart of a world philanthropist. In the four and a half years from November 1, 1914, to
May 1, 1919, which was the period of activity of the Commission, Belgium depended
upon it for the supplying of three-fourths of the food of its people, over seven million in
number. This amounted to about one million tons a year. In addition, the Commission
supplied the food through practically all this period for the maintenance of the nearly
two million unfortunate people in the German-occupied area of France. This amounted to
a total of about one million tons. The total value of the food supplied to Belgium and
occupied France was about six hundred million dollars, which was provided by the
Governments of Belgium, France, England, and America, and the private charity of the
world.

THE FOOD PRODUCTION OF GERMANY

For another impressive war-time food problem—which did not have the same solution
as Belgium's—let us take that of Germany. In peace times the Germans produce about 80
percent. of the total food annually consumed by them. But their tremendous military
effort necessarily entailed some reduction in their capacity for food production, although
they also made a tremendous effort to stimulate and direct into most effective channels
the native production of food.

Although it is true, as already stated, that Germany normally produces about 80

percent. of her food needs, making it seem possible for the nation to meet the blockade
emergency by repressing consumption by 10 per cent. and increasing production by 10
per cent. this does not mean that they normally produce 80 per cent. of each kind of food
consumed by them. As a matter of fact, they produce more than their total needs of
certain kinds of food, as sugar, for example, and less than 80 per cent. of certain other
kinds. And while there is a possibility of substituting, within certain limits, one kind of
food for another, so that a shortage of wheat might be made up by an abundance of rye,
or a shortage of bread-grains in general be made up, in some degree, by increasing the
ration of potatoes, if they are available, this substitution cannot go to the extent of
substituting pure carbo-hydrate or starchy foods like potatoes, which simply produce
heat or energy for the body, for the protein foods like meat, fish, eggs and dairy products
which produce not only energy but new tissues. A child must have protein food in order
to grow; an adult must have it in order to replace the tissues worn out by daily work.
Also, there are certain peculiar and so far little understood elements, called vitamines,
found only in certain kinds of food, notably fats, milk and the green vegetables, which
are essential to the proper metabolism of the body.

Photo by P. Thompson

The Battle Scene at Home

During the war the Allies called on the United States for
food in far greater quantities than we had ever dreamed of
exporting. For example, in the last years before the war we
had been sending yearly to Europe about five million tons of
food. In 1918 alone we shipped more than fourteen million
tons of foodstuffs overseas.

Click for a larger image.

GERMANY'S FOOD PROBLEM

Now in the light of these needs for proper feeding, and in the light of the special
conditions produced by the war, what was Germany's food problem through the war? It
was that of attempting to increase production when the men and work animals had been
sent to the fighting lines, of repressing consumption when both men in the army and the
men in the war factories had to be well fed in order to fight well and work well, of
attempting to get in food from outside the country when a blockade was steadily closing
the borders ever and ever more tightly, and finally, of trying to get the people to modify
their food habits in the way of accepting substitutes and using strange new semi-artificial
foods in place of the familiar staples.

In 1916 the potato crop of Germany was a failure—but the turnip crop was enormous.
So turnips were substituted largely for potatoes, and for many other kinds of food as
well. Even marmalade and coffee substitutes were made from them, and turnip meal was
mixed in the already too coarse and too much mixed flour. The Germans will never forget
that terrible kohl-rüben zeit, or turnip time, of late 1916 and early 1917. And it was just
after this time that the effects of Germany's great food difficulties began to show in a
really serious way; they began to undermine the strength and health of the people. Those
diseases like tuberculosis, which can rest in incipient or suppressed form for years
without becoming serious as long as the body is well nourished, began to develop rapidly
and dangerously. The birth rate decreased and the death rate increased. The physical and
mental and moral tone of the whole nation dropped.

THE SUGAR SHORTAGE

Belgium and Germany illustrate a special food situation created by the war, namely,
one in which a country, which relied on outside sources for a greater or lesser part of its
food needs, had access to these sources suddenly and almost completely shut off. But
grave food problems also confronted the countries which were not blockaded in so
specific a way. England and France, with full access to all the great food-producing lands
overseas (except to the extent that the submarines reduced this freedom of access),
nevertheless had food problems hardly less serious than those of the more strictly
blockaded countries. Their difficulties arose primarily from the fact that there was only so
much shipping in the world and that the war conditions created suddenly a need for
much more shipping than existed. The transference of large numbers of troops with their
necessary equipment and munitions from the distant colonies to the European seat of
fighting, and of other numbers from the mother countries to extra-European
battlegrounds, made great demands on the shipping available to these nations. At the
same time, the reduction of their native production increased largely their needs of food
importations.

Take, for example, the case of the sugar supply for England and France. England is
accustomed to use about 2,000,000 tons of sugar a year but she does not produce, at
home, a single ton. She had relied before the war chiefly on importations from Germany
and Austria with some little from Belgium and France. But with the outbreak of the war,
she could get none from the Central Empires, and none from Belgium, while France,
instead of being able to export sugar, suddenly found herself with her principal sugar-
producing region invaded by the Germans and able to produce hardly a third of her
former output. In fact, France herself was suddenly placed in the position of needing to
import nearly two-thirds of the supply needed for her own consumption. So England and
France had to turn to Cuba, the nearest great sugar-producing country, and ask for large
quantities of her output. But the United States has always depended on Cuba for a large
part of its own needs. Consequently there was a sugar problem for our own country as
well as for England and France long before we entered the war.

The situation was serious; the demands on Cuba were much larger than she could
meet, although she was able under this stimulation of demand to increase materially her
sugar crop in the years following the first of the war. One way of meeting this problem,
which was promptly resorted to, was to cut down the consumption of sugar in the
countries involved. In England and France sugar was strictly rationed; and in America
the people were called on to limit their use of sugar by voluntary agreement. England cut
her sugar allowance per capita from about seven and a half pounds a month to two, and
France from nearly four to one. In America we reduced our per capita consumption by
legally restricting the making of soft drinks and candy and by the voluntary restriction of
the home use of sugar by about one-half. All this lessened the demand on Cuba, and also
the demand on shipping.

NATIONAL TASTES IN FOOD

In this discussion of the war-time sugar problem one may be struck by the fact, as
noted, that the people of France were normally accustomed to eat much less sugar than
the people of England, indeed only about one-half as much. This introduces a subject of
importance in any general discussion of the world food problem. It is that of the varying
food habits of different peoples, even peoples living under very similar climatic and
general physical conditions. For example, the people of Germany are accustomed to eat
twice as many potatoes as the people of England, who in turn use more than three times
as many as the people of Italy. On the other hand, England uses twice as much sugar as
Germany, although she produces no sugar and Germany produces much sugar. The
Italians eat only a third as much meat as the English and the French only half as much.
But the English eat only two-thirds as much bread as the French.

These differences in food use, established by long custom, have to be taken into
account in all considerations of the world's food supply. They are differences which
cannot be easily or quickly changed, even under circumstances which such great
emergencies as war may produce. For example, we in America are accustomed to eat corn
as food in the form of green corn, corn meal, corn flakes, etc. And in Italy one of the great
national dishes is polenta (corn meal cooked in a certain way). But when the Commission
for the Relief of Belgium tried to introduce corn as human food in Belgium, because of
the large amount that could be obtained from America when wheat and rye were scarce,
it met with great opposition and but little success. To the Belgians, corn is food for
animals.

SCIENTIFIC CONTROL OF FOOD

An important point brought out by the war-time food problem is that of the "scientific"
make-up of the personal ration. Not only are the national food habits of a people often
difficult to understand from a point of view of taste, but they are often of such a character
as to lead to a most uneconomical use of food. The exigencies of a world food shortage
and a shortage of shipping for food transport have made it necessary for food ministries
and relief organizations to give careful consideration to the most economical selection of
foods for import and distribution, both from the point of view of economy of space and
weight and lack of deterioration during shipping and storage, and from that of
concentrated nutritional values and proper balancing of the ration.

Food provides energy for bodily work and maintenance. It is the fuel for the human
machine. Scientific students of nutrition measure the amount of energy thus provided, or
the amount needed by the body, in units termed calories. Physiologists have determined
by experiment the different amounts of calories produced by different kinds of foods and
the varying amounts needed by men at rest, at light work, at hard work, by women and
by children. By analyzing the make-up of a given population as to proportions of men,
women and children, and of work done by them, it is possible to express the total food
needs of the population in calories and to arrange for the most economical provision of
the total calories necessary.

But the simple provision of the total sum of calories may by no means satisfy the real
food needs of the population. For example, all the calories might be provided by potatoes
alone, or grains alone, or meat or fats alone. But the population would starve under such
circumstances. Food provides not merely the energy for the body, but the substances
from which the body adds new tissue to itself during growth and reproduces its
constantly breaking down tissues during all of life. Now while all kinds of food produce
energy in greater or less quantity, only certain kinds are the source of new tissues. Hence
there must be in the personal or national ration a sufficient proportion of the tissue-
producing foods, the protein carriers, as well as a sufficient amount of the more strictly
energy-producing foods, such as the fats and carbohydrates. And there is necessary, too,
in any ration capable of maintaining the body in properly healthy condition, the presence
in it, in very small quantities, of certain food substances called vitamines which have an
important regulatory effect on the functioning of the body. These substances occur only
in certain kinds of food.

All these things had to be taken into account in the war-time handling of food. So
important was a proper knowledge of scientific food use and application of this
knowledge, in connection with the efforts of the various countries to feed themselves
most economically and to best effect in the light of their possibilities in the way of food
supply, that every country concerned called on its scientific men to advise and help
control the obtaining and distribution of its national food supply. For example, America
and the Allies (England, France, Belgium and Italy) established an Inter-Allied Scientific
Food Commission composed of experts who met at various times at London, Paris, and
Rome, and on whose advice the determination, both as to kind and quantity, of the
necessary importations of food from overseas to England, France, Belgium and Italy was
largely made. Thus the war has done more to popularize the scientific knowledge of food,
and to put into practice a scientific control of food-use than all the efforts of colleges and
scientific societies and food reform apostles for years and years before. Calories, proteins,
carbohydrates, fats and vitamines have been taken out of the dictionary and put into the
kitchen.

Photo by P. Thompson

A Community Conference on
Food-Saving
The importance of work of this kind increased after the
signing of the armistice, because the Poles, the Belgians, and
 other peoples whom we could not reach during the war
needed every pound of food we could spare.

Click for a larger image.

GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

America's special relation to the world's war food problem was primarily that of a
provider of the Allies, but in order to insure that this provision should be sufficient to
keep the Allied soldiers and war workers up to full fighting and working strength and
their families in full health, it was necessary for America to stimulate its own production,
repress considerably its consumption and cut out all possible waste in food handling. To
do this there was needed some form of governmental food control and a nation-wide
voluntary effort of the people. Each of the Allied countries had established governmental
food control early in the war under the direction of a "food controller" either attached to
an already existing government department of agriculture or commerce, or acting as an
independent food minister.

On the actual entrance of America into the war in 1917, governmental food control was
vested in a "United States Food Administration" with powers given it by Congress to
control all exports of food and all food-handling by millers, manufacturers, jobbers,
wholesalers, and large retail dealers. But no retail dealer doing a business of less than
$100,000 a year, nor any farmer or farmers' coöperative association came under the Food
Administration's control. Thus the American food administration differed from that of
most European countries in that it had no authority to fix the prices at which the actual
producers should sell their products or the small retailers should charge the consumers.

But, indirectly, it was able to do, and did, a good deal in this direction. By its direct
control of exports, and of the millers, manufacturers and large dealers, it was able to cut
out a great part of the middleman profits, and reduce wholesale prices for most staple
foodstuffs, especially that most important one, flour. By publicity of prices and by
indirect pressure through the wholesaler it was also able to restrain the further sky-
rocketing of retail prices.

NATION-WIDE FOOD SAVING

But if the Food Administration was limited in what it could effect by legal authority,
there was no limit to what it could do by calling on the voluntary action of the people of
the country, except by the possible refusal of the people to help. So there was set in
movement a nation-wide propaganda for food-production and food-saving which
resulted in the voluntary acceptance of wheatless and meatless days, voluntarily
modified hotel and restaurant and dining-car meals, and the adoption of household
pledges, taken by more than 12,000,000 American homes, to follow the Food
Administration's suggestions for food-saving. All this, and the many other things which
the Food Administration asked the people to do, and which the people did, resulted in
accomplishing a very necessary thing. It enabled America not only to meet all those ever-
increasing absolutely imperative calls of the Allies for food for their armies and people
through 1917 and 1918, but to supply its own army and people sufficiently well to carry
on the war effectively. The more food sunk by submarines, or prevented from coming to
Europe from distant food sources, as Australia and Argentine and India, the more we
provided by saving and increasing our production.

A few figures will illustrate the actual results of the call for food conservation. We
entered the crop year of 1917 (July 1, 1917, to July 1, 1918), with a wheat supply which
gave us only about 20,000,000 bushels available for export. By December 1, 1917, our
surplus had gone overseas and an additional 36,000,000 bushels had been shipped to the
Allies. In January we learned of the further imperative need of the Allies of 75,000,000
bushels. We responded by sending 85,000,000 bushels between the first of the year and
the advent of the new crop. When the crop year ended we had sent in all about
136,000,000 bushels of wheat to Europe. We were assisted in these operations by the
importation of 28,000,000 bushels of wheat from Australia and the Argentine to
supplement our domestic supply, but the outstanding fact was the saving in our domestic
consumption, most of which was accomplished in the six-months' period from January 1
to July 1, 1918.

AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION

But the cessation of the war did not produce food for the war-ravaged countries of
Europe. The newly liberated peoples of Central and Eastern Europe found themselves, at
the time of the Armistice, facing a period of starvation until their 1918 harvest could come
in. Something to save these peoples had to be done quickly and on a large scale. The
situation was met by the establishment of a new American governmental organization
called the American Relief Administration which, with Mr. Hoover as director-general,
worked in connection with the Inter-Allied Supreme Economic Council. Representatives
of the A. R. A. were sent at once into all the countries crying for help to find out the exact
food situation, and to arrange with the respective governments for the immediate
beginning of the importation and distribution of staple foodstuffs. Programs for a food
supply sufficient to last until the 1919 harvest were determined on a basis of minimum
necessity, and provision for sufficient shipping and rail transportation was arranged by
international agreement.

Modern war has thrown the spotlight on food. It has partly realized that famous
prophecy of the Polish economist, Jean Bloch, who wrote, twenty years ago: "That is the
future of war, not fighting, but famine." In the World War of 1914—18 there was fighting
on a scale never before reached, but there was also famine, as never before dreamed of.
 IX THE HIGH COST OF LIVING
A Study of the Extraordinary Conditions
Subsequent to the Armistice

By THE DIRECTOR OF THE COUNCIL

OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
On August 9, 1919, Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Director of the Council of National defense,
submitted to the Secretary of War, a report entitled "An Analysis of the High Cost of
Living Problem." This report was the result of much careful study and investigation. It is
non-academic in form and by omitting details presents a "panoramic view of the
problem." It laid chief stress upon conditions since the armistice.

In the report the problem of the high cost of living is viewed as a permanent one. It
was, in other words, not peculiar to past war conditions. Careful investigation by the
Council has resulted in the following analysis of the problem.

THE ESSENCE OF THE HIGH COST OF LIVING SITUATION

"1. The only complaints of the high cost of living which have justification are those
which are based upon inability of the present income to maintain previous or reasonable
standards of living at present prices—such well-founded complaints mean that increase
of income has not kept pace with increased cost of living, and therefore imply enforced
reduction in standards of living.

AMERICA'S PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY

"2. America's industrial and economic achievements during the war, notwithstanding
depleted man power and diversion of productive effort to war purposes, demonstrate the
ample ability of the Nation to sustain its population according to a standard of living
equal to or above standards of living which obtained previous to or during the war.
 "3. The fundamental basis for the maintenance of national standards of living is
adequate production, economical distribution, and fair apportionment among the various
economic groups which constitute our society. With the exception of agricultural activity,
production since the armistice has shown evidence of curtailment, and has in general
been abnormally low. Normal consumption can not continue unless an adequate rate of
production is maintained.

FOOD SITUATION AND READJUSTMENT

"4. Food production and the facilities for food production were improved rather than
injured during the war. Moreover, the program with respect to food production since the
signing of the armistice has been one of vigorous expansion of the means of providing
raw food products. The actual consumption of wheat, as shown by the Grain
Corporation's report of May 25, 1919, had for the previous ten months averaged
37,700,000 bushels per month, as against 39,000,000 bushels for the previous twelve
months. This does not necessarily imply reduced consumption of cereals.

"The number of cattle slaughtered in the period January to May, 1919, was 3,803,000, as
against 4,204,000 for the corresponding period of 1918, though the national reserve of
cattle on farms had increased during the war. The swine slaughtered January to May
increased from 18,260,000 in 1918 to 20,500,000 in 1919.

CLOTHING SITUATION

"5. The production of civilian cloths and clothing suffered some reduction during the
war, and has suffered heavy curtailment for many months since the signing of the
armistice.

"Boot and shoe production for civilian use was unfavorably affected by the war and has
likewise undergone extreme curtailment since the signing of the armistice.

HOUSING PROBLEM

"6. Housing facilities developed acute shortage through curtailment of building during
the war and, due to curtailment, for many months following the armistice, of the
production of building material and of building construction, housing is still far below
normal. Rents continue to rise.

PROVISION OF NEW CAPITAL

 "7. The first half of 1919 shows diminished production of raw materials and subnormal
construction of new capital, and thus indicates failure to utilize an adequate proportion
of our productive forces in the preliminary processes of provision to meet future
requirements. In fact, due to business uncertainty and hesitation and tendencies to
disagreement between productive groups, retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, labor,
etc., there ensued after the armistice a disuse of a large proportion of America's
productive capacity. Unless this slump in production is atoned for by consistent future
activity, and unless production is constantly maintained on an adequate scale, reduced
standards of living will become inescapable, regardless of prices, whether they rise or
fall.

"8. The very fact that prices of finished commodities, consumption goods, so called,
have risen to an extent out of proportion to the rise in prices of raw materials and
perhaps out of proportion to the rise in general wages, indicates that production and
distribution carried on under these conditions is, in general, yielding profits abnormally
high."

In corroboration of the preceding analysis, the report cites statistical data gathered
from various sources. The relation of currency and credit to prices is admirably
epitomized in the following extract:

CURRENCY AND CREDIT

"The manner in which the volume of circulating credit and currency is related to the
war-time rise in prices is about as follows:

"The outbreak of the war brought to America urgent government orders for munitions
and supplies. Inasmuch as the belligerent governments could not brook delay they were
obliged to pay the increased prices which American producers found it possible to
demand, and thus the wave of war prices was started in America. When America entered
the war it required, in order to perform its part, almost boundless quantities of
equipment and man power. Producers naturally took advantage of the extremely urgent
character of these demands in order to increase their prices, and, as a natural sequence,
wages began to advance. These increased prices and wages of course necessitated larger
expenditures by the government.

"Increased prices also necessitate the employment of larger funds in the conduct of a
business. A larger volume of credit is required at higher prices to take care of bills for raw
materials, and more money is necessary to meet increased payrolls. As a consequence,
therefore, of increased prices, business men required increased credit if they were to
avoid curtailment of operations and reduced production. Due to higher prices, therefore,
the banks were under the necessity of meeting the business demand for expansion of
credit."

INFLATION

The inflation process is described as follows:

"In pre-war times every dollar finding its way to the market was supposedly the
counterpart of some commodity or part of a commodity also appearing in the market.
Funds expended for the purchase of food, clothing, and for the payment of rentals were
assumed to have been earned by some productive contribution to the general supply of
commodities. With the outbreak of war there began to appear in the market, funds
derived from wages, profits, etc., which had been paid out in connection with
nonproductive activities of war, and which therefore implied no corresponding
contribution to the market supply of commodities. The producers of, and the dealers in,
the decreased quantity of commodities brought to market increased the prices of these
commodities to the point where they might absorb all the purchase money that became
available. These increased prices and wages have required increased circulating medium.
This requirement has been met primarily by increased credit and the increased use of
bank checks as an instrument of payment. As to the currency situation, the total money in
the United States in 1900 amounted to $2,340,000,000. According to a statement issued by
Governor W. P. G. Harding, of the Federal Reserve Board, the amount of money in
circulation has varied during the last five years as follows:

July 1, 1914, $3,419,108,368, or $34.53 per capita.

April 1, 1917, $4,100,976,000, or $37.88 per capita.
December 1, 1918, $5,129,985,000, or $48.13 per capita.
August 1, 1919, $4,796,890,000, or $45.16 per capita.

"This shows an increase during our war period of $7.28 per capita. The amount of
money in the Treasury and in Federal Reserve Banks is not in circulation, and is,
therefore not included in the figures quoted from Governor Harding's statement.

"In regard to the part played by national credit in meeting the situation growing out of
the extraordinary requirements of the government and the rise in prices which the
urgency of demands made possible, it is to be noted that government bonds had to be
sold to pay for a large proportion of the goods which war activities were consuming. In
consequence the national debt up to August 1, 1919, had been increased by
$24,518,000,000, or approximately $230 per capita. Of course, government bonds are
always good security for bank credit."

FOOD SUPPLY—WHEAT, CORN AND SUGAR

Despite the fact that we sent large shipments of food to our Allies, our supply at the
close of the war was not seriously diminished. The 1919 crop, while not expected to be
large, was amply sufficient to prevent a real shortage. This is supported by the following
extract from Mr. Clarkson's report:

"The wheat crop for 1918 amounted to 917,000,000 bushels, as compared to an average
for 1910—14 of 728,000,000 bushels; and the probable harvest in 1919 is 1,236,000,000
bushels. Our supply of wheat in elevators, mills, etc., on May 9, 1919, was 96,000,000
bushels, as against 34,000,000 bushels the year before. Our flour mills, whose capacity is
estimated at something like double their usual output, were milling week by week during
1919 considerably more flour than the year before. They produced for the week ending
May 9, 1919, for example, 2,553,000 barrels as against 1,569,000 barrels for the
corresponding week of 1918. Notwithstanding large exports, our wheat supply is
obviously adequate. In 1918, a record year, we exported 21,000,000 barrels of flour. In
1915 our wheat exports reached their maximum—206,000,000 bushels.

McCutcheon in the Chicago Tribune

Will There Be Enough to Go Around?

 "The corn crop of 1918 was likewise sufficient. The supply of corn on hand on May 1,
1919, was 23,000,000 bushels, as compared with 16,000,000 bushels May 1, 1918, and
7,000,000 bushels on May 1 of both 1917 and 1913. Though the 1919 corn crop is not
expected to be unusually large, there is no prospect of real shortage. And the situation
with respect to the other cereals is generally very good.

"The sugar industry of the United States passed through the period of the war with a
tendency to increased production, notwithstanding shipping difficulties. Though present
stocks are somewhat low in the United States, our exports during 1919 have been
unusually large. The future is normally provided for."

THE MEAT SUPPLY

The meat situation is described as follows:

"America emerged from the war producing meat at a rate far above pre-war figures,
and yet possessing in reserve a larger number of animals on the farms than we had before
the heavy war drafts upon our supplies began. The number of cattle slaughtered in 1918
was 11,000,000, as compared with 6,978,000 in 1913. Swine slaughtered were 41,214,000 in
1918 and 34,163,000 in 1913. The cattle slaughtered in 1919, January—May, were
3,803,000, as against 4,204,000, January—May, 1918. The swine slaughtered January—
May, 1919, made an increase over the 1918 record, the figures being 20,500,000 for the
present year, as against 18,260,000 for the corresponding interval last year. Although
exports of hams and shoulders for 1918 approximately doubled previous records,
amounting to 518,000,000 pounds, as against 172,000,000 pounds for 1913, and exports
have continued large during 1919, there is no doubt that our productive capacity is vastly
more than ample to meet our requirements."

HIGH PRICE OF FOOD

In view of the apparent abundance of food it is interesting to know the reason for the
high price of foodstuffs. The Council of National Defense is of the opinion that the
probability that the production of garden products in war gardens had fallen far below
that of 1918, when, it is estimated, to have reached the value of $525,000,000, would not
account for the high prices. Exportation and storage had not depleted our stock
sufficiently to affect prices abnormally. In regard to the question of exports the report
gives the following illuminating figures:
 "Present food prices are not to be accounted for largely on the basis of heavy exports.
Exports of beef, canned, fresh, and pickled, for example, have been less for 1919 than in
the previous year, the quantity amounting to 23,499,000 pounds in May, 1919, as
compared with 82,787,000 pounds in May, 1918. The May figures for exports of hog
products show 125,937,000 pounds in 1919, as against 201,279,000 pounds in May, 1918.
The monthly exports of beef and pork show a declining tendency during the first five
months of 1919, contrary to the tendency in 1918, the total amounting to 1,090,000,000
pounds in 1919, as against 1,122,000,000 pounds for the corresponding period of 1918—
less than the amount of all meats in cold storage on July 1, 1919, which was 1,336,000,000
pounds."

Concerning storage the same report states that:

"Even the fact that the report of goods in cold storage shows an increase of over 9 per
cent. in the quantity of all meats held on July 1, 1919 (1,336,000,000 pounds), as compared
with the figures for July 1, 1918, is, though very important, not a matter of significance for
any considerable period of time. Storage poultry July 1, 1919, was 48,895,704 pounds, or
181 per cent. above last year; cheese, about 25 per cent.; butter, about 75 per cent.; and
eggs, about 25 per cent. above July 1 last year. There was a decrease of frozen fish of
about 13 per cent. from last year. Taken in connection with the evidence of relatively
abundant reserves of live animals and large crops for the current year, it would seem that
some relief from high prices of food should be possible."

WHY FOOD PRICES WERE HIGH

The explanation of the post-war high prices of food is given as follows:

"It is true that food is, by comparison, plentiful. But it is also true that money or other
circulating medium is unprecedently plentiful. The fact that food prices are relatively
high and that the prices of chemicals, metals, lumber, etc., are relatively low, though their
supply is relatively small, may be due to a concentration of purchasing power upon food,
and the general direction of the flow of currency toward the purchase of immediate
consumables. Some relatively minor luxuries such as jewelry (and perhaps automobiles
should also be included here as the semi-luxury of greater magnitude) find favor with
purchasers, but the main trend of purchase seems to bear toward demand for the
necessities of life now in a finished state or nearly so, with a relatively weaker tendency
toward demand of capital goods. If the supply, and also the production, of raw materials
has been relatively small, and if the prices at which they have exchanged have also been
relatively low, it seems obvious that the proportionate amount of currency and credit
engaged in their purchase must be abnormally small, thus accounting for the ability of
the producers and purveyors of food to demand abnormally high prices regardless of the
relative plentifulness of their goods."

CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO PROFITEERING

"The conditions just described are highly favorable to both speculative profiteering and
wasteful distribution, through the intervention of supernumerary middlemen and
caterers. In fact, the statistics published by the New York Industrial Relations
Commission seem to indicate an unusually large increase of persons engaging in certain
kinds of salesmanship after the armistice. It should, however, be remembered that even
though it may smack of profiteering to produce a very large crop and sell it at abnormally
high prices, this is a kind of profiteering which deserves unstinted praise as compared
with that other species of profiteering which deliberately reduces output in the
expectation that the extortionate prices which the reduced product will command may
more than make up to the producer or speculator for the portion of production withheld
or the percentage of hoarded goods condemned to spoil and be lost to the nation."

OTHER COMMODITIES

The price of commodities other than foodstuffs was influenced in 1919 by the
inadequacy of supply and the curtailment of production. This was especially true of
woolens, as stated by the Council:

"The most obvious explanation of the high prices of woolens is the glaring fact of the
extreme reduction in output which ensued after the signing of the armistice and the
completion of Army orders, which practically ended in January, 1919.

"The war came to an end with the supply of civilian woolens unprecedentedly low. The
total quantity of wool available for civilian fabrics between April and November, 1918,
was probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 75,000,000 pounds, an amount perhaps
a little more than sufficient to meet the demands of normal manufacture for civilian
consumption for one and one-half months.

"In consequence of the general situation the total consumption of wool in manufacture
during first five months of the year 1919 amounted to but little more than one-half the
amount consumed during the corresponding months of the previous year. The
proportion of looms, 50-inch reed space and over, idle increased from 21 per cent. in
November, 1918, to 52 per cent. idle in February, 1919, and these looms were still 39 per
cent. idle in May, 1919. Of worsted spindles, 27 per cent. were reported idle in December,
1918, and 52 per cent. idle in March, 1919, and 26 per cent. were still idle in May. In the
meantime an extraordinary number of textile workers were condemned to idleness, their
productive capacity perishing day by day and week by week, while the deficiency in the
supply of clothing was developing to such a point that it became possible for the
wholesale index number of the prices of cloths and clothing to rise to 250 in June."

The production of cotton and cotton goods also was far below normal. To quote again
from the report:

"When the war ended the world's cotton supply was understood to be below normal.
The supplies of cotton goods were also reported low. The acreage planted to cotton was
in 1919 approximately 9 per cent. less than for 1918. The present prospects are that the
cotton crop will be small, and published articles are appearing expressing gratification
over the prospectively large commercial returns which the cotton producers may be able
to command because of the high prices which may be had for the reduced cotton output.
The forecast of the cotton crop for 1919 is 10,900,000 bales—about 10 per cent. below that
of recent years and but little over two-thirds as large as the record crop of 1914."

"OUTPUT AND MORE OUTPUT" ABANDONED

"In regard to cotton manufacture, it may be recorded that the situation is less
unsatisfactory than as regards wool manufacture. In this industry, as in most of our
industries, the economic watchword of war-time, which was 'Output, and more output'
(the necessary condition of full prosperity in peace, as well as of success during war), was
not heard after the armistice. There soon developed, on the contrary, groundless doubts
about future demand, and hints of unhealthy fears of 'overproduction.'

"Notwithstanding the release of labor, if it were needed, by demobilization, and

notwithstanding adequate supplies of raw cotton to meet the season's requirements and
the lack of any important difficulties in the way of reconversion to peace-time products,
and with low supplies of finished goods in stock, the cotton industry kept more spindles
idle during the first five months of 1919 than were idle during the corresponding period
for 1918. The amount of cotton consumed in the United States during the nine months
ending with April, 1919, was approximately 12 per cent. less than for the corresponding
nine months of 1918. The prices of cloths and clothing, as above mentioned, show in June,
1919, an increase of 150 per cent. over 1913 prices."
 The boot and shoe industry showed a marked decline after the signing of the armistice.
This, too, was borne out by the investigations of the Council.

"The production of boots and shoes for the first quarter of 1919 was reported as about
60 per cent. below the production for the last quarter of 1918. Plants were partially closed
and in some cases it is reported that machinery was returned to the Shoe Machinery Co.
All in all, there were 75,000,000 less pairs of shoes produced in the first quarter of 1919
than in the last quarter of 1918.

"The census report shows a reduction of more than 25 per cent. in the output of civilian
men's shoes in the quarter ending with March, 1919, as compared with production in the
quarter ending with December, 1918, and nearly 25 per cent. reduction as compared with
the quarter ending with September, 1918. The reduction in output of women's shoes
amounted to approximately 30 and 25 per cent., respectively, in comprising
corresponding periods. The reduction in the output of shoes for youths, boys and misses
was even more marked."

COAL AND IRON

What has been said of the production of cotton and woolen goods applied equally to
the mining of coal and to the output of iron and steel. During the war we increased our
coal production. In 1918 it amounted to "685,000,000 short tons, almost 50 per cent. of the
world's estimated output for that year. Production for 1913 was 571,000,000 short tons."
The coal situation since the armistice is stated as follows:

"Coal, the source of a vast proportion of our industrial power as well as our chief
source of heat and light, is a commodity the production of which is itself an index of our
economic life. Coal output since the armistice has been greatly reduced, the weekly
production of anthracite for the first half of 1919 being from 1,200,000 to 1,800,000 net
tons, as against 1,800,000 net tons to 3,000,000 net tons for the corresponding period of
1918. Bituminous production was 9,147,000 net tons for a typical week in 1919, as against
12,491,000 net tons for the corresponding week in 1918. Coke production for the week
ending June 28, 1919, amounted to only 287,000 net tons, as compared with 627,000 net
tons for the week ending June 29, 1918. The total amount of coal produced up to July 5,
1919, was 261,000,000 long tons, as compared with 364,000,000 long tons for the
corresponding period of 1918."

The production of iron and steel which was greatly stimulated by the war was allowed
to decline as soon as the concentrated effort of the nation to win the war was abandoned.
The resulting condition is succinctly described by the Council:

"The record of our after-war steel and iron output furnishes us with another warning
that we have been neglecting to keep pace with the established American rate of
industrial improvement and expansion and foresighted preparation for future
requirements and progress.

"The iron and steel business was considerably stimulated by war-time requirements.
There was a governmental agency whose business it was to forsee the war needs and to
place orders so that those productive forces which are wrapped up in the steel industry
might be utilized to capacity. The steel industry's activity has, however, since the
armistice greatly declined. Pig-iron production for April, 1919, was 82,607 tons per day,
as against 109,607 tons in April, 1918. Birmingham properties are reported to have been
working in April, 1919, at about 50 per cent. of the 1918 production. For the period
January to May, 1919, pig-iron production was only 2,114,000 tons, as against 3,446,000
tons during the same period in 1918. Steel-ingot production fell in the spring of 1919 to
lower figures than had been reached in more than two years. In fact, a regular decline in
production was in evidence after December, 1918.

"The figures representing the unfilled orders of the United States Steel Corporation at
the end of May, 1919, were smaller than they had been since 1915."

Copyright Underwood & Underwood

Women Doing Night Farming

Girls running a tractor plow and harrow at Farmingdale,
Long Island.
 Click for a larger image.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Council summarized its findings and recommends remedial measures as follows:

"The findings of the Reconstruction Research Division Council of National Defense,

indicate that the high cost of living is primarily due to curtailment in the production of
nearly all commodities except raw food products, to hoarding of storage food products,
to profiteering, conscious and unconscious, and to inflation of circulating credit. The
findings indicate that the situation may be most advantageously met by:

"1. Stimulated production.

"2. Some readjustment of incomes to the basis of higher price levels.

"3. The repression of hoarding and profiteering.

"4. Improvement and standardization of methods and facilities for distributing and
marketing goods.

"5. The perfecting of means of keeping the nation frequently, promptly, and adequately
informed regarding probable national requirements and of current production and stocks
of the more important commodities.

"The findings emphasize the fact that high standards of living can not be maintained
upon a basis of reduced production, regardless of whether price levels be high or low."
The Ore Market—Cleveland
Click for a larger image.
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