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Chapter 8 Classes and Objects: A Deeper Look
Section 8.2 Time Class Case Sudy
8.2 Q1: The _________ of a class are also called the public services or the public interface that the class
provides to its clients.
a. public constructors.
b. public instance variables.
c. public methods.
d. All of the above.
ANS: c. public methods.

8.2 Q2: The static method ________ of class String returns a formatted String.
a. printf.
b. format.
c. formatString.
d. toFormatedString.
ANS: b. format.

8.2 Q3: Which statement is false?

a. The actual data representation used within the class is of no concern to the class’s clients.
b. Clients generally care about what the class does but not how the class does it.
c. Clients are usually involved in a class’s implementation.
d. Hiding the implementation reduces the possibility that clients will become dependent on class-
implementation details.
ANS: c: Clients are usually involved in a class’s implementation.

Section 8.3 Controlling Access to Members

8.3 Q1: Which of the following class members should usually be private?
a. Methods.
b. Constructors.
c. Variables (or fields).
d. All of the above.
ANS: c. Variables (or fields).

8.3 Q2: Which of the following statements is true?

a. Methods and instance variables can both be either public or private.
b. Information hiding is achieved by restricting access to class members via keyword public.
c. The private members of a class are directly accessible to the clients of a class.
d. None of the above is true.
ANS: a. Methods and instance variables can both be either public or private.

Section 8.4: Referring to the Current Object’s Member

with the this Reference
8.4 Q1: When must a program explicitly use the this reference?
a. Accessing a private variable.
b. Accessing a public variable.
c. Accessing a local variable.
d. Accessing an instance variable that is shadowed by a local variable.

© Copyright 1992-2015 by Deitel & Associates, Inc. and Pearson Education, Inc.
ANS: d. Accessing an instance variable that is shadowed by a local variable.

8.4 Q2: Having a this reference allows:

a. a method to refer explicitly to the instance variables and other methods of the object on which the
method was called.
b. a method to refer implicitly to the instance variables and other methods of the object on which the
method was called.
c. an object to reference itself.
d. All of the above.
ANS: d. All of the above.

Section 8.5 Time Class Case Study: Overloaded

Constructors
8.5 Q1: A constructor cannot:
a. be overloaded.
b. initialize variables to their defaults.
c. specify return types or return values.
d. have the same name as the class.
ANS: c. specify return types or return values.

8.5 Q2: Constructors:

a. Initialize instance variables.
b. When overloaded, can have identical argument lists.
c. When overloaded, are selected by number, types and order of types of parameters.
d. Both (a) and (c).
ANS: d. Both (a) and (c).

8.5 Q3: A programmer-defined constructor that has no arguments is called a(n) ________.
a. empty constructor.
b. no-argument constructor.
c. default constructor.
d. null constructor.
ANS: b. no-argument constructor.

8.5 Q4: What happens when this is used in a constructor’s body to call another constructor of the same
class if that call is not the first statement in the constructor?
a. A compilation error occurs.
b. A runtime error occurs.
c. A logic error occurs.
d. Nothing happens. The program compiles and runs.
ANS: a. A compilation error occurs.

8.5 Q5: When implementing a method, use the class’s set and get methods to access the class’s ________
data.
a. public.
b. private.
c. protected.
d. All of the above.
ANS: b. private.

Section 8.6 Default and No-Argument Constructors

© Copyright 1992-2015 by Deitel & Associates, Inc. and Pearson Education, Inc.
8.6 Q1: Which statement is false?
a. The compiler always creates a default constructor for a class.
b. If a class’s constructors all require arguments and a program attempts to call a no-argument
constructor to initialize an object of the class, a compilation error occurs.
c. A constructor can be called with no arguments only if the class does not have any constructors or
if the class has a public no-argument constructor.
d. None of the above.
ANS: a. The compiler always creates a default constructor for a class.

Section 8.7 Notes on Set and Get Methods

8.7 Q1: Set methods are also commonly called ________ methods and get methods are also commonly
called ________ methods.
a. query, mutator.
b. accessor, mutator.
c. mutator, accessor.
d. query, accessor.
ANS: c. mutator, accessor.

8.7 Q2: Using public set methods helps provide data integrity if:
a. The instance variables are public.
b. The instance variables are private.
c. The methods perform validity checking.
d. Both b and c.
ANS: d. Both b and c.

Section 8.8 Composition

8.8 Q1: Composition is sometimes referred to as a(n) ________.
a. is-a relationship
b. has-a relationship
c. many-to-one relationship
d. one-to-many relationship
ANS: b. has-a relationship.

Section 8.9 Enum Types

8.9 Q1: Which statement is false?
a. An enum declaration is a comma-separated list of enum constants and may optionally include other
components of traditional classes, such as constructors, fields and methods.
b. Any attempt to create an object of an enum type with operator new results in a compilation error.
c. An enum constructor cannot be overloaded.
d. enum constants are implicitly final and static.
ANS: c. An enum constructor cannot be overloaded.

8.9 Q2: Which method returns an array of the enum’s constants?

a. values.
b. getValues.
c. constants.
d. getConstants.
ANS: a. values.

© Copyright 1992-2015 by Deitel & Associates, Inc. and Pearson Education, Inc.
Section 8.10 Garbage Collection and Method finalize
8.10 Q1: Which of the following is false?
a. Method finalize does not take parameters and has return type void.
b. Memory leaks using Java are rare because of automatic garbage collection.
c. Objects are marked for garbage collection by method finalize.
d. The garbage collector reclaims unused memory.
ANS: c. Objects are marked for garbage collection by method finalize. (Objects are marked for
garbage collection when there are no more references to the object).

Section 8.11 static Class Members

8.11 Q1: Static class variables:
a. are final.
b. are public.
c. are private.
d. are shared by all objects of a class.
ANS: d. are shared by all objects of a class.

8.11 Q2: Which of the following is false?

a. A static method must be used to access private static instance variables.
b. A static method has no this reference.
c. A static method can be accessed even when no objects of its class have been instantiated.
d. A static method can call instance methods directly.
ANS: d. A static method can call instance methods directly.

Section 8.12 static Import

8.12 Q1: Which syntax imports all static members of class Math?
a. import java.lang.Math.*.
b. import static java.lang.Math.*.
c. import static java.lang.Math.
d. None of the above.
ANS: b. import static java.lang.Math.*.

Section 8.13 final Instance Variables

8.13 Q1: Instance variables declared final do not or cannot:
a. Cause syntax errors if used as a left-hand value.
b. Be initialized.
c. Be modified after they are initialized.
d. None of the above.
ANS: c. Be modified.

8.13 Q2: A final field should also be declared ________ if it is initialized in its declaration.
a. private.
b. public.
c. protected.
d. static.
ANS: d. static.

© Copyright 1992-2015 by Deitel & Associates, Inc. and Pearson Education, Inc.
Section 8.14 Package Access
8.14 Q1: When no access modifier is specified for a method or variable, the method or variable:
a. Is public.
b. Is private.
c. Has package access.
d. Is static.
ANS: c. Has package access.

8.14 Q2: Which of the following statements is false?

a. If a program uses multiple classes from the same package, these classes can access each other's package
access members directly through references to objects of the appropriate classes, or in the case of static
members, through the class name.
b. Package access is rarely used.
c. Classes in the same source file are part of the same package.
d. Use the access modifier package to give a method or variable package access.
ANS: d. Use the access modifier package to give a method or variable package access.

Section 8.15 Using BigDecimal for Precise Monetary

Calculations
8.15 Q1: Which of the following statements is false?
a. An application that requires precise floating-point calculations such as those in financial applications
should use class BigDecimal from package java.math.
b. We use class NumberFormat for formatting numeric values as locale-specific strings.
c. In the U.S, locale, the value 15467.82 would be formatted as "15,467.82", whereas in many European
locales it would be formatted as "15.467,56".
d. The BigDecimal method format receives a double argument and returns a BigDecimal object that
represents the exact value specied.
ANS: . d. The BigDecimal method format receives a double argument and returns a BigDecimal
object that represents the exact value specied. Actually, the BigDecimal method valueOf receives a
double argument and returns a BigDecimal object that represents the exact value specied.

8.15 Q2: BigDecimal gives you control over how values are rounded. By default:
a. all calculations are approximate and no rounding occurs.
b. all calculations are approximate and rounding occurs.
c. all calculations are exact and no rounding occurs.
d. all calculations are exact and rounding occurs.
ANS: c. all calculations are exact and no rounding occurs.

Section 8.16 (Optional) GUI and Graphics Case Study:

Using Objects with Graphics
No questions.

© Copyright 1992-2015 by Deitel & Associates, Inc. and Pearson Education, Inc.
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The Undergraduate instruction in philosophy provides five hours a
week of required work for one year:

1) IN DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC; 2) IN PSYCHOLOGY; 3) IN

ETHICS.

The courses are unified and thorough. A voluntary course in the

History of Philosophy is given; and advanced courses will be offered
this year in Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Kant, and in
English Ethics from Hobbes to Stephen. The instructors are
Professors Griffin and Emmot.
PERIODICALS.

MIND. July 1890. No. LIX.

CONTENTS:

OUR SPACE-CONSCIOUSNESS. A Reply. By Herbert Spencer.

VOLKMANN'S PSYCHOLOGY (I). By Thomas Whittaker.

THE LOGIC OF THE ETHIC OF EVOLUTION. By William Mitchell.

THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT. By Alexander F. Shand.

MENTAL TESTS AND MEASUREMENTS. By Prof. J. McK. Cattell.

DISCUSSION: 1) The Evolution of Inductive Thought. By Hiram

M.
Stanley.
2) The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality. By Julius
Pikler.

CRITICAL NOTICES: "Fouillée's L'Avenir de la Métaphysique

fondée
 sur l'Expérience"; Tarde's "Lois de l'Imitation"; Bæumker's
"Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie."

SOME NEWLY-DISCOVERED LETTERS OF HOBBES. By the Editor.

Our Space-Consciousness. In this article Mr. Herbert Spencer

replies to criticisms, by adherents of Kantian doctrine, of objections
contained in §§ 326-335 of The Principles of Psychology. He objects
that the disciples of Kant "cannot imagine how it is possible that our
space-consciousness can have arisen out of that which was not
originally a space-consciousness."

Volkmann's Psychology. Shows that the really important point in

Volkmann's doctrine of "psychological mechanism" is its theory of
the interaction of contemporaneous presentations, and of the
existence among them of unconscious presentations. Herbartian
psychology is strictly scientific system, but when its superfluous
mechanism is cleared away, its explanations become those of
associationism.

In The Logic of the Ethic of Evolution, Mr. William Mitchell points

out that the two conditions of an ethical end are that it be the
motive of individual action, and that it furnish a critical system of
universal laws; and further that those conditions are fulfilled by the
end variously propounded in the ethic of evolution only if it be
represented, not as an external limit forcing itself on men, but as
presenting a more desirable character and medium to the individual
than any other. The end and means of moral progress given by the
Ethic of Evolution are perfectly true, but they do not express the
essence of the matter.
 The Antinomy of Thought. This paper investigates an antinomy
which infects all our thought of reality that is not intuitive. The
source of error is the confusion of the judgment with the
consciousness or intuition of reality.

In the article on Mental Tests and Measurements, Prof. J. McK.

Cattell describes certain tests which are used in the Psychological
Laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania, with the object of
providing data for the discovery of the rules which govern the
constancy of mental processes, their interdependence, and their
variations under different circumstances.

The Evolution of Inductive Thought. A primary element in all

experience is its inductive quality. The struggle of existence awakens
experience to the thought-stage where it knows and directs itself,
but this very slowly. Development precedes self-development, and
this precedes a self-development which is self-conscious. This
conclusion is confirmed by some analyses of thought in the divisions
of conception, judgment, and reasoning.

The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality. This is a criticism

by Mr. Julius Pikler of Mr. Stout's criticism on Mill, which appeared in
the January number of Mind. His opinion is that Mr. Strong's
statements are simply negations of Mill's theory, and as such prove
nothing.

Some newly-discovered Letters of Hobbes. These letters,

seventeen in number, were written to the French physician Sorbière,
and have been discovered by Dr. F. Tönnies in the National Library at
Paris. All of them, with related letters of Sorbière and others, are
given at length in the Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. iii. 58-71, 192-232,
and the first nine, which are the only ones of real importance, are
set out in this number of Mind. They have reference to the important
period of Hobbes's life and work that led up to Leviathan in 1651.
(London: Williams & Norgate.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 175. July 1890.

CONTENTS:

L'HOMOGENEITE MORALE. By G. Fonsegrive.

CONTRIBUTIONS PSYCHO-PHYSIQUES A L'ETUDE

ESTHETIQUE (fin). By G.
Sorel.

LA FOLIE DE J. J. ROUSSEAU. By H. Joly.

LA PERCEPTION DES LONGUEURS ET DES NOMBRES CHEZ

QUELQUES PETITS
ENFANTS. By Alfred Binet.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

M. Fonsegrive in L'Homogénéité morale points out the necessity of

a proper system of education for developing in the mind of the
young a moral homogeneity to replace the heterogeneity which
psychologists find in the nature of man.

In Contributions psycho-physiques a l'Etude esthétique, M. G.

Sorel continues his studies on the psychology of æsthetics, and
concludes that experimental psychology and especially psycho-
physics form the base of practical æsthetics.
 M. H. Joly in La Folie de J. J. Rousseau points out that the problem
of the agreement of genius with insanity, so far as concerns
Rousseau, is reduced to small dimensions.

La Perception des Longueurs et des Nombres ches quelques petits

Enfants by M. Alfred Binet, describes certain original experiments
which indicate that young children have an accurate perception of
differences in length, but that their perception of number is very
limited. (Paris: F. Alcan.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 176. August 1890.

CONTENTS:

LES ORIGINES DE LA TECHNOLOGIE. By A. Espinas.

L'INHIBITION DANS LES PHÉNOMENES DE CONSCIENCE. By A.

Binet.

LA GÉOMÉTRIE GÉNÉRALE ET LES JUGEMENTS

SYNTHÉTIQUES A PRIORI. By G. Lechalas.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

REVUE DES PERIODIQUES RUSSES.

CORRESPONDANCE: "Les Manuscrits de M. de Biran."

In Les Origines de la Technologie M. Espinas aims at giving a

history of philosophy in action. The present paper is devoted to
physico-theological technology, and concludes with the observation
that it was undoubtedly a progress to conceive the technical arts as
a whole, as a divine gift in like manner as the fruits of the earth and
the beneficent phenomena of nature, since this conception by
opposition gave rise to the idea of art, that is of human initiative
acting differently according to diversity of circumstances.

In L'Inhibition dans les Phénomènes de Conscience M. Alfred Binet

explains certain phenomena by showing that under various
circumstances certain images and sensations cannot coexist with
others in the same field of consciousness; the presence of one
excludes that of another. Antagonism and exclusion are the two
simple facts which explain the phenomena in question.

La Géométrie Générale et les Jugements Synthétiques a priori is a

reply by M. G. Lechalas to an article by M. Renouvier in the Critique
Philosophique criticising M. Calinon's theory of geometrical spaces
embodied in the system of "general geometry." While showing that
spaces with three dimensions are rationally included in a space with
four dimensions, M. Lechalas recognises the impossibility of
establishing such a geometry, seeing that we have no figure that
answers to what a four-dimensional space would be, as well as the
purely formal character of the presentations of non-Euclidian figures.
(Paris: F. Alcan.)

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER

SINNESORGANE. Vol. I,
No. 2.

CONTENTS:
 UEBER DIE WAHRNEHMUNG UND LOKALISATION VON
SCHWEBUNGEN UND
DIFFERENZTÖNEN. By Carl L. Schaefer.

DIE ASSOCIATION SUCCESSIVER VORSTELLUNGEN. By H.

Münsterberg.

BRIEFE VON G. TH. FECHNER: UEBER NEGATIVE

EMPFINDUNGSWERTE.
(Concluded.) Edited by W. Preyer.

LITERATUR-BERICHT.

The results of Mr. Schaefer's researches are that for the

localisation of the vibrations of two tones, in the case of their
unequal relative intensity, the direction and distance of the relatively
louder tone are determinate. If the relative intensity of the primary
tones is equal, the vibrations are heard to proceed from the region
between the two sounding points. Differential tones are heard
between the ears, when the sounding sources are in the median
plane; but when both primary tones come from the same side, in or
immediately before the ear on that side; and in case of unequal
intensity, when both come from different sides, on the side of the
softer sound.

Prof. Münsterberg concludes that there is no successive

association of ideas; when successively appearing, they are received
singly into the memory.

The letters of Fechner are continued from No. 1.

 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER
SINNESORGANE. Vol. I,
No. 3.

CONTENTS:

UEBER DIE KLEINSTEN WAHRNEHMBAREN GESICHTSWINKEL IN

DEN
VERSCHIEDENEN TEILEN DES SPEKTRUMS. By W. Uhthoff.

DIE ÆSTHETISCHEN GEFUEHLE. By A. Döring.

BESPRECHUNGEN: (1) A. Mosso's und A. Maggiora's "Ueber die

Gesetze der Ermüdung." (2) Münsterberg's "Beitraege zur
Experimentellen Psychologie."

LITERATUR-BERICHT.

Dr. Uhthoff, in order to determine the least visual angle of

perception, has employed a grating in a pure-monochromatic
spectral field. His results were that the angles in the different parts
of the spectrum are essentially equal.

Æsthetic emotions, Mr. Döring contends, proceed from the

unhindered play of the functions of psychical faculties; their contrary,
from the inhibition of the same.

This periodical is edited by H. Ebbinghaus and A. König, with H.

Aubert, S. Exner, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Hering, J. v. Kries, Th. Lipps, G.
E. Müller, W. Preyer, and C. Stumpf as collaborators. It appears every
two months. The review of the literature of its special department of
research is very comprehensive. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.)
LA NUOVA FILOSOFIA.

RAGIONI E IDEALI. By La Direzione.

LA SENSAZIONE E LA SUA CONOSCIBILITA. By R. Ardigo.

J. E. ALAUX'S LE PROBLEME RELIGIEUX AU XIX^e SIÈCLE. By

A.
Torre.

ECONOMIA SCIENTIFICA ED ECONOMIA UTOPISTA. By A. Loria.

P. LEROY-BEAULIEU'S L'ETAT MODERNE ET SES FONCTIONS.

By F. S.
Nitti.

C. JANNET'S LE SOCIALISME D'ETAT ET LA REFORME SOCIALE.

By F. S.
Nitti.

LOMBROSO'S AND LASCHI'S IL DELITTO POLITICO E LE

RIVOLUZIONI. By
G. Fioretti.

CRITICA LETTERARIA.

A. Angiulli—A. Saffi—F. Petruccelli della Gattina. (MEMORIE.)

By A. Torre.

LA POLITICA.

QUESTIONI E PROBLEMI. La responsabilità filosofica,

secondo Paolo Janet.
 This is the first number of La Nuova Filosofia which is established,
under the editorship of Dr. Andrea Torre, to diffuse in Europe and
America the best results of contemporary culture, in relation
especially to the life and development of society. (Naples: Dr. Andrea
Torre, Vico Lungo Avvocata, 66.)
APPENDIX.

Cut exhibiting modifications that affect the accessory nucleus.

Referred to on page 26 of this number of The Monist, in M. Binet's
article "The Immortality of Infusoria."

[Illustration: CONJUGATION OF CHILODON CUCULLULUS.]

A, beginning of conjugation; b, mouth; n, nucleus; nu, nucleolus;

v. c., multiple contracticle vesicles.

B, division of the nucleolus into two segments, nu', nu'; the

nucleus n begins to show signs of regression.

C, each of the two individuals in conjugation contains two

nucleolar segments, brought near together, of which one probably
comes from the individual opposite by course of exchange, and will
fuse with the segment not exchanged, to form a compound segment
(Maupas).

D, division of the segment into two portions which grow to

unequal sizes; the larger, nn, will become the new nucleus, the
smaller, the nucleolus of the new formation, nun.
 E, the old nucleus, n, reduced to a small pale and rumpled mass,
is replaced by the new nucleus nn, near by which is seen the new
nucleolus nun.
VOL. I. JANUARY, 1891. NO. 2.
THE MONIST.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THEORIES.

Of the fifty or hundred systems of philosophy that have been

advanced at different times of the world's history, perhaps the larger
number have been, not so much results of historical evolution, as
happy thoughts which have accidently occurred to their authors. An
idea which has been found interesting and fruitful has been adopted,
developed, and forced to yield explanations of all sorts of
phenomena. The English have been particularly given to this way of
philosophising; witness, Hobbes, Hartley, Berkeley, James Mill. Nor
has it been by any means useless labor; it shows us what the true
nature and value of the ideas developed are, and in that way affords
serviceable materials for philosophy. Just as if a man, being seized
with the conviction that paper was a good material to make things
of, were to go to work to build a papier mâché house, with roof of
roofing-paper, foundations of paste-board, windows of paraffined
paper, chimneys, bath tubs, locks, etc., all of different forms of
paper, his experiment would probably afford valuable lessons to
builders, while it would certainly make a detestable house, so those
one-idea'd philosophies are exceedingly interesting and instructive,
and yet are quite unsound.
 The remaining systems of philosophy have been of the nature of
reforms, sometimes amounting to radical revolutions, suggested by
certain difficulties which have been found to beset systems
previously in vogue; and such ought certainly to be in large part the
motive of any new theory. This is like partially rebuilding a house.
The faults that have been committed are, first, that the dilapidations
have generally not been sufficiently thoroughgoing, and second, that
not sufficient pains has been taken to bring the additions into deep
harmony with the really sound parts of the old structure.

When a man is about to build a house, what a power of thinking

he has to do, before he can safely break ground! With what pains he
has to excogitate the precise wants that are to be supplied! What a
study to ascertain the most available and suitable materials, to
determine the mode of construction to which those materials are
best adapted, and to answer a hundred such questions! Now without
riding the metaphor too far, I think we may safely say that the
studies preliminary to the construction of a great theory should be at
least as deliberate and thorough as those that are preliminary to the
building of a dwelling-house.

That systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been

preached since Kant, but I do not think the full import of the maxim
has by any means been apprehended. What I would recommend is
that every person who wishes to form an opinion concerning
fundamental problems, should first of all make a complete survey of
human knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each
branch of science, should observe in just what respect each has
been successful and where it has failed, in order that in the light of
the thorough acquaintance so attained of the available materials for
a philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each, he
may proceed to the study of what the problem of philosophy
consists in, and of the proper way of solving it. I must not be
understood as endeavoring to state fully all that these preparatory
studies should embrace; on the contrary, I purposely slur over many
points, in order to give emphasis to one special recommendation,
namely, to make a systematic study of the conceptions out of which
a philosophical theory may be built, in order to ascertain what place
each conception may fitly occupy in such a theory, and to what uses
it is adapted.

The adequate treatment of this single point would fill a volume,

but I shall endeavor to illustrate my meaning by glancing at several
sciences and indicating conceptions in them serviceable for
philosophy. As to the results to which long studies thus commenced
have led me, I shall just give a hint at their nature.

We may begin with dynamics,—field in our day of perhaps the

grandest conquest human science has ever made,—I mean the law
of the conservation of energy. But let us revert to the first step taken
by modern scientific thought,—and a great stride it was,—the
inauguration of dynamics by Galileo. A modern physicist on
examining Galileo's works is surprised to find how little experiment
had to do with the establishment of the foundations of mechanics.
His principal appeal is to common sense and il lume naturale. He
always assumes that the true theory will be found to be a simple
and natural one. And we can see why it should indeed be so in
dynamics. For instance, a body left to its own inertia, moves in a
straight line, and a straight line appears to us the simplest of curves.
In itself, no curve is simpler than another. A system of straight lines
has intersections precisely corresponding to those of a system of like
parabolas similarly placed, or to those of any one of an infinity of
systems of curves. But the straight line appears to us simple,
because, as Euclid says, it lies evenly between its extremities; that
is, because viewed endwise it appears as a point. That is, again,
because light moves in straight lines. Now, light moves in straight
lines because of the part which the straight line plays in the laws of
dynamics. Thus it is that our minds having been formed under the
influence of phenomena governed by the laws of mechanics, certain
conceptions entering into those laws become implanted in our
minds, so that we readily guess at what the laws are. Without such a
natural prompting, having to search blindfold for a law which would
suit the phenomena, our chance of finding it would be as one to
infinity. The further physical studies depart from phenomena which
have directly influenced the growth of the mind, the less we can
expect to find the laws which govern them "simple," that is,
composed of a few conceptions natural to our minds.

The researches of Galileo, followed up by Huygens and others, led

to those modern conceptions of Force and Law, which have
revolutionised the intellectual world. The great attention given to
mechanics in the seventeenth century soon so emphasised these
conceptions as to give rise to the Mechanical Philosophy, or doctrine
that all the phenomena of the physical universe are to be explained
upon mechanical principles. Newton's great discovery imparted a
new impetus to this tendency. The old notion that heat consists in an
agitation of corpuscles was now applied to the explanation of the
chief properties of gases. The first suggestion in this direction was
that the pressure of gases is explained by the battering of the
particles against the walls of the containing vessel, which explained
Boyle's law of the compressibility of air. Later, the expansion of
gases, Avogadro's chemical law, the diffusion and viscosity of gases,
and the action of Crookes's radiometer were shown to be
consequences of the same kinetical theory; but other phenomena,
such as the ratio of the specific heat at constant volume to that at
constant pressure require additional hypotheses, which we have little
reason to suppose are simple, so that we find ourselves quite afloat.
In like manner with regard to light, that it consists of vibrations was
almost proved by the phenomena of diffraction, while those of
polarisation showed the excursions of the particles to be
perpendicular to the line of propagation; but the phenomena of
dispersion, etc., require additional hypotheses which may be very
complicated. Thus, the further progress of molecular speculation
appears quite uncertain. If hypotheses are to be tried haphazard, or
simply because they will suit certain phenomena, it will occupy the
mathematical physicists of the world say half a century on the
average to bring each theory to the test, and since the number of
possible theories may go up into the trillions, only one of which can
be true, we have little prospect of making further solid additions to
the subject in our time. When we come to atoms, the presumption
in favor of a simple law seems very slender. There is room for
serious doubt whether the fundamental laws of mechanics hold good
for single atoms, and it seems quite likely that they are capable of
motion in more than three dimensions.

To find out much more about molecules and atoms, we must

search out a natural history of laws of nature, which may fulfil that
function which the presumption in favor of simple laws fulfilled in the
early days of dynamics, by showing us what kind of laws we have to
expect and by answering such questions as this: Can we with
reasonable prospect of not wasting time, try the supposition that
atoms attract one another inversely as the seventh power of their
distances, or can we not? To suppose universal laws of nature
capable of being apprehended by the mind and yet having no reason
for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational, is
hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of
facts that need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should
sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular
explanation; but if it shows heads every time, we wish to know how
this result has been brought about. Law is par excellence the thing
that wants a reason.

Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature
and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution.
This supposes them not to be absolute, not to be obeyed precisely.
It makes an element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute
chance in nature. Just as, when we attempt to verify any physical
law, we find our observations cannot be precisely satisfied by it, and
rightly attribute the discrepancy to errors of observation, so we must
suppose far more minute discrepancies to exist owing to the
imperfect cogency of the law itself, to a certain swerving of the facts
from any definite formula.

Mr. Herbert Spencer wishes to explain evolution upon mechanical

principles. This is illogical, for four reasons. First, because the
principle of evolution requires no extraneous cause; since the
tendency to growth can be supposed itself to have grown from an
infinitesimal germ accidentally started. Second, because law ought
more than anything else to be supposed a result of evolution. Third,
because exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of
homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the
universe the most manifest and characteristic. Fourth, because the
law of the conservation of energy is equivalent to the proposition
that all operations governed by mechanical laws are reversible; so
that an immediate corollary from it is that growth is not explicable
by those laws, even if they be not violated in the process of growth.
In short, Spencer is not a philosophical evolutionist, but only a half-
evolutionist,—or, if you will, only a semi-Spencerian. Now philosophy
requires thoroughgoing evolutionism or none.

The theory of Darwin was that evolution had been brought about
by the action of two factors: first, heredity, as a principle making
offspring nearly resemble their parents, while yet giving room for
"sporting," or accidental variations,—for very slight variations often,
for wider ones rarely; and, second, the destruction of breeds or
races that are unable to keep the birth rate up to the death rate.
This Darwinian principle is plainly capable of great generalisation.
Wherever there are large numbers of objects, having a tendency to
retain certain characters unaltered, this tendency, however, not
being absolute but giving room for chance variations, then, if the
amount of variation is absolutely limited in certain directions by the
destruction of everything which reaches those limits, there will be a
gradual tendency to change in directions of departure from them.
Thus, if a million players sit down to bet at an even game, since one
after another will get ruined, the average wealth of those who
remain will perpetually increase. Here is indubitably a genuine
formula of possible evolution, whether its operation accounts for
much or little in the development of animal and vegetable species.

The Lamarckian theory also supposes that the development of

species has taken place by a long series of insensible changes, but it
supposes that those changes have taken place during the lives of
the individuals, in consequence of effort and exercise, and that
reproduction plays no part in the process except in preserving these
modifications. Thus, the Lamarckian theory only explains the
development of characters for which individuals strive, while the
Darwinian theory only explains the production of characters really
beneficial to the race, though these may be fatal to individuals.[33]
But more broadly and philosophically conceived, Darwinian evolution
is evolution by the operation of chance, and the destruction of bad
results, while Lamarckian evolution is evolution by the effect of habit
and effort.

[33] The neo-Darwinian, Weismann, has shown that mortality

would almost necessarily result from the action of the Darwinian
principle.

A third theory of evolution is that of Mr. Clarence King. The

testimony of monuments and of rocks is that species are unmodified
or scarcely modified, under ordinary circumstances, but are rapidly
altered after cataclysms or rapid geological changes. Under novel
circumstances, we often see animals and plants sporting excessively
in reproduction, and sometimes even undergoing transformations
during individual life, phenomena no doubt due partly to the
enfeeblement of vitality from the breaking up of habitual modes of
life, partly to changed food, partly to direct specific influence of the
element in which the organism is immersed. If evolution has been
brought about in this way, not only have its single steps not been
insensible, as both Darwinians and Lamarckians suppose, but they
are furthermore neither haphazard on the one hand, nor yet
determined by an inward striving on the other, but on the contrary
are effects of the changed environment, and have a positive general
tendency to adapt the organism to that environment, since variation
will particularly affect organs at once enfeebled and stimulated. This
mode of evolution, by external forces and the breaking up of habits,
seems to be called for by some of the broadest and most important
facts of biology and paleontology; while it certainly has been the
chief factor in the historical evolution of institutions as in that of
ideas; and cannot possibly be refused a very prominent place in the
process of evolution of the universe in general.

Passing to psychology, we find the elementary phenomena of

mind fall into three categories. First, we have Feelings, comprising
all that is immediately present, such as pain, blue, cheerfulness, the
feeling that arises when we contemplate a consistent theory, etc. A
feeling is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent
of any other state of mind. Or, a feeling is an element of
consciousness which might conceivably override every other state
until it monopolised the mind, although such a rudimentary state
cannot actually be realised, and would not properly be
consciousness. Still, it is conceivable, or supposable, that the quality
of blue should usurp the whole mind, to the exclusion of the ideas of
shape, extension, contrast, commencement and cessation, and all
other ideas, whatsoever. A feeling is necessarily perfectly simple, in
itself, for if it had parts these would also be in the mind, whenever
the whole was present, and thus the whole could not monopolise the
mind.[34]

[34] A feeling may certainly be compound, but only in virtue of

a perception which is not that feeling nor any feeling at all.

Besides Feelings, we have Sensations of reaction; as when a

person blindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a
muscular effort, or when any feeling gives way to a new feeling.
Suppose I had nothing in my mind but a feeling of blue, which were
suddenly to give place to a feeling of red; then, at the instant of
transition there would be a shock, a sense of reaction, my blue life
being transmuted into red life. If I were further endowed with a
memory, that sense would continue for some time, and there would
also be a peculiar feeling or sentiment connected with it. This last
feeling might endure (conceivably I mean) after the memory of the
occurrence and the feelings of blue and red had passed away. But
the sensation of reaction cannot exist except in the actual presence
of the two feelings blue and red to which it relates. Wherever we
have two feelings and pay attention to a relation between them of
whatever kind, there is the sensation of which I am speaking. But
the sense of action and reaction has two types: it may either be a
perception of relation between two ideas, or it may be a sense of
action and reaction between feeling and something out of feeling.
And this sense of external reaction again has two forms; for it is
either a sense of something happening to us, by no act of ours, we
being passive in the matter, or it is a sense of resistance, that is, of
our expending feeling upon something without. The sense of
reaction is thus a sense of connection or comparison between
feelings, either, A, between one feeling and another, or B, between
feeling and its absence or lower degree; and under B we have, First,
the sense of the access of feeling, and Second, the sense of
remission of feeling.

Very different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or

disturbances of feeling are general conceptions. When we think, we
are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a
general rule, we are aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual
power is nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in
cases essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote
from, the normal cases of connections of feelings under which those
habits were formed.
 The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in
a tendency to generalisation. Feeling tends to spread; connections
between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring feelings become
assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so
many formulations of the one law of the growth of mind. When a
disturbance of feeling takes place, we have a consciousness of gain,
the gain of experience; and a new disturbance will be apt to
assimilate itself to the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being
excited, become more easily excited, especially in the ways in which
they have previously been excited. The consciousness of such a
habit constitutes a general conception.

The cloudiness of psychological notions may be corrected by

connecting them with physiological conceptions. Feeling may be
supposed to exist, wherever a nerve-cell is in an excited condition.
The disturbance of feeling, or sense of reaction, accompanies the
transmission of disturbance between nerve-cells or from a nerve-cell
to a muscle-cell or the external stimulation of a nerve-cell. General
conceptions arise upon the formation of habits in the nerve-matter,
which are molecular changes consequent upon its activity and
probably connected with its nutrition.

The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in

the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it
requires is an exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces into a
motion a component motion to be combined with the rest by the
parallelogram of forces; but the component motion must actually
take place exactly as required by the law of force. On the other
hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact
conformity would be in downright conflict with the law; since it
would instantly crystallise thought and prevent all further formation
of habit. The law of mind only makes a given feeling more likely to
arise. It thus resembles the "non-conservative" forces of physics,
such as viscosity and the like, which are due to statistical
uniformities in the chance encounters of trillions of molecules.

The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in

Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders to-day. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question
arises whether physical laws on the one hand, and the psychical law
on the other are to be taken—

(A) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I

would name neutralism; or,

(B) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law
alone as primordial, which is materialism; or,

(C) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law
alone as primordial, which is idealism.

The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to

scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose
that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason,—an ultimate,
inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any
theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable.

Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known

as Ockham's razor, i. e., that not more independent elements are to
be supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward
aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.
 The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself
capable of explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws of
motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with
mathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be
demanded of every Philosophy.

Modern mathematics is replete with ideas which may be applied to

philosophy. I can only notice one or two. The manner in which
mathematicians generalise is very instructive. Thus, painters are
accustomed to think of a picture as consisting geometrically of the
intersections of its plane by rays of light from the natural objects to
the eye. But geometers use a generalised perspective. For instance,
in the figure let O be the eye, let A B C D E be the edgewise view of
any plane, and let a f e D c be the edgewise view of another plane.
The geometers draw rays through O cutting both these planes, and
treat the points of intersection of each ray with one plane as
representing the point of intersection of the same ray with the other
plane. Thus, e represents E, in the painter's way. D represents itself.
C is represented by c, which is further from the eye; and A is
represented by a which is on the other side of the eye. Such
generalisation is not bound down to sensuous images. Further,
according to this mode of representation every point on one plane
represents a point on the other, and every point on the latter is
represented by a point on the former. But how about the point f
which is in a direction from O parallel to the represented plane, and
how about the point B which is in a direction parallel to the
representing plane? Some will say that these are exceptions; but
modern mathematics does not allow exceptions which can be
annulled by generalisation. As a point moves from C to D and thence
to E and off toward infinity, the corresponding point on the other
plane moves from c to D and thence to e and toward f. But this
second point can pass through f to a; and when it is there the first
point has arrived at A. We therefore say that the first point has
passed through infinity, and that every line joins in to itself
somewhat like an oval. Geometers talk of the parts of lines at an
infinite distance as points. This is a kind of generalisation very
efficient in mathematics.

[Illustration]

Modern views of measurement have a philosophical aspect. There

is an indefinite number of systems of measuring along a line; thus, a
perspective representation of a scale on one line may be taken to
measure another, although of course such measurements will not
agree with what we call the distances of points on the latter line. To
establish a system of measurement on a line we must assign a
distinct number to each point of it, and for this purpose we shall
plainly have to suppose the numbers carried out into an infinite
number of places of decimals. These numbers must be ranged along
the line in unbroken sequence. Further, in order that such a scale of
numbers should be of any use, it must be capable of being shifted
into new positions, each number continuing to be attached to a
single distinct point. Now it is found that if this is true for
"imaginary" as well as for real points (an expression which I cannot
stop to elucidate), any such shifting will necessarily leave two
numbers attached to the same points as before. So that when the
scale is moved over the line by any continuous series of shiftings of
one kind, there are two points which no numbers on the scale can
ever reach, except the numbers fixed there. This pair of points, thus
unattainable in measurement, is called the Absolute. These two
points may be distinct and real, or they may coincide, or they may
be both imaginary. As an example of a linear quantity with a double
absolute we may take probability, which ranges from an unattainable
absolute certainty against a proposition to an equally unattainable
absolute certainty for it. A line, according to ordinary notions, we
have seen is a linear quantity where the two points at infinity
coincide. A velocity is another example. A train going with infinite
velocity from Chicago to New York would be at all the points on the
line at the very same instant, and if the time of transit were reduced
to less than nothing it would be moving in the other direction. An
angle is a familiar example of a mode of magnitude with no real
immeasurable values. One of the questions philosophy has to
consider is whether the development of the universe is like the
increase of an angle, so that it proceeds forever without tending
toward anything unattained, which I take to be the Epicurean view,
or whether the universe sprang from a chaos in the infinitely distant
past to tend toward something different in the infinitely distant
future, or whether the universe sprang from nothing in the past to
go on indefinitely toward a point in the infinitely distant future,
which, were it attained, would be the mere nothing from which it set
out.

The doctrine of the absolute applied to space comes to this, at

either—

First, space is, as Euclid teaches, both unlimited and

immeasurable, so that the infinitely distant parts of any plane seen
in perspective appear as a straight line, in which case the sum of the
three angles of a triangle amounts to 180°; or,
 Second, space is immeasurable but limited, so that the infinitely
distant parts of any plane seen in perspective appear as a circle,
beyond which all is blackness, and in this case the sum of the three
angles of a triangle is less than 180° by an amount proportional to
the area of the triangle; or,

Third, space is unlimited but finite, (like the surface of a sphere,)

so that it has no infinitely distant parts; but a finite journey along
any straight line would bring one back to his original position, and
looking off with an unobstructed view one would see the back of his
own head enormously magnified, in which case the sum of the three
angles of a triangle exceeds 180° by an amount proportional to the
area.

Which of these three hypotheses is true we know not. The largest

triangles we can measure are such as have the earth's orbit for
base, and the distance of a fixed star for altitude. The angular
magnitude resulting from subtracting the sum of the two angles at
the base of such a triangle from 180° is called the star's parallax.
The parallaxes of only about forty stars have been measured as yet.
Two of them come out negative, that of Arided (α Cygni), a star of
magnitude 1-1/2, which is -0."082, according to C. A. F. Peters, and
that of a star of magnitude 7-3/4, known as Piazzi III 422, which is
-0."045 according to R. S. Ball. But these negative parallaxes are
undoubtedly to be attributed to errors of observation; for the
probable error of such a determination is about ±0."075, and it
would be strange indeed if we were to be able to see, as it were,
more than half way round space, without being able to see stars
with larger negative parallaxes. Indeed, the very fact that of all the
parallaxes measured only two come out negative would be a strong
argument that the smallest parallaxes really amount to +0."1, were
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