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Intermediate Microeconomics 1st Edition Mochrie Solutions Manual instant download

The document provides information on various test banks and solutions manuals available for download, specifically focusing on 'Intermediate Microeconomics 1st Edition' by Mochrie. It includes links to additional resources for different editions and subjects in economics and accounting. The latter part of the document contains detailed solutions to specific questions related to microeconomic theory, particularly concerning trade and Pareto efficiency between two individuals, Liling and Maya.

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100% found this document useful (2 votes)
18 views

Intermediate Microeconomics 1st Edition Mochrie Solutions Manual instant download

The document provides information on various test banks and solutions manuals available for download, specifically focusing on 'Intermediate Microeconomics 1st Edition' by Mochrie. It includes links to additional resources for different editions and subjects in economics and accounting. The latter part of the document contains detailed solutions to specific questions related to microeconomic theory, particularly concerning trade and Pareto efficiency between two individuals, Liling and Maya.

Uploaded by

lestyvhai21
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Solutions Manual: Part V


Welfare
Summary answers to the ‘By yourself’ questions
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 20

X20.1 Given that the endowments represent Liling’s and Maya’s total wealth, explain why the
expressions on the left-hand side of Expression 20.2 cannot both be positive.
Were both expressions positive, then there would be a move up and to the right in the
diagram. Liling would consume more carrots and more beans; and Maya would consume
less of both. So, assuming that preferences are well-behaved, Liling would be better off and
Maya would be worse off, meaning that Maya would not agree to the new division.

X20.2 Define the marginal rate of substitution for Liling and Maya at the endowment, E. Explain
how the difference in values means that trade is possible.
For both Liling and Maya, the marginal rates of substitution are the slopes of the tangents to
their indifference curves. We see that Maya’s indifference curve is steeper than Liling’s, so
that she is willing to give up more carrots than Liling to acquire a set quantity of additional
beans. Liling and Maya could agree to any exchange rate : MRSL > - > MRSM.

X20.3 In Figure 20.2, the endowment is at the lower-right corner of the lens. Under what
conditions would the endowment be at the upper-left corner of the lens? What would be
the outcome of trade in this case?
We now require Liling’s indifference curve to be steeper than Maya’s, so that MRSM > - >
MRSL.

X20.4 Use Expression 20.2 to obtain an expression for the relative price of broad beans (the rate
at which Maya gives up consumption of carrots in order to increase consumption of broad
beans).
The relative price will be the ratio of the increase in consumption of broad beans to the
bLT  bLE
increase in consumption of carrots. We obtain    T .
cL  cLE

X20.5 Suppose that at the division, E, Liling and Maya were to have the same marginal rate of
substitution. Sketch an Edgeworth box showing this outcome. What do you conclude
about the possibility of exchange?
In the Edgeworth box, we begin by drawing a straight downward-sloping line that will be the
common tangent. We then draw two curves, both downward-sloping, with the one above
the line convex, and the one below the line concave. We draw these lines so that each has a
single point of tangency between each curve and the line; and so that the point of tangency
is common to both curves.
We note that there is no area defined by the intersection between the curves, and so there
are no divisions of the endowment where both Liling and Maya are better off than at the
point of tangency. This implies that there is no possibility of trade between Liling and Maya.

X20.6 How likely do you consider it to be that Liling would accept the division of goods at F?
It is possible, but we note that Liling is no better off than at E, so that she has no strong
reason to agree to the new division.

X20.7 Explain why division G is Pareto efficient, and discuss whether or not you consider it likely
that it will be the outcome of exchange.
G is Pareto efficient since the indifference curves through this division share a common
tangent. At this division, Maya is no better off than at the initial endowment, E, so it is
unlikely that she would agree to the division.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X20.8 The contract curve is sometimes defined as the portion of the Pareto set between F and G.
Why might this be a useful definition? [Hint: Consider peoples’ willingness to agree to any
division of the endowment.]
Between F and G, both Liling and Maya are better off than at the endowment E. Since all
points on the contract curve share a common tangent, there is no possibility of further Pareto
improvements. It is therefore possible that Liling and Maya might agree to any of these
divisions, with neither being able to propose an alternative division in which both would be
better off.

X20.9 Suppose that Maya and Liling consider broad beans and carrots to be perfect
complements, with their preferences represented by the utility function, U: U(bi, ci) =
min(bi, ci). The total quantities of broad beans and carrots in their total endowment are
equal.
a) Explain why, in any division in which bL = cL, their indifference curves just touch.
We know that with both Liling and Maya treating the goods as perfect complements, their
preferences across divisions can be expressed by a set of L-shaped indifference curves. For
Liling, the vertices are on the line bL = cL. On this line, bM = b – bL = c – cL = cM, so that the
vertices of Maya’s indifference curves also lie on this line. At every point on the line, bL = cL,
any downward-sloping line is a common tangent to the indifference curves that meet at this
point.

b) Suppose instead that Liling grows carrots and Maya grows broad beans. Using a diagram,
show that if Maya can determine the division of the endowment, she can take all of Liling’s
carrots and offer no broad beans in return.
With Maya growing broad beans, but taking all of Liling’s carrots, Liling is no worse off than
at the initial division, so that the Pareto efficiency condition is met by trade.

c) Again, using the diagram, show that it is possible for Maya and Liling to trade to any
division for which cL = bL.
From parts a) and b), we see that the Pareto set is represented in the Edgeworth box by the
line, OLOM, running from the bottom left to the top right corners (that is from the origin of
Liling’s measurement to the origin of Maya’s measurement); and all divisions in the Pareto
set are feasible in the sense that neither Liling nor Maya would be worse off after trade than
before. The whole of the line is the contract curve.

X20.10 Now suppose that Maya and Liling consider carrots and broad beans to be perfect
substitutes. However, while Maya would substitute 1 kg of broad beans for 1 kg of carrots,
Liling would swap 2 kg of broad bean for 1 kg of carrots.
a) Draw an Edgeworth box showing indifference curves, given that they wish to divide 12 kg
of carrots and 20 kg of broad beans, and that Maya starts with all of the carrots, and Liling
with all of the broad beans. On your diagram, indicate the region within which they might
trade.
We draw the Edgeworth box, measuring the endowment of broad beans on the horizontal
axis and the endowment of carrots on the vertical axis, so that the dimensions of the box are
20x12. We denote the bottom-left hand corner as OL, from which Liling’s consumption is
measured; and the top-right corner as OM, from which Maya’s consumption is measured.
Then the initial endowment, E, is located at the bottom-right corner of the box. For Liling, the
indifference curve through point E has the equation bL + 2cL = 20, while for Maya, it has
equation bM + cM = 12.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Liling’s indifference curve is a line meeting the left-hand edge of the box, (0, 10), while
Maya’s is a line meeting the top edge of the box at (8, 12). We see that Maya’s indifference
curve is steeper than Liling’s, so that the feasible set for trade is the area between them.

b) Assume instead that their initial endowments are (bLE, cLE) = (12, 6) and (bME, cME) = (8, 6).
Draw another Edgeworth box, and mark on it this endowment, E. Sketch the indifference
curves through the endowment, and indicate the region within which trade might occur.
In this case, the initial endowment, E, is located at the point (bLE, cLE) = (12, 6). For Liling, the
indifference curve through point E has the equation bL + 2cL = 24, while for Maya, it has
equation bM + cM = 14.
Liling’s indifference curve is a line meeting the top of the box at (0, 12), while Maya’s is a line
meeting the top edge of the box at (6, 12). As before, Maya’s indifference curve is steeper
than Liling’s, so that the feasible set for trade is the area between them.

c) What is the range of terms of trade which Maya and Liling might agree?
The terms of trade will be such that both Maya and Liling are better off after trade. We
define the relative price, , as the opportunity cost of beans, defined so that MRSM >  > -
MRSL; or so that -0.5 >  > - 1.

d) Under what conditions might Liling end up with all of the carrots?
This will happen if the exchange line is steep enough so that it passes through the top edge of
the box.

X20.11 Suppose that Maya and Liling have preferences represented by the utility function,
U: Ubi , ci   bi 3 ci 3 . The initial endowment, E: (bLE, cLE) = (90, 0) and (bME, cME) = (30, 120).
1 2

Assume that they agree to trade 1 kg of carrots for 2 kg of broad beans.


a) What is the opportunity cost of 1 kg of broad beans?
The opportunity cost,  = –0.5.

b) Write down expressions for their marginal utility functions and their (common) marginal
rate of substitution, MRS.
We obtain marginal utilities by partially differentiating U with respect to the quantity of each
of the goods in the consumption bundle.

  ; and marginal utility of carrots, MU =


2
U ci
 13
3
So marginal utility of beans, MUB = bi bi C


1
U bi
 23
3
c i ci

The marginal rate of substitution is (minus 1 times) the ratio of marginal utilities; MRSi =
 
2
1 ci 3
MU B 3 bi ci
   .
MU C
 
1
2 bi 3 2 bi
3 ci

c) Show that MRS = –0.5 whenever b = c. What do you conclude about the composition of
the most preferred, affordable consumption bundle?
If MRSi = -0.5, then 2cbi  21 , so ci = bi. We note that when bi = ci, Liling and Maya have the
i

same marginal rate of substitution; and note that for the total endowment (b, c) = (120, 120),
then if bL = cL, bM = 120 – bL = 120 – cL = cM; so that the conditions for Pareto efficiency are
satisfied when bL = cL; and the Pareto set consists of all allocations (bL, cL): bL = cL.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

d) Confirm that the division H: (bLH, cLH) = (30, 30) and (bMH, cMH) = (90, 90) is feasible, given
the terms of trade; and that Liling’s and Maya’s indifference curves through H both have
gradient  = –0.5.
To reach division H from the initial endowment, E, Liling gives up 60kg of beans, and acquires
30kg of carrots; Maya acquires 60kg of beans in exchange for 30kg of carrots. At division H,
the conditions for Pareto efficiency are satisfied, with beans being exchanged for carrots at
the agreed relative price.

e) Sketch an Edgeworth box showing the endowment point; the terms of trade line; the
indifference curves passing through the endowment point, E; and the indifference curves
passing through the final division, H.
In an Edgeworth box with dimensions 120x120, we measure the division of beans on the
horizontal axis, and division of carrots on the vertical, measuring the quantity available to
Liling of each from the bottom left corner. The initial endowment E: (90, 0) therefore lies on
the bottom edge of the box, three-quarters of the way from the left side to the right side of
the box. The terms of trade line starts from point E, and has slope -0.5, so that it passes
through point H(30, 30). At this final division, the indifference curves for Liling and Maya
(which are downward sloping and convex to their respective origins, approaching but never
touching the axes against which they are measured) both have gradient -0.5, so that the
terms of trade line forms a common tangent.

X20.12 In Figure 20.6, we suggest that Lukas and Michael will divide the endowment equally.
a) Confirm (from Expression 20.10) that Michael’s preferred bundle is half of the endowment
if the relative price,   bc .
We know that Michael’s optimal bundle bM*,cM *    c
2

, 2c . So with the relative price  = bc ,

the result follows. bM*,cM *  2 , 2


b c
 
b) Demonstrate that when the relative price,   bc , Lukas’s most preferred affordable
bundle, b*,c *  2 , 2 .
b c
 
c cL c
If the relative price  = b, then for Lukas, MRSL = bL
= b. Then cMb = bMc; and for the
c b  bL  bM
feasibility constraint to be satisfied, b bL + cL = c. Then cL = b
c b
c  2c ; and it is easy to
b
confirm that bL = 2 .

c) Explain why we can write Lukas’s problem as having two constraints:


bc 
1
c 1
max
b L ,c L
(bL cL)½: cL = b (b - bL) and [(b – bL)(c – cL)]½ = 2
2
. Form the Lagrangean, ,
required to solve the problem.
Lukas’s problem has the two constraints of affordability and feasibility. It has to be possible
for Lukas and Michael to trade to the equilibrium. Michael has to be willing to accept the
outcome of the trade, and so must be no worse off than at his optimum.
We write the Lagrangean,   bLcL   bc  bcL  cbL   
0.5
 bc
1
2
0.5

b  bL c  cL 0.5 .

d) By obtaining the first-order conditions, confirm that cL *  2 .


c

The first-order conditions for an optimum can be written as



bL  0 .5  
c L 0.5
bL   
c c
  c  0 .5  b  bLL 
0 .5
 0.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016


c L  0 .5  
bL 0 .5
cL 
  b  0 .5  c  cLL 
bb 

0 .5
 0.


 bcbcL cbL  0.


 12 bc 0.5  b  bL c  cL 0.5  0.
We see from the last two expressions that (b – bL)c = bcL, so we can repeat the argument.
Since
c – cL =
c
b
b L , we can rewrite the last condition as 4bbL  b bL bc , so that 4(b – bL)bL = b2.
c
 
b
This simplifies to (b – 2bL)2 = 0, so that bL = 2 . The result then follows by substitution.

X20.13 Assume that Rachel’s maximization problem can be written as:


max
bR ,cR
U bR , cR   bR cR1  :  bRE  bR  cRE  cR  0
a) By forming the Lagrangean or otherwise, confirm that Rachel’s most preferred, affordable
1 
bundle (bR*, cR*) has the characteristic: bR *   c R * .
We write the Lagrangean, :  = bRcR1 -  + [(bRE – bR) + (cRE – cR)]
We obtain first-order conditions for the maximum:

b R
  cR 1  
bR
   0 ; 
c R
 1         0 ; and    bRE bR cRE cR 0
bR 
cR

Taking the first two, we see that 



     1     . The result follows immediately
cR 1  
bR
bR 
cR

from cross-multiplying terms.

b) Hence or otherwise, demonstrate that Rachel’s most preferred affordable bundle is


b R *, c R *  :
bR *, c R *     b R
E

cR E

, 1   b R
E
 cRE 
1
We write cR   bR , and since (bRE – bR) + (cRE – cR) = 0, we can write
1 b 
1 
 R

b  bRE
 R
 cRE ; and the result follows immediately.

c) Show that as the relative price, , increases, cR increases, but bR decreases.


By partial differentiation, we see that bR    c R2  0 , but that cR  1   bR E  0
E

d) Write an expression for cR* in terms of bR*. (This is the equation of Rachel’s price offer
curve.)
We see that it is possible to extract a common factor, bRE + cR from the expressions for bR*
1 
and cR*. This gives us cR* = 
bR * .

X20.14 Assume that Rachel continues to solve the problem in X20.13, but with the expenditure
share parameter, a  3 , and initial endowments (bRE, cRE) = (bSE, cSE) = (12, 12).
1

a) Obtain an expression for Rachel’s optimal consumption bundle in terms of the relative
price, .
We apply the expressions obtained from X20.13: bR *, c R *    bR E  c R , 1    bR E  c R E  .
E
  
Then bR*,cR *   12 ,
1
3
12

2
3
12  12 41 1 ,81   .
b) Show that if  > 0.5, Rachel will want to trade some of her broad beans for more carrots.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

If  = ½, it is easy to confirm that (bR*, cR*) = (12, 12) = (bRE, cRE), so that Rachel can do no
better than by consuming her endowment. Given that bR* is decreasing in , and that cR* is
increasing in , it follows that if  > 0.5, then Rachel will give away some beans, and demand
more carrots.

c) Evaluate the expression in (a) for Rachel’s optimal consumption bundle for relative prices
 = 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, and 4. Are all of these choices feasible?
 0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2 4
bR* 36 20 12 8 6 5
cR* 9 10 12 16 24 40
We see that when the relative price,  = 2, cR* = 24, so that Rachel wishes to consume all of
the carrots. With cR* increasing in , this is the maximum possible value of the relative
price; for higher prices, the price offer curve will lie outside the box.
Although it is not shown in the table, we note that when  = 0.2, bR* = 24. In this case,
Rachel wishes to consume all of the beans in the endowment and, as before, with bR*
decreasing in , this is the minimum possible value of the relative price; for lower prices, the
price offer curve will lie outside the box.

d) Sketch Rachel’s price offer curve.


Plotting these points in an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, we see that Rachel’s price
offer curve is downward sloping and convex to OR. It intersects the top edge of the box at
the division (bR, cR) = (6, 24), where MRS = -2, passes through the division (12, 12), and
intersects the right edge of the box at the division (24, 6), where MRS = -0.2.
X20.15 Repeat X20.14 but for Sonja, whose utility function we write as UbS , cS   bS 3 cS 3 .
2 1

We are able to write Sonja’s preferred division, given the relative price  as (bS*, cS*):
   
bS *, c S *   1    bR E  cR ,  bR E  c R E  , which with the given parameterization becomes
E

bS*,cS *  23 12  12 , 13 12  12 81 1 , 41  .


Replicating the table of preferred consumption bundles from X20.14:
 0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2 4
bS* 72 40 24 16 12 10
cS* 4.5 5 6 8 12 20
We note that it would not be feasible for the value of  to be very small: from the table, and
knowing that Sonja’s demand for beans in her preferred division, bS* is decreasing in the
relative price, , we require bS*  0.5. Although we have not shown this in the table, it is
straightforward to show that if  > 5, then cS* > 24, so that Sonja would then demand more
than the total endowment of carrots.

X20.16 Given the endowments and utility function in X20.14 and X20.15, confirm that at the
division J: (bRJ, cRJ) = (8, 16); (bsJ, csJ) = (16, 8) with relative price  = 1, Rachel and Sonja
maximize their utilities and both markets clear.
We see that by adding up the demands that both markets clear, the demand for both beans
and carrots equals the total endowment.

X20.17 Suppose that the relative price increases, so that  = 2. Find Rachel’s and Sonja’s most
preferred, feasible consumption bundles. Explain why these are not consistent with an
equilibrium division.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

When  = 2, (bR*, cR*) = (6, 24); and (bS*, cS*) = (12, 12). The total demand for carrots is 36,
so that there is excess demand for them; and the total demand for beans is 18, so that there
is excess supply.

X20.18 Repeat X20.17, but with the relative price decreasing so that  = 0.5. Without carrying out
any further calculations, characterize the nature of the outcome for  = 0.5.
We have seen that when the relative price is above the market clearing price, there is excess
demand for carrots, and excess supply of beans. We therefore expect that for a relative price
less than the market clearing price, there will be excess supply of carrots and excess demand
for beans.
[Check: When  = 0.5, (bR*, cR*) = (12, 12); and (bS*, cS*) = (24, 6). The total demand for
carrots is 18, so that there is excess supply of them; and the total demand for beans is 36, so
that there is excess demand.]

X20.19 Continuing to use the endowments and utility functions in X20.14 and X20.15, suppose
that Rachel initially proposes  = 2.
a) Confirm that Sonja will not wish to trade, but that Rachel would wish to acquire Sonja’s
endowment of carrots.
This follows directly from calculations that we have completed already. Sonja demands her
initial endowment, while Rachel demands the bundle (bR, cR) = (6, 24), which includes the
total endowment of carrots.

b) Calculate the excess demand for carrots and the excess supply of broad beans.
Again, from previous calculations, we see that there is an excess demand for carrots, cR + cS -
24 = 12 and excess supply of beans, 24 – (bR + bS) = 6.

c) Repeat parts (a) and (b), assuming firstly that Sonja proposes a revised relative price,  =
1.5, and then that Rachel proposes a further revision,  = 1.25.
We present the results in a table, in which the first four columns show Rachel and Sonja’s
demands for beans and carrots, and the next two show the excess demand for beans and
carrots.
 bR* bS* cR* cS* bX cX bX + cX
2 6 12 24 12 -6 12 0
20 40
1.5 3 3
20 10 -4 6 0
1.25 7.2 14.4 18 9 -2.4 3 0
1 8 16 16 8 0 0 0
We note that as the relative price falls towards the market clearing price, there is a reduction
in the excess supply of beans and the excess demand for carrots.

X20.20 To prove some important results in general equilibrium theory, it is often convenient to
rely upon Walras’ Law: that the sum of values of excess demand across markets must be
equal to zero.
a) Confirm that Walras’ Law is satisfied in X20.19, so that at each relative price, the value of
the excess demand for carrots is also the value of the excess supply of broad beans.
This is straightforward: we multiply the excess demand for beans by the relative price, and
add the excess demand for carrots. In all cases in the table in X20.19, we see that this
condition is satisfied.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

b) Given that Rachel and Sonja share a single feasibility constraint, use an Edgeworth box to
demonstrate that if the market for carrots clears, the market for broad beans must also
clear.
Suppose otherwise. Then it would be possible to draw an Edgeworth box, with dimensions
representing the endowment of beans and carrots, and Rachel’s share of the endowment in
any division measured from the bottom left corner (with the distance from the left edge
representing the quantity of beans, and the distance from the bottom the quantity of carrots
in her consumption bundle), with the feasibility constraint shown as a downward sloping
straight line, passing through the endowment. There are two points shown on the feasibility
constraint, one Rachel’s preferred division, and the other Sonja’s preferred division, where
the quantity of carrots available to Rachel would be the same in both, but the quantity of
beans would be different. This contradicts the assumption that the line has a negative
gradient, since as the quantity of beans increases, the quantity of carrots in the division must
decrease.

c) Show that if there is a Walrasian equilibrium, the division must also be Pareto-efficient.
Continuing to think about the Edgeworth box analysis, if there is a Walrasian equilibrium
then the indifference curves passing through that division share a common tangent, and so
there is no possibility of further, mutually beneficial trade for Rachel and Sonja: if Rachel
increases her utility, it will be at some cost to Sonja (and vice versa). This division is therefore
Pareto-efficient.

X20.21 Using the results of X20.16, explain why we can be certain that the Walrasian equilibrium
J1 will be achieved through an exchange that begins from any division on the line bR + cR =
24.
In X20.16, we have seen that it is possible to trade to the equilibrium division (bR*, cR*, bS*,
cS*) = (8, 16, 16, 8) from a single point on this line. It must therefore be possible to reach this
division from any point on this line.

X20.22 Assume that Rachel and Sonja have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption
bundles containing broad beans and carrots:
UbR ,cR   bR 3 cR 3 ; UbS ,cS   bS 3 cS 3
1 2 1 2

with a total of 24 kg of both goods in every division.


a) By partial differentiation, or otherwise, show that if Sonja has to meet a payoff target VS :
VS  (12), Rachel will propose a division in which bR = cR.
We write the Lagrangean, , for the constrained optimization as:
1 2

bR ,cR ,   bR 3 cR 3   24 bR  3 24 cR 3  12
1 2

Partially differentiating with respect to bR and cR, we obtain the first-order conditions:

     0 , so that      ; and
2 2 2 2
 cR  24 cR cR 24 bR
 13
3 3 3 3
bR bR 3 24 bR bR 24 cR

     0 , so that      . Then since the right hand side of these


1 1 1 1
 bR 2 24 bR bR 24 cR
 23
3 3 3 3
cR cR 3 24  cR cR 24 bR
expressions must be equal, (24 – cR)bR = cR(24 – bR), and bR = cR.

b) Confirm that whatever division Rachel proposes, with bR = cR, her marginal rate of
U R
b R
substitution,  U R   0.5 .
c R
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

For Rachel, marginal rate of substitution, MRS : MRS(bR, cR) =


 
2
U 1 cR 3
MU B 3 bR cR
 b R ; and so the result follows directly, given bR = cR.
MU C    
 
U 1
c R 2 bR 3 2 bR
3 cR

c) Hence confirm that if Sonja insists on receiving a payoff VS, she will just meet that target if
the initial endowment lies on the line bR  2 c R  36 .
We require Sonja to obtain payoff VS = 12, and confirm that where Rachel proposes the
1 2
division (bS, cS) = (24 – bR, 24 – cR) = (12, 12), Sonja obtains payoff VS = 12 3 .12 3 = 12; so Sonja
just meets her target. We also note that for Sonja, MRSS(12, 12) = -½, since she and Rachel
have the same utility function; so when they divide the allocation equally, Sonja is just able to
achieve her target payoff while Rachel maximizes her utility subject to that constraint.
In terms of an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, reflecting the total endowment, and
with Rachel’s allocation of beans measured along the bottom edge from the left hand corner,
and her allocation of carrots measured along the left edge, we draw in the indifference
curves passing through the division K: (bR. cR; bS, cS) = (12, 12; 12, 12) as convex curves, which
have a common tangent at K, with gradient -0.5. We can therefore write the equation of the
tangent as (cR – 12) = -0.5(bR – 12), so that bR + 2cR = 36.

X20.23 Rachel and Sonja seek to maximize their utilities, which have the same form as in X20.22.
Suppose that Sonja has a utility target VS = 10. Rachel’s endowment ER = (18, 12); Sonja’s
endowment ES = (6, 12). Sketch a diagram showing (1) the initial endowment; (2) the
Pareto set; (3) the relative price at which they will trade; and (4) the indifference curves
(for Rachel only) at the initial endowment and after trade.
We draw here on what we have already found out about this situation in X20.22. Drawing
an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, reflecting the total endowment, and with Rachel’s
allocation of beans measured along the bottom edge from the left hand corner, and her
allocation of carrots measured along the left edge, we denote the endowment E: (bRE, cRE; bSE,
cSE) = (18, 12; 6, 12) as a point ¾ of the distance from the left to the right edges and midway
between the top and the bottom edges. We know that from this endowment, given the
relative price  = -0.5, Rachel and Sonja will agree to trade to a division K1: (bR. cR; bS, cS)
where bR = cR and bS = cS, with Rachel giving up 2kg of beans for every 1kg of carrots that she
obtains from Sonja. This implies that Rachel will trade 4kg of beans for 2kg of Sonja’s
carrots; Sonja ends up with 10kg of beans and carrots, and Rachel ends up with 14kg of each.
Rachel ends up better off because she has a larger proportion (in terms of value) of the
endowment.

X20.24 Confirm that irrespective of her initial endowment, when Rachel’s price offer curve
intersects the Pareto set, bR = cR, her marginal rate of substitution, MRSR = -0.5.
This follows directly from the argument of X20.22b).

X20.25 What might be the policy implications of this capacity of an exchange economy to reach a
competitive equilibrium from any initial division of endowments?
This suggests that if we are concerned about the outcome, it is possible to cause some
variation in it by changing the initial endowment, rather than prices within the economy.
This suggests that lump-sum taxes might be preferable to proportional taxes based on
activity, which will change prices.

X20.26 Using Figure 20.12, confirm that compared with the competitive equilibrium, J*, Rachel
secures a larger share of the final division and so a higher utility when she is able to choose
the relative price *.
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For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We note that Rachel’s indifference curve, ICRM intersects the Pareto set above and to the right
of the intersection of Sonja’s price offer curve, PS, with the Pareto set. The competitive
equilibrium would occur at the latter intersection, so Rachel must be better off when able to
choose the price.

X20.27 We can write Rachel’s problem formally as:


max

UR b b * bS S
E

,cS E ,  ,c  cS * bS E ,cS E ,  , 
wherebS *,cS * : bmax U  bS ,cS  : bS  cS  bS E  cS E
,c S S S

a) Set out Rachel’s problem for the now familiar case in which the endowment of 24 kg of
broad beans and 24 kg of carrots is divided equally between them, when Rachel’s utility
function UR bR ,cR   bR 3 cR 3 , and Sonja’s utility function US bS , cS   bS 3 c S 3 .
1 2 2 1

Sonja’s constraint can be simplified substantially in this case, since bSE = cSE = 12. She wishes
to maximize her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 12(1 + ). We rewrite Rachel’s
problem as
max

UR 24 bS *  ,24 cS *  , wherebS*,cS * : bmax,c US  bS ,cS  : bS  cS  121   . S S

b) Solve Sonja’s maximization problem, defining her demands bS and cS in terms of the
relative price, . Note: you can use the expressions for demands obtained in Chapter 9, to
simplify calculations.
We write the Lagrangean, , for the constrained optimization as:
bS ,cS ,  bS 3 cS 3  121    bS  cS` 
2 1

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

  0 ,and    0 , so that        . From the latter


1 2 1 2
 cS  bS 2 cS 1 bS
 23  13
3 3 3 3
bS bS cS cS 3 bS 3 cS
equality, 2cS = bS.
In addition, in the last first-order condition,


 121   bS cS` 0 , substituting for
bS, 12(1 + ) = 3cS, so that we obtain bS *, c S *   8   , 41   .
1 

c) Hence, solve Rachel’s maximization problem, defining the relative price, M, so that Rachel
maximizes her utility.
From b), we are able to simplify Rachel’s problem further:
max

UR 82  ,45    . This
1

becomes
max
U 
 R
82   45    , and on differentiating, we obtain the first-order
1

1
3
2
3

condition:
dUR
d
  
 38 2 8 2  1
 23
45 
2
3
   45
 83 8 2  1
1
3  13
0 .
This simplifies to 1
2
45    82  1 , so that 5 -  = 42 - 2, and 42 -  - 5 = 0. Applying
1  81
the quadratic formula, we obtain   8
 1.25 .

d) Compare the outcome in parts (b) and (c) with the Walrasian equilibrium when prices are
set competitively, confirming that with Rachel able to set the relative price, it is now
higher, that Rachel’s share of the endowment (and so her payoff) has increased, but that
Sonja is worse off. Confirm that the monopoly outcome is not Pareto optimal.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

From X20.16, we know that the competitive equilibrium division is J1: (bR*, cR*; bS*, cS*) =
(8, 16; 16, 8), with the competitive equilibrium price, * = 1. Here we see that Rachel
chooses a relative price  = 1.25, which is greater than in equilibrium. We do not perform all
of the calculations here, but substituting back into the solution of part b), we see that Sonja
chooses the bundle (bS, cS) = (14.4, 9), so that Rachel is able to consume the bundle (9.6, 15).
There is less trade than we would expect there to be in the Pareto efficient outcome, and we
see for Rachel MRS(9.6, 15)  1.25, so that the requirement MRSR = MRSS =  is not satisfied.

X20.28 Repeat X20.27, but replacing the utility functions and endowments:
a) Rachel: utility, UR bR ,cR  bR 3 cR 3 , endowment ER = (18, 12);
1 2

Sonja: utility, US bS ,c S   bS 3 c S 3 , endowment ES = (6, 12).


1 2

Sonja’s constraint can again be simplified, given the endowments. She wishes to maximize
her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 6(2 + ). We rewrite Rachel’s problem as
24 bS *   24cS *   , wherebS *,cS * : bmax b 3 c 3 : bS  cS 62    .
1 2 1 2
max 3 3
 ,c S S
S S

We write the Lagrangean, , for Sonja’s constrained optimization as:


bS ,cS ,   bS 3 cS 3  62     bS  cS` 
1 2

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

   0 ,and    0, so that        . From the latter


2 1 2 1
 cS  bS 1 cS 2 bS
bS  13 bS
3
cS  23 cS
3
3 bS
3
3 cS
3

equality,
cS = 2bS.
In addition, in the last first-order condition,   6 2 bS cS`

  0 , substituting for c ,
S

6(2 + ) = 3bS, so that we obtain bS *,c S *   2 1  2 , 42    .   

We now return to Rachel’s problem, which we simplify as:


max

2421   24 42    ,
2

1
3
2
3

or
max

22  16 4  . On differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition:
4

1
3
2
3

dUR
d 
 342 22 4 
23
164
2
3  
 83 22 4 3 1643 0 .
1 1

This simplifies to 1
2
4   11  2 , so that 4 -  = 112 - 2, and 112 -  - 4 = 0. Applying

the quadratic formula, we obtain   1  22177  0.60 .

b) Rachel: utility, UR bR ,cR   bR 2 cR 2 , endowment ER = (24, 0);


1 1

Sonja: utility, US bS , cS   bS 2 c S 2 , endowment ES = (0, 24).


1 1

Sonja’s constraint can again be simplified, given the endowments. She wishes to maximize
her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 24. Note that since Sonja has no
endowment of good B, the value of her endowment is constant, and does not depend on the
relative price that Rachel chooses. We rewrite Rachel’s problem as
24 bS *   24 cS *   , wherebS *,cS * : bmax
1 1 1 1
max

2 2 b 2 c 2 : bS  cS  24 .
,c S S
S S
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We write the Lagrangean, , for Sonja’s constrained optimization as:


bS ,cS ,   bS 2 cS 2  24  bS  cS` 
1 1

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

   0 ,and    0, so that        . From the latter


1 1 1 1
cS bS 1 cS 1 bS

bS  12 bS
2 
cS  12 cS
2
2 bS
2
2 cS
2

equality,
cS = bS.

In addition, in the last first-order condition,   24bS cS`

0 , substituting for b , S

24 =2cS, so that we obtain bS *, c S *   12


 ,12 .  

We now return to Rachel’s problem, which we simplify as:


max

24  12 , or
12

1
2
1
2
max

 .
12 2  1
1
2

On differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition:


dUR
d  
 62 2 1
12
 1.5 26 10.5 0 . This is
a rather complicated expression, but we can show that it can only be evaluated for value of 
> 0.5, and that the derivative is decreasing in , but always positive, so that Rachel will set as
large a value as possible. As   , (bS*, cS*)  (0, 12). Rachel takes half of Sonja’s
endowment, offering as little as possible in return. Given the form of the utility functions,
and the extent of Rachel’s monopoly power, this should seem intuitively reasonable
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 21

X21.1 Suppose Robinson has a diminishing marginal product of labour, while he requires an
increasing rate of compensation for his labour, on the basis that his preferences over
combinations of leisure time and fish are well behaved.
a) Sketch a diagram representing the total quantity of fish that Robinson can catch (as a
function of labour time); and (at least) three separate indifference curves representing
levels of preference over combinations of labour time and fish, one of which just touches
the total quantity curve.
Drawing a diagram with Robinson’s hours of work measured on the horizontal axis and the
number of fish that he catches measured on the vertical axis, we draw an upward-sloping
concave curve that starts from the origin. This output curve represents the total quantity of
fish that Robinson catches. We also draw three upward-sloping convex curves, which begin
from some point on the vertical axis, and one of which is drawn so that there is some point of
common tangency between this curve and the output curve. These convex curves are
effectively indifference curves, drawn on the basis that Robinson trades off effort against
catching fish.

b) Define the agreed wage w as the number of fish that Mr Crusoe gives Robinson per hour of
labour time. Assume that Mr Crusoe will also pay Robinson a retainer – a quantity of fish,
F0 = F(0), in addition to the wage paid for fishing. Sketch straight lines on your diagram
showing the minimum wage that Robinson must be offered to reach each of the three
indifference curves. Decide whether or not the implied production plans are feasible.
We assume here that Robinson is able to choose the number of hours of labour, L, that he
works. He receives total payment W = F0 + wL. For him to be able to reach any particular
indifference curve, we have to construct the payment so that there is a point of tangency
between the indifference curve and the value of the payment schedule.
For feasibility, F0 + wL  F(L), where F(L) is the quantity caught given effort. Each production
plan will be feasible if at the planned hours of effort, the number of fish caught is large
enough for him to reach the desired utility target.

c) On a separate diagram, show that the optimal outcome has the characteristics that:
i. the marginal rate of substitution of fish for labour time is equal to the marginal
product of labour time, and also the agreed exchange rate for fish for additional
effort (the wage);
This is essentially Figure 21.1. We draw a single payoff curve, which shares a
common tangent with the output curve. The slope of the common tangent is the
wage rate that Mr Crusoe offers.

ii. the total compensation which Mr Crusoe offers Robinson is the whole catch of fish;
We achieve this by Mr Crusoe making two transfers – a fixed rate transfer F0 plus the
transfer equal to the payment for the time spent working.

iii. Mr Crusoe maximizes profit by just breaking even; and


The number of fish that Mr Crusoe has to give Robinson will be equal to the number
caught. He cannot give Robinson fewer, or Robinson will reduce his effort.

iv. Robinson maximizes utility given the production constraint.


This follows directly from the satisfaction of the first-order conditions.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X21.2 If the bakery and the creamery operate in perfectly competitive markets, why might they
decide not to use their founders’ endowments of labour and capital?
We have developed a standard model in which all firms in a perfectly competitive market are
the same size, at least in the long run. It would therefore be quite surprising were the
founders’ endowments to be appropriate to that scale of business. This merely relates to the
quantity of factors. If we were to allow for some degree of differentiation in factors, it might
be that other sources of capital and labour would be more efficient than the founders’
endowments.

X21.3 Suppose that Richard concludes that he could run the bakery more efficiently with less
capital and more labour, while Seth would prefer to hire more capital and less labour. How
might they be able to trade their endowments so that both firms can increase their
output?
This could be done through the bakery hiring Seth as a worker (on a part-time basis), or even
through the creamery seconding Seth to the bakery (from time to time). In the same way,
Seth might borrow money to finance the purchase of assets either directly from Richard, or
else the creamery might borrow the money from the bakery.

X21.4 Suppose that the bakery has a production function bKB ,LB   KB 3 LB 3 , while the creamery
1 2

has production function cKC ,LC   KC 3 LC 3 . Set out the firms’ production problems where
2 1

the total endowment, (K, L), is divided equally between them, and obtain the Pareto-
efficient outcomes.
For the bakery, the problem is to maximize b = KB 3 LB 3 :wK KB  K2 wL LB  2L  0 . The
1
   
2

: wK KC  K2  wL LC  2L  0 .
2 1
creamery’s problem is to maximize c = KC LC 3 3

Writing the Lagrangean for both of these problems separately, we have


(KB, LB, ) = KB 3 LB 3  wK K2  wL 2L  wK KB  wLLB  , from which we derive the first-order
1 2

  w 0 ; and
2

 13
LB 3
 
1
conditions: KB KB K

 LB  2
3
KB
LB
3
  w L  0 . Rewriting these conditions as

    , we see that wLLB = 2wKKB; and taking into account the third of the first-
2 1
LB KB
  3w1 K KB
3
 3w2 L LB
3

order conditions, 

wK K2  wL 2L  wK KB  wLLB   0 , we substitute to obtain
3wKKB  21 wKK wLL and 3w L LB  w K K  w L L .
We omit the calculations for the creamery, but they are very similar, and recalling that we
expect, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, that the factor shares of expenditure will
be proportional to indices in the production function, we obtain the result 3w K K C  w K K  w L L
and 3wLLC  2 wKK wLL .
1

Writing the value of the endowment as V = wKK + wLL, it follows that (KB, LB) =  v
6wK

, 3wv ; and
 
L

v
that (KC, LC) = 3wK
, 6wv . We note that we start off with both firms sharing the endowments
L

exactly equally, so that each firm’s endowments consist of half of the capital and half of the
labour; or of half of the total value of the assets in the endowment.

X21.5 Repeat X21.4, but replacing the production functions and endowments:
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The noise did not stop. Sussh-sussh-sussh-sussh. It seemed
farther away now, up near the bow and the figurehead. It was stilled
for a moment and then it began again, near the captain’s cabin.
They heard a faint scratching, as though something had slid along
the floor somewhere, and then again the sussh-sussh growing
fainter.

“Come on,” Jo spoke hoarsely through pale tight lips. “Now’s our
chance to get off.”

The doughty band ran in full retreat to the side of the ship. Jo
swung each of them overside in his strong arms and he was the last
to leave the wreck. He dropped beside them in the sand.

None of them stopped to look up into the face of the figurehead


that towered over them as they ran by. With wings of the wind in
their feet they sped up the meadow toward the lights where their
suppers were waiting for them.

At supper Mrs. Seymour noticed Helen’s pale tired face. She had
grown to expect a certain sort of tiredness in all of the children at
night, and this was very different. She looked from one to another of
them.

“How did you like playing on the ship?” she asked casually.

“How did you know that we were there?” asked Ann.

“I saw you climbing up and once in a while I saw you on deck,”


explained Mrs. Seymour.

To Ann there was something very reassuring in the thought that


all the time they had been on the schooner their mother had been
keeping an eye on them; they had been perfectly safe, even when
Ann was feeling nervous and fidgety and wanting to look over her
shoulder. That was that, thought Ann, “And I’ll never let myself feel
the least bit afraid again, when I am on the wreck.”
She could not know that Mrs. Seymour had spent an anxious
afternoon. She trusted her husband’s judgment, but sometimes
mothers know things without being told, while fathers have to hear
reasonable explanations before they can understand the very same
things that mothers have known by instinct.

“We had such a lot of fun on the wreck, mother,” said Ann.

“Yes,” said Helen pluckily, “we had lots of fun. You won’t tell us not
to go there, will you, mother? Please!”

Ben looked at both the girls as if he wished to remind them of the


band’s pledge of secrecy. But he need not have worried. Ann’s
determination to solve the mystery unaided by the help of older
people was even stouter than his, and Helen had always proved a
trustworthy young thing who never gave a secret away.

Ann knew that her mother wanted to hear more about the
afternoon; she must explain a part of what they were doing. “The
band has taken an oath, a strict oath to keep secret everything
connected with the wreck—you’ll understand, won’t you, that is why
we can’t talk about it more? If you ask us to tell you, of course we
will, but we are planning a surprise.”

“I don’t think you need to worry about the ship, Emily,” said Mr.
Seymour. “Helen played too hard to-day, that’s all that is wrong. To-
morrow she will be as brown and rosy as ever.”

So Mrs. Seymour said nothing more and the whole family talked
about other things.

Later in the evening Jo came over and the band gathered around
the fire in the living room for a conference while Mr. and Mrs.
Seymour read in the kitchen.

“What do you suppose it was that we heard?” Ben asked in a


whisper; sometimes his mother had been known to hear more than
she should. Not that the band wished to deceive, but they had
started on an exciting adventure and they meant to put it through
alone.

“I know it was not made by ghosts,” asserted Ann. “Nor by that


wicked demon, either. He’s nailed too tight to the bow.”

“I don’t believe that I want to go on the wreck again to-morrow,”


said Helen. “It makes me feel too tired.”

“We won’t go on again, not any of us,” Jo said. “I’ve been thinking
over the situation while I had my supper. We’ll keep a sharp lookout
for the man who built that fire; sort of hang around the woods, we
will, and watch the ship, too, but from the outside. If anybody or
anything climbs over the side we’re bound to see it.”

“I’m going to watch for that lantern,” said Ann.

Jo nodded wisely. “If we can find out who it is that carries the
lantern we shall know what made the noise; that’s how it looks to
me.”
CHAPTER VI

GOING LOBSTERING

“Hist-sst! Ann! Wake up!”

It was Ben’s voice that woke Ann, and his hand on her shoulder.
She thought it was the middle of the night, it was so dark, and her
second thought was of the wreck. Had anything happened there?
They had watched for days and never seen a sign of life on it.

“Jo just called me,” whispered Ben. “He wants to know whether
we would like to go after lobsters with him. He says it is going to be
a fine day and not too rough for landlubbers like us.”

Would she like to go? Well, rather! Jo had promised that he would
take them some fine day when the swell on the water was not too
heavy. The Baileys, either Jo or his father, made a daily trip out
through their lobster string, which was set beyond the pond rocks
and Douglas Head in the wide expanse of the sea. Jo had decided
that Helen had better not go as she was still so frail that if she grew
dizzy and ill out there probably she would have to go to bed for the
rest of the day. And as she would be grief-stricken if she knew that
she was being left behind the others arranged to go some day
without letting her know anything about it.

Ann’s room was just light enough for her to see her way without
lighting a lamp. She had not realized that the night faded so slowly
just before the sun rose, for she never had been up so early in all
her life. The small clock on the chest of drawers pointed to half past
one. She could hear Ben moving about in his room, scurrying into
his clothes with a sound like the little scramblings of a squirrel.
They found Jo waiting for them by the kitchen steps with a lighted
lantern in his hand.

“Probably we won’t need this after we get across the meadow and
strike the road,” explained Jo, “but now it will be easier going with a
light to shine and show up the bumps. Dawn is coming pretty fast
now.”

He struck off down the sloping meadow, going across it diagonally


in such a way as to give the wreck a wide berth. Ann realized that
he deliberately chose the rougher ground of the field in preference
to walking along the road, merely because of that ship waiting to
draw their thoughts into her shadows. Ann had no desire to peer
into the grinning face of the demon in the half-light of the pale
dawn. She still had a vivid recollection of its leer the first time she
had seen it in the gathering shadows of dusk. And dawn is exactly
like the dusk in its power to make things look different from the way
they really are.

“I’m glad we’re not going past the boat,” Ben murmured heartily in
her ear, and she nodded in sympathy.

The cove lay at the mouth of the swamp river and was only a
short walk from the road at the end of the meadow. Jo swung into a
swift pace as waiting for Ben and Ann had made him later than
usual. He always timed himself with the sunrise and should have his
dory in the water and well started before the sun hopped up over
the horizon. The others kept beside him only by running now and
then with short quick steps, and when they caught him Jo would
spurt ahead and the race would start again.

“Ben Seymour couldn’t have paced this,” Ben cried breathlessly.


“But Allan-a-Dale can. Chasing bucks in the wood is fine for
strengthening the wind.”

It was true. In the past few weeks Ben had filled out considerably
and he had grown an inch as well. Ann looked down at her own
strong brown lean hands; they had changed since she first
undertook to handle a hoe. The healed blisters still showed on her
palms but they had long ago ceased to hurt. And so the three of
them frisked away in the early dawn like three young colts turned
loose in the meadows.

The gray shacks of the fishermen, clustered at the mouth of the


river, seemed not much larger near at hand than they looked from
the bluff. They all were built with only one story, the shingled roofs
coming almost down to the ground on either side. Small square
doors led into the dark interiors and the windows were nothing but
little openings cut in the walls.

A narrow winding lane led from the dirt road down through the
ravine bordered by thick brush and the same variety of dark pines
that stood about the swamp pond above. After the track reached the
pebbly beach it was paved with crushed clamshells that glistened in
the early light like a pale ribbon over the dark oval pebbles.

As soon as the lane met the shacks it twined gracefully in and out
among them all, so that although the shacks seemed from a
distance to stand together, pressed up in a heap, the lane managed
to come directly to the door of each one of them. Suddenly from a
regular workaday world Ann felt that she had been transplanted into
a tiny village out of some fairy tale, whose inhabitants were yellow
gnomes with big sou’wester hats pulled over their heads. Under the
reversed brim of each gnome’s yellow oiled hat a pair of keen blue
eyes, laughing as Fred Bailey’s eyes laughed, peered out at the
children. Every face was brown, seamed, and leathery. Always a
small stubbed pipe belched clouds of smoke about each lobsterman’s
head. All the men were built alike, square and solid, and they all
wore yellow.

“How do you tell them apart?” Ann asked Jo.


“Tell them apart?” Jo echoed Ann’s question; it sounded so foolish
to him that he barely took the trouble to make any answer. “Why,
I’ve known them since I was a baby in long clothes. Why shouldn’t I
be able to tell them apart?”

Then, seeing that she was actually puzzled, he stopped teasing


and pointed them out to her; she had seen them all before.

“I do suppose,” he said, “that in the dim light they look as much


alike as so many Chinamen. Don’t you recognize that one down by
the boat in the water? That’s Jed; he’s a mite shorter and rounder
than the rest, though I don’t suppose you’d notice it in broad
daylight. Yes, I know he looks very different with his slicker off. The
one traveling along with the basket—he’s Walt. He’s the youngest
next to me. He’ll be fifty-three this fall. That fellow coming toward us
now, he’s Pete Simonds; he’s quite a joker.”

“Pete Simonds was one who went out to the ship with your father
the day after she was wrecked,” said Ann, remembering the name.

“Sure,” said Jo. “They all were there. They all came up from the
village when I told them that a boat needed help. Why shouldn’t
they?”

Ann could not take her eyes from the figures pottering up and
down the shelving beach of pebbles, fitting their dories for the trip
out to sea. These were the men who had taken a small boat across
the terrible pounding waves to go to the help of sailors who had
come from no one knew where. They had risked their lives to try to
do something for others. While Fred Bailey was telling the story Ann
had listened as if some one were reading a thrilling tale out of a
magazine or a book, without half realizing it all had actually
happened. But these were real live men, and old men at that. She
had seen them, often, going along the road on their way to the
cove, but she never had thought much about their connection with
the wreck.
She looked more closely at Pete Simonds. As she came up beside
him she noticed how powerful he was in spite of the wrappings of
his cumbersome slicker. His great fingers were gnarled and looked
like steel rods. Under his sou’wester she could see frayed ends of his
snow-white hair and his eyes shone as cold ice shines when the
winter sky is unclouded.

“Hallelujah, Jo-ey,” he shouted as he came abreast of them,


shifting his bitten pipe to the other corner of his shaven lips. “Ain’t
you a mite late? A spry boy like you layin’ abed till afternoon! You
oughter be ashamed of yourself.”

“It wasn’t his fault,” Ann spoke bravely into the unsmiling face.
“We delayed him. He promised to take us out in the boat with him
this morning and he had to wait for us. We’re the lazy ones, not Jo.”

“Oho!” The big foghorn voice boomed out and Ann was sure he
could be heard in the village. “So it was you, young lady, he was
waiting for. Wal, now, I don’t blame him.”

“Hush your noise,” ordered Jo, laughing. “This is Ann Seymour and
Ben Seymour who are staying up at the homestead this summer.
They don’t know that you’re pestering them just for fun.”

“Why, o’ course she knows I was only a-funnin’. This young lady
has good sense, I can see that.” Pete clapped one huge hand down
on Ann’s shoulder. “I wouldn’t go for to hurt her feelings.” He looked
into Ann’s eyes. “Jo’s a good boy and a first-class skipper. You
couldn’t have picked a better captain among us.”

Jo visibly swelled under the compliment after Pete had left them,
and Ann was happy to see him so pleased.

“It was nice of Pete to say that about you,” she said softly.

“You bet it was,” said Jo. “He is a close-mouthed old fellow but he
sure knows how to handle a boat. And his bark is a good deal worse
than his bite. He has been awfully kind to me. He taught me just
about everything I know, what with father being so busy often when
I needed help. But Pete never said anything to make me think he
was pleased with the way I was sailing the boat. I can remember
when I was very small and came down here to watch the men; Pete
used to pull a pair of oars in his boat and make a straight trip of
over twenty miles a day and think nothing of it.”

“You said twenty miles?” asked Ben incredulously.

“All of that,” asserted Jo. “He was the first fisherman to buy a
motor for his dory, when everybody thought he was a fool to do it.
He used to sit here on the beach for hours reading over the book of
instructions that came with the engine, and finally he put the parts
together and made the thing work without any help from anybody. It
has made a heap of difference, having engines in the boats. A man
can take care of pretty nigh eighty pots if he has a motor boat, when
he used to be held down to twenty, pulling oars.”

Ann had peeped into a shack where a lantern glowed. It was


stacked with barrels of salt and open kegs of steeping fishbait; nets
were festooned on the walls, coiled ropes were thrown here and
there, and a yellow goblin was preparing for his morning’s voyage
out to sea. The air was filled with the pungent smell of tar.

Jo opened the padlock of his own shack, reached into the


darkness, and pulled out a pair of oars. Then he shut the door after
him, leaving the lock dangling from the hinge.

“We don’t clasp it,” he explained, “while we are out on the water;
otherwise our neighbors would think we didn’t trust our tackle open
to them.”

“Why are you taking oars, if it is a motor boat that you use?”
asked Ann.

“In case anything should happen to the engine. It’s safer.”


“And why aren’t you taking all the rest of the things that the other
men are working with?” inquired Ben.

“I thought it was likely to be fine to-day, so I stored the bait kegs


in the dory last night. We can get off right now.”

With Ben’s help he shoved the light dory into the smooth water of
the river and helped Ann aboard, suggesting that she should sit in
the bow as she was heavier than Ben. The two boys in the back
would balance the dory evenly.

“She would have been afloat if the tide had been up a mite,”
apologized Jo; “but sometimes the water runs out on the ebb a bit
faster than we calculate and that drops the boats a mite high up the
beach.”

Ben had climbed in over the gunwale without minding his wet
feet. Sea water would dry without giving him a cold. He really had
enjoyed helping to push the dory afloat.

Jo took his place by the engine; he could manage it and the tiller
at the same time. He spun the wheel of the motor once or twice, the
engine sputtered as the spark ignited the gasoline and then it caught
in a clear put-put. Then he seized the tiller cord and pointed the
boat’s nose steadily out toward the dark smoothly rolling waves of
the sea beyond the mouth of the river. They were off.

Under Jo’s expert handling the boat took the first wave without
effort. With the second wave she rolled a little, but as Jo swung her
more toward the end of Douglas Head she moved steadily up and
over the crest of each running wave and slid gently down on the far
side.

From where she sat in the bow Ann could feel the dory rise and
plunge, run forward and rise to plunge again. The wind was fresh
and cool, blowing straight into her face and tossing her short hair all
topsy-turvy. The sky far over to the east had turned a blood-red with
flames of orange shooting up through the center of the mass of
color. Suddenly the first sun ray shot out over the water and touched
the racing boat. The last of the darkness melted quickly away.

“Oh, Ben! Isn’t it wonderful!” Ann exclaimed.

But her brother was not so enthusiastic. “I am not sure that I like
it yet,” he admitted. “I have a queer feeling in my middle; all gone,
like dropping down in a fast elevator.”

“That comes from the pancakes you ate last night,” said Jo
unsympathetically. “Don’t think about them and you will be all right
in a minute.”

“I forgot,” said Ann, putting her hand in her pocket. “I brought


these crackers; it will be rather a long time before breakfast and I
thought that mother would say we must eat something.”

“I ought to have thought of that,” apologized Jo, “but I never have


anything myself.”

But though he did not feel the crying emptiness that was
upsetting Ben, Jo ate his share. Never had crackers tasted better to
any of them.

“That was a fine idea of yours, Ann,” said Ben.

“Now,” advised Jo, “if you should sing you’d feel even better. I’ve
heard that some doctors cure patients by giving them something
worse than they have already.”

“That cure might work,” admitted Ben, “but it seems hard to give
you and Ann a dose of the same medicine, and besides, I don’t need
any, now. What shall I sing?”

“Oh, we wouldn’t suffer in silence,” said Jo. “We’ll sing, too. How’s
this one?” And he began:
Oh, it’s bonny, bonny weather
For sailormen at sea,
He pulls his ropes and trims his sails,
And sings so merrily——

His fresh young voice rang out high and clear in the new warm
sunlight.

“Jo!” exclaimed Ann. “I never have heard you sing. I didn’t know
you could. Where did you learn that song?”

“I sing only when I’m in the boat,” Jo answered laughingly. “It


must be the bobbing up and down that makes me want to do it, just
like a chippie bird swinging on the branch of a tree. My mother used
to sing me that song when I was little. She taught it to me.”

“You were old enough to remember her?” Ann asked gently.

“Yes,” he replied, speaking as gently as Ann had asked her


question, “I remember her very well. I was nine years old when she
got through.”

Ann had learned since she came to Pine Ledge that the fishermen
never spoke of any one as dying. They talked as though the person
who had left this world had finished a task and gone somewhere
else. They had “got through” with the present job of living and were
resting.

“My mother taught the district school before she was married,” Jo
continued. “She was very smart and she taught me a great deal
during the winter evenings. In lots of ways she was like your
mother; kind, you know, with never a cross word, and always
understanding when I tried to please her. She knew lots of songs
and taught them to me. How she used to laugh because I always
got the tune right even when I was so little that I could hardly say
the words! One bit she used to sing a lot and I liked it one of the
best, but though I remember the tune I have forgotten most of the
words. I wish I knew them. Maybe you know it, Ann. It started
something like this:

Maxwelton’s braes are bonnie,


Where early fa’s the dew——”

“Oh, I know that,” said Ben.

“Yes, we know the rest of that, Jo. It is ‘Annie Laurie,’ an old


Scotch song, and it goes on like this,” and Ann took up the song
where Jo had been interrupted.

“That’s the one! That’s the one!” cried Jo happily. Then he stopped
suddenly. “Hey! Here’s my first buoy, and I came near running it
down.”

Ben peered after the block of green and yellow that Jo had just
missed striking. “However do you manage to come away out here
and hit a little block of wood floating in the middle of the ocean?”

“That’s easy. I do it every morning,” Jo answered. “And I don’t


generally pass it by, as I was going to do to-day.”

He turned the dory in a wide circle and just before reaching the
buoy he shut off his engine and coasted alongside. Seizing a short
boat book that lay beside him on the thwart he deftly caught the
rope attached to the buoy and began to haul it in. Yard after yard
ran through his hands until finally it began to pull harder, as if a
heavy load were attached to it.

“Here she comes,” he said.


The huge wooden crate swung up beside the boat. Jo opened the
catch at the top and threw up the swinging lid. Then he began to
take out the lobsters. They were green and shining, with big claws
waving frantically in their effort to catch Jo’s fingers. One, two,
three, and four he fished out of the crate. The last was a small one
and he threw it back into the water.

“It is too short,” he said. “We are not allowed to bring them in as
small as that.”

“Aren’t they good to eat?” asked Ann.

“They’re the sweetest and the tenderest. But if the lobstermen


began selling them there soon wouldn’t be any left to grow up.
Lobsters under ten inches long aren’t allowed to be sold in the state
of Maine.”

“What a lot you know, Jo!” exclaimed Ben admiringly.

Jo looked a little surprised. “That’s my business; of course I know


that, about boats and lobsters. There’s a plenty of things that you
know and I don’t.”

He dropped the three big lobsters into a wooden box in the dory.
“Now hand me one of those bait bags, Ben, if you please; out of the
keg behind you.”

He took the bag, wet and dripping, from Ben’s outstretched hand
and fastened it into the trap, taking out the half-empty one that had
been there. Then he closed the cover, hasped it, and let the trap slip
gently down, down, away from sight in the clear green water.

“Now for the next,” he said as he spun the wheel, and the dory
once again pointed her course up the coast.

Jo visited twenty of his pots that morning, replacing the bait in


each before he dropped it back into the water. Ann soon learned to
fill the little bait bags which he handed across to her as he pulled
them out of the pots and she always had them ready for him by the
time the next pot had been hauled to the surface. They had taken
pity on Ben and forbidden him to handle the bait, for the smell of
the fish was a little too much for his slight attack of seasickness.

“I’m all right now,” he insisted.

“Next time you come out you won’t feel the motion at all,” Jo
promised. “And you’ll forget all about this as soon as you step on
shore. Everybody gets a little sick the first time they go outside in a
small boat. Ann’s just tough, that’s the only reason she has
escaped.”

“Where do you get the fish for the bait, Jo?” asked Ann after she
had filled the twentieth bag and they were sweeping in toward the
cove with the morning’s catch.

“The lobstermen get it. We would catch our own bait, but the farm
work takes so much of my father’s time and I’m not strong enough
to handle a trawl alone. So we buy from the men who go out after
fish. You see, to go lobstering the way most of the fishermen do
would take all day. First, they have to dig their clams down on the
sand beach a mile to the south; they use the clams to bait the fish
trawls. After the trawls are baited, they have to go out and catch the
fish and bring them in. Then the fish are used to catch the lobsters.”

“Sort of ‘great fleas have little fleas to bite ’em,’” Ben quoted.

“I guess you are almost well now, after that,” said Jo as he swung
the boat into the river.

Just before landing he once more cut off his engine and let the
dory drift alongside a large wooden box afloat in the smoother
protected water of the river. “This is the storage box where we put
our catch until we gather enough to pay to ship them to Boston.”
He opened the padlock on the cover and swung the big lid up,
dumping the day’s catch into it, eighteen in all, most of them fair-
sized. Jo felt that his morning’s work had been well worth while.

They landed, pulling the dory after them until it was slightly out of
the water. Jo threw the iron anchor well up the beach, so that the
tide would not set the boat adrift as it rose to the flood.

When she began to walk Ann discovered that she still felt the
motion of the boat and she swayed a bit as she went up the lane.
She had real “sea-legs” Jo told her and would soon be a regular
deep-sea man.

On the way back to the shack to replace the oars and snap the
lock on the door they passed a building Ann had not noticed in the
early morning. It was merely a built-in shed between two shacks, a
sort of lean-to in a sad state of repair. The door stood open so that
she could see the man working inside as she passed by. He was
dressed in rough clothing, a pair of dark trousers and a thin shirt
opened at the throat, and what surprised her most was the fact that
he was not wearing oilskins. He was much younger than any of the
other men she had seen that morning and this, too, astonished her,
for Jo had said that Walt was the youngest of the fishermen, while
this man could not have been as old as her own father. He wore no
hat and his thick hair was unkempt. She could see, even as she
walked by, that he was unshaven and looked like a tramp—a rather
interesting tramp, however.

“Who is that man?” she asked Jo.

“Him? That’s Warren Bain.” Jo’s voice sounded contemptuous.

“He doesn’t seem like the other fishermen.” Ann did not wish to
show her interest, especially as Jo did not seem eager to talk about
the stranger. But she was feeling inquisitive about him and she had
already learned that Jo talked more freely if he were not being
questioned.
“He’s a queer fellow,” Jo continued after a moment, as though it
had taken him a while to decide whether or not to gossip. “He don’t
belong to these parts. Came from Down East this spring and set out
lobstering from the cove here. We don’t quite take to his coming,
because there are more lobsters down his way than there are here
and we feel that it would be fairer for him to keep to his home
grounds. Besides, he ain’t been none too friendly with the men since
he came, and he pries into other folks’ private affairs a good deal. I
haven’t got anything against him, but I just don’t like his way.”

As they passed the open door of the shed Warren Bain lifted his
head from his work and saw them. Then he moved slowly and lazily
to the doorway and watched them. He said nothing, although he
looked Ann and Ben over from head to foot. Ann was annoyed by his
intense stare and she resented the fact that he did not reply
immediately to Jo’s curt greeting.

“Fine morning,” Jo had said when the man first noticed them.

Finally Bain shifted his eyes a little from Ann and Ben and relaxed
against the side post of his shack, lounging comfortably. “Good
enough,” he said, and nodded his head to Jo.

“You kids stayin’ up at the Baileys’?” he asked with a slow drawl.

Trying not to be angry, Ann answered, “Yes. We are spending the


summer with Jo.”

“Hum,” and Bain brought his piercing eyes back to Ann’s face.
“Where do you spend all o’ your spare time?”

Jo interrupted Ann before she could answer such an astonishingly


rude question. “I don’t know that that is for you to worry about,” Jo
said, and though his words were discourteous, his voice was quietly
polite.
“Oh,” Warren Bain apologized, “I was just interested. I didn’t
mean to be pryin’. It really ain’t none of my business.”

Ann thought that he was going to laugh at their indignation, but


he did not. He lounged against the door and watched them as they
went away up the lane.

When she thought that they must be completely out of sight, Ann
turned excitedly to Jo. “You don’t suppose that he knows anything
about the wrecked schooner?” she whispered breathlessly, although
the man couldn’t hear, not possibly. “Perhaps he doesn’t want to
have us play on it and perhaps interfere with whatever he plans to
do.”

“Gee, Ann!” exclaimed Ben. “You have brains! I’ll bet that he
knows something! No man would have acted in such a strange way
for no reason at all.”

“What do you think, Jo?” insisted Ann.

Jo did not answer for another moment. He thought for a little


space, piecing together all the different things that had happened—
especially trying to tie them up with that lantern and the fire in the
woods.

“I think you are right, Ann,” he said at last. “I believe he does


know something, and we will watch him as well as the ship.”
CHAPTER VII

PAINTING THE DEER

Ann did not have to watch alone for the lantern that might again
be seen flickering and swaying across the deck of the schooner. The
band mounted guard in turn and watched so industriously that Mr.
and Mrs. Seymour began to wonder what the children hoped to see
out in the night.

Jo took upon himself the watch during the late hours, for he
believed that no one would be likely to venture aboard the wreck
while lamps still glowed from house windows so near. At least a man
would not carry a lantern there during the early hours of the night
but would creep about in the shadows or hang a covering over the
portholes so that whatever light was needed would be hidden.

“I think that the reason you saw it that first night, Ann, was
because pop and I go to bed so early. Whoever it was got careless.
He thought we always were asleep by that hour and he didn’t know
that you folks were coming.”

The evenings were long now; the sun did not set until after
supper, and it made the time of watching for a lantern very short.

Mr. Seymour had been interested in hearing about the buck deer
that Robin Hood had tracked to its lair and he joined with the band
in several early forays. They picked their way stealthily through
underbrush that dripped with dew and waited silently by the swamp
pond, counting discomfort nothing if only they could sometime see a
deer drink.
At last they were rewarded in the half-light of one clear dawn. A
big buck stepped gently out from the end of the narrow trail they
had followed that first day. He slowly approached the pond, cautious
at first. But Jo had chosen a hiding place where the breeze would
not betray their presence and the animal soon felt perfectly safe.
First he nosed about through the tender young marsh grass which
grew close to the water’s edge. He pulled a little of it, here and
there, before he raised his head. Whether he signaled that all was
safe the human beings could never know, although Jo said afterward
that deer had ways of warning their own kind, but when he had
taken several mouthfuls of grass he threw up his head and looked
carefully about him, sniffing into the light rustling breeze.

Down the same trail by which he had entered, his doe came with
mincing steps to take her place beside him. The legs that carried her
slim body so easily seemed no thicker than the twigs of the trees
through which she came so swiftly and quietly, and her big soft ears
pricked forward over her gentle brown eyes.

The children hardly dared to breathe and they spoke no louder


than a whisper even after the deer had vanished.

“Oh, father!” sighed Ben. “How lovely they are! You will show me
how to draw them, won’t you?”

So Allan-a-Dale resigned temporarily from Robin Hood’s band and


became the constant companion of his father. After his beans were
hoed and his potatoes hilled—for both corn and potatoes had
sprouted rapidly and gave promise of making an excellent crop—Ben
took his canvas and easel and went with his father to the swamp
pond. Here they set up their props and worked every day.

Mr. Seymour showed Ben how to plan his picture, so that his
drawing would be balanced and the deer stand straight on their own
four legs.
“You will have to decide first of all, Ben, just how the deer
balances his weight on his feet while he is jumping, and then draw
him so that this point of balance comes as a straight right angle up
from the line where you are going to draw in your ground. That
point of balance is what makes people and animals stand upright,
for otherwise they would fall down. So when you draw pictures of
them, you have to plan very carefully to get an effect of stability in
your drawing.”

In beginning his own picture Mr. Seymour planned to paint the


swamp first, and then place the deer in position some morning after
he had had an opportunity to sketch them rapidly from life. He
hoped to see them again, poised on the edge of the water before
him. Consequently he busied himself in transferring the pond with its
green motionless water surrounded by the dark pine woods to a
canvas that was twice the size of the one that Ben was working on.

Often the rest of the band gathered around the painters to watch
the growth of the two pictures, for they felt a personal interest and
responsibility because of their share in discovering the deer. Jo liked
to watch the brush in Mr. Seymour’s quick deft fingers and see how
a few strokes of color here and there made a splotch of green look
like a pine tree. Under his eyes Jo saw the swamp grow on the gray
canvas. It was the swamp, and yet it was not exactly like the swamp
itself, for Mr. Seymour had left out a great deal of underbrush and
many of the trees. When Jo asked him why, he explained:

“When you look at that pond out there with the trees for a
background, it fills the entire space so far as you are concerned
while you are looking at it. That is the first thing you notice. Now
what is the second thing?”

“Well, I guess,” Jo ventured, “that I notice next that the pine trees
are pointed up into the sky, all jagged, while down below the trees
come together and I can’t separate one from another. It is all a
darkness.”
“Yes,” said Mr. Seymour, “but doesn’t that mean something more
to you than just a lot of pine trees growing together?”

“I don’t exactly know what you mean,” Jo answered. “They are


pine trees, most of them, although I can see one or two foliage trees
among them—shouldn’t wonder but what they are swamp maples.”

“You’re too definite, Jo.” And Mr. Seymour laughed. “I didn’t mean
to ask you to look for the other trees, because you can see them
only when you look carefully.”

“I know what you mean, father, and you shouldn’t ask questions—
it takes too long. You should tell Jo right out.” Ann looked at her
father with her eyes twinkling. “You wanted Jo to say that the first
thing he saw in looking into a space filled with trees was the line
they grew in.”

“Of course,” Jo agreed. “Everything grows in a line or a clump.”

“That is just what I mean,” Mr. Seymour replied. “After you decide
that the space before you is filled with trees you next decide what
the line or pattern of the background of your picture is to be. After
you decide this, you can plan how to transfer the trees which fill the
big space into the much smaller space that is your canvas. You do it
by following the pattern which you see before you.”

“But you can’t get all that swamp on a little canvas,” Jo protested.

“Exactly,” said Mr. Seymour. “And that’s why I am leaving out so


much. By following the pattern of the pine trees for my background
and the twisting shore of the pond for my foreground, I can shrink
the whole swamp to the size of my canvas even though I leave out a
great deal that your eye sees growing there in the living wood. Now,
while you are looking and comparing so closely, watching picture
and swamp at the same time, the swamp, in contrast, seems
magnificent. But next winter when you see only the picture you will
forget about these details that mean so much to you now, and you
will think the picture looks quite like the swamp as you remember it.”

“Gee!” Jo said sadly. “You’ve forgotten that I won’t be seeing the


picture next winter.” He scraped the toe of his boot disconsolately
against the loose pebbles. “You aren’t thinking of going home too
soon?”

“Not for ages!” exclaimed Ann. “And I’ll write to you every week
after we get back,” she promised.

“We’ll sign our names to the same letter,” said Ben.

“You won’t!” Ann assured him, in her most decided manner. “If I
write a letter I am going to be the only one to sign it. He will have to
write his own letters, won’t he, father?”

“It looks as if he would have to.” Mr. Seymour laughed. “I know


that Jo would like to get more than one a week through the winter.
How about it, Jo?”

“You bet I would,” answered Jo, his eyes shining.

Ben was almost entirely interested in painting the animals. He was


trying to draw them from his recollection of the leaping buck. He got
the action very well, Mr. Seymour told him, but he would have to
practice more on the outlines, so that the leaping figure would look
more like a deer.

“When I saw that deer,” Ben explained excitedly, “I felt as if I were


jumping in exactly the same way. That is why I am sure about how
the lines should go.”

“With a little patience, Ben,” his father promised, “I feel certain


that you will be able to draw.”

“And I shall be very famous?”


“I can’t promise that. The famous—but of course you don’t mean
‘famous’; you aren’t using the right word and I can’t have you saying
it. You are trying to ask me whether you can do work that will satisfy
yourself, and that no one can prophesy. You will have to work hard.
Don’t think that you can be anything you wish by merely wishing it.
And besides, some of the greatest painters have only made a bare
living after studying and working all their lives long.”

“I don’t care if I don’t make any money,” said Ben stoutly, “if I can
paint as much as I like.”

“Paint costs money,” said Mr. Seymour rather sadly. “And an artist
has to feed himself and his family.”

“Don’t you worry about that, Ben,” Ann protested. “When Jo and I
get our ranch started you can come and live with us—can’t he, Jo?”

“Sure he can,” Jo assented readily. “And he can paint all the time;
there will be lots of animals out there, steers and horses. And we
can live on potatoes and beans.”

Mr. Seymour seemed to think that this was very funny, for he
laughed heartily.

“I’ll come to visit you once in a while,” said Helen. “But I am going
to marry a millionaire and live on candy and nuts.”

“You’ll be glad to eat some of Jo’s beans, in that case,” said Ben
quite positively. He once had known what it was to eat too much
candy. “And if Jo lets me live there with him and with Ann, I’ll
promise to do my full share of hoeing.”

“Father will come, too,” said Ann eagerly, “even though he will be
the greatest painter in America by that time. When our ranch is
paying, neither father nor mother nor Mr. Bailey will need to do any
more work for money.”
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