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Name:_______________________ CSCI 2490 C++ Programming
Armstrong Atlantic State University
(50 minutes) Instructor: Dr. Y. Daniel Liang
1
12 quizzes for Chapter 7
1 If you declare an array double list[] = {3.4, 2.0, 3.5, 5.5}, list[1] is ________.
A. 3.4
B. undefined
C. 2.0
D. 5.5
E. 3.4
2 Are the following two declarations the same
A. no
B. yes
3 Given the following two arrays:
1
A. yes
B. no
6 Suppose char city[7] = "Dallas"; what is the output of the following statement?
A. Dallas0
B. nothing printed
C. D
D. Dallas
7 Which of the following is incorrect?
A. int a(2);
B. int a[];
C. int a = new int[2];
D. int a() = new int[2];
E. int a[2];
8 Analyze the following code:
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
int main()
{
int list[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
int newList[5];
reverse(list, 5, newList);
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++)
cout << newList[i] << " ";
}
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
2
int main()
{
int x[] = {120, 200, 16};
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++)
cout << x[i] << " ";
}
A. 200 120 16
B. 16 120 200
C. 120 200 16
D. 16 200 120
10 Which of the following statements is valid?
A. int i(30);
B. int i[4] = {3, 4, 3, 2};
C. int i[] = {3, 4, 3, 2};
D. double d[30];
E. int[] i = {3, 4, 3, 2};
11 Which of the following statements are true?
A. 5
B. 6
C. 0
D. 4
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
3
int main()
{
int matrix[4][4] =
{{1, 2, 3, 4},
{4, 5, 6, 7},
{8, 9, 10, 11},
{12, 13, 14, 15}};
int sum = 0;
return 0;
}
A. 3 6 10 14
B. 1 3 8 12
C. 1 2 3 4
D. 4 5 6 7
E. 2 5 9 13
15
Which of the following statements are correct?
a. (2 pts)
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
int main()
{
int a[] = {1, 2};
swap(a[0], a[1]);
cout << "a[0] = " << a[0] << " a[1] = " << a[1] << endl;
return 0;
}
4
b. (2 pts)
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
int main()
{
int a[] = {1, 2};
swap(a);
cout << "a[0] = " << a[0] << " a[1] = " << a[1] << endl;
return 0;
}
c. (4 pts) Given the following program, show the values of the array
in the following figure:
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
int main()
{
int values[5];
for (int i = 1; i < 5; i++)
{
values[i] = i;
}
return 0;
}
5
After the last statement
After the array is After the first iteration After the loop is in the main method is
created in the loop is done completed executed
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
Part III:
Part III:
<Output>
<End Output>
6
Write a test program that reads a C-string and displays the number of
letters in the string. Here is a sample run of the program:
<Output>
7
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came into action, took on Bluecher, while Tiger took No. 3 and Lion
No. 1. When New Zealand came within range, Bluecher was passed
on to her. This was at about 9:35. So early as a quarter to ten the
Bluecher showed signs of heavy punishment, and the first and third
ships of the enemy were both on fire. Lion was engaging the first
ship, Princess Royal the third, New Zealand the Bluecher, while Tiger
alternated between the same target as the Lion and No. 4. For some
reason not explained the second ship in the German line does not
appear to have been engaged at all. Just before this the Germans
attempted a diversion by sending the destroyers to attack. Meteor
(Captain Mead), with a division of the British destroyers, was then
sent ahead to drive off the enemy, and this apparently was done
with success. Shortly afterwards the enemy destroyers got between
the battle-cruisers and the British squadron and raised huge volumes
of smoke, so as to foul the range. Under cover of this the enemy
changed course to the northward. The battle-cruisers then formed a
new line of bearing, N.N.W., and were ordered to proceed at their
utmost speed. A second attempt of the enemy’s destroyers to attack
the British squadron was foiled by the fire of Lion and Tiger.
The chase continued on these lines more or less for the next
hour, by which time the Bluecher had dropped very much astern and
had hauled away to the North. She was listing heavily, was burning
fiercely, and seemed to be defeated. Sir David Beatty thereupon
ordered Indomitable to finish her off, and one infers from this, the
first mention of Indomitable, that she had been unable to keep pace
with New Zealand, Princess Royal, Tiger, and Lion, and therefore
would not be able to assist in the pursuit of the enemy battle-
cruisers.
The range by this time must have been very much reduced. If
between 7:30 and 9:30 a gain of 10,000 yards, or 5,000 yards an
hour, had been made, between 9:30 and 10:45 a further gain of
6,250 yards should have been possible, if the conditions had
remained the same. But with Bluecher beaten, the German battle-
cruisers could honourably think of themselves alone. Unless their
speed had been reduced by our fire, while we ought to have gained,
we should hardly have caught up so much as in the first hour and a
half. But there had, besides, been two destroyer attacks threatened
or made by the enemy, one apparently at about twenty minutes to
ten, and one at some time between then and 10:40. It is highly
probable that each of these attacks caused the British squadron to
change course, and we know that before 10:45 the stations had
been altered. Each of these three things may have prevented some
gain. Still, on the analogy of what had happened in the first two
hours, we must suppose the range at this period to have been at
most about 13,000 yards. At six minutes to eleven the action had
reached the first rendezvous of the German submarines. They were
reported to and then seen by the Admiral on his starboard bow,
whereupon the squadron was turned to port to avoid them. Very few
minutes after this the Lion was disabled.
(LARGER)
The battle off Jutland Bank, which took place on May 31, 1916,
was the first and, at the time of writing, has been the only meeting
between the main naval forces of Great Britain and Germany. It was
from the first inevitable that we should have to wait long for a sea
fight. It was inevitable, because the probability of a smaller force
being not only decisively defeated, but altogether destroyed in a sea
fight, is far greater than in a land battle, and the consciousness of
this naturally makes it chary of the risk. Sea war in this respect
preserves the characteristic of ancient land fighting, for—as is
luminously explained in Commandant Colin’s incomparable
“Transformations of War”—it was a common characteristic of the
older campaigns that the main armies would remain almost in touch
with each other month after month before the battle took place. He
sums up his generalization thus:
“From the highest antiquity,” he says, “till the time of Frederick
II, operations present the same character; not only Fabius or
Turenne, but also Cæsar, Condé, and Frederick, lead their armies in
the same way. Far from the enemy they force the pace, but as soon
as they draw near they move hither and thither in every direction,
take days, weeks, months in deciding to accept or to force battle.
Whether the armies are made up of hoplites or legionaries, or
pikemen or musketeers, they move as one whole and deploy very
slowly. They cannot hurl themselves upon the enemy as soon as
they perceive him, because while they are making ready for battle
he disappears in another direction.
“In order to change this state of affairs we must somehow or
another be able to put into the fight big divisions, each deploying on
its own account, leaving gaps and irregularities along the front.
“This, as we have seen, is what happened in the eighteenth
century.
“Up to the time of Frederick II, armies remained indivisible
during operations; they are like mathematical points on the huge
theatres of operations in Central Europe. It is not possible to grasp,
to squeeze, or even to push back on some obstacle, an enemy who
refuses battle, and retires laterally as well as backwards. There is no
end to the pursuit. It is the war of Cæsar, as it was that of Condé,
Turenne, Montecuculi, Villars, Eugène, Maurice de Saxe, and
Frederick. It is the sort of war that all more or less regular armies
have made from the remotest antiquity down to the middle of the
eighteenth century.
“Battle only takes place by mutual consent, when both
adversaries, as at Rocroi, are equally sure of victory, and throw
themselves at one another in open country as if for a duel; or when
one of them, as at Laufeld, cannot retreat without abandoning the
struggle; or when one is surprised, as at Rossbach.
“And certainly to-day, as heretofore, a general may refuse battle;
but he cannot prolong his retreat for long—it is the only means that
he has for escaping the grip of the enemy—if the depth of the
theatre of operations is limited. On the other hand, an enemy
formerly could retire laterally, and disappear for months by
perpetually running to and fro, always taking cover behind every
obstacle in order to avoid attack.”
But at sea a fleet has to-day precisely the same power of
avoiding action that an army had in former days. It cannot disappear
for months by “running to and fro,” but it can disappear for years by
burying itself in inaccessible harbours. It can, in other words, take
itself out of the theatre of war altogether while yet retaining liberty
at any moment to re-enter it. How, in view of these potentialities,
did the rival fleets dispose their forces?
On April 25, 1916, some German cruisers made an attack on
Lowestoft, similar in character but far less considerable in result to
those made in the autumn of 1914, on the same small town, on
Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepools. As in 1914, there was
considerable perturbation on the East Coast, and the Admiralty,
urged to take steps for the protection of the seaboard towns, made
a somewhat startling announcement. While this was going forward
in England, the German Admiralty put out an inspired commentary
on the raid, which dwelt with great exultation over the picture of
“the Island Empire, once so proud, now quivering with rage at its
own impotence.” These two documents, the First Lord’s and the
German apology, led to a good deal of discussion, which I dealt with
at the time in terms that I quote textually, as showing the general
conception of naval strategy underlying the dispositions of the British
Fleet.
“The directly military employment of the British Fleet has during
the last week been made the subject of discussion. Mr. Balfour has
written a strange letter to the Mayors of the East Coast towns, which
foreshadows important developments; an inspired German apology
for the recent raid on Yarmouth and Lowestoft has been published,
and both have aroused comment. Mr. Balfour’s letter was inspired by
a desire to reassure the battered victims of the German
bombardment. He realized that the usual commonplace that these
visits had little military value no longer met the case, and proceeded
to threaten the Germans with new and more effective methods of
meeting them, should these murderous experiments be repeated.
The new measures were to take two forms. The towns themselves
would be locally defended by monitors and submarines, and, without
disturbing naval preponderance elsewhere, new units would be
brought farther south, so that the interception of raiders would be
made more easy. But for one consideration the publication of such a
statement as this would be inexplicable. If the effective destruction
of German raiders really had been prepared, the last thing the
Admiralty would be expected to do would be to acquaint the enemy
with the disconcerting character of its future reception. Count
Reventlow indeed explains the publication by the fact that no such
preparations have indeed been made. But the thing is susceptible of
a more probable explanation.
“When Mr. Churchill, in the high tide of his optimism, addressed
the House of Commons at the beginning of last year—he had the
Falkland Islands and the Dogger Bank battles, the obliteration of the
German ocean cruising force, the extinction of the enemy merchant
marine, the security of English communications to his credit—he
explained the accumulated phenomena of our sea triumph by the
splendid perfection of his pre-war preparedness. The submarine
campaign, the failure of the Dardanelles, the revelation of the
defenceless state of the northeastern harbours, these things have
somewhat modified the picture that the ex-First Lord drew. And, not
least of our disillusions, we have all come to realize that in our
neglect of the airship we have allowed the enemy to develop, for his
sole benefit, a method of naval scouting that is entirely denied to us.
That the British Admiralty and the British Fleet perfectly realize this
disadvantage is the meaning of Mr. Balfour’s letter. He would not
have told the enemy of our new North Sea arrangements had he not
known that he could not be kept in ignorance of them for longer
than a week or two, once they were made. The letter is, in fact, an
admission that our sea power has to a great extent lost what was at
one time its supreme prerogative, the capacity of strategical
surprise.
“But this does not materially alter the dynamics of the North Sea
position, although it greatly affects tactics. The German official
apologist will have it, however, that another factor has altered these
dynamics. Admiral Jellicoe, he says, may be secure enough with his
vast fleet in his ‘great bay in the Orkneys,’ and, between that and
the Norwegian coast, hold a perfectly effective blockade line, but all
British calculations of North Sea strategy have been upset by the
establishment of new enemy naval bases at Zeebrügge, Ostend, and
Antwerp. He speaks glibly, as if the co-operation of the forces based
on the Bight with those in the stolen Belgian ports had altered the
position fundamentally. This, of course, is the veriest rubbish. So far
no captured Belgian port has been made the base for anything more
important than submarines that can cross the North Sea under
water, and for the few destroyers that have made a dash through in
the darkness. Such balderdash as this, and that the German battle-
cruisers did not take to flight, but simply ‘returned to their bases’
without waiting for the advent of ‘superior forces,’ imposes on
nobody. It remains, of course, perfectly manifest that our surface
control of the North Sea is as absolute as the character of modern
weapons and the present understanding of their use make possible.
“The principles behind our North Sea Strategy are simple. One
hundred years ago, had our main naval enemy been based on
Cuxhaven and Kiel, we should have held him there by as close a
blockade as the number of ships at our disposal, the weather
conditions, and the seamanship of our captains made possible. The
development of the steam-driven ship modified the theory of close
blockade and, even without the torpedo, would have made, with the
speed now attainable, an exact continuation of the old practice
impossible. The under-water torpedo has simply emphasized and
added to difficulties that would, without it, have been insuperable.
But it has undoubtedly extended the range at which the blockading
force must hold itself in readiness. To reproduce, then, in modern
conditions the effect brought about by close blockade in our previous
wars, it is necessary to have a naval base at a suitable distance from
the enemy’s base. It must be one that is proof against under-water
or surface torpedo vessel attack, and it must be so constituted that
the force that normally maintains itself there is capable of prompt
and rapid sortie, and of pouncing upon any enemy fleet that
attempts to break out of the harbour in which it is intended to
confine it.
“The great bay in the Orkneys’ may, for all I know to the
contrary, supply at the present moment the Grand Fleet’s main base
for such blockade as we enforce. But there are a great many other
ports, inlets, and estuaries on the East Coast of Scotland and
England which are hardly likely to be entirely neglected. Not all, nor
many, of these would be suitable for fleet units of the greatest size
and speed, but some undoubtedly are suitable, and all those that
are could be made to satisfy the conditions of complete protection
against secret attack. Assuming the main battle fleet to be at an
extremely northerly point, any more southerly base which is kept
either by battle cruisers, light cruisers, or submarines may be
regarded as an advance base, if for no other reason than that it is so
many miles nearer to the German base. The Orkneys are 200 miles
farther from Lowestoft than Lowestoft is from Heligoland. An Orkney
concentration while making the escape of the Germans to the
northward impossible, would leave them comparatively free to harry
the East Coast of England. If, approaching during the night, they
could arrive off that coast before the northern forces had news of
their leaving their harbours, they would have many hours’ start in
the race home. It is not, then, a close blockade that was maintained.
This freedom had to be left the enemy—because no risk could be
taken in the main theatre. It is assumed on the one side and
admitted on the other, that Germany could gain nothing and would
risk everything by attempting to pass down the Channel. The
Channel is closed to the German Fleet precisely as the Sound is
closed to the British. It is not that it is physically impossible for
either fleet to get through, but that to force a passage would involve
an operation employing almost every kind of craft. Minefields would
have to be cleared, and battleships would have to be in attendance
to protect the mine-sweepers. The battleships in turn would have to
be protected from submarine attack, and as the operation of
securing either channel would take some time, there would be a
virtual certainty of the force employed being attacked in the greatest
possible strength. In narrow waters the fleet trying to force a
passage would be compelled to engage in the most disadvantageous
possible circumstances. The Channel is closed, then, for the
Germans, as the Sound is closed to the British, not by the under-
water defences, but by the fact that to clear these would involve an
action in which the attacking party would be at too great a
disadvantage. The concentration, then, in the north of a force
adequate to deal with the whole German Fleet—again I have to say
in the light of the way in which the use of modern weapons is
understood—remains our fundamental strategical principle.”
I then went on to reply to the critics who had said that the use
of monitors for coast defence was the most disturbing feature of a
very unwise series of departures from true policy, and then passed
on to what seemed to me the more serious criticism, as follows:
“The attack on this part of Mr. Balfour’s policy is vastly more
damaging. For it asserts that the policy of defensive offence, Great
Britain’s traditional sea strategy, has now been reversed. The East
Coast towns may expect comparative immunity, but only because
the strategic use of our forces has been altered. It is a modification
imposed upon the Admiralty by the action of the enemy. Its
weakness lies in the ‘substitution of squadrons in fixed positions for
periodical sweeps in force through the length and breadth of the
North Sea.’ Were this indeed the meaning of Mr. Balfour’s letter and
the intention of his policy, nothing more deplorable could be
imagined.
“But what ground is there for thinking that this is Mr. Balfour’s
meaning? He says nothing of the kind. He makes it quite clear that a
new arrangement is made possible by additional units of the first
importance now being ready to use. The old provision of adequate
naval preponderance at the right point has not been disturbed. It is
merely proposed to establish new and advanced bases from which
the new available squadrons can strike. It stands to reason that the
nearer this base is to the shortest line between Heligoland and the
East Coast, the greater the chance of the force within it being able
to fall upon Germany’s cruising or raiding units if they venture within
the radius of its action. To establish a new or more southerly base,
then, is a development of, and not a departure from, our previous
strategy—it shortens the radius of German freedom. If there is
nothing to show that the old distribution is changed, certainly there
is no suggestion that the squadron destined for the new base will be
‘fixed’ there. If squadrons now based on the north are there only to
pounce upon the emerging German ships, why should squadrons
based farther south not be employed for a similar purpose?”
The foregoing will make it clear that the general idea of British
strategy was to maintain, to the extreme north of these islands, an
overwhelming force of capital ships. It was adopted because it
economized strength and secured the main object—viz. the paralysis
of our enemy, outside certain narrow limits.
The southern half of the North Sea—say, roughly from Peterhead
to the Skagerack, 400 miles; from the Skagerack to Heligoland, 250;
from Heligoland to Lowestoft, 300; and from Lowestoft to Peterhead,
350 miles—was left as a kind of no man’s land. If the Germans
chose to cruise about in this area, they took the chance of being cut
off and engaged by the British forces, whose policy it was to leave
their bases from time to time for what Sir John Jellicoe in the Jutland
despatch describes as “periodic sweeps through the North Sea.” But
the German Fleet being supplied with Zeppelins, could, in weather in
which Zeppelins could scout, get information so far afield as to be
able to choose the times for their own cruises in the North Sea, and
so make the procedure a perfectly safe one, so long as chance
encounters with submarines and straying into British mine-fields
could be avoided. Thus for the old policy of close blockade was
substituted a new one, that of leaving the enemy a large field in
which he might be tempted to manœuvre; and it had this value, that
should he yield to the temptation, an opportunity must sooner or
later be afforded to the British Fleet of cutting him off and bringing
him to action. Meantime he was cut off from any large adventure far
afield. He would have to fight for freedom. It gave, so to speak, the
Germans the chance of playing a new sort of “Tom Tiddler’s ground.”
The point to bear in mind is, that it left the Germans precisely the
same freedom to seek or avoid action as the armies of antiquity
possessed. Thus no naval battle could be expected unless—as Colin
says—the weaker wished to fight, or was cornered or surprised.
Now, against surprise, the German Fleet was seemingly
protected by Zeppelins. It could hardly be cornered unless, in
weather in which aerial scouting was impossible, it was tempted to
some great adventure—such as the despatch of a raiding force to
invade—which would enable a fast British division to get between
this force and its base. So that the chance of a fleet action really
turned upon the Germans being willing to fight one. And they could
not be expected to be anxious for this. “A war,” says Colin, “is always
slow in which we know that the battle will be decisive, and it is so
important as to be only accepted voluntarily.”
The state of relative strength in May, 1916, was not such as to
afford the Germans the slightest hope of a decisive victory if it
brought the whole British Fleet to action. Nor was the naval situation
such that there was any stroke that Germany could execute if it
could hold the command of some sea passage for twenty-four hours
or so. There was nothing it could expect to achieve if, by defeating
or at any rate standing off one section of the British Fleet, it could
enjoy a brief local ascendancy.
The argument, indeed, was all the other way. The professed
main naval policy of Germany, viz., the blockade of England by
submarine, though for the moment in abeyance, was being held in
reserve until the military and political situation made the stake worth
the candle. Now, deliberately to risk the High Seas Fleet in an action
on the grand scale, when the chances of decisive victory were
remote and the probability of annihilation extremely high, was to
jeopardize not the fleet alone but also the blockade. For, with the
High Seas Fleet once out of the way, the one stroke against the
submarine which could alone be perfectly effective, viz., the close
under-water blockade by mines, immediately outside the German
harbours, would at once become feasible. So far, then, as military
considerations went, the arguments against seeking action were far
stronger than those in its favour.
But in war it is not always reasons which are purely military that
operate; and as this war got into its second year there were many
forces, each of which contributed something towards driving the
German Navy into action. First, and in all probability by far the most
powerful, would be the impatience of a large body of brave and
skilful seamen—in control of an enormous sea force—with the rôle of
idleness and impotence that had been imposed upon them. The
German apologist, when uttering his pæans of triumph over the
bombardments of Lowestoft, said, on May 7:
“It must not be assumed that this adventure was a mere
question of bombarding some fortified coast places. It would also be
a mistake to think that it was only an expression of the spirit of
enterprise in our young Navy. The spirit is indeed just as fresh as
ever, and is simply thirsting for deeds, and when one sees or talks to
officers and men one reads on their lips the desire ‘If only we could
get out.’ The sitting still during the spring and winter may also play
their part in this. Only a well-considered leadership knows when it
will use this thirst for action, and employ it in undertakings which
keep the great whole in view. Our Navy, thank God, does not need
to pursue prestige policy; the services which it has already rendered
us are too considerable and too important for that.”
There is no occasion to quarrel with a word in this passage. The
German admirals and captains in command of twenty-three or
twenty-four of the most powerful ships in the world must certainly
have been straining at the leash. This, then, would be a predisposing
cause to a battle of some kind being voluntarily sought by the
weaker force.
And in May, 1916, there were other causes as well. The German
Higher Command, while ignorant perhaps of the exact points at
which the Allies would attack, must have been very perfectly aware
that attacks of the most formidable character, and on all fronts, were
impending. It also knew that the resources of the Central Empires
were to this extent relatively exhausted, that all the Allied attacks,
when they came, must result in a series of successes, not of course
immediately decisive, but such as no counter-attacks could balance
or neutralize. Austria and Germany, in short, would be shown to be
on the defensive. They would have to yield ground. It may not have
seemed a situation bound to lead to military defeat. For the
superiority of the Allies—at least so it may have appeared to the
German command—in men and ammunition and moral, would have
to be overwhelming to bring this about.
But the Higher Command had made the mistake of carrying the
civil population with them in the declaration and prosecution of the
war, first by the promise and then by the assertion of overwhelming
victory. But the victory that was claimed did not materialize in the
way that is normal to great victories. There was no submission of
the enemy, and no sign of a wish for an honourable peace. What
was worse, the defeated enemy had shown an almost unlimited
capacity to starve and hamper their conquerors. It was bad enough
that they should not acknowledge themselves beaten. It was worse
that the flail of hunger should fall on those who should be fattening
on the fruits of victory. What would the state of mind of the German
people be if, on the top of all this, the conquered Allies were to
evince a capacity for winning a few battles themselves? It was
manifestly a position in which, at any cost, the moral of the German
people should be braced for a new trial. Given a fleet impatient to
get out and a higher command anxious for news of a victory, these
are surely elements enough to explain the events that led to the
action of May 31.
But the most powerful motive of all was this: Not only was
German moral badly in need of refreshment, it was especially that
Germany’s belief in her naval power needed to be confirmed. For, in
the last week in April, the Emperor and his counsellors had been
compelled to submit to a peremptory ultimatum despatched by
President Wilson with the endorsement of both houses of Congress
behind him. Towards the end of the winter 1915–16 the German
people had been led to expect a decisive stroke against England by
the new U-boats which the Tirpitz building programme of the
previous year was reputed to be producing in large and punctual
numbers. The Grand Admiral himself, amid the vociferous applause
of the Jingoes and Junkers, announced that the campaign would
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