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 PROGRAMMING
fOR
PRObleM SOlvING
Gujarat Technological University - 2018
About the Author

E Balagurusamy, is presently the Chairman of EBG Foundation, Coimbatore. In the past he has also held
the positions of member, Union Public Service Commission, New Delhi and Vice-Chancellor, Anna University,
Chennai. He is a teacher, trainer and consultant in the fields of Information Technology and Management.
He holds an ME (Hons) in Electrical Engineering and PhD in Systems Engineering from the Indian Institute
of Technology, Roorkee. His areas of interest include Object-Oriented Software Engineering, E-Governance:
Technology Management, Business Process Re-engineering and Total Quality Management.
A prolific writer, he has authored a large number of research papers and several books.
A recipient of numerous honors and awards, he has been listed in the Directory of Who's Who of Intellectuals
and in the Directory of Distinguished Leaders in Education.
 PROGRAMMING
fOR
PRObleM SOlvING
Gujarat Technological University - 2018

E Balagurusamy
Chairman
EBG Foundation
Coimbatore

McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited

CHENNAI

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 McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited
Published by McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited
444/1, Sri Ekambara Naickr Industrial Estate, Alapakkam, Porur, Chennai-600 116

Programming for Problem Solving

Copyright © 2019 by McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise or stored in a database or retrieval system without the prior written permission of
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Print Edition
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Preface

P
rogramming for Problem Solving requires a deep understanding of C. C is a powerful, flexible, portable
and elegantly structured programming language. Since C combines the features of high-level language
with the elements of the assembler, it is suitable for both systems and applications programming. It
is undoubtedly the most widely used general-purpose language today in operating systems, and embedded
system development. Its influence is evident in almost all modern programming languages. Since its
standardization in 1989, C has undergone a series of changes and improvements in order to enhance the
usefulness of the language.

Organization of the Book

Programming for Problem Solving starts with an Introduction to Computer Programming, Chapter 2 discusses
fundamentals of C. Control Structures in C is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 deals with Arrays and
Strings. Chapter 5 discusses Functions. In Chapter 6 students can study Pointers. While Chapter 7 details
Structure. Dynamic Memory Allocation is discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 details on File Management.

Salient Features of the Book

∑ Learning Objectives
∑ Key Concepts
∑ Content Tagged with LO
∑ Worked Out Problems
∑ Tips
∑ Closing Vignette
∑ Review Exercises – True False, Fill in the blanks, Questions, Programming Exercises – categorized into
LO and Difficulty level (E for Easy, M for Medium and H for High)

Acknowledgements
I owe special thanks to the entire team of McGraw Hill Education India.
A note of acknowledgement is due to the following reviewers for their valuable feedback.

Ms. Kalpana Mudaliar Gandhinagar Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar, Gujarat

H K Patnaik Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology, KIIT University, Bhubaneswar
T V Gopal College of Engineering, Anna University, Chennai, Tamil Nadu
Unnati Nitin Chaudhari Tolani Maritime Institute, Pune, Maharashtra
Tanveer Ahmed Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi
Ravindra Divekar KJ Somaiya College of Engineering, Mumbai, Maharashtra
SC Dutta Birsa Institute of Technology, Sindri, Dhanbad, Jharkhand
D Lakshmi Adithya Institute of Technology, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu
vi Preface

This book is my sincere attempt to make a footprint on the immensely vast and infinite sands of knowledge.
I would request the readers to utilize this book to the maximum extent.
E Balagurusamy

Publisher’s Note
McGraw Hill Education (India) invites suggestions and comments from you, all of which can be sent to info.
india@mheducation.com (kindly mention the title and author name in the subject line).
Piracy-related issues may also be reported.
Contents

About the Author ii

Preface v

1. Introduction to Computer and Programming 1

Learning Objectives 1
Introduction 1
Generations of Computers 2
Classification of Computers 5
Basic Anatomy of a Computer System 7
Input Devices 8
Processor 9
Output Devices 10
Memory Management 12
Types of Computer Software 13
Overview of Operating System 14
MS Word 19
MS Excel System 21
MS Powerpoint System 22
Networking Concepts 23
Network Topologies 25
Network Protocols and Software 29
Decimal System 31
Binary System 32
Hexadecimal System 33
Octal System 34
Conversion of Numbers 35
Binary Arithmetic Operations 44
Logic Gates 52
Programming Languages 55
viii Contents

Translator Programs 58
Problem-Solving Techniques 59
Using the Computer 70
Learning Outcomes 70
Key Concepts 71
Review Questions 73
Discussion Questions 84

2. Fundamentals of C 87
Learning Objectives 87
History of C 87
Importance of C 89
Sample Program 1: Printing a Message 89
Sample Program 2: Adding Two Numbers 92
Sample Program 3: Interest Calculation 93
Sample Program 4: Use of Subroutines 95
Sample Program 5: Use of Math Functions 96
Basic Structure of C Programs 97
Programming Style 98
Executing a ‘C’ Program 99
UNIX System 99
MS-DOS System 102
Key Concepts 102
Always Remember 103
Review Questions 103
Debugging Exercises 105
Programming Exercises 105

3. Control Structure in C 107

Learning Objectives 107
Introduction 107
Decision Making with if Statement 108
Simple If Statement 108
The If.....Else Statement 111
Nesting of If....Else Statements 114
The Else If Ladder 117
The Switch Statement 121
The ? : Operator 125
The goto Statement 129
Key Concepts 132
 Contents ix

Always Remember 132

Brief Cases 132
Review Questions 137
Debugging Exercises 141
Programming Exercises 141

4. Array & String 145

Learning Objectives 145
Introduction 145
One-Dimensional Arrays 147
Declaration of One-dimensional Arrays 148
Initialization of One-dimensional Arrays 151
Two-Dimensional Arrays 156
Initializing Two-dimensional Arrays 161
Multi-dimensional Arrays 168
Dynamic Arrays 169
More About Arrays 170
Declaring and Initializing String Variables 170
Reading Strings from Terminal 171
Writing Strings to Screen 177
Arithmetic Operations on Characters 181
Putting Strings Together 183
Comparison of Two Strings 184
String-Handling Functions 184
Table of Strings 190
Other Features of Strings 192
Key Concepts 192
Always Remember 193
Brief Cases 194
Review Questions 210
Debugging Exercises 214
Programming Exercises 215

5. Functions 220
Learning Objectives 220
Introduction 220
Need for User-Defined Functions 221
A Multi-Function Program 221
Elements of User-Defined Functions 224
x Contents

Definition of Functions 224

Return Values and Their Types 227
Function Calls 228
Function Declaration 229
Category of Functions 231
No Arguments and No Return Values 231
Arguments but No Return Values 233
Arguments with Return Values 236
No Arguments but Returns a Value 241
Functions that Return Multiple Values 242
Nesting of Functions 243
Recursion 244
Passing Arrays to Functions 245
Passing Strings to Functions 250
The Scope, Visibility and Lifetime of Variables 251
Multifile Programs 260
Key Concepts 262
Always Remember 262
Brief Cases 263
Review Questions 266
Debugging Exercises 270
Programming Exercises 270

6. Pointers 273
Learning Objectives 273
Introduction 273
Understanding Pointers 274
Accessing the Address of a Variable 276
Declaring Pointer Variables 277
Initialization of Pointer Variables 278
Accessing a Variable Through its Pointer 279
Chain of Pointers 281
Pointer Expressions 282
Pointer Increments and Scale Factor 284
Pointers and Arrays 284
Pointers and Character Strings 288
Array of Pointers 290
Pointers as Function Arguments 291
Functions Returning Pointers 294
 Contents xi

Pointers to Functions 295

Pointers and Structures 297
Troubles with Pointers 299
Key Concepts 300
Always Remember 300
Brief Cases 301
Review Questions 306
Debugging Exercises 309
Programming Exercises 309

7. Structure 311
Learning Objectives 311
Introduction 311
Defining a Structure 312
Declaring Structure Variables 313
Accessing Structure Members 315
Structure Initialization 316
Copying and Comparing Structure Variables 318
Operations on Individual Members 320
Arrays of Structures 320
Arrays within Structures 323
Structures within Structures 324
Structures and Functions 326
Unions 329
Size of Structures 330
Bit Fields 330
Key Concepts 333
Always Remember 333
Brief Cases 334
Review Questions 338
Debugging Exercises 341
Programming Exercises 341

8. Dynamic Memory Allocation 344

Learning Objectives 344
Introduction 344
Dynamic Memory Allocation 344
Allocating a Block of Memory: malloc 345
Allocating Multiple Blocks of Memory: calloc 347
xii Contents

Releasing the Used Space: free 348

Altering the Size of a Block: realloc 348
Concepts of Linked Lists 350
Advantages of Linked Lists 353
Types of Linked Lists 354
Pointers Revisited 354
Creating a Linked List 356
Inserting an Item 360
Deleting an Item 363
Application of Linked Lists 365
Key Concepts 365
Always Remember 366
Brief Cases 366
Review Questions 372
Debugging Exercises 374
Programming Exercises 374

9. File Management 376

Learning Objectives 376
Introduction 376
Defining and Opening a File 377
Closing a File 378
Input/Output Operations on Files 379
Error Handling During I/O Operations 385
Random Access to Files 387
Command Line Arguments 394
Key Concepts 396
Always Remember 396
Review Questions 397
Debugging Exercises 398
Programming Exercises 398
 Roadmap to the Syllabus
Programming For Problem Solving
Code: 3110003

Introduction to computer and programming: Introduction, Basic block diagram and functions of various
components of computer, Concepts of Hardware and software, Types of software, Compiler and interpreter,
Concepts of Machine level, Assembly level and high level programming, Flowcharts and Algorithms

GO TO Chapter 1 Introduction to Computer and Programming

Fundamentals of C: Features of C language, structure of C Program, comments, header files, data types,
constants and variables, operators, expressions, evaluation of expressions, type conversion, precedence
and associativity, I/O functions

GO TO Chapter 2 Fundamentals of C

Control structure in C: Simple statements, Decision making statements, Looping statements, Nesting of
control structures, break and continue, goto statement

GO TO Chapter 3 Control Structure in C

Array & String: Concepts of array, one and two dimensional arrays, declaration and initialization of arrays,
string, string storage, Built-in-string functions
Recursion: Recursion, as a different way of solving problems. Example programs, such as Finding
Factorial, Fibonacci series, Ackerman function etc. Quick sort or Merge sort.

GO TO Chapter 4 Array & String

xiv Roadmap to the Syllabus

Functions: Concepts of user defined functions, prototypes, definition of function, parameters, parameter
passing, calling a function, recursive function, Macros, Pre-processing

GO TO Chapter 5 Functions

Pointers: Basics of pointers, pointer to pointer, pointer and array, pointer to array, array to pointer, function
returning pointer

GO TO Chapter 6 Pointers

Structure: Basics of structure, structure members, accessing structure members, nested structures, array
of structures, structure and functions, structures and pointers

GO TO Chapter 7 Structure

Dynamic memory allocation: Introduction to Dynamic memory allocation, malloc, calloc

GO TO Chapter 8 Dynamic Memory Allocation

File management: Introduction to file management and its functions

GO TO Chapter 9 File Management

Introduction to
Chapter
Computer and
Programming 1
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
LO 1.1 Identify the various generations of computers
LO 1.2 Classify computers on the basis of different criteria
LO 1.3 Describe the computer system
LO 1.4 Classify various computer software
LO 1.5 Discuss various operating systems
LO 1.6 Discuss Microsoft software
LO 1.7 Know various networking concepts and protocols
LO 1.8 Identify the various positional number systems
LO 1.9 Carry out number conversions from one number system to another
LO 1.10 Explain how binary arithmetic operations are performed
LO 1.11 Describe primary logic gates
LO 1.12 Discuss various levels of programming languages
LO 1.13 Know various problem solving techniques and computer applications

introduction
A computer is an electronic machine that takes input from the user, processes the given input and generates
output in the form of useful information. A computer accepts input in different forms such as data, programs
and user reply. Data refer to the raw details that need to be processed to generate some useful information.
Programs refer to the set of instructions that can be executed by the computer in sequential or non-
sequential manner. User reply is the input provided by the user in response to a question asked by the
computer.
A computer includes various devices that function as an integrated system to perform several tasks
described above (Fig. 1.1). These devices are:
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
It is the processor of the computer that is responsible for controlling and executing instructions in the computer.
It is considered as the most significant component of the computer.
 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
on the extreme right was driven out of the engagement, and the
British gunboats, turning the American flank, attacked the
“Ticonderoga,” which maintained a doubtful battle. The American left
was also turned, the “Eagle” having been driven to take refuge
between the “Saratoga” and “Ticonderoga,” in the centre.
Macdonough’s ship was then exposed to the concentrated fire of the
“Confiance” and “Linnet,” and his battery was soon silenced. The
“Saratoga” could no longer use a gun on the engaged side, and the
battle was nearly lost.
Then Macdonough’s forethought changed the impending defeat
into victory. His fire had nearly silenced the “Confiance,” and
disregarding the “Linnet,” he ceased attention to the battle in order
to direct the operation of winding ship. Little by little hauling the ship
about, he opened on the “Confiance” with one gun after another of
the fresh broadside, as they bore; and the “Confiance,” after trying
in vain to effect the same operation, struck her colors. Then the
British fleet was in the situation which Downie had anticipated for
the Americans in the event of silencing the “Saratoga.” The three
smaller vessels were obliged to surrender, and the gunboats alone
escaped. The battle had lasted from quarter past eight till quarter
before eleven.
 POSITIONS
OF THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES
AT
PLATTSBURG
AFTER A SKETCH BY BRIG. GEN. MACOMB

By land, the British attack was much less effective than by water.
The troops were slow in reaching their positions, and had time to
make no decisive movement. A column under Major-General
Robinson was ordered to move round by the right flank to a ford
previously reconnoitred, some distance up the Saranac, in order to
gain a position whence they could reverse the American works and
carry them by assault; but Robinson’s column missed its way, and
before reaching the ford heard the cheers of the American troops,
and halted to ascertain its cause.[180] The remainder of the army
waited for Robinson’s column to assault. The casualties showed that
nothing like a serious engagement took place. The entire loss of the
British army from September 6 to September 14 was officially
reported as only thirty-seven killed and one hundred and fifty
wounded, and of this loss a large part occurred previous to the
battle of September 11. The entire American loss was thirty-seven
killed and sixty-two wounded.
In the naval battle, Macdonough reported fifty-two killed and fifty-
eight wounded, among about eight hundred and eighty men. The
British reported fifty-seven killed and seventy-two wounded, in crews
whose number was never precisely known, but was probably fully
eight hundred. In neither case was the loss, though severe, as great
relatively to the numbers as the severity of the action seemed to
imply. The “Saratoga” lost twenty-eight killed in a crew of two
hundred and forty. In Perry’s battle on Lake Erie, the “Lawrence” lost
twenty-two men killed in a crew of one hundred and thirty-one.
About one man in eight was killed on Macdonough’s ship; about one
man in six on Perry’s.
With needless precipitation, Prevost instantly retreated the next
day to Champlain, sacrificing stores to a very great amount, and
losing many men by desertion. The army was cruelly mortified, and
Prevost lost whatever military reputation he still preserved in
Canada. In England the impression of disgrace was equally strong.
“It is scarcely possible to conceive the degree of mortification and
disappointment,” said the “Annual Register,”[181] “which the
intelligence of this defeat created in Great Britain.” Yeo brought
official charges of misconduct against Prevost, and Prevost defended
himself by unusual arguments.
“With whatever sorrow I may think of the unfortunate occurrences
to which I allude,” he wrote to Bathurst, three weeks later,[182] “I
consider them as light and trivial when compared to the disastrous
results which, I am solemnly persuaded, would have ensued had any
considerations of personal glory, or any unreflecting disregard of the
safety of the province, or of the honor of the army committed to my
charge, induced me to pursue those offensive operations by land,
independent of the fleet, which it would appear by your Lordship’s
despatch were expected of me. Such operations, my Lord, have been
attempted before, and on the same ground. The history of our
country records their failure; and had they been undertaken again
with double the force placed under my command, they would have
issued in the discomfiture of his Majesty’s arms, and in a defeat not
more disastrous than inevitable.”
The Duke of Wellington was not so severe as other critics, and
hesitated to say that Prevost was wrong; “though of this I am
certain, he must equally have returned ... after the fleet was beaten;
and I am inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers
repeatedly that a naval superiority on the Lakes is a sine qua non of
success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should
be wholly defensive.”[183] Yet the Duke in conversation seemed to
think that his army in Canada was also at fault. “He had sent them
some of his best troops from Bordeaux,” he said five-and-twenty
years afterward,[184] “but they did not turn out quite right; they
wanted this iron fist to command them.”
Meanwhile Major-General Izard, by Armstrong’s order, marched
his four thousand men as far as possible from the points of attack.
Starting from Champlain, August 29, the army reached Sackett’s
Harbor September 17, having marched about two hundred and
eighty miles in twenty days. At Sackett’s Harbor Izard found no
orders from the government, for the government at that time had
ceased to perform its functions; but he received an earnest appeal
from General Brown to succor Fort Erie. “I will not conceal from
you,” wrote Brown, September 10,[185] “that I consider the fate of
this army very doubtful unless speedy relief is afforded.” Izard, who
had no means of testing the correctness of this opinion, decided to
follow Brown’s wishes, and made, September 17, the necessary
preparations. Violent storms prevented Chauncey from embarking
the troops until September 21; but September 27 the troops reached
Batavia, and Izard met Brown by appointment. The army had then
been a month in movement. The distance was more than four
hundred miles, and no energy could have shortened the time so
much as to have affected the result of the campaign. At one end of
the line Sir George Prevost retreated from Plattsburg September 12;
at the other end, Lieutenant-General Drummond retreated from Fort
Erie September 21; and Izard’s force, constituting the largest body
of regular troops in the field, had been placed where it could
possibly affect neither result.
Izard was a friend of Monroe, and was therefore an object of
Armstrong’s merciless criticism.[186] Brown was a favorite of
Armstrong, and shared his prejudices. The position of Izard at
Buffalo was calculated to excite jealousy. He had implicitly obeyed
the wishes of Armstrong and Brown; in doing so, he had sacrificed
himself,—yielding to Macomb the credit of repulsing Prevost, and to
Brown, who did not wait for his arrival, the credit of repulsing
Drummond. As far as could be seen, Izard had acted with loyalty
toward both Armstrong and Brown; yet both distrusted him. Brown
commonly inclined toward severity, and was the more sensitive
because Izard, as the senior officer, necessarily took command.
Until that moment Izard had enjoyed no chance of showing his
abilities in the field, but at Niagara he saw before him a great
opportunity. Drummond lay at Chippawa, with an army reduced by
battle and sickness to about twenty-five hundred men. Izard
commanded fifty-five hundred regular troops and eight hundred
militia.[187] He had time to capture or destroy Drummond’s entire
force before the winter should set in, and to gather the results of
Brown’s desperate fighting. Brown was eager for the attack, and
Izard assented. October 13 the army moved on Chippawa, and
stopped. October 16, Izard wrote to the War Department,[188]—
“I have just learned by express from Sackett’s Harbor that
Commodore Chauncey with the whole of his fleet has retired into port,
and is throwing up batteries for its protection. This defeats all the
objects of the operations by land in this quarter. I may turn Chippawa,
and should General Drummond not retire, may succeed in giving him
a good deal of trouble; but if he falls back on Fort George or
Burlington Heights, every step I take in pursuit exposes me to be cut
off by the large reinforcements it is in the power of the enemy to
throw in twenty-four hours upon my flank or rear.”
In this state of mind, notwithstanding a successful skirmish,
October 19, between Bissell’s brigade and a strong detachment of
the enemy, Izard made a decision which ruined his military
reputation and destroyed his usefulness to the service. He reported
to the Department, October 23,[189]—
“On the 21st, finding that he [Drummond] still continued within his
works, which he had been assiduously engaged in strengthening from
the moment of our first appearance, the weather beginning to be
severe, and a great quantity of our officers and men suffering from
their continued fatigues and exposure, at twelve at noon I broke up
my encampment, and marched to this ground [opposite Black Rock]
in order to prepare winter quarters for the troops.”
Nothing remained but to break up the army. Brown was sent at
his own request to Sackett’s Harbor, where the next fighting was
expected. A division of the army went with him. The remainder were
placed in winter quarters near Buffalo. Fort Erie was abandoned and
blown up, November 5, and the frontier at Niagara relapsed into
repose.
 Izard felt the mortification of his failure. His feelings were those of
a generous character, and his tone toward Brown contrasted to his
advantage both in candor and in temper with Brown’s language
toward him; but great energy generally implied great faults, and
Brown’s faults were better suited than Izard’s virtues for the work of
an American general at Niagara. Greatly to Izard’s credit, he not only
saw his own inferiority, but advised the government of it. He wrote
to the Secretary of War, November 20,[190]—
“The success of the next campaign on this frontier will in a great
measure depend on concert and good understanding among the
superior officers.... General Brown is certainly a brave, intelligent, and
active officer. Where a portion of the forces is composed of irregular
troops, I have no hesitation in acknowledging my conviction of his
being better qualified than I to make them useful in the public
service.”

So sensitive was Izard to the public feeling and his loss of

standing that he sent his resignation to the secretary, December 18,
[191] in terms which betrayed and even asserted his consciousness
of shrinking under the weight of responsibility:—
“I am fully aware that attempts have been made to lessen the
confidence of government as well as of the public in my ability to
execute the important duties intrusted to me,—duties which were
imposed unexpectedly and much against my inclination. It is therefore
not improbable that my voluntary retirement will relieve the
Department of War from some embarrassment, and that my individual
satisfaction will accord with the public advantage,—especially as my
view of the connection between military command and responsibility
differs materially from that entertained by persons in high authority.”
A man who showed so little confidence in himself could not claim
the confidence of others, and in contact with stronger characters like
Armstrong, Brown, Scott, or Andrew Jackson could play no part but
that of a victim. His resignation was not accepted, but his career was
at an end. When he relieved the pressure kept by Brown constantly
applied to the extremity of the British line, the movement of war
necessarily turned back to its true object, which was Sackett’s
Harbor. Drummond no sooner saw Fort Erie evacuated and his lines
re-established, November 5, than he hurried on board ship with a
part of his troops, and reached Kingston, November 10,[192] where
Sir George Prevost had already prepared for an attack on Sackett’s
Harbor as soon as supplies could be brought from Quebec to
Kingston over the winter roads. Soon afterward Sir George Prevost
was recalled to England, and a new commander-in-chief, Sir George
Murray, supposed to be a man of higher capacity, was sent to take
direction of the next campaign. Reinforcements continued to arrive.
[193] About twenty-seven thousand regular troops, including officers,

were in Canada;[194] a seventy-four-gun ship and a new frigate were

launched at Kingston; and no one doubted that, with the spring,
Sackett’s Harbor would be formally besieged. Izard remained at
Buffalo, doing nothing, and his only influence on the coming as on
the past campaign was to leave the initiative to the enemy.
 CHAPTER V.
Armstrong’s management of the Northern campaign caused severe
criticism; but his neglect of the city of Washington exhausted the
public patience. For two years Washington stood unprotected; not a
battery or a breastwork was to be found on the river bank except
the old and untenable Fort Washington, or Warburton.[195] A
thousand determined men might reach the town in thirty-six hours,
and destroy it before any general alarm could be given.[196] Yet no
city was more easily protected than Washington, at that day, from
attack on its eastern side; any good engineer could have thrown up
works in a week that would have made approach by a small force
impossible. Armstrong neglected to fortify. After experience had
proved his error, he still argued in writing to a committee of
Congress[197] that fortifications would have exhausted the Treasury;
“that bayonets are known to form the most efficient barriers; and
that there was no reason in this case to doubt beforehand the
willingness of the country to defend itself,”—as though he believed
that militia were most efficient when most exposed! He did not even
provide the bayonets.
 POSITIONS
OF THE
BRITISH and AMERICAN
FORCES NEAR
WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE,
FROM AUGUST 20 TO SEPTEMBER 12 1814
In truth, Armstrong looking at the matter as a military critic
decided that the British having no strategic object in capturing
Washington, would not make the attempt. Being an indolent man,
negligent of detail, he never took unnecessary trouble; and having
no proper staff at Washington, he was without military advisers
whose opinion he respected. The President and Monroe fretted at his
indifference, the people of the District were impatient under it, and
every one except Armstrong was in constant terror of attack; but
according to their account the secretary only replied: “No, no!
Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more
consequence.”[198] Probably he was right, and the British would
have gone first to Baltimore had his negligence not invited them to
Washington.
In May the President began to press Armstrong for precautionary
measures.[199] In June letters arrived from Gallatin and Bayard in
London which caused the President to call a Cabinet meeting. June
23 and 24 the Cabinet met and considered the diplomatic situation.
[200] The President proposed then for the first time to abandon
impressment as a sine qua non of negotiation, and to approve a
treaty that should be silent on the subject. Armstrong and Jones
alone supported the idea at that time, but three days afterward,
June 27, Monroe and Campbell acceded to it. The Cabinet then took
the defences of Washington in hand, and July 1 decided to organize
a corps of defence from the militia of the District and the
neighboring States. July 2, the first step toward efficient defence
was taken by creating a new military district on the Potomac, with a
military head of its own. Armstrong wished to transfer Brigadier-
General Moses Porter from Norfolk, to command the new Potomac
District;[201] but the President selected Brigadier-General Winder,
because his relationship to the Federalist governor of Maryland was
likely to make co-operation more effective.
Political appointments were not necessarily bad; but in appointing
Winder to please the governor of Maryland Madison assumed the
responsibility, in Armstrong’s eyes, for the defence of Washington.
The Secretary of War seemed to think that Madison and Monroe
were acting together to take the defence of Washington out of his
hands, and to put it in hands in which they felt confidence.
Armstrong placed Winder instantly in command, and promptly issued
the orders arranged in Cabinet; but he left further measures to
Winder, Monroe, and Madison. His conduct irritated the President;
but no one charged that the secretary refused to carry out the
orders, or to satisfy the requisitions of the President or of General
Winder. He was merely passive.[202]
Winder received his appointment July 5, and went to Washington
for instructions. He passed the next month riding between
Washington, Baltimore, and points on the lower Potomac and
Patuxent,[203] obtaining with great fatigue a personal knowledge of
the country. August 1 he established his permanent headquarters at
Washington, and the entire result of his labors till that time was the
presence of one company of Maryland militia at Bladensburg. No line
of defence was selected, no obstructions to the roads were
prepared, and not so much as a ditch or a breastwork was marked
out or suggested between Annapolis and Washington. Another
fortnight passed, and still Winder was not further advanced. He had
no more men, arms, fortifications, and no more ideas, on the 18th of
August than on the 5th of July. “The call for three thousand militia
under the requisition of July 4 had produced only two hundred and
fifty men at the moment the enemy landed at Benedict.”[204] Winder
had then been six weeks in command of the Washington defences.
Meanwhile a British expedition under command of Major-General
Robert Ross, a distinguished officer of the Peninsula army, sailed
from the Gironde, June 27, to Bermuda. Ross was instructed “to
effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in
favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower
Canada.” The point of attack was to be decided by Vice-Admiral
Cochrane, subject to the general’s approval; but the force was not
intended for “any extended operation at a distance from the coast,”
nor was Ross to hold permanent possession of any captured district.
[205]

“When the object of the descent which you may make on the coast
is to take possession of any naval or military stores, you will not delay
the destruction of them in preference to the taking them away, if
there is reasonable ground of apprehension that the enemy is
advancing with superior force to effect their recovery. If in any
descent you shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten
the inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby
authorized to levy upon them contributions in return for your
forbearance; but you will not by this understand that the magazines
belonging to the government, or their harbors, or their shipping, are
to be included in such an arrangement. These, together with their
contents, are in all cases to be taken away or destroyed.”

Negroes were not to be encouraged to rise upon their masters,

and no slaves were to be taken away as slaves; but any negro who
should expose himself to vengeance by joining the expedition or
lending it assistance, might be enlisted in the black corps, or carried
away by the fleet.
Nothing in these orders warranted the destruction of private or
public property, except such as might be capable of military uses.
Ross was not authorized, and did not intend, to enter on a mere
marauding expedition; but Cochrane was independent of Ross, and
at about the time when Ross reached Bermuda Cochrane received a
letter from Sir George Prevost which gave an unexpected character
to the Chesapeake expedition. A small body of American troops had
crossed Lake Erie to Long Point, May 15, and destroyed the flour-
mills, distilleries, and some private houses there. The raid was not
authorized by the United States government, and the officer
commanding it was afterward court-martialed and censured; but Sir
George Prevost, without waiting for explanations, wrote to Vice-
Admiral Cochrane, June 2, suggesting that he should “assist in
inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy
from a repetition of similar outrages.”[206]
When Cochrane received this letter, he issued at Bermuda, July
18, orders to the ships under his command, from the St. Croix River
to the St. Mary’s, directing general retaliation.[207] The orders were
interesting as an illustration of the temper the war had taken.
“You are hereby required and directed,” wrote the Vice-Admiral to
the British blockading squadrons, “to destroy and lay waste such
towns and districts upon the coast as you may find assailable. You will
hold strictly in view the conduct of the American army toward his
Majesty’s unoffending Canadian subjects, and you will spare merely
the lives of the unarmed inhabitants of the United States. For only by
carrying this retributory justice into the country of our enemy can we
hope to make him sensible of the impropriety as well as of the
inhumanity of the system he has adopted. You will take every
opportunity of explaining to the people how much I lament the
necessity of following the rigorous example of the commander of the
American forces. And as these commanders must obviously have
acted under instructions from the Executive government of the United
States, whose intimate and unnatural connection with the late
government of France has led them to adopt the same system of
plunder and devastation, it is therefore to their own government the
unfortunate sufferers must look for indemnification for their loss of
property.”
This ill-advised order was to remain in force until Sir George
Prevost should send information “that the United States government
have come under an obligation to make full remuneration to the
injured and unoffending inhabitants of the Canadas for all the
outrages their troops have committed.” Cochrane further wrote to
Prevost that “as soon as these orders have been acted upon,” a copy
would be sent to Washington for the information of the Executive
government.
Cochrane’s retaliatory order was dated July 18, and Ross’s
transports arrived at Bermuda July 24. As soon as the troops were
collected and stores put on board, Cochrane and Ross sailed, August
3, for Chesapeake Bay. They arrived a few days in advance of the
transports, and passing up the bay to the mouth of the Potomac,
landed, August 15, with Rear Admiral Cockburn, to decide on a plan
for using to best effect the forces under their command.
Three objects were within reach. The first and immediate aim was
a flotilla of gunboats, commanded by Captain Joshua Barney, which
had taken refuge in the Patuxent River, and was there blockaded.
The next natural object of desire was Baltimore, on account of its
shipping and prize-money. The third was Washington and
Alexandria, on account of the navy-yard and the vessels in the
Potomac. Baltimore was the natural point of attack after destroying
Barney’s flotilla; but Cockburn, with a sailor’s recklessness, urged a
dash at Washington.[208] Ross hesitated, and postponed a decision
till Barney’s flotilla should be disposed of.
Two days afterward, August 17, the troops arrived, and the
squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, moved twenty
miles up the bay to the mouth of the Patuxent,—a point about fifty
miles distant from Annapolis on the north, and from Washington on
the northwest. Having arrived there August 18, Cochrane wrote, or
afterward ante-dated, an official letter to Secretary Monroe:[209]—
“Having been called on by the Governor-General of the Canadas to
aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the
inhabitants of the United States for the wanton destruction committed
by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty,
conformably with the nature of the Governor-General’s application, to
issue to the naval force under my command an order to destroy and
lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found
assailable.”

The notice was the more remarkable because Cochrane’s order

was issued only to the naval force. The army paid no attention to it.
Ross’s troops were landed at Benedict the next day, August 19; but
neither there nor elsewhere did they destroy or lay waste towns or
districts. They rather showed unusual respect for private property.
At Benedict, August 19, the British forces were organized in three
brigades, numbering, according to different British accounts, four
thousand five hundred, or four thousand rank-and-file.[210] Cockburn
with the boats of the fleet the next day, August 20, started up the
river in search of Barney’s flotilla; while the land force began its
march at four o’clock in the afternoon abreast of the boats, and
camped four miles above Benedict without seeing an enemy, or
suffering from a worse annoyance than one of the evening thunder-
storms common in hot weather.
The next day at dawn the British army started again, and
marched that day, Sunday, August 21, twelve miles to the village of
Nottingham, where it camped.[211] The weather was hot, and the
march resembled a midsummer picnic. Through a thickly wooded
region, where a hundred militia-men with axes and spades could
have delayed their progress for days, the British army moved in a
solitude apparently untenanted by human beings, till they reached
Nottingham on the Patuxent,—a deserted town, rich in growing
crops and full barns.
At Nottingham the army passed a quiet night, and the next
morning, Monday, August 22, lingered till eight o’clock, when it again
advanced. Among the officers in the Eighty-fifth regiment was a
lieutenant named Gleig, who wrote afterward a charming narrative
of the campaign under the title, “A Subaltern in America.” He
described the road as remarkably good, running for the most part
through the heart of thick forests, which sheltered it from the rays of
the sun. During the march the army was startled by the distant
sound of several heavy explosions. Barney had blown up his
gunboats to prevent their capture. The British naval force had thus
performed its part in the enterprise, and the army was next to take
the lead. Ross halted at Marlboro after a march of only seven miles,
and there too he camped, undisturbed by sight or sound of an
armed enemy, although the city of Washington was but sixteen miles
on his left, and Baltimore thirty miles in his front. Ross had then
marched twenty or twenty-one miles into Maryland without seeing
an enemy, although an American army had been close on his left
flank, watching him all day.
 At Marlboro Ross was obliged to decide what he should next do.
He was slow in forming a conclusion. Instead of marching at day-
break of August 23, and moving rapidly on Baltimore or Washington,
the army passed nearly the whole day at Marlboro in idleness, as
though it were willing to let the Americans do their utmost for
defence. “Having advanced within sixteen miles of Washington,”
Ross officially reported,[212] “and ascertained the force of the enemy
to be such as might authorize an attempt to carry his capital, I
determined to make it, and accordingly put the troops in movement
on the evening of the 23d.” More exactly, the troops moved at two
o’clock in the afternoon, and marched about six miles on the road to
Washington, when they struck American outposts at about five
o’clock, and saw a force posted on high ground about a mile in their
front. As the British formed to attack, the American force
disappeared, and the British army camped about nine miles from
Washington by way of the navy-yard bridge over the Eastern Branch.
Thus for five days, from August 18 to August 23, a British army,
which though small was larger than any single body of American
regulars then in the field, marched in a leisurely manner through a
long-settled country, and met no show of resistance before coming
within sight of the Capitol. Such an adventure resembled the stories
of Cortez and De Soto; and the conduct of the United States
government offered no contradiction to the resemblance.
News of the great fleet that appeared in the Patuxent August 17
reached Washington on the morning of Thursday, August 18, and set
the town in commotion. In haste the President sent fresh militia
requisitions to the neighboring States, and ordered out the militia
and all the regular troops in Washington and its neighborhood.
Monroe started again as a scout, arriving in the neighborhood of
Benedict at ten o’clock on the morning of August 20, and remaining
there all day and night without learning more than he knew before
starting.[213] Winder was excessively busy, but did, according to his
own account, nothing. “The innumerably multiplied orders, letters,
consultations, and demands which crowded upon me at the moment
of such an alarm can more easily be conceived than described, and
occupied me nearly day and night, from Thursday the 18th of
August till Sunday the 21st, and had nearly broken down myself and
assistants in preparing, dispensing, and attending to them.”
Armstrong, at last alive to the situation, made excellent suggestions,
[214] but could furnish neither troops, means, nor military
intelligence to carry them out; and the President could only call for
help. The single step taken for defence was taken by the citizens,
who held a meeting Saturday evening, and offered at their own
expense to erect works at Bladensburg. Winder accepted their offer.
Armstrong detailed Colonel Wadsworth, the only engineer officer
near the Department, to lay out the lines, and the citizens did such
work as was possible in the time that remained.
After three days of confusion, a force was at last evolved.
Probably by Winder’s order, although no such order was preserved, a
corps of observation was marched across the navy-yard bridge
toward the Patuxent, or drawn from Bladensburg, to a place called
the Woodyard, twelve miles beyond the Eastern Branch. The force
was not to be despised. Three hundred infantry regulars of different
regiments, with one hundred and twenty light dragoons, formed the
nucleus; two hundred and fifty Maryland militia, and about twelve
hundred District volunteers or militia, with twelve six-pound field-
pieces, composed a body of near two thousand men,[215] from
whom General Brown or Andrew Jackson would have got good
service. Winder came out and took command Sunday evening, and
Monroe, much exhausted, joined them that night.
There the men stood Monday, August 22, while the British army
marched by them, within sight of their outposts, from Nottingham to
Marlboro. Winder rode forward with his cavalry and watched all day
the enemy’s leisurely movements close in his front,[216] but the idea
of attack did not appear to enter his mind. “A doubt at that time,” he
said,[217] “was not entertained by anybody of the intention of the
enemy to proceed direct to Washington.” At nine o’clock that evening
Monroe sent a note to the President, saying that the enemy was in
full march for Washington; that Winder proposed to retire till he
could collect his troops; that preparations should be made to destroy
the bridges, and that the papers in the government offices should be
removed.[218] At the same time Monroe notified Serurier, the only
foreign minister then in Washington, that the single hope of saving
the capital depended on the very doubtful result of an engagement,
which would probably take place the next day or the day after, at
Bladensburg.[219]
At Bladensburg, of necessity, the engagement must take place,
unless Winder made an attack or waited for attack on the road. One
of two courses was to be taken,—Washington must be either
defended or evacuated. Perhaps Winder would have done better to
evacuate it, and let the British take the undefended village; but no
suggestion of the sort was made, nor did Winder retreat to
Bladensburg as was necessary if he meant to unite his troops and
make preparations for a battle. Instead of retreating to Bladensburg
as soon as he was satisfied—at noon of Monday, August 22—that
the British were going there, he ordered his troops to fall back, and
took position at the Old Fields, about five miles in the rear of the
Woodyard, and about seven miles by road from the navy-yard.
Another road led from the Old Fields to Bladensburg about eight
miles away. The American force might have been united at
Bladensburg Monday evening, but Winder camped at the Old Fields
and passed the night.
That evening the President and the members of the Cabinet rode
out to the camp, and the next morning the President reviewed the
army, which had been reinforced by Commodore Barney with four
hundred sailors, the crews of the burned gunboats. Winder then had
twenty-five hundred men, of whom near a thousand were regulars,
or sailors even better fighting troops than ordinary regulars. Such a
force vigorously led was sufficient to give Ross’s army a sharp check,
and at that moment Ross was still hesitating whether to attack
Washington. The loss of a few hundred men might have turned the
scale at any moment during Tuesday, August 23; but Winder neither
fought nor retreated, but once more passed the day on scout. At
noon he rode with a troop of cavalry toward Marlboro. Satisfied that
the enemy was not in motion and would not move that day, he
started at one o’clock for Bladensburg, leaving his army to itself. He
wished to bring up a brigade of militia from Bladensburg.[220]
Winder had ridden about five miles, when the British at two
o’clock suddenly broke up their camp and marched directly on the
Old Fields. The American army hastily formed in line, and sent off its
baggage to Washington. Winder was summoned back in haste, and
arrived on the field at five o’clock as the British appeared. He
ordered a retreat. Every military reason required a retreat to
Bladensburg. Winder directed a retreat on Washington by the navy-
yard bridge.
The reasons which actuated him to prefer the navy-yard to
Bladensburg, as explained by him, consisted in anxiety for the safety
of that “direct and important pass,” which could not without hazard
be left unguarded.[221] In order to guard a bridge a quarter of a mile
long over an impassable river covered by the guns of war-vessels
and the navy-yard, he left unguarded the open high-road which led
through Bladensburg directly to the Capitol and the White House.
After a very rapid retreat that “literally became a run of eight
miles,”[222] Winder encamped in Washington near the bridge-head
at the navy-yard at eight o’clock that night, and then rode three
miles to the White House to report to the President. On returning to
camp, he passed the night until three or four o’clock in the morning
making in person arrangements to destroy the bridge “when
necessary,” assuring his officers that he expected the enemy to
attempt a passage there that night.[223] Toward dawn he lay down,
exhausted by performing a subaltern’s duty all day, and snatched an
hour or two of sleep.
The British in their camp that evening were about eight miles
from Bladensburg battle-field. Winder was about five miles distant
from the same point. By a quick march at dawn he might still have
arrived there, with six hours to spare for arranging his defence. He
preferred to wait till he should know with certainty that the British
were on their way there. On the morning of Wednesday, August 24,
he wrote to Armstrong:[224]—
“I have found it necessary to establish my headquarters here, the
most advanced position convenient to the troops, and nearest
information. I shall remain stationary as much as possible, that I may
be the more readily found, to issue orders, and collect together the
various detachments of militia, and give them as rapid a consolidation
and organization as possible.... The news up the river is very
threatening. Barney’s or some other force should occupy the batteries
at Greenleaf’s Point and the navy-yard. I should be glad of the
assistance of counsel from yourself and the Government. If more
convenient, I should make an exertion to go to you the first
opportunity.”

This singular note was carried first to the President, who, having
opened and read it, immediately rode to headquarters. Monroe,
Jones, and Rush followed. Armstrong and Campbell arrived last.
Before Armstrong appeared, a scout arrived at ten o’clock with
information that the British army had broken up its camp at daylight,
and was probably more than half way to Bladensburg.[225]
Winder’s persistence in remaining at the navy-yard was explained
as due to the idea that the enemy might move toward the Potomac,
seize Fort Washington or Warburton, secure the passage of his
ships, and approach the city by the river.[226] The general never
explained how his presence at the navy-yard was to prevent such a
movement if it was made.
The whole eastern side of Washington was covered by a broad
estuary called the Eastern Branch of the Potomac, bridged only at
two points, and impassable, even by pontoons, without ample
warning. From the Potomac River to Bladensburg, a distance of
about seven miles, the city was effectually protected. Bladensburg
made the point of a right angle. There the Baltimore road entered
the city as by a pass; for beyond, to the west, no general would
venture to enter, leaving an enemy at Bladensburg in his rear. Roads
were wanting, and the country was difficult. Through Bladensburg
the attacking army must come; to Bladensburg Winder must go,
unless he meant to retreat to Georgetown, or to re-cross the Eastern
Branch in the enemy’s rear. Monroe notified Serurier Monday evening
that the battle would be fought at Bladensburg. Secretary Jones
wrote to Commodore Rodgers, Tuesday morning, that the British
would probably “advance to-day toward Bladensburg.”[227] Every
one looked instinctively to that spot[228], yet Winder to the last
instant persisted in watching the navy-yard bridge, using the hours
of Wednesday morning to post Barney’s sailors with twenty-four-
pound guns to cover an approach[229] where no enemy could cross.
 MAP OF THE
BATTLE
OF
BLADENSBURG
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.

No sooner did Winder receive intelligence at ten o’clock

Wednesday morning that the British were in march to Bladensburg,
than in the utmost haste he started for the same point, preceded by
Monroe and followed by the President and the rest of the Cabinet
and the troops. Barney’s sailors and their guns would have been left
behind to guard the navy-yard bridge had Secretary Jones not
yielded to Barney’s vigorous though disrespectful remonstrances,
and allowed him to follow.[230]
In a long line the various corps, with their military and civil
commanders, streamed toward Bladensburg, racing with the British,
ten miles away, to arrive first on the field of battle. Monroe was
earliest on the ground. Between eleven and twelve o’clock he
reached the spot where hills slope gently toward the Eastern Branch
a mile or more in broad incline, the little straggling town of
Bladensburg opposite, beyond a shallow stream, and hills and woods
in the distance. Several militia corps were already camped on the
ground, which had been from the first designated as the point of
concentration. A Baltimore brigade, more than two thousand strong,
had arrived there thirty-six hours before. Some Maryland regiments
arrived at the same time with Monroe. About three thousand men
were then on the field, and their officers were endeavoring to form
them in line of battle. General Stansbury of the Baltimore brigade
made such an arrangement as he thought best. Monroe, who had no
military rank, altered it without Stansbury’s knowledge.[231] General
Winder arrived at noon, and rode about the field. At the same time
the British light brigade made its appearance, and wound down the
opposite road, a mile away, a long column of redcoats, six abreast,
moving with the quick regularity, of old soldiers,[232] and striking
directly at the American centre. They reached the village on one side
of the stream as Winder’s troops poured down the hill on the other;
and the President with two or three of his Cabinet officers,
considerably in advance of all their own troops, nearly rode across
the bridge into the British line, when a volunteer scout warned them
of their danger.[233]
Much the larger portion of the American force arrived on the
ground when the enemy was in sight, and were hastily drawn up in
line wherever they could be placed.[234] They had no cover. Colonel
Wadsworth’s intrenchments were not used,[235] except in the case of
one field-work which enfiladed the bridge at close range, where
field-pieces were placed. Although some seven thousand men were
present, nothing deserving the name of an army existed. “A few
companies only,” said the Subaltern, “perhaps two or at the most
three battalions, wearing the blue jacket which the Americans have
borrowed from the French, presented some appearance of regular
troops. The rest seemed country-people, who would have been
much more appropriately employed in attending to their agricultural
occupations than in standing with muskets in their hands on the
brow of a bare, green hill.” Heterogeneous as the force was, it would
have been sufficient had it enjoyed the advantage of a commander.
The British light brigade, some twelve or fifteen hundred men,
under Colonel Thornton of the Eighty-fifth regiment, without waiting
for the rear division, dashed across the bridge, and were met by a
discharge of artillery and musketry directly in their face. Checked for
an instant, they pressed on, crossed the bridge or waded the
stream, and spread to the right and left, while their rockets flew into
the American lines. Almost instantly a portion of the American line
gave way; but the rest stood firm, and drove the British skirmishers
back under a heavy fire to the cover of the bank with its trees and
shrubs. Not until a fresh British regiment, moving well to the right,
forded the stream and threatened to turn the American left, did the
rout begin. Even then several strong corps stood steady, and in good
order retired by the road that led to the Capitol; but the mass, struck
by panic, streamed westward toward Georgetown and Rockville.
Meanwhile Barney’s sailors, though on the run, could not reach
the field in time for the attack, and halted on the hillside, about a
mile from Bladensburg, at a spot just outside the District line. The
rout had then begun, but Barney put his five pieces in position and
waited for the enemy. The American infantry and cavalry that had
not fled westward moved confusedly past the field where the sailors
stood at their guns. Winder sent Barney no orders, and Barney, who
was not acting under Winder, but was commander-in-chief of his
own forces under authority of the Navy Department, had no idea of
running away. Four hundred men against four thousand were odds
too great even for sailors, but a battle was not wholly disgraceful
that produced such a commander and such men. Barney’s account
of the combat was as excellent as his courage:[236]—
“At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road in
force and in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt. I
reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when
 I ordered an eighteen-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared
the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the
enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They then crossed
over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right. He was met
there by three twelve-pounders, the marines under Captain Miller, and
my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time
not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or
six hundred posted on a height on my right, from which I expected
much support from their fine situation.”
Such a battle could not long continue. The British turned Barney’s
right; the corps on the height broke and fled,[237] and the British,
getting into the rear, fired down upon the sailors. The British
themselves were most outspoken in praise of Barney’s men. “Not
only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision that
astonished their assailants,” said the Subaltern, “but they stood till
some of them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor
was it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw
themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they left the
field.” Barney held his position nearly half an hour, and then, being
severely wounded, ordered his officers to leave him where he lay.
There he was taken by the British advance, and carried to their
hospital at Bladensburg. The British officers, admiring his gallantry,
treated him, he said, “with the most marked attention, respect, and
politeness as if I was a brother,”—as though to show their opinion
that Barney instead of Winder should have led the American army.
After the sailors retired, at about four o’clock, the British stopped
two hours to rest. Their victory, easy as it seemed, was not cheaply
bought. General Ross officially reported sixty-four killed and one
hundred and eighty-five wounded.[238] A loss of two hundred and
fifty men among fifteen hundred said to be engaged[239] was not
small; but Gleig, an officer of the light brigade, himself wounded,
made twice, at long intervals, an assertion which he must have
intended as a contradiction of the official report. “The loss on the
part of the English was severe,” he said,[240] “since out of two thirds
of the army which were engaged upward of five hundred men were
killed and wounded.” According to this assertion, Ross lost five
hundred men among three thousand engaged, or one in six. Had
Winder inflicted that loss while the British were still on the Patuxent,
Ross would have thought long before risking more, especially as
Colonel Thornton was among the severely injured. The Americans
reported only twenty-six killed and fifty-one wounded.
At six o’clock, after a rest of two hours, the British troops
resumed their march; but night fell before they reached the first
houses of the town. As Ross and Cockburn, with a few officers,
advanced before the troops, some men, supposed to have been
Barney’s sailors, fired on the party from the house formerly occupied
by Gallatin, at the northeast corner of Capitol Square. Ross’s horse
was killed, and the general ordered the house to be burned, which
was done. The army did not enter the town, but camped at eight
o’clock a quarter of a mile east of the Capitol. Troops were then
detailed to burn the Capitol, and as the great building burst into
flames, Ross and Cockburn, with about two hundred men, marched
silently in the darkness to the White House, and set fire to it. At the
same time Commodore Tingey, by order of Secretary Jones, set fire
to the navy-yard and the vessels in the Eastern Branch. Before
midnight the flames of three great conflagrations made the whole
country light, and from the distant hills of Maryland and Virginia the
flying President and Cabinet caught glimpses of the ruin their
incompetence had caused.
Serurier lived then in the house built by John Tayloe in 1800,
called the Octagon, a few hundred yards from the War and Navy
Departments and the White House.[241] He was almost the only civil
official left in Washington, and hastened to report the event to
Talleyrand:[242]—
“I never saw a scene at once more terrible and more magnificent.
Your Highness, knowing the picturesque nature and the grandeur of
the surroundings, can form an idea of it. A profound darkness reigned
in the part of the city that I occupy, and we were left to conjectures
and to the lying reports of negroes as to what was passing in the
quarter illuminated by these frightful flames. At eleven o’clock a
 colonel, preceded by torches, was seen to take the direction of the
White House, which is situated quite near mine; the negroes reported
that it was to be burned, as well as all those pertaining to government
offices. I thought best, on the moment, to send one of my people to
the general with a letter, in which I begged him to send a guard to the
house of the Ambassador of France to protect it.... My messenger
found General Ross in the White House, where he was collecting in
the drawing-room all the furniture to be found, and was preparing to
set fire to it. The general made answer that the King’s Hotel should be
respected as much as though his Majesty were there in person; that
he would give orders to that effect; and that if he was still in
Washington the next day, he would have the pleasure to call on me.”
Ross and Cockburn alone among military officers, during more
than twenty years of war, considered their duty to involve personal
incendiarism. At the time and subsequently various motives were
attributed to them,—such as the duty of retaliation,—none of which
was alleged by either of them as their warranty.[243] They burned
the Capitol, the White House, and the Department buildings because
they thought it proper, as they would have burned a negro kraal or a
den of pirates. Apparently they assumed as a matter of course that
the American government stood beyond the pale of civilization; and
in truth a government which showed so little capacity to defend its
capital, could hardly wonder at whatever treatment it received.
A violent thunder-storm checked the flames; but the next
morning, Thursday, August 25, fresh detachments of troops were
sent to complete the destruction of public property. Without orders
from his Government, Ross converted his campaign, which till then
had been creditable to himself and flattering to British pride, into a
marauding raid of which no sensible Englishman spoke without
mortification. Cockburn amused himself by revenging his personal
grievances on the press which had abused him. Mounted on a brood
mare, white, uncurried, with a black foal trotting by her side, the
Admiral attacked the office of the “National Intelligencer,” and
superintended the destruction of the types. “Be sure that all the C’s
are destroyed,” he ordered, “so that the rascals cannot any longer
abuse my name.”[244] Ross was anxious to complete the destruction
of the public buildings with the least possible delay, that the army
might retire without loss of time;[245] and the work was pressed
with extreme haste. A few private buildings were burned, but as a
rule private property was respected, and no troops except small
detachments were allowed to leave the camp.
Soon after noon, while the work was still incomplete, a tornado
burst on the city and put an end to the effort. An accidental
explosion at the navy-yard helped to check destruction. Ross could
do no more, and was in haste to get away. No sooner had the
hurricane, which lasted nearly two hours and seemed especially
violent at the camp, passed over, than Ross began preparations to
retire. With precautions wholly unnecessary, leaving its camp-fires
burning, the British column in extreme silence, after nine o’clock at
night, began its march. Passing Bladensburg, where the dead were
still unburied, Ross left his wounded in the hospital to American
care, and marched all night till seven o’clock Friday morning, when
the troops, exhausted with fatigue, were allowed a rest. At noon
they were again in motion, and at night-fall, after marching twenty-
five miles within twenty-four hours, they arrived at Marlboro. Had
the advance from Benedict been equally rapid, Ross would have
entered Washington without a skirmish.
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