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____ 18. The first electronic digital computers, sometimes called mainframe computers, consisted of vacuum tubes,
wires, and plugs, and filled entire rooms.

____ 19. In the early 1940s, computer scientists realized that a symbolic notation could be used instead of machine
code, and the first assembly languages appeared.

____ 20. The development of the transistor in the early 1960s allowed computer engineers to build ever smaller,
faster, and less expensive computer hardware components.

____ 21. Moore’s Law states that the processing speed and storage capacity of hardware will increase and its cost
will decrease by approximately a factor of 3 every 18 months.

____ 22. In the 1960s, batch processing sometimes caused a programmer to wait days for results, including error
messages.

____ 23. In 1984, Apple Computer brought forth the Macintosh, the first successful mass-produced personal
computer with a graphical user interface.

____ 24. By the mid 1980s, the ARPANET had grown into what we now call the Internet, connecting computers
owned by large institutions, small organizations, and individuals all over the world.

____ 25. Steve Jobs wrote the first Web server and Web browser software.

____ 26. Guido van Rossum invented the Python programming language in the early 1990s.

____ 27. In Python, the programmer can force the output of a value by using the cout statement.

____ 28. When executing the print statement, Python first displays the value and then evaluates the expression.

____ 29. When writing Python programs, you should use a .pyt extension.

____ 30. The interpreter reads a Python expression or statement, also called the source code, and verifies that it is
well formed.

____ 31. If a Python expression is well formed, the interpreter translates it to an equivalent form in a low-level
language called byte code.

Multiple Choice
Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.

____ 32. The sequence of steps that describes a computational processes is called a(n) ____.
a. program c. pseudocode
b. computing agent d. algorithm
____ 33. An algorithm consists of a(n) ____ number of instructions.
a. finite c. predefined
b. infinite d. undefined
____ 34. The action described by the instruction in an algorithm can be performed effectively or be executed by a
____.
a. computer c. computing agent
b. processor d. program
____ 35. In the modern world of computers, information is also commonly referred to as ____.
a. data c. input
b. bits d. records
____ 36. In carrying out the instructions of any algorithm, the computing agent starts with some given information
(known as ____).
a. data c. input
b. variables d. output
____ 37. In carrying out the instructions of any algorithm, the computing agent transforms some given information
according to well-defined rules, and produces new information, known as ____.
a. data c. input
b. variables d. output
____ 38. ____ consists of the physical devices required to execute algorithms.
a. Firmware c. I/O
b. Hardware d. Processors
____ 39. ____ is the set of algorithms, represented as programs in particular programming languages.
a. Freeware c. Software
b. Shareware d. Dataset
____ 40. In a computer, the ____ devices include a keyboard, a mouse, and a microphone.
a. memory c. input
b. CPU d. output
____ 41. Computers can communicate with the external world through various ____ that connect them to networks
and to other devices such as handheld music players and digital cameras.
a. facilities c. racks
b. ports d. slots
____ 42. The primary memory of a computer is also sometimes called internal or ____.
a. read-only memory (ROM) c. flash memory
b. random access memory (RAM) d. associative memory
____ 43. The CPU, which is also sometimes called a ____, consists of electronic switches arranged to perform
simple logical, arithmetic, and control operations.
a. motherboard c. chip
b. computing agent d. processor
____ 44. Flash memory sticks are an example of ____ storage media.
a. semiconductor c. optical
b. magnetic d. primary
____ 45. Tapes and hard disks are an example of ____ storage media.
a. semiconductor c. optical
b. magnetic d. primary
____ 46. CDs and DVDs are an example of ____ storage media.
 a. semiconductor c. optical
b. magnetic d. primary
____ 47. A ____ takes a set of machine language instructions as input and loads them into the appropriate memory
locations.
a. compiler c. loader
b. linker d. interpreter
____ 48. A modern ____ organizes the monitor screen around the metaphor of a desktop, with windows containing
icons for folders, files, and applications.
a. GUI c. terminal-based interface
b. CLI d. applications software
____ 49. ____ programming languages resemble English and allow the author to express algorithms in a form that
other people can understand.
a. Assembly c. Low-level
b. Interpreted d. High-level
____ 50. Early in the nineteenth century, ____ designed and constructed a machine that automated the process of
weaving.
a. George Boole c. Herman Hollerith
b. Joseph Jacquard d. Charles Babbage
____ 51. ____ took the concept of a programmable computer a step further by designing a model of a machine that,
conceptually, bore a striking resemblance to a modern general-purpose computer.
a. George Boole c. Herman Hollerith
b. Joseph Jacquard d. Charles Babbage
____ 52. ____ developed a machine that automated data processing for the U.S. Census.
a. George Boole c. Herman Hollerith
b. Joseph Jacquard d. Charles Babbage
____ 53. ____ developed a system of logic which consisted of a pair of values, TRUE and FALSE, and a set of
three primitive operations on these values, AND, OR, and NOT.
a. George Boole c. Herman Hollerith
b. Joseph Jacquard d. Charles Babbage
____ 54. ____ was considered ideal for numerical and scientific applications.
a. COBOL c. LISP
b. Machine code d. FORTRAN
____ 55. In its early days, ____ was used primarily for laboratory experiments in an area of research known as
artificial intelligence.
a. COBOL c. LISP
b. Machine code d. FORTRAN
____ 56. In science or any other area of enquiry, a(n) ____ allows human beings to reduce complex ideas or entities
to simpler ones.
a. abstraction c. module
b. algorithm d. compiler
____ 57. In the early 1980s, a college dropout named Bill Gates and his partner Paul Allen built their own
operating system software, which they called ____.
a. LISP c. MS-DOS
 b. Windows d. Linux
____ 58. Python is a(n) ____ language.
a. functional c. interpreted
b. assembly d. compiled
____ 59. To quit the Python shell, you can either select the window’s close box or press the ____ key combination.
a. Control+C c. Control+Z
b. Control+D d. Control+X
____ 60. In Python, you can write a print statement that includes two or more expressions separated by ____.
a. periods c. colons
b. commas d. semicolons
____ 61. The Python interpreter rejects any statement that does not adhere to the grammar rules, or ____, of the
language.
a. code c. definition
b. library d. syntax
1
Answer Section

TRUE/FALSE

1. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 2

2. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 3
3. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 3
4. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 3
5. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 4
6. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 4
7. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 5
8. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 6
9. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 7
10. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 7
11. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 8
12. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 8
13. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 8
14. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 9
15. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 9
16. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 11
17. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 15
18. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 16
19. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 16
20. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 18
21. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 18
22. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 19
23. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 20
24. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 21
25. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 23
26. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 23
27. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 25
28. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 25
29. ANS: F PTS: 1 REF: 28
30. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 30
31. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: 30

MULTIPLE CHOICE

32. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 3

33. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 3
34. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 3
35. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 4
36. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 5
37. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 5
38. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 6
39. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 6
40. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 6
41. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 6
42. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 7
43. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 7
44. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 8
45. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 8
46. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 8
47. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 8
48. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 9
49. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 9
50. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 14
51. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 14
52. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 14
53. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 14-15
54. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 17
55. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 17
56. ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: 18
57. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 21
58. ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: 23
59. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 25
60. ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: 25
61. ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: 30
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
Conveyed to Brixton prison, to await a suitable opportunity
for his being sent to Germany, he appealed to the Home
Office for release. His appeal included claims to the effect
that he was absolutely innocent of any crime, that he had
nothing whatever to do with the Official Secrets Act, and
that, since the police had produced no documents in court,
they had evidently discovered nothing of an incriminating
nature at his place in Caledonian Road, where he had
carried on business as a hairdresser for sixteen years, with
a Pentonville official among his customers. Inquiries proved
the truth of a claim that he made to the effect that he was a
British subject, which rendered it impossible to detain him
under the Aliens Restriction Act. He was consequently
released, and rearrested outside the prison gates as a spy
on the country in which he had voluntarily become a citizen
by means of naturalisation. The charge against him now is
that is he traitor as well as spy.

His position with regard to the original charge and sentence

of deportation is worthy of note. For sixteen years he had
been in business in Caledonian Road; that is to say, he had
resided in his place for such a length of time that there
were no grounds for suspicion against him on the part of
the inhabitants of the district. He was a part of the life of
the place, almost an old inhabitant, when his doings
rendered him worthy of the notice of the police. This is
characteristic of the fixed agent in French centres, as
already stated here.

On September 28, 1914, the present case was opened

against Ernst by Mr Bodkin, who appeared for the Director
of Public Prosecutions at Bow Street Police-Court. The
charge was to the effect that Ernst had “obtained and
communicated, and attempted to obtain and communicate
to one Steinhauer, certain information calculated to be
useful to an enemy.”
Mr Bodkin stated that the prisoner first came under the
suspicion of the authorities in October of 1911, and it was
evident that from then until January of 1914 he had been a
spy in the pay of the German secret service. The man who
was practically Ernst’s master was one Steinhauer, a
member and organiser of the German secret service, whose
name had figured in practically every espionage case
investigated in this country for the past three or four years.

Acting under Steinhauer’s orders, the prisoner was alleged

to have been deputed to accomplish certain duties which fell
under two heads. In the first place, it was alleged that he
was to receive from Steinhauer, who was located in
Germany, letters enclosed in envelopes which gave them
the appearance of ordinary business communications, and
to post them in England to various members of the
organisation. In the second place, it was alleged that he
was to make inquiries on his own account with regard to
persons and places which, in the opinion of Steinhauer,
would be useful to the German secret service. His salary
consisted of out-of-pocket expenses and a retaining fee of
one pound a month, which, when Ernst pointed out the risk
attaching to what he was doing, and the importance of his
work, was increased to one pound ten shillings a month. Mr
Bodkin stated that “the system was perfectly well-known
from the commencement in 1911, and the hairdresser’s
shop in Caledonian Road was accordingly kept under
observation.”

The observation included the opening of letters addressed

to the accused, which were traced and the tracings filed
before delivery of the originals to Ernst. There were
included among these letters a large number of
communications from Germany, chiefly from Potsdam, and
Ernst himself sent many communications to Potsdam and
Berlin. His letters were posted in different districts of
London, while the letters coming from Germany to him were
written on English note-paper and enclosed in English
envelopes, which the prisoner had forwarded to Steinhauer
for use—in one instance the paper and envelopes had been
sent as “samples,” the package being so weighty that
Steinhauer had to pay excess postage at the other end. By
opening both outgoing and incoming correspondence the
authorities were placed in possession of a mass of valuable
information as regards not only Ernst, but also other
members of the system in England.

For the purpose of the correspondence with Ernst,

Steinhauer was alleged to have adopted the alias of “Mrs
Reimers,” and Ernst himself, the prosecution stated,
changed his name from time to time, having letters
addressed to his shop as to “J. Walters, care of K.G. Ernst,”
and sometimes to “W. Weller.” These two names were the
prisoner’s own suggestion to Steinhauer. The latter sent
letters not only to Ernst himself, but also missives to be
forwarded to various places, including Chatham, Sheerness,
and Portland Harbour. These letters were opened by the
authorities under powers which they possessed for dealing
with such cases, and tracings were taken before the letters
were delivered.

Ernst was requested by Steinhauer to find out all that he

could about certain persons named, on the ground that they
were connected or believed to be connected with the
Intelligence Department of the War Office. One of the firms
upon which he was called to make inquiries and report had
an office in the City opposite to the office occupied by the
late Captain Stewart, who figured in the German courts in
an espionage case, and subsequently was imprisoned in a
German fortress. In one of the envelopes sent to Ernst by
Steinhauer were two letters, one of which was addressed to
a British sailor, and the other to a German located at
Portland Harbour. Further, the prosecution alleged, Ernst
was in constant communication with persons named Kruger
and Krumer, in connection with espionage work, while one
of his letters referred to a magazine article which described
the defences of the East Coast. Another letter contained
reference to the espionage case against Parrott, which took
place in the autumn of 1912. After January of 1914,
Steinhauer requested Ernst to make inquiries about a
person living in Somerset, and to this Ernst replied that he
could not spare the time to do so, though he had previously
gone up to Sheffield on business of a similar nature.

Here, with the taking of some formal evidence, the first

hearing of the case closed, and at this point Mr S.Y. Tilly,
who had been retained for the defence of the prisoner, said
that if he had been in possession of the information outlined
by Mr Bodkin it would have made a difference in his
procedure in the case. He had been assured by the prisoner
and the prisoner’s friends that Ernst was a perfectly
straightforward British subject: but, in the circumstances
revealed by Mr Bodkin’s statement, he felt compelled to
withdraw from the case. The act was sufficiently unusual to
excite comment on the part of the court authorities; but Mr
Tilly withdrew.

The second hearing took place on October 5, 1914, when

the first witness called, a clerk in the secretary’s office at
the General Post Office, deposed to having opened and
copied the letters which bore as postmark either “Potsdam”
or “Berlin.” These letters were written in German, and many
of the envelopes contained letters which were to be
reposted by Ernst to other addresses. Some of the letters to
Ernst were signed “St.,” and one of them, bearing the
postmark “Berlin 6-1-12” contained an envelope addressed
to “Mrs Seymour, 87, Alexandra Road, Sheerness.” Mr
Bodkin explained that this was the pseudonym and address
of the man Parrott, who figured in an espionage case in the
autumn of 1912.

Another letter to Ernst, the witness further deposed, was

dated “Potsdam, January 25, 1912,” and signed “St.” It
contained a request that envelopes, bearing the printed
name of the makers, should be sent to the writer. Then, on
February 12, the same correspondent addressed Ernst:
“Please post the enclosed letters at once, and send me, if
you please, fifty envelopes as sample which you sent. Then
write me a letter, if you please, a letter in good English, in
which a customer asks for letters to be forwarded to him on
the Continent addressed to ‘Poste Restante, etc.’”

There were enclosed with this missive two letters,

addressed respectively to “F. Ireland, Mess 2, H.M.S.
Foxhound, care of G.P.O.,” and “A Schutte, 5, Castletown,
Portland Harbour.” Another letter produced, bearing date of
January 23, 1912, signed “St.,” and dated from Potsdam,
contained the following:

“According to information from newspapers, a fireman has

been arrested on the English cruiser Foxhound. If that is
Kr’s nephew, then it is certain he was dragged into it
through the carelessness and stupidity of Kr. Perhaps you
can get into communication with K., but by all means be
cautious. If my suspicions are correct, then Kr. will be
watched. Above all—caution. Should you have an
opportunity to speak to him then ask him at the same time
respecting a certain Schmidt he once recommended to me.
He (Kruger) must be cautious, and especially show no
address. That is to say, only go there when you know there
is no danger to you. I mean, he must not start speaking
German to you in the presence of others. Please let me hear
something soon.”
Mr Bodkin explained that Ireland of the Foxhound was a
nephew of a man named Kruger, who took the name of
Ireland when he joined the Navy.

Another letter addressed to the prisoner from Potsdam, and

dated February 11, 1912, contained the following:

“Many thanks for your valuable letter. In future it will be

done so. Do you also desire that the letters I send you be
sent ‘care of’? Please reply to me as to this. Please deliver
at once enclosed letter addressed to Kronan. Expenses
please charge. Best greetings.—St.”

A letter sent to the prisoner for reposting was addressed to

“H. Graves, Esq, B.M., B.Sc., 23, Craiglea Drive,
Morningside, Edinburgh,” and in this were three five-pound
Bank of England notes. On March 7, 1912, Steinhauer
signed his name in full, and enclosed 100 marks, requesting
Ernst to obtain for him a copy of a London daily paper,
which contained a detailed article on espionage, published a
little time before the close of the Stewart espionage case.
Copies of the letters sent through Ernst to “Mrs Parrott,
Alexandra Road, Sheerness,” and to “H. Graves,” at
Edinburgh and later at Glasgow, were put in as evidence,
but these were not read in court. One of Graves’s letters
was enclosed in an envelope which bore the name of a well-
known firm of chemical and drug manufacturers, as detailed
in the evidence at the trial of Graves. Mr Bodkin,
commenting on this, said that the envelope was probably
stolen.

On March 23 “St.” (Steinhauer) wrote from Potsdam to

Ernst: “K. has excited himself for nothing. The youth is free.
I will tell you the story orally next time.” Mr Bodkin
remarked, by way of explanation, that the youth Ireland
had been discharged.
Another letter addressed to Mr Graves, at the Central Hotel,
Glasgow, dated April 9, 1912, and forwarded through Ernst,
contained bank-notes for 15 pounds—this was very nearly
the last letter ever sent to Graves, judging from the time of
his arrest and trial. On March 2 a letter from Potsdam
contained a request for the prisoner to inquire whether a
certain person living near Hyde Park was a busy man, and
whether he was connected with the English Government.
Then, in July of 1912, “St.” must have grown suspicious of
the correspondence having been examined, for he wrote:
“There is another point that I wish to impress on you, and
that is, always to post registered letters in different post
offices or districts. But you do that probably on your own
accord.” Yet again, in a letter dated September 1, from
Potsdam, Steinhauer emphasised the need for caution. “You
can imagine,” he wrote, “for yourself that we need in all
directions only good, sure, and trustworthy people. We
must be safe from surprises on the part of the women. Will
you take another name instead of Walters?”

Evidence of another travelling spy was afforded by letters

addressed to “F. Gould, Queen Charlotte Hotel, Rochester,”
and to “Charles Graham, care of Mr Gould,” at the same
address. The one directly addressed contained two five-
pound notes, and the “care of” letter contained three of
these.

So far, the evidence had concerned letters addressed to

Ernst, and then the witness went on to tell of the letters
sent by Ernst to Steinhauer. Witness had from time to time
opened these letters, acting under his official instructions,
and had found they were posted in London to Mrs or Miss
Reimers, care of Steinhauer, at a Potsdam address. They
were all in handwriting which he recognised as that of the
prisoner, when given the opportunity of comparing the
writing, and were variously signed “G.E.,” “W. Weller,” and
“J. Walters.” Certain extracts from these letters were read in
court by Mr Bodkin, and the following passages may be
quoted:

“Dear Mr Steinhauer,—Allow me to make a few suggestions

which came into my head while reading the case of Grosse.
You will be able to see that your agent Grosse had not the
slightest consideration for your other agents. No more could
be expected from a man who has already done ten years’
penal servitude. Therefore, I beg that when you give any
one my address, you give a different name, such as W.
Weller.

“I have immediately posted both letters. (To Schutte and

Ireland.) Herewith enclosed two sample letters. I should
also like to mention that the papers are making a gigantic
row respecting the Stewart affair. To-day several papers had
the interview and confession which he has made. W. Weller.”

The “sample” letters referred to may be judged from the

following, read in court from one of them:

“Dear Sir,—My business has caused me to go to Switzerland

for a short time, and, as I shall not be back in London for
about two months, I should like you to send on my letters,
marked Poste Restante. Any expenses you might incur I will
make up on my return to London.”

Another letter was as follows:

“Dear Mr Steinhauer,—I should be very pleased if you would

address letters to J. Walters, care of Ernst. In future I shall
sign my letters J. Walters, so that no mistake can be
made... With regard to your other order, I beg you to
excuse me, as I don’t at all wish to meet Kruger. I have
seen him once, and he does not please me. I myself got a
letter for somebody, care of the Foxhound. I did not post
the letter in my vicinity, but in the West End. The
newspapers have the sailor’s photograph, and he is said to
be named Ireland, and to have been born in Germany. I
shall have nothing to do with it.”

Another letter was mentioned in which the accused was

alleged to have referred to what he described as “a fine
article” in a monthly magazine with regard to the East Coast
defences, and he also enclosed a cutting from a newspaper
which detailed the arrest of Doctor Graves of Edinburgh.
Ernst’s comments on this, as read in court, were: “It shows
how dangerous it is to have letters addressed Poste
Restante. I only say of myself that for one pound a month I
will not live in fear, as I have indeed a good business which
maintains me. In April I shall end my second year in your
service, and I should like to ask that my salary be
increased. A confidential post such as mine is worth 30
shillings a month.”

Further letters produced referred to the Parrott case, and

one of these contained a cutting from a paper giving a
report of the evidence against Parrott in the police-court.
When asked if he wished to question the witness, Ernst
replied that he was unable to employ a solicitor, and had
determined to reserve his defence until he appeared on
trial. With that the hearing of the case was adjourned for a
week.

The detailed evidence, summarised above, is extremely

interesting and enlightening, in that it outlines, with a few
gaps, the working of the fixed post system, and further
discloses that, in addition to the headquarter stations
established at Brussels, Lausanne, Berne, and other places
outside Germany, a headquarter station exists by means of
which the fixed agents are enabled to communicate direct
with Berlin. Moreover, this case demonstrates very forcibly
the measures taken for counter-espionage, and shows that
Germany needs another Stieber if the secret service of the
present day is to be made as efficient as in the time of the
first Franco-German War. Since the alleged treachery of
Ernst was in the knowledge of the police from the beginning
of the time stated as his period of work, and since the
alleged effect of his establishment as a fixed agent was to
produce more arrests by the English and Scottish police
than useful news for Germany, one is at liberty to entertain
very grave doubts of the efficiency of a system which
includes such establishments as this. The capture of letters,
and their opening and tracing, is worthy of note, especially
when it is remembered that not only were the post office
authorities able to capture incoming letters—a
comparatively simple matter, once their suspicions were
aroused—but also were able to trace and find the letters
that Ernst was alleged to have posted to Potsdam—not so
simple a matter, when it is remembered that he is alleged
to have posted his missives from all over London. The chief
feature of the case, as reported, is the credit it reflects on
the British system of counter-espionage, and the way in
which German efforts are neutralised.

The length of time the prisoner had resided in England was

in accordance with the system pursued at Berlin, of planting
men for use when they had passed out from chance of
suspicion by reason of their having become to all intents
citizens of the country on which espionage is required. The
fact of naturalisation is proved to have no significance—nor,
since a German retains his nationality if he wishes it, in
spite of having been naturalised in any other country,
should naturalisation be held as a bar to suspicion. The
position held by the defendant, in which he was able to
carry on an independent business of his own, is quite in
accordance with secret-service methods—these are the men
Berlin wants for its fixed posts. The only discrepancy with
known methods lies in the rate of pay known to be allowed
to fixed agents in French centres, but this may be
accounted for by the fact that Ernst is alleged to have
completed only a short period (two years or so) in the
employment of the Berlin secret service.

Such evidence as the prosecution gave, as shown in the

foregoing report, is worthy of very careful attention with
regard to the working of the espionage system. For such a
post as that which Ernst is alleged to have filled is but a link
in a chain, and the chain is a long one.
 Chapter Twelve.
Other Recent Cases. Bibliography.

The work of the supply ship captured recently in a port on

the east coast of Scotland hardly comes within the limits of
this book, but it is significant as showing the daring of
German methods, which apparently include the obtaining of
supplies from an enemy’s country by means which
endanger neutral shipping—so long as the neutral ships can
be found to take the risks. It was noted by the naval
authorities that German submarines had been displaying
activity at such a distance from their legitimate ports of
supply as to render probable and almost certain the
existence of other sources of supply. A watch was
consequently kept for suspicious neutral shipping, and in
the end a capture was made.

A vessel came into port and proceeded to load for

departure, and the customs officers could find nothing
wrong with her. Her papers were in order, her cargo
contained nothing in the nature of contraband of war, and
there was no cause for detaining her, as far as could be
seen. But there were noted on the deck of the vessel,
neatly coiled, cables and cables, enough to furnish a whaler
on a three-years’ sailing voyage and leave over sufficient to
start a ropemaker in business. All over the decks bulky coils
of hawser lay, and though, at any other time, the hawsers
might have passed without notice, it was felt by the
customs men that the superabundance of rope justified
further investigation than had already been bestowed on
the boat.
So one of the coils was unfastened, its wrappings removed,
and the cable itself was uncoiled. Then was it found that
there was merely a shell of rope, which served as covering
for a steel drum containing oil fuel suited for the use of
submarine engines. And there the story ends.

The other case which I propose to quote shows equal

audacity. At the Guildhall Court there appeared, on October
5, George Newton Spencer, who described himself as a
clerk, and gave his address as Lubeckerstrasse, 33,
Hamburg, Germany. He was charged with “unlawfully
inciting Mr Frank Henry Houlder (Houlder Brothers, Limited,
Leadenhall Street and Liverpool) to trade with the enemy.”

Mr Humphreys stated in opening the case for the

prosecution that the charges against the accused were
based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914. The
accused was a British subject (as they all seem to be) who
had been long resident in Germany, and had been clerk to a
shipping company with a rather long name, but which might
be translated as the Transport Shipping Company of
Hamburg. The accused appeared to have been sent over to
this country by his employers towards the end of
September for the purpose of negotiating what, from their
point of view, was a most important transaction. Although
an Englishman, and of the age of thirty-two years, no
difficulty was made by the German military authorities over
the accused obtaining a pass to travel in Germany and leave
the country. There was little doubt that the object of his
visit was known to the authorities, who gave him that
permission, although, from the German Emperor’s point of
view, he was an alien enemy.

The prisoner arrive in London on September 22, and on the

next day he called on Mr Houlder. He introduced himself by
producing a document in English, signed by his employers,
which contained the proposal which had been made the
subject of the charge. The proposal was as follows: There
were six ships owned by the company at Hamburg, on
which Messrs Houlder had mortgages amounting to about
30,000 pounds. These ships, on the outbreak of the war,
and certainly in September—were either in neutral ports,
and therefore temporarily lost to their owners, or were
prizes of war, and as such temporarily—and probably finally
—lost to their owners. The proposal to Messrs Houlder—to
whom was payable 20,000 pounds on November 11, and
13,000 pounds on November 15, was to the effect that they
should pay over 15,000 pounds to the Hamburg firm, and
take over three of the steamers. The result would be that
the mortgages on all six of the vessels would be wiped off,
and Messrs Houlder would become the owners of them,
while the steamship company at Hamburg would have
15,000 pounds in cash to enable them to carry on their
business. The fact that one of the steamers was a prize of
war in Gibraltar, and would probably be sold as such, made
the proposal still more remarkable. Since, under these
circumstances, Messrs Houlder could have no title, the
Hamburg firm were virtually, asking for cash for nothing.

Mr Houlder did not seriously consider the proposition, but,

having made up his mind what to do, told the defendant he
would have to consult his solicitors, and mentioned the
existence of the proclamation which he assumed would
prevent them from carrying out the transaction. Defendant
replied to the effect that his employers had communicated
with the German Foreign Office—as they had no
proclamation—and had received permission to carry out the
transaction. He handed Mr Houlder a bundle of documents
in German, which showed that the defendant’s employers in
Hamburg, before ever they attempted to put this
transaction in form, obtained leave from their own
authorities, to whom they stated their own frank view-point
with regard to the matter. It was set out that monetary
benefit to a certain amount would accrue to the Hamburg
company as a result of the transaction, and that the vessels
were all old freight steamers, of no possible use to the
German Navy—neither were they fit for transport purposes.
The Berlin Secretary of State for Home Affairs replied that
no objection would be taken to the transaction.

Mr Houlder communicated with the Admiralty instead of

with his solicitors, and in the meantime the defendant went
to a firm of marine insurance agents and made a similar
proposal—this time to the extent of about 13,400 pounds
cash benefit to the Hamburg firm. In neither case was any
application made to the authorities in England for a licence
to break the law regarding trading with the enemy. The
total effect of the proposals, had they been carried through,
would have been to place the Hamburg company in
possession of about 28,000 pounds, with no compensating
advantage whatever to the British firms—and the defendant
was committed for trial. He received sentence of
imprisonment for his treachery on October 14, 1914, after
due and proper trial.

The only point worthy of comment in connection with this

case is the doubtful morality, in a business sense, of
German firms. We may set aside the fact that a
contravention of an enemy’s law was attempted, for no
country would consider or regard the laws of a country with
which it was at war, unless they involved principles of
definite conduct and were the laws of civilisation rather than
the laws framed for the protection of the said enemy in time
of war. The point at issue is that a shipping company of
Hamburg, by its offer of valueless titles in exchange for
hard British cash, was attempting such a form of sharp
practice as would land any British trader in the criminal
courts for fraud. One is forced to the conclusion that among
many Germans, and even among German firms whose
standing ought to guarantee the cleanliness of their hands
in business, there is no such thing as honesty, at least
where dealing with a foreign firm is concerned. These
people asked two London firms to break British law, and to
be swindled. By German ethics, evidently, this is fair play
and just dealing. It is an effect of the spy system on the
moral fibre of the nation, rather than an instance of the
working of the spy system itself—though the British subject
who passed out from Germany at an acute point of the war
between the two countries, without being questioned by
German authorities, looks perilously like a spy at work, and
the nature of his other missions in England, had he been
left at liberty, calls for some speculation.

Much may be learned with regard to the present working of

German spies by intelligent perusal of the war reports,
especially those coming from France, for the Russian
theatre of war is so tremendous and so far off that the
small details seldom come through—the details small in
themselves, but of far-reaching import. As an instance may
be again mentioned the way in which German troops,
occupying a town, chalk on certain doors “Spare this
house”—there is a world of enlightenment in the three
words. Similarly, in advance and retreat the Germans have
their agents with them or near them, and often the report
makes tacit admission of the fact, in such a way that it is
clear to one who reads with the espionage system in mind.
The work of these agents is as endless as it is dishonourable
and deadly—a poison that works just as efficiently as the
legitimate weapons of war—and often more efficiently, since
one can guard against an open weapon, but against the
treachery that uses naturalisation and all things to further
the ends of the monster trampling across the earth, there is
no guard that soldiers can use as they use their weapons
against troops opposed to them.
The bibliography of espionage—German espionage—is a
brief one, so far as books of value are concerned. First and
foremost stand Stieber’s Memoirs, which tell all that Stieber
chose to tell—and that is a good deal. The work has been
translated into French, but not into English. There is the
“Indiscretions” of Wollheim, a book which gives some idea
of the system, but is mainly concerned with incident. The
Memoirs of Busch, Bismarck’s friend, afford further light on
the system, but only in a fragmentary way. “Military
Espionage in Peace and War,” by W.N. Klembovski, a
Russian Staff Officer, is more a manual of what ought to be
done by purely military spies than a book descriptive of the
German system. “Espionage Militaire,” by Lieutenant
Froment of the French Army, is open to the same class of
criticism, as is to a certain extent “Espionage,” by N. de
Chilly, though the last named is a more informative book.
“The German Spy System in France,” an English translation
of Paul Lanoir’s book on the subject, is a brief but well-
compiled review of what Germany has accomplished in the
way of espionage since 1870 in France, and although rather
pessimistic in tone as regards French counter-measures,
ranks as a work of value.

As a rule “confessions” of spies may be disregarded, though

they make good melodramatic reading. The nature of the
subject is such that those who would tell the whole cannot,
and those who can will not. Bearing in mind the effect of
thorough espionage on the German nation as a whole, it is
to be hoped that in the near future the whole system will be
swept away, together with the form of government that
gave it birth and room to grow.
 Chapter Thirteen.
Appendix.

Since the preceding pages were written, and as proofs are

being passed for press, the following statement has been
issued for publication by the Home Office with regard to
British counter-espionage measures:

“In view of the anxiety naturally felt by the public with

regard to the system of espionage on which Germany has
placed so much reliance, and to which attention has been
directed by recent reports from the seat of war, it may be
well to state briefly the steps which the Home Office, acting
on behalf of the Admiralty and War Office, has taken to deal
with the matter in this country. The secrecy which it has
hitherto been desirable in the public interest to observe on
certain points cannot any longer be maintained, owing to
the evidence which it is necessary to produce in cases
against spies that are now pending.

“It was clearly ascertained five or six years ago that the
Germans were making great efforts to establish a system of
espionage in this country, and in order to trace and thwart
these efforts a Special Intelligence Department was
established by the Admiralty and the War Office which has
ever since acted in the closest co-operation with the Home
Office and Metropolitan Police and the principal provincial
Police Forces. In 1911, by the passing of the Official Secrets
Act, 1911, the law with regard to espionage, which had
hitherto been confused and defective, was put on a clear
basis and extended so as to embrace every possible mode
of obtaining and conveying to the enemy information which
might be useful in war.
“The Special Intelligence Department, supported by all the
means which could be placed at its disposal by the Home
Secretary, was able in three years, from 1911 to 1914, to
discover the ramifications of the German secret service in
England. In spite of enormous efforts and lavish
expenditure of money by the enemy, little valuable
information passed into their hands. The agents, of whose
identity knowledge was obtained by the Special Intelligence
Department, were watched and shadowed without in
general taking any hostile action or allowing them to know
that their movements were watched. When, however, any
actual step was taken to convey plans or documents of
importance from this country to Germany the spy was
arrested, and in such case evidence sufficient to secure his
conviction was usually found in his possession. Proceedings
under the Official Secrets Acts were taken by the Director of
Public Prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were passed
varying from eighteen months to six years’ penal servitude.
At the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep
under observation all the agents known to be engaged in
this traffic, so that when any necessity arose the Police
might lay hands on them at once, and accordingly on
August 4, before the declaration of war, instructions were
given by the Home Secretary for the arrest of twenty known
spies, and all were arrested. This figure does not cover a
large number (upwards of two hundred) who were noted as
under suspicion or to be kept under special observation. The
great majority of these were interned at or soon after the
declaration of war.

“None of the men arrested in pursuance of the orders

issued on August 4 has yet been brought to trial, partly
because the officers whose evidence would have been
required were engaged in urgent duties in the early days of
the war, but mainly because the prosecution, by disclosing
the means adopted to track out the spies and prove their
guilt, would have hampered the Intelligence Department in
its further efforts. They were, and still are, held as prisoners
under the powers given to the Secretary of State by the
Aliens Restriction Act. One of them, however, who
established a claim to British nationality, has now been
formally charged, and, the reasons for delay no longer
existing, it is a matter for consideration whether the same
course should now be taken with regard to some of the
other known spies.

“Although this action taken on August 4 is believed to have

broken up the spy organisation which had been established
before the war, it is still necessary to take the most rigorous
measures to prevent the establishment of any fresh
organisation and to deal with individual spies who might
previously have been working in this country outside the
organisation, or who might be sent here under the guise of
neutrals after the declaration of war. In carrying this out the
Home Office and War Office have now the assistance of the
Cable Censorship, and also of the Postal Censorship, which,
established originally to deal with correspondence with
Germany and Austria, has been gradually extended (as the
necessary staff could be obtained) so as to cover
communications with those neutral countries through which
correspondence might readily pass to Germany or Austria.
The censorship has been extremely effective in stopping
secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy;
but, as its existence was necessarily known to them, it has
not, except in a few instances, produced materials for the
detection of espionage.

“On August 5 the Aliens Restriction Act was passed, and

within an hour of its passing an Order-in-Coundl was made
which gave the Home Office and the Police stringent powers
to deal with aliens, and especially enemy aliens, who under
this act could be stopped from entering or leaving the
United Kingdom, and were prohibited while residing in this
country from having in their possession any wireless or
signalling apparatus of any kind, or any carrier or homing
pigeons. Under this Order all those districts where the
Admiralty or War Office considered it undesirable that
enemy aliens should reside have been cleared by the Police
of Germans and Austrians, with the exception of a few
persons, chiefly women and children, whose character and
antecedents are such that the local Chief Constable, in
whose discretion the matter is vested by the Order,
considered that all ground for suspicion was precluded. At
the same time the Post Office, acting under the powers
given them by the Wireless Telegraphy Acts, dismantled all
private wireless stations; and they established a special
system of wireless detection by which any station actually
used for the transmission of messages from this country
could be discovered. The Police have co-operated
successfully in this matter with the Post Office.

“New and still more stringent powers for dealing with

espionage were given by the Defence of the Realm Act,
which was passed by the Home Secretary through the
House of Commons and received the Royal Assent on
August 8. Orders-in-Council have been made under this Act
which prohibit, in the widest terms, any attempt on the part
either of aliens or of British subjects to communicate any
information which is calculated ‘to be or might be directly or
indirectly useful to an enemy’; and any person offending
against this prohibition is liable to be tried by court-martial
and sentenced to penal servitude for life. The effect of these
Orders is to make espionage a military offence. Power is
given both to the police and to the military authorities to
arrest without a warrant any person whose behaviour is
such as to give rise to suspicion, and any person so
arrested by the police would be handed over to the military
authorities for trial by court-martial. Only in the event of
the military authorities holding that there is no prima-facie
case of espionage or any other offence tryable by military
law is a prisoner handed back to the civil authorities to
consider whether he should be charged with failing to
register or with any other offence under the Aliens
Restriction Act.

“The present position is, therefore, that espionage has been

made by statute a military offence tryable by court-martial.
If tried under the Defence of the Realm Act, the maximum
punishment is penal servitude for life; but if dealt with
outside that Act as a war crime the punishment of death
can be inflicted.

“At the present moment one case is pending in which a

person charged with attempting to convey information to
the enemy is now awaiting his trial by court-martial, but in
no other case has any clear trace been discovered of any
attempt to convey information to the enemy, and there is
good reason to believe that the spy organisation crushed at
the outbreak of the war has not been re-established.

“How completely that system had been suppressed in the

early days of the war is clear from the fact—disclosed in a
German Army Order—that on August 21 the German
Military Commanders were still ignorant of the despatch and
movements of the British Expeditionary Force, although
these had been known for many days to a large number of
people in this country.

“The fact, however, of this initial success does not prevent

the possibility of fresh attempts at espionage being made,
and there is no relaxation in the efforts of the Intelligence
Department and of the Police to watch and detect any
attempts in this direction. In carrying out their duties, the
military and police authorities would expect that persons
having information of cases of suspected espionage would
communicate the grounds of the suspicion to local military
authority or to the local police, who are in direct
communication with the Special Intelligence Department,
instead of causing unnecessary public alarm, and possibly
giving warning to the spies by public speeches or letters to
the Press. In cases in which the Director of Public
Prosecutions has appealed to the authors of such letters
and speeches to supply him with the evidence upon which
their statements were founded in order that he might
consider the question of prosecuting the offender, no
evidence of any value has as yet been forthcoming.

“Among other measures which have been taken has been

the registration, by Order of the Secretary of State, made
under the Defence of the Realm Act, of all persons keeping
carrier or homing pigeons. The importation and the
conveyance by rail of these birds have been prohibited;
and, with the valuable assistance of the National Homing
Union, a system of registration has been extended to the
whole of the United Kingdom, and measures have been
taken which it is believed will be effective to prevent the
possibility of any birds being kept in this country which
would fly to the Continent.

“Another matter which has engaged the closest attention of

the police has been the possibility of conspiracies to commit
outrage. No trace whatever has been discovered of any
such conspiracy, and no outrage of any sort has yet been
committed by any alien—not even telegraph-wires having
been maliciously cut since the beginning of the war.
Nevertheless, it has been necessary to bear in mind the
possibility that such a secret conspiracy might exist or
might be formed among alien enemies resident in this
country.
“Accordingly, immediately after the commencement of
hostilities, rigorous search was made by the police in the
houses of Germans and Austrians, in their clubs and in all
places where they were likely to resort. In a few cases
individuals were found who were in possession of a gun or
pistol which they had not declared, and in one or two cases
there were small collections of ancient firearms, and in such
cases the offenders have been prosecuted and punished;
but no store of effective arms—still less any bombs or
instruments of destruction—have so far been discovered.

“From the beginning, any Germans or Austrians who were

deemed by the police to be likely to be dangerous were
apprehended, handed over to the military authorities, and
detained as prisoners of war; and, as soon as the military
authorities desired it, general action was taken to arrest and
hand over to military custody Germans of military age,
subject to exceptions which have properly been made on
grounds of policy. About 9,000 Germans and Austrians of
military age have been so arrested, and are held as
prisoners of war in detention camps, and among them are
included those who are regarded by the police as likely in
any possible event to take part in any outbreak of disorder
or incendiarism.”

| Preface | | Foreword | | Chapter 1 | | Chapter 2 | | Chapter 3 | |

Chapter 4 | | Chapter 5 | | Chapter 6 | | Chapter 7 | | Chapter 8 | |
Chapter 9 | | Chapter 10 | | Chapter 11 | | Chapter 12 | | Chapter
13 |
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